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THOUGHTS ON
TODAY AND TOMORROW

Richard Gotshalk

February 2009 and February 2022
Sheridan, Montana

PREFACE and DEDICATION
What follows is the draft of my final manuscript, with an
introduction and Chapters 1-4 in near-final form; Chapter 5 in a
too-long version is also included, and some scratchings at most
trying to find the right way to start Chapter 6. It may be that I will
get a bit more done, but death seems too close, and weakness too
strong, for that to be likely. I was hoping to get a publishable book
out of this, completing the three Beginnings set (Beginnings of
Philosophy in India China, and Greece) and the Well of Eternity,
but that is unlikely. Nonetheless I wrote this work with the thought
of providing to my two sons, Lincoln and Walter, some written
testament of what I have spent much of my time thinking on. In
addition, I would like some friends of mine (mostly at the
department in Missoula) to be able to get a look at it – including
Fred McGlynn, Roger Dunsmore, and Mike Howell, and see if they
can make anything of it. Dick Walton might also find something of
interest in it here and there. In any case, such as it is, it is my
parting gift to my sons, as well as to colleagues and students in
Missoula, in fond memory of times spent with them (and Henry
Bugbee as well) especially here in Western Montana.
Dick Gotshalk
February, 2009
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INTRODUCTION
I. What is philosophy?
Fifty years ago, I composed a doctoral dissertation and entitled it
"What is philosophy?" In the intervening years my understanding of the
matter at issue in the question has evolved, and I have come to see that
while the question is one which a philosopher can not avoid asking, the
posing of it as a philosophic question needs to take place in a particular
way if we are not to beg the question. The basic reason for thinking this is
my own deepening and increasingly self-aware involvement over time in
an ongoing response to a presence that was known to me even as a graduate student, indeed well before then.
Experience is a continuous ongoing affair, and not a series of discrete
and self-contained 'experiences'. And yet if we are mindful of what we are
doing, we can speak of times of our experiencing and catch something of
what they were like. On this matter of philosophy, there was a 'pre-existence' of it in me (to use the imagery of the Platonic Socrates i) in times I
knew both in town and on the farm. One of the earliest significant times of
that sort that I can remember came when, down on my grandparents' farm,
as an eight year old boy I was part of a venture with my grandfather and
my uncle. We were going to the river-bottomland for the day, and I was
riding on the horse-drawn wagon with the sacks of corn that were to be
planted in the clearing in the woods that was our destination. Sitting on
the back of the wagon, legs hanging over the end, I said to myself with the
naive pride of the child, 'we are going to work', expressing thereby an innocence that, however extensive the obliviousness it involved, nonetheless
harbored a capacity to register in my youthful self what to adults is the ordinary everyday work world. It was not simply that I could register it and
even feel a part of it, if only in a peculiar child-like way; more important
was that I could find its features registering in me with a forceful sort of
immediacy. I remember, after the wagon had turned at a crossroads and
headed toward the river, and not long thereafter had begun a gradual but
noticeable downward descent into the bottomland woods, the sway and
bumps of its movement on the rutted track we had entered upon and the
feel of weeds popping up and brushing my feet as we passed over them
and left them behind. Twenty-five years later, returning on an autumn day
to the farm a number of years after my grandfather's death, I had driven
that same course, and had unexpectedly found the swaying of the car in the
ruts of that same bottomland track evoking with such strength the feel of
viii
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that childhood time that for a while I was there again on that summer day,
feeling those same feelings again. That day had been spent on or near the
wagon, walking up and down its tongue, fleeing occasionally into the sun
away from the mosquitoes. The woods surrounding the small clearing held
the feel of a wilderness far from home, the distance at once muted and
strengthened by the familiar presence of uncle and grandfather, by the
sound of the tractor my uncle was using to finish preparing the field, and
by the voice of my grandfather when coming to the end of a row he would
call out to the horses and institute the characteristic clinking of harness and
squeal of planter stopping, turning, and starting up again in the reverse direction. The striking presence of the facets of that place and the excitement of that venture were those in and to a child, the exciting magic of a
world distant from the farm-house and its familiar surroundings, distant
physically but for the day also distant in some different sense that I found
myself welcoming, enjoying, wanting to have continue. What formed the
heart of the experiencing was the quality of presence then, and not simply
that of what was around me but also that of myself to myself: something
was touching and raising me up, exciting and rejoicing me, but there was a
quality to the joy different from any other 'pleasure' or 'fun' that I knew,
recognizable in its immediate character even though I would not have
known how to speak of it then, or known how to distinguish it verbally
from other things I liked doing, other ways of joyful and playful involvement with things and people. But I knew a difference in immediacy, knew
myself touched and moved in a distinctive and peculiarly intimate way.
As I grew and became more capable, the character of such presence
altered. By my mid-teens magic had deepened into strangeness. I was sixteen, and as I stood there on the football practice field on a mid-November
day after school, the light was beginning to drain out of the sky. A highschool senior, I played on the school's football team. We were practising
our offense, and our practice had paused while the coach talked with the
defensive team about its problems stopping our running plays. Standing
off to one side waiting for practice to resume, I had been simply looking
around when the silhouette of the trees against the sky had caught and held
my attention. It was not that I had not seen those trees before, but rather
that their presence had altered. Indeed, the high-school building, the
ground and fence enclosing the track and the game-field, but above all, the
trees: these were close now, as if a filtering film that had previously been
muting their presence had dropped away and they had come forward with
an unusual clarity and force. What was it, I wondered, this strange close-

x

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

ness of other beings and things, this peculiar looming world, still but intense and touching me, stirring me in delicate fashion, a world into which I
had entered quite unexpectedly, without fanfare, with the suddenness of
Alice dropping into her wonderland. I was in the middle of musing on this
presence, wondering but not knowing what to make of its puzzling character, when the call to resume practice broke my concentration and summoned me back to the world that had been occupying me when this brief
glimpse had caught me up and taken me into that other world-- no, into the
presence of this same world, but a different presence, one evoking the
awareness and occasioning the attention and the beginning of a reflective
musing that had been filling this pause within a pause.
Whatever else may be involved in the difference between my boyhood
experience and that of my youth, the strangeness investing my youthful
experience pointed to myself having changed from my boyhood-self so
that in the coming together of my youthful-self with circumstance both
circumstance and myself-and-my-awareness were more intensely and profoundly there. That more-intense-and-profound-- that fuller-- being-there
of youth was marked by the attracting, the claiming, of something in presence which was provoking a power of thought in me and awakening a
desire to understand. Something problematic was emerging for register in
me with some force, something puzzling and baffling; emergent into the
open, yet remaining elusive, it set me to searching out presence, attending
more closely and alertly to what was happening and wanting to understand
it, to understand what was being disclosed (and yet, still seemingly only on
the verge of disclosure), what the meaning of this or that facet of presence
was. Seen in the perspective of the larger movement and unfolding of life,
the timing of such presence and its provocation to thought has a rationale.
For the thinking being evoked was not just any sort of thinking but an inflection of a more primordial form of re-flective thought which in its distinctive nature first arises as possible in youth. ii At that time of life, we
find ourselves in the midst of that transitional 'being cast back on
ourselves' in which we are first discovering 'my life as my own and my
responsibility'. In the aloneness of that condition and place in which we
are in process of shedding our dependence on others and becoming aware
of the ultimate dependence of our being on ourselves alone, there is need
for a thinking-- again, 'my own' thinking--, one commensurate with the task
of responsibility and exploratory of what is emerging for us as the circumstantial and inward matrix for our effort to take responsibility. In my
case, at the time of my mid-teens I was-- without knowing what was taking
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place-- underway in this adolescent transition, in the gathering together
and emerging of myself beyond 'myself in the innocent dependency that
had been mine for all my life up to then'. That moment of pause on the
practice field, that moment for contemplative register of what I found in
my immediate presence, that silent strange presence of what was visible,
its visage darkening as the light was fading, that presence there as forefront of my current circumstance, as location of my current being, as
correlative to my being here and now, and as in its touching me bringing
me into a strangeness that I could not but respond to with some effort to
probe and understand: in a concrete way, that moment realized and manifest the emerging-me and my world coming together with some self-awareness on my side, 'me' at an early stage of my needing and learning to take
my life on as my responsibility. But it was more.
Youth, adolescence, is a time of life-- of life's natural unfolding in oneself as human-- which itself takes time to transpire; and in such transpiring
the transformation of one's awareness that brings strangeness and the entry
of one's evolving capacity for thought into a peculiar re-flective mode with
a function in our youthful assumption of responsibility are recurrent natural features central to the meaning of the time. Nonetheless, because it
involves an ingathering of ourselves as harboring a variety of capacities
and a carrying of these into the initial reaching to take responsibility, the
times of responsive practical reflection can also bring into play this-or-that
capacity or set of capacities in us as that with which our venture into the
future can be undertaken. The discovery may include that of a capacity
unknown to ourselves before, or known in another form, or simply of one
harboring in its earlier enactments promise for our future. In at least some
of us, then, youth can involve a transforming development of the practical
re-flective thinking that is essential to our assumption of responsibility; the
development as I know it transforms the immediate practical reference of
re-flection by universalizing the thinking it involves, making it into a reflection which puzzles on presence and meaning in a way that concerns
human being as human and thus goes quite beyond (while yet still including on this beyond-level) one's own life and future and the implications of
presence for one's own individual responsibility. I did not know it at the
time, but by the time of that moment on the football practice field I was already entered onto a particular path that would prove natural to me, one
not simply of self-responsibility but also of intermittent reflective engagement of this further sort, a path of self-responsible life on which this peculiar thought-provoking character of presence and the practical thoughtful-
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ness it provoked would recurrently arise and persistently transmute and
universalize and become central to the way I would take part in life's affairs in the time to come. Mine was to be a life of philosophical reflection.
Nonetheless, in the years that immediately followed I went off to college with a different idea of the future in mind, that of a budding concert
pianist who was moved by music and naive enough to think that my talents
would enable me to play things I loved and that they could be sufficient to
make of such playing a vocation, not simply a livelihood but a life in
which something that I loved to do was central-- to make certain music
come alive for others and myself and to find it resonating in me as I did so,
setting me to vibrating. For the sounding of music often touched and
moved and energized me and in its own distinctive way resonated with a
presence kindred to the magical and the strange. But what was to be a
time of broader learning which would eventually lead to such a future of
performing turned out to be something different. The change in setting
and effort which this new venture brought fit closely and well with
changes going on in me. And the next noticeable sign of what was coming
to birth in me (to speak again in the fashion of the Platonic Socrates) was
much time spent in that first year wandering the night-time streets of Cambridge. In that wandering, something of that same mute but strange presence I had known on the practice field impressed itself on me, more deeply
evocative now, stronger in its power to attract and invite me to enter again
into it; I also found myself stronger in my capacity to respond, to gather
myself up into the listening and looking, and to wonder. In this new and
urban environment, away from both of the paternal and grand-paternal
homes and familiar places of my childhood and early youth, I was finding
the initial makings of another and more inward home, one of my own, one
I was in the process of making my own. I was drawn increasingly beyond
the simple register of strange presence and into the effort to bring presence
to thought and to understand the meaning, the nature, the disclosive significance, of what I was finding.
This nighttime wandering and my eagerness to find puzzling presence
again and to respond in this reflective vein formed a backdrop on which
the instructors and the material I was encountering in classes, the books I
was reading, were tested for how they sounded against that ground bass.
For if the primordial impetus for my thinking was initially-- and has remained enduringly-- first-hand experience and this strange thought-provoking presence, I found myself looking at what I was encountering in
books and through classes for helpful clues, for signs that the voices mak-
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ing themselves heard in them knew something of what I was finding and
could speak to it and help me understand. In and through classes and instructors, the thinking of my night-time wandering began to refine and
develop itself, nourished and sustained by works appearing to me from out
of the circumstance of my life-- works to be read, works of literature, of
historical narrative, of poetry, works that claimed to speak religious revelation, in short, all kinds of writings, and works as well to be listened to,
works of music, and ... . To learn as I was expected by my instructors to
learn for class, and at the same time (but often in some tension with that)
to greet those among the voices that spoke to me in such works and to do
this in a way that made the most of their address to me in my quest for
understanding, I needed to receive and discover as clearly and faithfully as
I could the works I was reading and listening to and playing. Anything
less would mean missing opportunities for understanding the truth about
life that are opened by hearing other voices uttered out of their own experience of life and the world. And yet, although I could take up readily
(say) with writings in English, were they really meant for me, for this
young American who, scarcely more than a boy with little experience yet
of what it is to be a human being or of the realities of life and the world,
was nonetheless taking on this responsibility for himself gladly, eagerly
indeed, but quite unknowing of what he was actually doing? No, not specifically for me, not likely even with youngsters such as I was in mind at
all, and yet ... I was human, and they were meant for human beings, meant
perhaps under different specific ideas of the humanity in their audience,
and meant likely with anticipations of readership which I might fit only in
unanticipated ways. But nonetheless, meant for me as a human being.
It was very soon on this path of dual learning that I began finding a
name-- one name, at least, that seemed to be somewhat appropriate-- for
that endeavor of reflection in which I had been engaging for several years
without having a name for it, let alone knowing what I was doing. The
name-- "philosophy"-- was already familiar to me: my father taught it at
the University of Illinois; but concerning what it really meant, I had developed only a vague idea as I grew up, and had felt little curiosity to
know more. Now however, a class in ancient philosophy, then one in
modern philosophy, and another in philosophy of religion, seemed to hold
readings-- Aristotle, Spinoza-- and (one of them) an instructor-- Henry
Bugbee-- that spoke to me; I had been engaged, it seems, in 'philosophy'.
Or had I? For it was not long before the Bhagavad-g_t_ and the Dao-de
Jing, even in their translated forms, seemed likewise to find a resonance in
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me; but neither was 'philosophy' in the Western meaning of that term, and
more particularly, in either the early Greek or the modern European
versions that had both resonated in me. And besides, things known under
the name of "myth" also made an impress that I could not dismiss. Was it,
then, not philosophy but something else that I had been engaged in? But
then, I thought, what does the name matter, as long as the works themselves spoke to me, strengthened the reflective drive in me, and opened up
possibilities of understanding life?
When I look back in retrospect now on those earlier times of my life
and life experience, I seem to myself to have been, out of that barely developed being of myself, quite unwittingly drawn by my nature and experience into a seeking for understanding that, as that seeking evolved and
separated itself out from its immediate practical reference and took on a
shape of its own and sought to bring itself to realization, was quite natural
to me. While that seeking was a possibility-- a can-be and meant-to-be-rooted in human nature, it was by nature the seeking of an individual
human being who would be responsible for his/her own life, and of an individual brought up in and immersed in a particular time and culture. As a
result, and because the realization of a meaning (here, a native meaning) is
different from the instantiation of a universal (the particularity of instances
is extrinsic to their character as instances, whereas particularity is internal
to the realization of a meaning), that possibility would always be concretely realized in each case differently in different human beings, and
even more so in different human beings living in different societies and
cultures and times in human history. Nonetheless, in such realizations-- if
they were indeed realizations of the same native meaning and possibility--,
however differently they took shape and however differently in each case
they understood their own shape and shape-taking, there would be the
same ultimate reference point for understanding them. In this case, that
reference point would be accessible in principle to all humans, but visible
in its actuality to-- and only to-- those persons in whom concrete entry into
such reflection has been made. What would be needed for understanding
such reflective inquiry would be not simply first-hand access to this meaning, but also discernment of the meaning itself as different from any one of
its concrete realizations. Any attempt, however, to bring that visible
meaning itself to understanding, to grasp it as it functions to make
intelligible the nature of an undertaking that is realizing that meaning,
would itself be a part of a reflective endeavor, thus of a realization of that
meaning which was itself concrete and unavoidably invested with
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particulars and particularity. The issue of such an attempt at understanding and definition would thus carry in itself particularities that belonged to
its own concrete realization and not to the meaning itself. Now if this
mode of reflective inquiry gained a name in one of its concrete realizations
("philosophy", say) , the posing of the question "what is philosophy?"
could mean two quite different things and its answering involve two quite
different procedures. One-- the nominal and empirical-- would involve
taking all that had been given that name (leaving aside whether appropriately or not) and seeking to sort out what was in fact common and universal to all cases, or more importantly, essential and distinguishing for all
cases; the other-- the experiential-- would involve taking the meaning
being realized responsively in one's own efforts and, while finding that it is
also realized (well or badly, fully or incompletely) in various efforts which
were given the name "philosophy", discovering other endeavors which
also realized that meaning (again, well or badly, fully or incompletely) but
were not recognized under that name. In the latter case, the question
would be concerned with the meaning and its different realizations, and
the participants in a discussion pursuing understanding guided by that
question would need to know that meaning in its first-hand presence in
their own lives and to attend first and foremost to it and thence to the various realizations in order properly both to understand the question itself iii
and to assess the claims of any answer, any definition, to be adequate.
That no particularity-free grasp of a meaning and its realizations is
possible does not make all particularity-marked claims to understand the
meaning and the nature of the activity that realizes that meaning be equal,
let alone be altogether inadequate.
In the years since college and graduate school, this adventurous venture, which out of the language and history that have become mine as I
have grown up I call "philosophical reflection", has been central in a life
that has taken many twists and turns. It would be difficult to put into
words for myself, let alone into words that would convey to others, how
such reflection has taken shape in and for me during the years. But here at
what is likely to be near to the end of my journey and endeavor, if I would
speak in summary and definitional fashion of how this venture of inquiry
and attempted understanding that I have been involved in seems to me to
be best understood in its own nature and meaning as a human possibility, I
would bring it to speech in the following succinct characterization. Philosophy is a sustained effort of re-flection, which is responsive to the
problematic of existence and meaning and disciplined to a responsible
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exploration of that problematic in a reaching for conceptual understanding
of it in its truth.
Let me seek to make clearer what I have in mind by expanding that
characterization a bit.
In life from beginning to end, we find ourselves entered into an interacting with the beings which form the circumstance of our existence, and
entered there in a forming of our effort that is invested with the register of
something being at stake in this interacting, and at stake in a way that concerns us in our very being as active beings and that makes of our participation in the interacting a venturing to help secure what is at stake. The
interacting which we recognize as forming the heart of existence is thus
problematic in its nature: something matters, and it matters that and how
we take part in achieving what matters.
While this inclusion of ourselves as active beings who are concerned
with an at-stake makes us beings who care, our being is a temporal one
and, more precisely, an evolving one. We live and act as beings involved
in a growth and maturation of ourselves as human. At the start, as infants,
our capacity to register and to take part is minimal and primitive. Our early life is meant by nature to achieve a gradual unfolding of our nature out
of itself, one conditioned by circumstance and, for its reduction of our
initial impotence and its augmentation of our initial potency, importantly
dependent upon how we take part in the interacting which mediates such
unfolding. It is not until we are sufficiently developed in capacity as sensitive and active beings that we can find the beginning of philosophy in ourselves, to the extent that it ever does begin. What first makes possible as a
first-hand affair that mode of inquiry is the turn of development and maturation which enters us initially and tentatively into adulthood as human
beings: the transitional time of adolescence, of youth, understood not in
terms of years but of development according to nature. As part of the call
at this time to take responsibility for our self and our life and living, we are
summoned to re-flect, to think for ourselves out of that initial standpoint
which aspiration and passion, the reaching for responsibility, the immanence of the problematic of existence, and the strangeness of presence,
open up to us as youthful active beings, as still relatively inexperienced
and incompletely developed human agents. From our beginning we have
had direct access to, and have been responding to, the problematic of
existence, the at-stake as concerning us and including us as active participants in its securing. But due to our relative impotence during this time,
we have been unable to distinguish it from a variety of other factors (the
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pressure of desire toward deeds and accomplishments, say), let alone discern it in its full nature. In the experience of this time of transition, however, we find this problematic coming into an express and forceful register,
and discover it as, inward to our taking our lives upon ourselves as our
own responsibility, now claiming us as a matter for re-flection upon which
we need to put our minds in a way sufficient for our movement ahead in
the venture of self-responsibility. Given that what is at issue for us in this
time of life is our lives-- mortal, and beginning here as 'our own' even as
this 'beginning' is in the middle of life's unfolding in ourselves--, the
register of the problematic takes on a particular character, focusing our
attention and bringing us to inquire: What is really at stake here? Not
simply as before, at stake in regard to this-or-that action in this-or-that
situation, but now, at stake in regard to the life-- and its unfolding unto
death-- that we are assuming responsibility for. How should I live that
life, now that it is mine as something I am taking responsibility for? How
am I, as self-responsible human being, to answer now to the summons to
participate in the securing of what is at stake? However little thought we
put into such questions and the answers at which we arrive, however much
we borrow the horizon and content of our ideas from others, however
much we tailor our thoughts to our circumstance, the practical answers we
come to as self-affirmed guides in the living of our own lives will be ours
to live with now, in initial and provisional fashion at least.
Such re-flection is not yet philosophy, nor even philosophical except
fleetingly and rarely. Yet in virtue of the particular nature of some of us
and the character of the discovery of ourselves to ourselves in this transition, the practical reflection which all of us are called to in this transitiontime matrix, and called to in a way suited to and sufficing for our own nature and situation, can find itself nudged, urged, invited, enticed, incited,
summoned-- the sense of the prompting can be quite varied-- to move beyond interpreting the problematic simply in its practical reference to our
own individual living and being and to become a searching out which
would be commensurate in conceptually-truthful apprehension with the
problematic as a whole and in its universal reference. The universality I
have in mind is, first and foremost, that achieved in the transmutation of a
practical re-flection that by nature situates or centers itself back in the reflective agent's singular being and situation and serves that individual's
living and acting and self-responsible involvement with circumstance, into
a re-flection that would explore that being and situation as a universally
human situation, and more specifically, would discern those facets and
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features of it that relate to any human being as human. With this transmutation into a re-flection concerned with the human condition, individual
human beings find themselves entered into the domain of philosophy and,
depending on the circumstance and the response and native capacity of the
individual, entered into the beginning of philosophy as a life-long discipline of reflection. iv
Even when such entry is achieved, the beginning is only a beginning,
and the character of what we are entering upon almost certainly will
change as we make ourselves more at home in it. For not only is the living
which harbors a commitment to philosophical inquiry as a central affair
something which is itself meant to evolve and thereby (in complicity with
circumstance, which in its own right brings change) such as to make for a
changing matrix for such inquiry as we pursue it; but what we have entered
upon is the realization of a possibility, a meaning, that is fully realized
only in and as a discipline, a craft, which needs to be learned over time so
that we become skilled, capable, in our inquiring. But since our initial
entry-- out initial effort and initial learning-- is at best limited and crude,
and our capacity to pursue inquiry does not spring forth fully formed like
Athena from Zeus's thigh, we find in our pursuit that we need to unlearn
and relearn as well as learn further; and as a result, the venture may well
take many unpredictable turns internal to itself and its own evolution in us
and thus eventually become-- and seem-- rather different from how it was-and seemed-- at the start. v
Central in the pursuit and learning-assisted evolution of philosophically reflective inquiry are
three constants.
First, is the need in inquiry to maintain oneself in self-aware and steadfast fashion at that standpoint which is part of the ultimate common ground
in the different individuals, the agential standpoint 'beyond' and free of any
interpretative horizon, historical or personal, to which we would make the
proceeding of inquiry conform. That is the standpoint of a human agent
who, finding the problematic of existence emerging concretely for re-flection, centers inquiry back in his/her being as human agent venturing to find
his/her way in this strange world. I say "self-aware and steadfast" because
that standpoint, being that of a person whose agency can deepen and fill
out and eventually become consummated in time as the matters of human
maturation and responsibility unfold over a lifetime, alters naturally in
some of its elements over time. vi Steady and apt maintaining of that standpoint is not easy.
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Second, and perhaps even more significant and pressing at the start, is
the need for the address in inquiry to the problematic to be self-critical,
'skeptical'. For while in our entry into re-flection concretely we may be
reaching inwardly a nature-provided standpoint that correlates with presence emerging for us beyond and in a priority to interpretation rather than
with some interpretation-defined horizon, we do not stand there except as
individual selves, and that means (among other things), with all the (what
are now for us) interpretatively-inflected pre-conceptions and pre-dispositions which we have heretofore developed and still initially carry with us
into our continuing engagement with things and which, while they may be
helpful in facilitating our interpretative work in this reflection-provoking
situation, are as yet unexamined and untested in regard to their pre-judicing potential. We may eventually be able to attend responsively to presence in its immediacy-- thus to the problematic in its concrete presence,
and to such directive(s) as have a place in the native re-flective possibility
that is being realized as we work with that problematic-- and form our
interpretations (thence concepts) in a way that is not channeled or slanted,
let alone hindered and even blocked off, by unexamined pre-conceptions
and pre-dispositions. But that is an art we must learn, and which for
various reasons, including its difficulty, takes much of a lifetime to learn
well. However, unless and until we can become self-aware sufficiently of
how the directive force of the pre-conceptions and pre-dispositions which
are entering into our response is disposing us to interpret the immediacy of
presence, can assess in the midst of not-yet-interpreted presence the possibility of such disposing misleading us, and can guard against this, we are
almost unavoidably allowing our response and interpretative working to be
guided according to such horizons and directions in a way that distorts in
some unnoticed but actual measure our apprehending of what is coming to
disclosure in immediacy. The "eventual" achievement of such an art of inquiry requires of us along the way an alert intellectual conscience, and
with it, an effort to dwell not simply attentively and carefully in what is
coming to disclosure in immediacy antecedently to interpretation and
knowing, but also to dwell there honestly and warily, guarding against our
tendencies of interpretation, with the skepticismvii of a genuine desire not
to deceive ourselves.
Third is the need for the address in inquiry to explore not simply attentively and honestly, but also sensitively and patiently, what is coming to
disclose itself in presence. Experience is an ongoing affair, the disclosure
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in which is ever complex. To begin with, as our own capacities for taking
part in affairs and for living develop and (if things go well) become more
diverse and complex and more confidently employed, so our interacting
harbors an evolving capacity for sensitive register and subtle differentiation and discernment which in the situation of our interacting make possible discovery that ranges wider, higher, and deeper, than we were earlier
capable of. Then secondly, as beings who care, this augmenting sensitivity
and subtlety in our discernment come into play in ourselves as, in our participation in the interacting with circumstance, filtering and selecting out
what is presenting itself and doing so under some sense of importance, of
relevance to what matters. As this sense of what matters, and thence our
selective attending to what is immediate in our experience of interacting,
alters with our development and growth, we continue to filter out and to
dismiss as unimportant much that our greater sensitivity and subtlety is
opening to us. Finally, philosophical inquiry can first come to birth amidst
the transformation we undergo in the time of youth when following on our
early growth we find much emerging for our evolving capacity to feel and
register, much changing in our sense of what matters and our selectivity,
and much changing in our interpretations and ways of interpreting. The
sort of evolution we are in the midst of in youth-- evolution in feeling, in
register and sense of importance, in interpretation, in matter significant for
reflection-- does not stop with youth but continues in adult life as we grow
further into our being, bringing further novelty and change into the matrix
for any philosophical inquiry that has arisen and thence into our register
and discernment of the problematic and of the evidence for understanding
it in its truth. For such reasons, in philosophical inquiry as a sustained and
potentially life-long discipline we need not only an attentive and honest
exploration of the immediate which freely and sensitively searches it out to
register fully and clearly what is coming to disclosure there, but also a
claiming of insight that is circumspect and commensurate with our growing into our being and finding this matter of the life in ourselves giving us
not only a fuller realization of our being as individual human beings but
also a richer fund of presence and disclosure for a reflection that would
discern the truth of the problematic of existence and the human condition.
One of the major threats to the vitality of such a life of reflection is hasty
interpretation, that is, a too-early fixation upon a reading which, while it
opens up a direction of hermeneutic activity that one can develop further
readings within, is not felt or acknowledged in its character as a simply
preliminary judgment which over time one must recurrently test, returning
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to experience sufficiently honestly and capably that we can feel and recognize limits to the earlier reading and can re-interpret, amplify, or re-work
the earlier in the way needed to make it more nearly apt to the disclosure
of current experience. With the impatience of too-early commitment to
seeming insight, with the settled conviction of having the truth in hand,
one compounds one's vulnerability to prejudicial pre-reflective pre-conceptions with entanglement in reflective judgments which are not being
affirmed and maintained in keeping with their inherent nature. For all reflective ideas-- ideas as they take a distinctive shape and receive a distinctive meaning in re-flective inquiry-- are basically preliminary ideas, which
enable for a while some matter to seem intelligible given the evidence that
is currently open to one; but such ideas require re-testing and re-forming,
all the more as our capacities and the ongoing life-experience which forms
the matrix of reflective inquiry are both changing and making possible not
only our testing the ideas in a new and fuller evidential context but also
our recollective discovery of things missed previously or now visible as
mis-read in the earlier times of the formation of such an interpretation.
In short: Three constant needs invest sustained reflective inquiry as an
experiential and evolving affair, and in the measure in which they are felt
and responded to and we are able to give ourselves effectively to inquiry
under their pressure, the pursuit of truth through inquiry can advance and
evolve with some prospect of expanding our understanding. The matter
that we would understand is complex. To understand the problematic of
existence, we need to grasp the embracing nature of the uni-verse in which
we find ourselves, ourselves as participants in the interacting whereby that
uni-verse is concretely itself, and what is at stake in the interacting for
participants such as ourselves. Our understanding of this complex matter,
beginning from a point within the concrete interacting of inquirer and circumstance and expanding discursively from there, at any time amounts to
an evolving self-aware conceptual grasp of facets of the matter, which
aspires to become a noetic whole commensurate with the problematic and
composed of self-consistent and coherent affirmations-and-negations
whose claim to truth rests upon experientially-accessible evidence. The
various affirmations-and-negations developed along the way in the course
of inquiry and taken by the inquirer as forming fragments of knowledge
are at most tentatively-proposed elements in this aspired-to-but-neverfully-achieved whole of living knowledge. As more or less connected and
integrated this ongoing approximation to the noetic whole being aspired to
is, at its best, coherent in a complex way suited to its function of bringing
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the uni-verse and the human condition into self-consistent apprehension by
and from the living and self-aware standpoint of a human participant in the
making of that whole.
II. The historical beginnings of philosophy
In my encounter with the Dao-de Jing and the Bhagavad-g_ t_, I had
early on found works of substance which made questionable my discovery
and acknowledgment that my peripatetic reflecting could be seen as a kind
of philosophizing as this was commonly understood in the West. And
when in my first years of teaching I had the opportunity to teach 'oriental
thought', I eagerly took up with it as a chance to broaden and deepen my
acquaintance with the re-flective traditions (religion, philosophy, art) in
ancient India and China and to discover more fully the nature of the
affinity I felt with the two works that had already spoken to me. As that
expanded acquaintance and that testing out of affinity was taking place,
and I was able also to expand my dialogue with the Greeks to include Homer and the tragedians, and to explore more extensively the matter of myth
as it appeared in all manner of societies, eventually, by the time of my
sabbatical in the mid-60s and a couple of years away from teaching, I
began to realize what I had unwittingly been doing in all this exploring in
various seemingly unrelated directions following out works that had struck
a responsive chord in me. I had become involved in what now appeared to
be a single coherent large-scale project, which could be phrased in brief as
an exploration of the three indigenous and separate beginnings to philosophy in a meaning of "philosophy" for which the Western idea was only one
realization. That exploration would mean a studying of the three
beginnings with a view to several things: one, learning from them what
would help me understand matters that concerned me as a budding philosopher; two, searching them out sufficiently thoroughly to register and
understand their differences, their strengths and weaknesses, and to puzzle
over the meaning of there being three beginnings (Why in those places, at
those times? Why only three?); and three, discovering the light they might
throw on the nature of this current world and world-condition in which I
found myself living and working, a world that stemmed mainly, if distantly, from one of the three.
During these first years of philosophizing, I was encountering much
that I thought was questionable about the present-day world I found myself
in. But in those two years away from the university and teaching, I was fo-
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cused on ancient worlds, and composed several manuscripts, the initial one
being the first form of this present work. What began to emerge then, and
came to greater confirmation as I pursued these matters after returning to
teaching, was this initially odd but, upon second thought, not so puzzling
fact, that in each case the social and cultural matrix within which philosophy had arisen long ago as an indigenous outgrowth and response was
characterized by two things: one was the turmoil of a society in process of
fundamental change, and the other was various extant elements in that society which were in some measure inviting to and supportive of (among
other things) an effort by individuals to venture in reflective thought to
bring into its focus the problematic of existence, which was being raised
broadly and pressingly to the fore in the concrete situation of turmoil, and
to take individual responsibility for discerning it in its universal truth. The
three social and cultural matrices in which such birth had taken place were
different from each other in many respects, not the least in the horizon of
intelligibility which was provided for the members of the matrix and which
in each case was formed by a religion or religions dominant in the thencurrent social order that functioned as womb; and because according to its
inner nature philosophic inquiry is always concrete, involving the effort to
reach to the universal by exploring and penetrating the particular, these
novel ventures in philosophizing in each setting took shape differently as
well. In the three studies I have since composed and published, devoting
one each to the beginnings in India, China, and Greece, I have sought to
sketch out these beginnings in their social-and-cultural matrix, in the factors that supported such reflective venturing, and in the thought-issue that
emerged as those beginnings took shape.
In those past situations, the beginnings were separate from each other,
reflecting that the associations of human beings in the history of the human
race up till recently have all been limited. The associational matrix for the
birth of philosophy in each case involved some encounter with ways of life
and thought and religious forms from beyond the society in question, but
the challenges that provoked the effort of thought and the potential which
enabled such an effort came essentially from within the matrix itself. Peculiarly enough, as I was recalling and exploring these beginnings, I was
doing this in a context with some fundamental kinship to those I was pondering. For we live today in a time of fundamental crisis and turmoil, but
one with this difference: our crisis is global, one associated with the increasingly complex interaction of societies throughout earth's different
places. It may well be that we are at a cross-roads as a human race, and
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this, in virtue of an impetus whose proximate historical origin lies in modern western Europe. In times since the Renaissance, there has been a gradual liberation from the dominance of the Christian church and teachings
which marked medieval times on the continent of Europe, and a movement
of political and social "progress", at the heart of which was the newly developing "empirical science" and the technology it was enabling and that
was being put to use in ways that were changing society and social conditions within Europe. This progressive movement contained as well an
expansionist venturing, of a religious (missionary), political (imperialistic), and economic (trade and exploitation of natural resources) sort, to
mention the most obvious aspects of it. This European venturing, reaching
out across oceans and continents, has been the catalyst for something
which is currently engulfing humanity everywhere on earth, a drive toward
integration of the human race on a global scale. Because it has brought
various societies and their traditions (religious and philosophic included)
to have to do with each other, this drive has occasioned intense conflicts of
various sorts, the foreground features of which are religious, economic,
and political. At present, the thrust of expansionism is being carried
particularly by an offspring of Europe, namely, the United States, and the
latest conflict-- the war in Iraq-- has features on all those levels.
We in the West tend, not surprisingly, to understand these conflicts in
Western terms. But are those terms sufficient? Indeed, may not those
terms be themselves contributing to the crisis? I do not mean to suggest
that other terms, reflecting other traditions, might be more appropriate. I
mean rather to imply: If the situation that has been developing in the modern world and is coming into a very intense and conflict-ful phase in our
day is not unlike the times in which philosophy began, long ago in India,
China, and Greece, that would suggest that now could be an opportune
time not simply for a practical re-thinking of this Western-initiated venture
sensitive to the reach of history but in particular for the re-birth of philosophy. That would mean: the emergence of the effort to achieve a philosophically re-flective grasp which, in rising-beyond-but-working-through
the current confluence of traditions and particular contexts in a world becoming increasingly one, seeks an understanding of the problematic of
existence with the help (from among other sources) of the three philosophic traditions that emerged in all three places, and as part of this, seeks
more specifically an understanding of the current historically-provoked
socially-induced form of that problematic in the midst of which such reflection is itself being called forth and must find its own terms and take on
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its own form. If that is right, then the task of the philosopher now would
include a grasp of how, and on what basis, in a world of diverse societies,
traditions, and religions, coming into closer and more impactful connection with each other, a global coming-together of humanity as a whole in
keeping with the best in humanity is consonant with-- indeed, is called for
out of-- the very nature of things. Such insight would, however, be an
understanding in universal terms and for that reason not amount to such an
understanding as could function as a practical guide sufficiently determinate to govern participation in the concrete working out of the integration in
constructive fashion. At best, it would represent what all re-flection does,
namely, a recall to the fundamental sides of the human condition, and with
that, a critical monitor for any determinate guide claiming to be
appropriate in and for the participants in the current world and to realize
thus in particular form what the philosopher discerns in terms of universal
meanings.
Put slightly differently: the philosopher's task in regard to such a constructive concrete working out as is needed in the course of the century
ahead-- indeed, of the centuries immediately ahead-- would be to articulate
what forms the appropriate foundation in the nature of things for a practical realization that would achieve an integration in keeping with the best
in humanity-- to articulate, say, our common humanity, and its native
meant-to-be's, and the implications of these for communities. But in
contrast with that articulation, the practical realization itself has to be
concrete and communal, and that means, to grow out of (and yet, beyond)
current actuality, with the latter serving as the sufficiently apt seedbed for
realization of the higher-and-better. At best, the philosopher could discern
the conditions which call for such a realization and constitute its ultimate
enabling grounds, and in virtue of what he does discern of those grounds,
he could be a critic of proposed or purported realizations, and his rendering of such enabling grounds could do as re-flective ideas are meant to do,
namely, focus participants in whom re-flection is a significant possibility
back upon the ultimate assessment-grounds for weighing the practical
endeavors. But the concrete realization that is called for could not be
something dictated by a philosopher from above, say, as philosopher-king.
On the other hand, it may well be that, because the philosophically reflective effort reaches toward a reshaped-and-clarified understanding of
(say) common-humanity (what it is to be a human being) and does this in
exploration and penetration of the present context, the philosopher would
also (as individual human being who is participant in the situation and has
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first-hand experience of it) be able to discern and draw attention to
particularities that would contribute at the level of particularity to the achievement of the concrete, communal, and ongoing realization that is
needed. He could even-- as participant and as philosopher both-- be an
advocate of an integrating whose facilitating forms in principle and on the
level of universality embodied his understanding of the human and to that
extent could function as guiding social framework for the whole of humanity in its current diversity, the vision embodied in them appealing to
the higher-and-better in each and all (individually, and in associations) and
summoning and inviting a commitment-to-and-upon which is sufficiently
powerful to enable a transcendence beyond current commitments by the
desire to be part of this 'new integrated order of things'. As philosopher,
however, his is not the task of practical leadership but that of disciplined
insight into universality. And when it comes to the particularities and their
apt embodiment of the universal, both Plato and Heidegger, major philosophers in the Western tradition, badly misjudged the practical situation
they were involved in in its particularities, a warning to all of us; but
while that raises questions about the judgment at work in their practical
assessment of the world they were currently involved in, it does not by
itself undermine their philosophically reflective achievements.
In the course of reflection in this time of the needed re-birth of philosophy, the philosopher may find that the three ancient beginnings of philosophy, when drawn on as aids in the effort to find the understanding
sought, will contribute unequally to his/her task as something to be pursued in exploration and penetration of the present-day world. For those
ancient achievements took shape as outgrowths within the various separate
(cultural, civilizational) traditions, and what was accomplished in (say)
one them may have focused in ways that the other two did not, and this,
because invited by emphases in the particular matrices being explored.
But in any case, what is needed is that, as the movement of global integration is working itself out and in its actuality effecting such leavingbehind and beginning-again, such re-forming and such novelty, as it is doing in regard to the variety of traditions (quite more than three) involved,
the philosopher in this ‘new world’ is careful not to allow the thought of
one tradition of philosophizing to dominate the others and subordinate
them to itself because it is that tradition in which he/she was brought up
and the thought developed in its course is most familiar. What is needed is
a self-critically aware creation on the reflective level of insight which
represents another-and-different beginning of philosophy, a re-beginning
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in midstream, and as regards these first beginnings, such creation would
represent an ongoing inclusive extension of the drive toward reflective understanding which assimilates them all into itself as its own pre-approximations and as helpful in the measure in which they assist in the philosopher's probing and understanding. In my own case, when I draw on the
three beginnings in their strengths and in their weaknesses and limitations,
I find that the strengths of the Greek beginning that forms the horizon of
intelligibility which took shape in the earlier phase of Western tradition
and is still embodied (in evolved form) in the catalyst for the integration
that is the crisis-occasioning movement of the present day are significantly
offset by limitations, the understanding of which, with the help of the
Indian and Chinese beginnings, makes that beginning appear importantly
one-sided, and with a one-sidedness that, when the Greek is reborn in the
Renaissance, helps make intelligible the different one-sidedness of the
modern Western catalyst to the happenings of our day.
III. The work which follows
The work that follows uses the written word to communicate a philosophically-engendered vision, such approximation to reflective wisdom as
I have been able to develop so far. Now if reflective wisdom is what I
have been claiming it to be above, then any communication of it by way of
writing is at best an attempt, by way of a linguistic-meaning-bearing proxy,
to communicate the author's thoughts and claims by first and foremost
pointing a reader back into such experience in his/her own life and such
reflection upon it as would (so it is hoped) issue in the reader's discovery
of what the author is talking from-and-about so that the reader,
understanding what is being claimed, will be in the best position to assess
the claims’ truth and join, from out of the way he/she can dwell in our
common humanity, in dialogue over this matter of the problematic of existence. The consideration of it will fall into two parts. Part I will address
the emergence within being of today; Part II will address tomorrow and
the task of today as regards the emergence of tomorrow.
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NOTES

i. For my understanding of the imagery, see my Loving and Dying and the discussion there (Chapter 4, 52-61) of Plato's
Phaedo.
ii. I hyphenate this word when I wish to indicate that I am using it with its etymology in mind; “re-” (Latin) signifies “back”,
and re-flection is thought arising within a condition in which the thinker (at a minimum) has been placed back out of the ordinary
immersion in things and, gathered back inwardly into him-/herself as someone taking responsibility for his/her life, has been
drawn to undertake thought out of that standpoint.
iii. Understand it, that is, as a philosophic question. One may ask it, in contrast, as a dictionary question, seeking as answer
the other words which purport to make intelligible the term in common use but leave quite up in the air whether this definition
successfully articulates the meaning which enters into the forming of the activity and which is the reality intended in the philosophic question and the use of the term in that questioning.
iv. For a further discussion of this matter of the standpoint of philosophical reflection, see my discussion in The Well of
Eternity, Chapter 3, especially pages 51-68.
v. Taking apparently polar examples: Plato presents us with a Socrates who acknowledges that, even as his initial venture
was claimed and was seeking to respond to the problematic, he had initially gone amiss, and only as that became clear to him and
he was able to recover did he find how he could proceed in a fashion that came to seem to him apt. And in rough parallel, we
find Nietzsche acknowledging in Ecce Homo his initial efforts as flawed, and his reaction against how he had been proceeding
itself going to an extreme-- all this, before the two flawed ways of proceeding were finally surmounted. For the case of Socrates,
see my Loving and Dying (Chapter 9, 107-115); for Nietzsche, see my The Well of Eternity (Chapter 2, especially 18-44).
vi. See Note 4 above for reference to a complementary discussion of this matter.
vii. With a meaning reflecting the etymology of the word (it derives from skeptomai, to look about carefully). As I am thinking it here, skepticism is not the denial of knowing and knowledge, but rather an affirmation of these, based on the refusal to
simply accept or take for granted without having first 'looked about carefully', especially with a carefulness regarding the proclivity in oneself to unquestioningly believe this or that (as self-evident, say, or on the basis of authority). Such skepticism, presupposing the care-filled attentiveness to presence in its disclosive presentation, relates thus to the interpretative, conceptual, and
verbal sides of knowing, and enables a grounding of these in the immediate which affirms knowledge (when that seems warranted) as tentative, as ever held and accorded in each case such place as it has in the presence of that which, while absolute as
regards the disclosure of immediacy, can not be grasped absolutely.

PART I
THE EMERGENCE OF TODAY
Chapter 1
A creational universe
A. Wonder and being
1. A day long ago: the beginning of a sketch
In our daily life we are so much focused elsewhere that we rarely notice how variable the attentiveness and awareness are that enter into our
ongoing involvement with things. Then there come times when our ordinary involvement turns extraordinary, and we become aware of changes in
our attentiveness and awareness as at the heart of what is happening.
It was autumn in the early 1960s, and I was spending some time with
my aunt and uncle, in a small town not far from the farm in southern Illinois that had belonged to my grandparents. One day I had gone out near
the farm, to wander in the woods and swampland that had had such a
strong attraction for me as I was growing up.
The set of dirt tracks led me along the edge of the field that tops the
ridge of the sand hill which is central in a memory that crystallizes for me
something of the farm as one place of my early life. Turning off those
tracks onto others, following the latter towards the woods that brought to
an end the wedge of cultivated land, I began to walk down the barely discernible continuation of the tracks into the woods. Soon I came out into
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further fields, through which I circled, to return to the passage through the
woods.
The day was gray, overcast hung low and moved slowly: a mild November day, with vegetation and ground showing browns and grays, dead
leaves still hanging on many trees (mostly oak). As I re-entered the
woods, I came into the midst of an isolated flock of birds, gathered in
dense community: song sparrows, white-throated sparrows, cardinals, blue
jays, crows, chickadees, Brewer's blackbirds, red-headed woodpeckers,
flickers, robins ... an unusual diversity for that time of year. I stood there
listening to the life in that otherwise silent place.
While I stood and listened, becoming more alert, intent, concentrated, I
could feel indistinct memories of farm life edging into the background
periphery of my quickening awareness. I knew that in the next few years, I
would be leaving behind this place and its life, since I no longer had that
active relation to it which I need if I am to spend much time in a place. In
the midst of the brooding silent still gray brown presence enfolding its unseasonal life, I came to feel the place as both holding me, yet not. Holding
me: because a place where I belonged, at the moment a place of dark and
silent reticence, damp, earthen, fertile, cool, rich and alive, yet shadowy,
strange and hidden, but up until my grandfather’s recent death, a place of
work, of plowing, planting, harvesting, there on the edge of and in some
penetration of the river-bottom swampland. Yet not holding me: because
tied in the main to an entryway into it that had now gone without real replacement. In this ambivalence, the place was vital as a place of the past
and present; yet its vitality was that of a place which knew no restriction to
these but with which I could never really be done, though I might and
probably would leave it behind soon.
As I walked back out of the woods towards the car, I came to the opening onto the field atop the ridge, and in the early twilight I saw a marsh
hawk skimming over the open field, hovering, dipping, tilting, hesitating,
dropping, darting, veering, circling, gliding, all within twenty feet of the
ground. Grace, fluency, wild alertness, showed themselves in its movement. Around that graceful figure, things in their reticence and apparent
unconcern and I in my attentiveness and life were brought to a focus.
As in the ensuing moments the focus of my attentiveness widened beyond the hawk and became contemplative in wider sweep, things impressed themselves on me with increasing force, and coming alive to my
surroundings and to myself here amidst them, I suddenly became aware of
us as participants in a peculiar happening. Difficult to describe, it seemed
the very happening of ourselves, of we who were busily engaged in our
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having-to-do-and-not-to-do with each other but who were now discovered,
abruptly, unexpectedly, as happening to be, or perhaps more precisely, as
in the midst of the happening of our being. If understood as I mean it, the
phrase (“happening of our being”) seems accurate, catching something of
the wonder of being, that being is a happening and a happening of such
character that when it registers in us with clarity it is registered in the wondrousness of ‘that we are, and that there is not nothing’. But the phrase
has other possible meanings, so before finishing this recall and characterizing more fully the character of-- and shift in-- the awareness and attention it involved, let me dwell for a moment on what I mean by it.
The underlying question is this: How is being constituted, such that a
human being could discover it-- find it coming to be uncovered in and for
his awareness-- in this way, in the wonder which registers being in the
‘that we are, and that there is not nothing’?
Let us consider this, starting from where we are when we discover
being in wonder.
1a. Existence and being: consideration of priority
My discovery of the ‘we are’ in wonder was a discovery by an active
(human) being con-cretely i interacting with other active beings out of the
here-and-now of his own sharing in existence. Such discovery is issue in a
qualitative alteration and expansion of our awareness, bringing to our attention (among other things) matters already registering in us but now
registering differently, and also bringing forward aspects of our situation,
facets of our own being, that we had not been aware of before, or at least
had not been noticing (at all, or in this way). In my case, the alteration and
expansion of awareness brought (among other things) a self-aware openness within that awareness to its own enabling grounds, since the factors
that came into express view included the very conditions which were enabling for the attentive awareness itself. Re-flection ii which seeks to discern such pre-conditions seeks to have recourse to them in their immediacy and to attend to and discern their nature and function. What became
visible in my experience in the way of such pre-conditioning factors, and
is now to be discerned in reflection?
Let us begin with the fact that the disclosure had dawned in me as I had
been walking and, as I moved amidst the fields and trees, had been paying
attention to, taking in and noticing, what was present and taking place
within the reach of my sense-mediated receptivity. The fuller inward and
outward activity-matrix for the awareness and attention in which that
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dawning had taken place is significant of the characteristically multi-faceted character of the human activity which forms the ongoing con-crete
actualization of a human being’s initiative and of his/her way of taking active part in existence, whatever the time and place. Attention and awareness do not operate in a void, but are operative elements in an inclusive
functioning which reflects the complexity of the activity of a human agent.
This fuller activity-matrix to my attention and awareness has its seat, in
myself as an existing active agent. As such an agent, I was marked by a
psychosomatic being, a human nature and endowment, and an actualization of that nature and endowment that gave them definite shape at the
time in my life in question; the existence in which, through my activity in
all its complexity, I was taking part as a complex but centered active being
was (as existence always is) an affair of diverse beings interacting with
each other, each acting out of its own nature and capacities and actualizing
itself as the determinate active center which it is, and each, according to its
character and capacity, integrating what is around it into that actualizing
and its own active being. iii Thus in my walking and the wonder-awakened
awareness which became part of it, I was sharing in existence as a concrete affair, as the locus of the activity of diverse existent beings (including myself and the marsh hawk, among others) who connect or growtogether in virtue of their interacting with each other. My awareness in
wonder formed a central element in this connecting as I was participating
in it on this occasion.
About this existence and this taking part, there is this further to be
noted: whatever the ongoing character and complexity of the activity and
of the component interacting agents, activity takes place for each agent in
its own here-and-now, constantly and enduringly here-and-now as time
moves onward and as the active agent moves spatially in whatever he/she
does. This constantly-here-and-now locus of the activity in which we take
part in existence reflects the latter-- the being-extant of ourselves as agents
entering into the interactive-activity in which we are actualizing ourselves
and connecting with others as active beings-- as enabled and conditioned
by space-and-time. Our existence as active beings is accordingly a spatialand-temporal affair. We shall consider this matter more fully in Chapter 2,
but here, briefly and only sufficiently for our purpose in this place: Space
and time are joint enabling conditions with a specific nature such that the
existence which they enable to individual beings-- the ‘standing forth’
beyond their simply being as distinct beings, their ‘standing forth’ as existents under the conditions of space and time-- is an affair of activity
which is constituted spatially-and-temporally in a specific fashion, namely,
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as in each existent marked by a here-and-now out of which that existent is
active in an interacting with other beings. Concomitantly, such an individual participant in existence is inherently implicated in a distinctive and
limiting non-, that of non-existence, and is thus by nature finite. Thus temporally, the 'now' enabling our participation in existence as active centers
is inherently centered in an ongoing which is ‘ever now’ and ever bounded
by a beginning and ending which belong to it in its essence and which are
such that there is a 'not' representing (from our perspective, at the here and
now of our existential-being) ‘my non-existence before my beginning to
exist', and a 'not' representing (from our perspective, at the here and now
of our existential-being) 'my non-existence after the ending of my existence'. These 'not's' belong to our existential-being as the inherent negative
counterparts to-- and accompanying factors in-- an existence centered in
the ongoing now of the here-and-now and continually being further actualized in the activity being undertaken at this moving mid-point between
beginning and end. Spatially, we and the others which are not ourselves
but with which we exist and interact are also finite, in this case in such way
that each exists 'here' in relation to all others who are not here but (in
relation to us) 'there'. Situated in our existential-being by the 'here' of our
active being and initiative, we find that ‘here’ opening us out to-- and relating us to-- other existent active-beings who are, in relation to our ‘here’,
'there', but who are, like ourselves, active out of their own here-and-now.
All of us are further constituted in our own spatial ‘here’ in such way that
in virtue of our spatiality we have and maintain in our interacting our own
'here' and our own continuing active initiative out of our ‘here’ so long as
we exist. Our actuality-and-actualizing are ever here, never there, although ever in a having-to-do-with what is there. iv
Now the enabling conditions (space and time) which constitute our
spatial-and-temporal existence in such way as makes of it an active affair
centered in a here-and-now do not themselves have this existential-being
which we do; in wonder's disclosure it is 'we' who 'are', not space-and-time,
and the latter have a place in being only as they effectively function as
enabling conditions for our existential being. If such conditions enable the
existence-and-existential-being which we know as ours, in what sense are
they, if it is not as existent-beings? Or rather, and more precisely, what
place do they have in being if they are not themselves existent-beings? If
they have their place as enabling factors, there is a clear sense in which
they are prior to ourselves-as-enabled-by-them, otherwise they could not
be enabling for us. Yet this priority can not be temporal; of what nature,
then, can it be? Space and time can not themselves be primordial, for
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while they may have a place in being, without being there could be no
space-and-time. Being is ‘prior’, and space-and-time are not being but enabling conditions for the existence of active beings. Thus they have a
place-- only an enabling place, indeed, but nonetheless, a place-- that is
functional for, thus relative to, the existential-being of beings. The standing, then, of space-and-time-- that they have a 'priority' (but a nontemporal one) and an 'enabling' role for the existence of beings-- would
seem to point us into a certain possibility, namely, that being itself harbors
a 'dynamic' (again, nothing temporal) that is internal to itself.
What do I mean by this?
We must be very careful here in the way we understand what we have
been discerning as uncovered in wonder and especially in the way we understand the words being used to formulate that understanding. We have
been reaching back in our re-flective activity to recover in thought facets
of a matter of experience, starting with the activity of attentive awareness
on a certain occasion and moving first to the fuller activity of a human being engaging with other beings, then to our existence itself as an affair of
extant agents interacting with each other, then further to the space-andtime that are preconditions for-- and conditioning factors in-and-for-- such
existence and activity. In regard to this eliciting of the prior, we are not
inferring to something that lies beyond the experiential situation in
question, but are simply noticing facets of it we may well not ordinarily
take express note of but rather disregard or take for granted ordinarily.
Now someone might ask, concerning any so-called 'dynamic' such as I
have been alluding to: “Can we find, in wonder's disclosure, the presence
of 'something' 'prior' to space-and-time, for example a source of beings and
their enabling conditions both?” But the question formulated in this
manner can be quite misleading, and will mislead if we take the pronoun
"something" to signify "a being" or "an existent being". It is at best a linguistic crutch which, if taken (whether implicitly or explicitly) as standing
for some being/existent-being, becomes a misrepresentation. We have already urged that space-and-time are not beings or existent-beings; neither
would anything which our re-flective searching discerned as 'prior' to
space-and-time be an existent-being, a 'something' in that sense. "Priority"
in the form we are noticing does not point us back to entities that are prior,
not in the case of space-and-time nor in this case either. It signifies a
priority within being. But what is there within being that could be ‘prior’
to space-and-time?
To discern that, let us bring back into mind the deepest side of the
disclosure in question, and let us take note of three points.
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First, in the 'we are' of wonder, the “are” is plural, a 'we' of beings who
are and who, in our being, are other than each other, and more precisely,
are other in our being. This means, to begin with, that as beings we each
are not each other but are ourselves and in that selfhood are different from
all others; but we are different in a difference in which we contrast essentially-- in our very being-- with each other, not in terms of other factors or
features. But if, secondly, our different-from-each-other concerns our being itself, and thus is internal to what we share, this means that being is not
a universal, of which we beings are instances who, as beings, would be the
same with each other and would be differentiated only by something else.
Being is instead a unity or oneness internally differentiated in virtue of a
unique kind of othering such that ‘we’-- beings other to each other in our
being, thus inherently distinct from each other-- ‘are’. Such othering-intoand-among-contrasting-sharers is of the essence of being, making being a
single universe of diverse beings, of beings diverse simply as beings.
Second, wonder is not the puzzled (?) astonished (?) marveling (?)
apprehension ‘that we are’ in the sense that ‘we-- that is, certain beings-are rather than other beings’; it is rather the astonished register of being at
all: ‘that anything is’, ‘that there are any beings at all’, ‘that there is not
nothing’. This last phrase is revealing. It is as if, in its register in us-whoare, being-as-universe-of-beings (including ourselves as one of those beings) discloses itself as primordial, but in such way that this primordiality
of being-as-universe-of-beings is registered by us in a contrast with the
possibility of ‘nothing being’. But if being-as-universe-of-beings is primordial, from where does the suggestion of this possibility of ‘nothing being’ derive-- this possibility which, if understood (as it seems to be in the
phrase in question) as negating being itself, is in truth negated by being,
and is not, then, a real possibility? Even if it is in that sense specious,
what suggests it? Is there something internal to being-as-universe-of-beings and other than the otherness of beings that inherently introduces a
“not” which, when being-as-universe-of-beings is brought to register in
relation to this “not” internal to itself, brings being-as-universe-of-beings
into the (apparently meaningful) question, ‘Why is there anything at all?’
But in-and-to whom is this appearance apparent?
Third, whatever it is for us-- for all beings-- to be, and whatever characterizes us beyond the otherness of ours in our distinctness simply as beings, the discovery by a human being of this shared being of ours-- and
with it, of the seeming negation of the (absolute) not-being of being-registers in us as existent beings actively engaged here-and-now with other
beings and finding this disclosure coming to pass in our interacting with
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them. The disclosure in wonder of our being, however, is not identical
with the disclosure of our existence, of the ex-tension of the simply-other
aspect of our being so that we stand forth (ex-sistere) as active centers
placed amidst other such centers and con-cretely connect with other active
centers in an interactive fashion, but reaches back more deeply into the
nature of being; for the former is the disclosure of the being at all of distinct beings, whereas the latter is the disclosure of us as, in our simply
being, not simply being distinct as beings but existing here-and-now as
individual active beings interacting and connecting con-cretely with these
other active beings rather than with those other active beings. Being thus
harbors existence (that is, the existence of active beings interacting with
each other, each out of its own here-and-now) within itself, but is not
identical with existence. Put differently and more precisely: Existence is
an internal ex-tension of being, a self-augmentation, expanding being in its
distinct definiteness (that of the ‘we’ simply as being) so that, with the
enabling help of space-and-time, we distinct beings are as existing active
beings connecting with each other in our interacting. That is, our being
has fuller form in our existing as connecting active beings. This existence
is not something external to being, an add-on coming from somewhere
outside being (from where could it have come, to be added to being?) but,
as the terms “ex-tension” and “augmentation” are meant to convey, an internal expansive-unfolding of being whereby distinct beings, who in their
simply being are simply other than each other, are as diverse-and-determinate spatially-and-temporally-conditioned active beings. This being so,
‘non-existence’ and (absolute) ‘non-being’ are also different from each
other; or better, the confused and specious notion of (absolute) ‘non-being’
(as if non-being could be) is occasioned by the sense of being held forth
into an actual finite existence which inherently implicates the non-’s of
non-existence as factors in such existence, but involves the confusion of
being with existence.
With these points in mind, we may return to the matter of ‘priority’ and
say: If wonder's disclosure points us into the ‘we are’ as fundamentally 'the
being of beings other to each other in their being', and if this is indeed
what is primordial, it would seem that in this matter of 'priority', it is being
in the definiteness of its own bare plurality-- not of the plurality of existence-and-existents (that is, of active beings in the determinateness of their
operation as diverse space-and-time-enabled and spatially-and-temporallyconditioned active centers), but of the plurality in-and-of being (that is, the
distinct-and-distinctive self of each being simply as being)-- that represents this 'something prior' within being itself. For such definiteness (that

Chapter 1. A creational universe

9

of beings ‘at all’, in their otherness to each other simply as beings that are)
does not represent an entity or entities, an existent or existents, but
‘something’ original and internal to being that could be 'prior' to spaceand-time and to spatial-and-temporal existence, and could function within
the internal dynamic of being as the 'beginning-point' of the dynamic that
is of the essence of being. Seen in this light, being is in a ‘be-coming’ of
itself which starts from being-as-universe-of-distinct-beings-in-their-bare
selves-as-distinct-beings. Or such definiteness could be such a startingpoint, if that distinct otherness represents (say) an in-completeness in-andto being that (a) is so natured (in that incompleteness) as to need (in a
‘need’ internal to being) the overcoming of that incompleteness, and that
(b) would be-- or could be-- overcome by way of space-and-time functioning as prior enabling conditions for the existence of definite-and-diverseactive-beings. But what “incompleteness” is involved, what “need”, and
what would "overcome" mean here, and in what way or form would
spatial-and-temporal existence represent an "overcoming" of the incomplete and an achieving (as least, potentially) of the completeness in question? For answers to those questions, we need to return to the startingpoint of our reflections, the disclosure of wonder to ourselves as existing
active beings interacting with other such beings, and to reverse the direction of our thought.
To prepare for re-flection which follows out this ‘dynamic’ to its end,
let me return to my recall of the experience of that day and finish my account of it.

2. A day long ago: the sketch completed
As within the here-and-now of my existence I became absorbed in the
peculiar register of myself-and-others together in the miraculousness of
our being, I was intent and strangely expectant, on the alert, aware of us as
in our happening being on the verge, the happening not yet finished. And
yet, in what sense?
My expectancy was not futural in the sense, say, of an anticipation that
took me away from what was directly present-- the hawk, the field, the
trees, the sky--, but more like a being stretched out futurally in an awaiting
which was charged by a sense of imminence that dominated my register of
the interplay of myself and the place, by an ‘about to come’ of a ‘more’, an
‘about to come’ which was immanent in the current interplay and pertained
to myself-and-things in respect of some sort of intensification and fulfilling
of what was in process of happening; and it was as if that ‘more’ could and
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would emerge within that happening and become disclosed to my attentive
regard if the latter could become more concentrated, more still and quiet,
deeper and purer. All the while, as my attentive watching and looking
around me carried with it somehow (and took its shape within) a registering of this not-yet-but-on-the-verge in a futural expectancy of some odd
sort, I was also strangely remembrant, as if things that had been part of my
earlier life on the farm and had been retained obliviously as life had
moved on were bubbling up now and, brought back in my engagement
with this place as themselves still belonging to my life, were entering into
the recollective periphery of my awareness, carrying the feel of something
over but not yet done with, of bearing relevantly on what was happening
here and now in my still ongoing life. In neither case did the expectancy
or remembrance divert my attention from its focus on the immediately
present; instead this convergence of future and past in my awareness and at
the periphery of my attention augmented the awareness within which my
attention took its shape and enlivened my concentration, and brought what
was present and at the focus of my attention all the closer.
What was presenting itself to me as I watched, then, was continually
gathered up into an attentiveness whose exploratory regard of the currently
ongoing and present was amplified and enlivened by the peripheral register of an unusual converging of future and past. At the heart of this peculiarly complex attentive awareness I was becoming more fully aware of
things present and entered into an awareness of myself-and-them as companions, companion journeyers in the movement of time. We seemed disclosed as being in the middle of going somewhere, and this, in a going
which was purposive, yet in a peculiar sense, one defined by no determinate purpose. This lack of determinate ‘purpose’ linked with the lack of
a determinate ‘somewhere else’ as destination for our going; on the
positive side, the purposiveness linked with a deepening in my going, my
ongoing, and with a need (for the moment) simply to be doing what would
bring me more deeply and fully into the happening of things-and-myselftogether in this place. Thus there was a peculiar mixture of fragility,
urgency, and finality, that marked the ongoing as it registered in me who,
to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, had “fallen into the well
of eternity”. v
The fragility in question lay (in part) in the momentary, temporary,
passing, character of the coming-together-in-community of diverse active
beings which was taking place as my sharing in the present of this comingtogether stretched out, but also (in part) in the delicacy and consequent
vulnerability to impurity, disturbance, distortion, of my participation in the
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connection being formed and my contributing to that community, and finally, also (in part) in the dependence of the duration and quality of the
connecting (from my side, at least) upon an effort of attentiveness which
required my ingatheredness into an attending, a concentrating, as profound
and intense as I could muster, yet without assurance that that would be
enough, that I would thereby maintain the touch which seemed needed,
that I had energy, strength, and resources, enough to be able to keep my
part in the connecting ongoing and to enable it to deepen.
At the same time, the transiency of the moving locus for such continuing but fragile formation of connection was invested with a peculiar urgency. I say “urgency”: it was as if something of moment was in process of
happening and its importance was such that I was being pressed to take
part and help it come to pass, as if an opportunity was being offered and
with it an inviting invitation to plunge in before the opportunity vanished.
In that regard, the connecting which was taking place and (on my side)
involved effort at the heart of which was my attention and awareness
seemed to offer a taste, yet at the same time a foretaste of something deeper and fuller to come, something which the taste was at once realizing in
some measure and urging me to enter more fully into.
That urgency, as I felt it, came to bear on me as involved in an ongoing
which, integrating my temporal bounds (as limits, not as actualities) into
my self-awareness, resonated with the previous and eventual non-existence
of myself as actual existent. I was here now as having begun and as eventually to end, and I was self-aware to the negating force of those converging limits from this place in between them. Yet although those temporal
bounds reinforced the urgency with a distinctive negativity, adding to the
pressure to take part and do the needful while there was time, the current
moment was dominantly resonant with what lay within those bounds, and
that meant, inwardly, with the future (potential) and past (events and developed resources) of my life, and this, as converging in this contemplative
involvement with others in this current encounter. It was as if I-- not forever, but for a while-- belonged here, was meant to be here in this place
with these things. With that, the positivity of myself-as-active-being encountering and connecting with other-active-beings was discovered in the
ongoing moment as in the midst of the realization-- in the connecting I was
party to-- of a peculiar finality. For as long as the activity which that urgency pervaded was continually entering me into some sort of fragile current culmination, giving me a taste of what it really is to be, for that long
the ongoing flowering of current effort seemed partial and tentative realization-- consummatory in quality, sufficing the moment but uncertain as
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regards its abiding reality-- of an existence in which something was at
stake (as care and attention indicate) and in which that something was at
present both being continuingly secured as the moment lasted and at the
same time not yet fully secured, still to be more fully secured, in the course
of the coming of time and (so far as I was to be participant in it) with the
help of my continuing active participation in existence.
The finality I thus became aware of-- the purposive quality of being as
it is being realized in its ultimate reality-- registered in me as human participant in that realization; it was itself peculiar, and that register was also
peculiar. Itself: a sufficing being continuingly reached in the interplay of
temporal agents, yet only being reached in the ongoing connecting and in
the continuing pregnancy of that connecting with ‘something more’; the
register: in someone whose current participating in the interacting that was
ongoingly arriving at such sufficing was invested with an urgency to take
part and to contribute further at the same time as it was accomplishing
such a contributing according to the joint measure of that time and occasion and of my active capacity on that time and occasion. In regard to this
accomplishing, there was the sense of ‘more is possible for me and called
for’, my contributing is not yet what it could be, my potential not yet exhausted; and this, even as at the same time, the sufficing being reached
with the help of my contributing, the finality being realized in the interactive actuality in question, was indeed sufficing and final, and yet not as
having arrived at its end in such way that the impetus reaching sufficiency
in this time had exhausted itself, had arrived at its destination with no need
to stretch out further into the future, let alone to amplify. In the register of
a finality which was marked by this unity of a sufficing and a not-yetfinished which belonged to that sufficing, I could find myself as contributing agent called for more on my side of the interactive encounter, under
an inward urgency that extended itself into the future and what potential
for such participational contributing on my part as it held, but one that also
embraced the revived parts of the past, whose upsurge was of times somehow instinct in character with the current moment. But what did that
mean? What was I discovering myself to be implicated in in this expectancy-and-remembrance-enfolded register of finality in the present of this
river-bottomland moment of contemplative awakening? It seemed to concern my life, not just my involvement in this place on this occasion, a brief
time in my life. But as with music (I went off to college to be a concert
pianist), so with my recurrent involvement in farm life which this time in
the swampland woods was calling back into mind: both were entryways
into life as I was meant to find and live it, and yet neither could exhaust
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life, indeed neither lasted as the enduring center in that living of my life in
which I would recurrently find my place, the place where I belonged.
Nonetheless, while there was something still to be done beyond my
current contemplative engagement, it was not as if I had somewhere else to
be or something else to be doing at the moment. There was no urgency to
hasten off, no finality which slighted the present; rather, there was the concentration of time in the current ongoing and a sufficiency of being (from
my side, at least) for the time-- a sufficiency that included an attentiveness
that was taking shape in an alertness that had a futural side and within an
awareness that had futural and preterite sides-- and the need to abide for
the while in that contemplative taking heed within the concentratedness of
the current happening, with the sense that such doing and undergoing as I
was now taken up into were the needed current medium for a having-to-do
which was not yet at its end, which rather spanned my life's time so that,
while there was something of life's doing to be done in the current
confluence of things here and now, that doing was more than what would
happen and be done here in the current movement of the now.
So I watched on, until the hawk finally veered up and around and off
above the field nearby, then down over the ridge line out of sight. The
focus of my attention now being gone and my concentration relaxed a bit, I
slowly walked the few hundred yards on to the car.
2a. At-stake and being: consideration of the end
Wonder brings being to disclosure in us as ourselves existing here-andnow and, more precisely, as ourselves active in the here-and-now of our
existing-- paying attention, being alert to what is presenting itself and taking place within the reach of our receptivity, and discovering the ‘we are’
in its wondrous character with a transformation of that receptivity. This
existence which we share in is not, for any of us active beings, an isolated
and self-contained affair; it is rather that of a space-and-time enabled-andconditioned interacting of diverse active beings whose existence is the
standing-forth of such beings in a determinateness beyond that of the distinct self of their simply being as a being, standing-forth as centers involved in an active engagement with each other. Existence thus is a concrete affair, at least in the sense of a growing-together of the diverse agents
in virtue of their interacting with each other.
In that standing forth, interacting, and connecting in con-crete fashion,
there is something at stake. And while that is the key to everything, it is a
very complex and peculiar key. For the at-stake which forms the problem-
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atic heart of being is not itself an existent-being like us, nor an enabling
condition for existent-beings like space-and-time; nor for that matter is it a
feature of existent beings like our spatiality and temporality, or like the
actuality and potentiality which mark such spatial-and-temporal beings.
And yet it is a factor within being which concerns existent-active-beings in
their interactive-activity; and we human beings, in our active participation
in existence, responsively register this at-stake as concerning us and engage actively with other beings under the sense that something is at stake,
that something matters and is to be gained or lost in our participation in
the interacting. Accordingly we know ourselves as concerned and caring
beings, who register this at-stake as central to our initiative, indeed to our
living and our ‘reason for being’.
What is it that is at-stake? Why is there an at-stake at the heart of
being?
That we exist, and exist as active beings in whose interacting something is at stake, reflects being as constituted to ‘be-come’ fully itself in
and through a ‘dynamic’ internal to itself. Central to that dynamic is this
matter of the at-stake. We have spoken earlier of being in regard to the
simple being of beings distinct and other to each other simply as beings.
But that beings are not simply that, that they are more and such as we find
them (ourselves included) to be-- existing and active beings--, that they are
enabled-and-conditioned in that existence and activity by space-and-time,
and that in their interacting there is something at-stake: all this reflects that
the otherness-of-beings-simply-as-beings is being in an incompleteness of
itself. That incompleteness consists in the disconnectedness of distinct
beings simply as beings. Otherness does, in a limited sense, relate parties
that are other to each other (their ‘otherness’ is an ‘otherness to’), but it
does not connect them, let alone connect them with each other out of their
own distinct being. The at-stake reflects the nisus of being, in that incompleteness to itself, toward its own completeness, which is to be achieved in
the course of a connecting-- with each other, from out of themselves-- of
the distinct-and-other-to-each-other-beings. For that, being must (first of
all) have a determinateness beyond its simple distinctness; and it is in
virtue of this ‘must’ that, with space-and-time as enabling conditions, a
determinateness-- that of existence and existing active beings-- forms part
of each distinct being, and a determinateness fit for making possible a
connecting of distinct beings under those conditions. But (second of all)
space-and-time are such conditions as place each existing being in a context of diverse-and-other such beings and make of the activity of each its
participating in an interacting of such active beings. Being is not being--
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is not fully itself-- except by way of a connecting of beings which is
achieved in that interacting. But (third and finally) not just any connecting
will bring being to its completeness. For under the conditions of spaceand-time, the connecting of diverse active beings can take place only by
way of each being’s activity out of itself as center of activity, as agent, and
that means, by the operation of its own nature as each being initiates and
carries on its active participation in the interaction of diverse beings which
constitutes existence. Now the nature of any temporal being harbors a
differentiation between actuality and potentiality, and with this, the possibility of an active being operating out of its nature but in an incompletely
developed form of it. Moreover, as a temporal affair, interacting is transient, and likewise any connecting actually achieved in it. The attainment
of that joining of beings in which being becomes complete, then, arises-to the extent that it does-- in dependence on the condition of the nature,
and the manner of the interacting, of those active beings; and due to the
conditions under which that interacting is possible, being’s completeness
arises ever as finite, limited, and may not arise at all if the active beings
are incompletely formed in their nature or participate in their interacting in
an inadequate fashion. (More on this later.)
The completeness of being, then, the ultimate and final reality of beings effectively connecting out of themselves with each other and uniting
as other beings, is the meant-to-be final issue of being’s internal ‘be-coming’. That be-coming, starting from the in-completeness of beings as
merely-being-and-other-in-their-being, is structured around the at-stake
which, harbored in the meant-to-be of being’s nisus toward completeness,
signifies a completeness that is to be achieved in the course of the interactivity of active-beings. What the at-stake which we are responsive to in
our activity reveals, then, is that being is internally structured as a directionally-constituted ‘happening’, the happening of a con-crete universe. In
that side of our selves in which we are existing active beings, we as human
beings are part of the mid-point in the dynamic of this happening, a midpoint crucial for the emergence of the end but not itself (simply as existent
and active beings) the end. This internal ‘be-coming’ of being, with its
‘augmenting’ of the simple being of beings-other-as-beings so as to make
being be existent active beings that ‘emerge’ as determinate such beings
under the enabling-and-conditioning power of space-and-time, provides
thereby for its completion a medium meant-and-fitted-by-nature for
bringing itself (i.e. being) to that end; and by holding its own completeness
(the ultimate reality of being vi) as an at-stake in-and-for the interacting of
such beings, it makes the completing of itself (i.e. being) its own work, its
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self-realization, dependent on the interlinking in the initiative of diverse
distinct beings situated in their con-crete existence so as to be able to
interact with each other. It thereby also introduces finitude (in the preeminent forms of the temporality and spatiality of existent beings) and
con-creteness into the realizing achievement of such completeness, and
thus within its own completeness unites what of itself (i.e. of being) is
prior to space-and-time with what of itself is spatial-and-temporal.
In putting this very complex matter into these words, I have had difficulty in finding readily intelligible language for the distinctions that need
to be made, as I am sure any reader who has made his/her way through the
preceding paragraphs can attest. In particular, I have difficulty because
much of the nature of being is best expressed in language which seems-but is not-- temporal in import, and yet ... the temporal also has an integral
place and role to play in being, and temporal language is quite appropriate
in certain places, even though my sense of time (see Chapter 2) and thus
my temporal language is at odds with the common-sense views many of
my readers are likely to bring to the reading of my words. Thus I use a
mixture of, an interweaving of, and a contrasting of, literal and metaphorical temporal language that can be confusing if one can not find, as immediate presence in one’s own experience, the factors that are being put into
such language. To help prevent, or undo, confusion, let me expand on
what has been said, and reminding my readers that the experiential matrix
for reflection is the con-crete discovery of ourselves as existing and active
beings, let me make several attempts in what follows to clarify various
sides of what I have in mind. (I will attempt further clarification in later
Chapters, especially 2 and 3.)
2a-(1). First clarifying step: the evolving human
register and reading of the at-stake
From the beginning to the end of our existence, we human beings engage in activity under the sense of something being at stake. But though
what we are registering is constant in its claiming of our initiative and in
its introduction of tension into the forming of that initiative (‘something
matters’), our register is a changing one. For (as we shall lay out more
fully in Chapter 3) given our own temporal nature-- in particular, that as
humans we by nature take time to evolve out of ourselves into a maturity
in our capacity to take part in affairs as human beings--, the character of
our register of the at-stake, our interpretation of it as we enter activity responsive to it, and thus how we direct ourselves in our effort to help secure
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it, alter along the way as we grow, gain in capacity, and mature. Because
by nature we develop over time from an initial starting-point of relative
impotence, this alteration involves a nature-based evolution in how we
register the claiming and a characteristically progressive shift in our interpretative rendering of what is ultimately (and constantly) at stake, reflecting our evolving capacity and growth as human beings.
At the risk of oversimplifying, but to provide enough indication of my
meaning for our present purpose: In our initial impotence, we human
beings begin our participation in existence acting at the behest of desire; as
the primordial factor which motivates the effort in which we begin our
development toward maturity, the urgent prompting of this power seems to
teach us that what is at stake is doing and achievement that both satisfies
desire and affirms and strengthens our ‘ego’. This ‘teaching’, what we
make of the immediacy we know first-hand-- we who are immature in the
extreme, thus undeveloped in our responsive initiative, unable to register
and interpret and understand as we will in time be able to, and limited in
our initial capacity for learning--, is mistaken, and yet functional for the
growth and maturation needed at the time. But we soon find a mixed response to that in others, and already we have been finding (and assimilating into ourselves) a social articulation (of right and wrong, good and
bad); as this assimilated factor gives shape to an artificialized (socialization-inflected) second-nature, we learn a responsive participating in
existence under the dictate of such a social articulation, so our sense of
what is at stake in our participation in existence alters. Something originally from beyond ourselves now operates internally and, to the extent to
which we can identify our ‘ego’ with its dictates, its interpretation of the
good, and its norms, it restrains and directs our effort. Again, this interpretation is mistaken in a number of basic ways, but functional for us during this early time in our life.
In our inward evolution throughout the natural time of childhood, prior
to the transition time of youth in which we are meant to take responsibility
for ourselves and our own lives as ‘our own’, our still relatively impotent
capacity to register the at-stake, then interpret it, constantly leaves it undifferentiated from such factors in our (first or second) nature, so that we regard what really matters in an ego-self and/or social-and-interpersonal
vein, mistaken as such a reading of the at-stake is. Under the aspiration
which emerges by nature in youth, however, and with the transformation of
our initiative-capacity as we take responsibility for our own lives and
selves, our nature’s meant-to-take-place amplification, transformation, and
purification, of our register of the at-stake and its claiming brings the at-
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stake to immediate presence in the mode of obligation and in a connection
with our primordial responsibility for ourselves and our lives as human beings. This enables it (if we have developed the capacities we are by nature
meant to have developed by this time) to be interpreted rather differently
from before, and interpreted now on a distinctive first-hand basis and in a
rather different reference. If at first we are drawn to interpret it in connection with aspiration’s reaching for the higher-and-better, both as regards
our own self and as regards the immediate social matrix and the
community of ourselves to be con-cretely realized in life ahead with its
members, eventually and with our own further evolution toward the fulness of maturity and responsibility we can find the at-stake disclosing itself
in its ultimate and full nature and meaning to us who are taking a helping
self-aware part in its con-crete securing.
Two things become manifest about the at-stake as we reach this place
in the fulness of our maturity and responsibility and find ourselves open to
its claiming us in some differentiation from the previously focal factors
from which we had earlier been unable to differentiate it. One, which we
will consider in some detail in Chapter 3 and in some aspects a bit later in
the present discussion, concerns the life-task in which we find ourselves
implicated when our self-responsibility for our own lives and selves becomes discernible in the perspective of obligation. The other is this, that
the at-stake now appears to us to concern being, and in virtue both of the
othering-interrelation-of-beings-in-their-simple-being and of the interactive nature of existence, what is at-stake within being (namely, the final
reality of being) appears as a matter of beings con-cretely entering into a
certain connection with each other as they interact. This is what is meant
to happen, and what we in our participation in interactive existence are
meant to-- and ‘must’ (in the ‘must’ of obligation)-- help secure. We will
discuss this in Chapter 3 in other aspects, but here, the following can and
needs to be said.
The at-stake, seen in its full nature, concerns all existent active beings
as agents meant-and-fitted-by-nature for taking part in the securing of what
is at stake in-and-through their interacting. That at-stake is to be secured
ever con-cretely, in an interacting that connects natured active being with
natured active being and does this in a connecting that has its roots in a
completeness in the inward initiative-capacity of the beings involved and
that takes its shape in dependence on the way such active beings initiate
their activity out of themselves and link with each other as they carry it
out. The nature of any such active being is a complex and ordered affair,
involving a manifold of capacities and powers, to say nothing of a variety
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of particularity-features. In its own active engagement, any natured being
brings the whole of its nature into play, but does this in such way that that
whole functions as ordered more or less closely around certain facets of
that active being’s being: in human effort, there is the initiative heart in the
decision-making-and-executing capacity and the variety of capacities employed and/or employed differently in (say) playing the piano as contrasted with standing and contemplating a hawk circling over an open field
surrounded on three sides by woods. Whatever the natures of the active
beings may be and whatever the character of the initiative by which they
engage in interactive-activity, in their interacting the various participants
are continually giving shape to the current actuality of their own existence
(of themselves whole and their participating) in this more-or-less co-ordinated way and also helping to shape the current actuality of the existence
of the others with whom they are interacting; but this interacting-and-actualizing becomes a participating in effectively helping to secure the ultimate
reality of being only in the measure in which in the interacting the agents
are effectively acting out of the completeness of their own active nature
and are connecting from out of that completeness in a way that measures
up to the meant-to-be. vii For implicit in the meant-to-be which harbors the
at-stake are measures-or-standards definitive for (and in human responsiveness, normative for) the ongoing issue of any interactive connecting (so long as it goes on) that would be a spatially-and-temporally
conditioned realization of the fulness of being. These presuppose, but amplify and fulfill in a connective reference, the agential completeness standard-or-measure which is integral to the con-crete realization of being.
What is at-stake, ultimately, is a con-crete actuality of beings and their
connection-forming interacting which meets these measures-or-standards;
so long as the ongoing interactive connecting meets the standards-andmeasures in question, the connecting consummates being and qualifies it
with the finality of ultimate reality. What does not measure up, while actual, does not embody ultimate reality. Given the venture-character of activity in which something is at stake and to be gained or lost, given the
oppositional nature of diverse beings interacting out of their diverse natures, and given the particularities of any interacting, there is nothing automatic in the actuality of existence meeting such measures-or-standards. viii
2a-(2). Second clarifying step: human participation
in the realization of ultimate reality
In recalling my venture in the woods and fields of the Johnson hill and
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my encounter with the marsh hawk, I spoke of a time when I seemed to be
participant in the realization of ultimate reality in con-crete fashion, a time
marked in the course of my participation in it by the emergence, then
lapsing, of the peculiar disclosive awakening that is wonder. Since what is
at stake ever is the con-crete realization of being in its ultimate reality,
such realization is at bottom always unique, but harbors a variety of aspects so that, when considered from the perspective (say) of a human participant, its innumerable occurrences have many forms, reflecting the determinateness of the beings (human and non-human) that are involved.
Even considering only my participation in it during my life-time, such
realization is by no means always contemplative, let alone always inclusive of an awakening in wonder; but however many the possible forms,
and more broadly, throughout the innumerable unique occurrences involving beings of all types, the con-crete interacting in question is ever the locus of the realization (in a finite manner) of the same meaning and of
reality in the same mode (the connecting of beings out of the completeness
of their natures). In our (the human) case, participation takes place via a
responsive initiative which enables what is taking place-- in certain aspects, at least-- to enter the awareness and come to the attention of the participant in question, and provides thereby (among other things) first-hand
experiential access to the realization in question and to a human participant’s part in effectively helping to secure the at-stake con-cretely. Given
that such an agential register provides the only access commensurate with
the matter we are considering, let me turn back to the experience I recounted earlier and, seeking to sort out what would be of universal significance from the particularities in what took place, try to interpret in further
regards the matter being disclosed as a human participant in it would register, interpret, and understand it.
In calling back to mind that mid-life time in my life, I feel again, here
toward the end of life, something like I felt at that time, strangely remembrant of my childhood and youthful life on the farm, reminded of how
much taking part in life there as I was growing up meant to me at the time,
and how much it foreshadowed for me (in embryonic ways that I can now
much later discern as such) the connecting as a self-responsible adult in
which one eventually finds a place where one belongs, in which one is successfully sharing in the securing of the at-stake con-cretely, and accordingly in which life has meaning for the while, and with it, its sense of being
immeasurably worthwhile as a human affair. If it takes time (and more
than time, namely, our own growth and maturation) to arrive at the place
of sufficient maturity as a self-responsible adult where our venturing-- and
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risking of ourselves-- under the sense of ‘something matters’ enables us to
take part in a way that is not simply satisfying the claim of the at-stake but,
in the course of that taking part, expressly discovering it in the immediacy
of what seems its full nature, it also takes time to understand what has been
discovered, to say nothing of taking the rest of one’s life to venture concretely upon the carrying out of the allotted task and work one finds there
to be central to human responsibility.
That task and work allotted to us concern the ultimate reality of being-its fulness-- as something which is to arise con-cretely as issue in the
space-time-conditioned-and-enabled interacting into which we-- all existent beings-- are entered in our existence. We started this chapter by calling attention to attention and awareness; in our engaging with circumstance as human beings, attention is called into play and focused under a
sense that something matters, and in the experience I went on to recount,
my attending to what I was encountering around me as I moved amidst it
transformed. As that happened, as I began connecting in a way that held
this transformed attentive-awareness at the heart of my participation in that
connecting, I was drawn (so far as my contributing to the connecting was
concerned) to draw more deeply on my capacity within and to seek to
establish a sharper, deeper, and purer, register of the things of the place I
was in and of myself in that place. While this meant a more intent
awareness-and-attentiveness at the heart of my side of the connecting, this
was felt as a forefront in a fuller drawing closer and connecting, and one in
which there was (again, on my side at least) something like what is
expressed in the exclamation, ‘This is what life was meant to be like!’
However one understands such an expression, it harbors at the very least a
sense of a realizing of something sufficing-- as it is formulated in the expression, it is the sufficing of a “meant to be” relating to life. This seems
pertinent so far as it goes, but it does not get all the way to the heart of the
matter. A more appropriate form of the exclamation would be something
more like ‘This (interacting and connecting) is what it is (for us) really to
be!’, and more narrowly and one-sidedly, ‘This (participating in the interacting and connecting) is what it is for me really to be!’, or finally (putting
this narrower one-sided expression somewhat more precisely), ‘This (participating in the interacting and connecting) is what it is for me really to be
my self here-and-now’ (where the “to be” points to something like “to take
part in existence as active being in such way as enacts the responsibility of
my self-as-human-being in a fulness of connecting”). Even that is still
inexact, but perhaps a precise enough first formulation if one draws out its
meaning in three regards.
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One is that this “enacts” is not a matter of a conscious deliberate act
but (in my case) of a responsive allowing what I am encountering to draw
me out and engage me; for it was in an engaging evoked by striking presence that this coming to a human-responsibility-grounded fulness in the
connecting of myself with what was around me took place.
Second is that this fulness in connecting was (= was being enacted and
realized) in my interacting with other active beings, who in the situation
were integral not simply to my taking part (it was, after all, a responsiveto-others taking part, a taking part in a being attentive-and-aware of others
as I walked and stood amidst them and looked around), but also to the inclusive connecting in which we all had an active part. For in our interacting, we were joining together with each other in our active-beings by way
of our activity, and this joining-together of ourselves-as-agents carried the
sense (at least on my side) of our having-something-to-do-with each other
that matters, that is of concern. Indeed, we were joining in such way that
the wonder which dawned in the course of the interacting attested the conjoint character of our being in the ‘we are’.
Third is that my share in that conjoint interactively-realized being-- my
being as intertwined with that of other beings-- was not the simple-andother self of my being-at-all, nor even that self-being augmented initially
by my active existence as agent; it was the con-crete being of an existing
active (human) being whose actual-and-actualizing activity took such
shape as, enacting his self-responsibility, enabled the realization of his being in a certain sufficient-unto-the-time-and-place way-- a realizing of it in
the con-crete caring involvement with these other beings as active beings,
one that is in process of forming and establishing a certain tie, a bond, of
care and concern, that includes those others, and a realizing of it in the
ongoing interacting in which that care (and with it, his whole active being
as ordered around it) was being actualized in spatially-and-temporallyconcentrated fashion. Considering aspects of this third point more fully:
(a) My sharing-and-share in the conjointly-realized being arose in
my participating in an ongoing interacting that sufficed two things at once:
first, a meant-to-be of my individual being as an actually existent being
(alluded to in ‘This is the way life is meant to be’), and second, the meantto-be of ultimate reality itself as a uni-versal (interconnective) realization
of the being of the existent active beings involved (‘This is reality being
realized in its ultimate character’). Given that mine is a human mode of
being, thus one whose actualization takes place in an evolution of my humanity over time toward its own fulness (responsibility), the being being
realized in my own case was that of someone who, in his active being, had
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grown to be adult and was active out of a taking responsibility for my own
life and self. The conjoint-realization of ultimate reality in this case thus
presupposed in one party (= myself) a having reached the initial actualization (at the least) of the meant-to-be of the maturation of the human in
himself (a temporal affair) and involved a participation in the interacting
in which he was enacting that responsibility (the culmination of the meantto-be of his humanity) in adequate ix con-crete fashion. At the same time,
this individual human sharing in the conjoint-realization formed part of a
con-crete connecting of multiple and diverse active beings, only one of
which agents was human; the connecting within which this realization of
ultimate reality was occurring was dependent, in truth, on the active participation of all the parties involved, taking part in their own way out of
their own nature, and in each case contributing to and helping to secure
such realizing according to the party’s own capacities. Thus my participation was contributory and assistant to a realizing which was not exhausted by the realization of my own being (although that realizing was
included in the whole, that is, in being-in-the-uni-versal-con-creteness-ofthis-occasion) but which related to the being of the others as well.
(b) Put in another way: It is in the coming together and interweaving of diverse parties that the realizing of the fulness of being-as-the-universe-of-beings takes place; and when it does (and to the extent that it
does), it takes place in con-crete fashion, under the conditions of spaceand-time, and therefore in a spatially-and-temporally limited existential
locus. In all their participation in the interacting of existence, the active
agents are actualizing their powers and capacities and giving rise to an interwoven actuality; but not all such actuality measures up to the standardsand-measures implicit in the meant-to-be of the ‘dynamic’ of being. Those
standards-and-measures relate both to the agents and to the connecting that
is involved in their interacting, and determine the good (what measures up
to the standards) as a fulness in integrating (in the con-crete situation) the
parties and the particularities. Where any of the agents are human, there is
internal to the active being of such agents the further meant-to-be of maturation and the completeness in essence of the maturational being of a human being. Only as we have grown and entered adulthood and can enact
some degree of maturity and adult responsibility can our participation in
existence become a participation first-hand in the securing of ultimate
reality and can we know intimate closeness with the other, the strange,
whether human or non-human, and our being-together in the fulness of
being itself.
2a-(3). Third clarifying step: participation of others
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in the connecting of realization
I have been speaking of a connecting of a multiplicity of active beings
diverse in their being, with rather different forms of initiative-capacity and
thus ways of taking part in interactive-activity, but a multiplicity that
included the human. What about those others, the non-human types of
beings? Since the connecting-and connection are indeed inclusive affairs,
and since the various beings (and types of being) involved in the interacting contribute to the con-crete connecting-and-connection out of themselves and their own distinctive natures, how are we to understand the
place and role of those others, and in particular, the non-human others?
As we will take note more fully in Chapter 2, the spatiality which conditions our activity means that, as parties to such an interacting, we are not
privy to the inwardness of each other, even to that of other human beings;
and thus we can not know directly (with immediacy and from within) the
initiative in virtue of which their activity, even while it is affecting us and
we are registering it, is taking shape, and therefore we can not know all
that makes the contributing of others to the connecting be what it is. With
other human beings, we can, of course, communicate verbally from out of
our respective inwardness and put into words for each other what was
taking place inwardly in ourselves; but this gives us only indirect access to
others at best, and one subject to many qualifications as to accuracy and
completeness, and with much room for misunderstanding and inadequate
receptivity in the effort to communicate. In the case of the encounter with
non-human beings, we do not have even that.
Consider the marsh hawk of my experience as an example. The activity by which that bird was involved in the interaction with its circumstance, including with me, was seen and felt by me from out of my side in
the interacting, but seen and felt therefore as that of another being which
was being active out of itself as regards its circumstances, including me.
Being able to discern that activity only as we were other to each other in
our interacting, I was thereby unable to discover and be aware of its activity (including such cognizance as was involved) from its side (more precisely, from its inside and its initiative-center), and to know in this immediate fashion its sharing contributively to the realization that was taking
place. Even if as participant in our interacting I would have brought greater experience with marsh hawks into the encounter and would have been
able to distinctly register and sensitively discern and interpret the activity
of the hawk as it was encountering me, taking me into account, and entering that into its involvement with what was circumstantial to it, its inward-
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ness would have remained inaccessible to me. At best, I would have been
able to make inferences to the inward, based on evidence gained from the
outside; but even with a more complex and presumably more reliable basis
for inference, the inwardness which could directly confirm or disconfirm
what my inferences lead me to would still remain forever closed off from
me. Regardless of what I was able to make, or could have made, in the
way of inferential penetration, I would have been unable to find any direct
confirmation or disconfirmation of what was taking place in the decisive
inwardness of the bird. But even while lacking direct access to much that
was entering into the activity of the bird I was focusing upon, I could feel
that activity registering in me by way of its outward side (its behavior),
and registering over against me as alien, as other in some basic way.
It was as cognizant of my own activity from the inside, and of the
hawk’s from the outside, that I was one of the parties being connected in
the interaction. And as such, I could know the connecting-and-connection
that was forming-and-being-formed but, knowing it from within it, could
know it directly only in this contrast in the agency of the participants. And
that is our situation even when the other beings are human beings: we
know the connecting from within, indeed, but with immediate access to the
decisive inward side only in ourselves, and correlatively, with direct
access to the activity of the others only by way of their outward side and
no direct access at all to the decisive inward inside of their connecting, to
that connecting as they are taking part in it from out of themselves. This is
the peculiar evidential matrix from which alone we can speak of our interactivity and of the connecting taking place in it: knowing it directly as we
are participants and knowing our activity as one-- but only one-contributing factor to the connection’s arising and being what it is. It was
from this matrix that I spoke when speaking of the encounter in relation to
its embodying a sufficing connecting of the active beings in whose interacting the ultimate reality of being is meant to arise. At best, I can say that
my experience of the connecting, so far as it reached in direct disclosure,
revealed that so far forth a sufficing was being satisfied, not just in regard
to the meant-to-be of my own being as human but in regard to the meantto-be of the at-stake in its con-creteness in this situation.
2a-(4). Fourth clarifying step: the at-stake
and our life-work and task
Our temporality as human beings, while essentially involving this
matter of our evolving initiative-capacity, is more immediately obvious in
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a further side of it, in our existence as a matter of our moving forward in
life as time moves on and our ever living our lives in the activity which is
the medium for that forward movement. Thus even as, in the youthful
entry into self-responsibility, we have reached into the initial completion
of the evolution of our initiative-capacity and thus into an adult state which
we are meant to maintain to the end of life, in the further movement onward in life we are meant to strengthen and perfect our initiative-capacity
and eventually enter into human responsibility in its fulness. The life for
which we have assumed responsibility, while lived in the ongoing of time,
at all times reaches out finitely ahead of us (to death, its inherent end) and
behind us (to birth, its inherent beginning), and harbors a natural
endowment as basis and resource (primitive, and to be developed) for our
living that life; it also holds an already-actualized span of itself up to our
current present, and the development during that time of ourselves as
living beings and of our resources for further living. What we assume selfresponsibility for in the ongoing now of the living of life is this whole between beginning and end, this endowment, and the so far actualized self
and resources of ourselves as living beings. In a futural and activity reference, we assume self-responsibility for developing our native potential and
employing our native endowment in the course of life ahead, and for
making our life as we live it from then to the end genuinely our own.
Given that life is lived as a finite whole in the forward movement of time,
our assumption of responsibility is (seen in this futural direction) a commitment to activity whereby, as we live out that finite whole toward its
end, we are (under the circumstances of our existence) applying ourselves
and employing our original-and-developed endowment in effort responsive
to the at-stake and seeking to help secure it. This matter is quite complex,
and something we will return to in Chapter 3; for the moment, however,
we can say the following things that are pertinent to the matter of the atstake.
As we have been considering it, the at-stake or the ultimate reality that
is to be realized in the con-crete is a connecting that is inclusive of the active beings participant in the realization, and inclusive thus of their agential nature as well as their activity. Where such beings are living beings,
this means, inclusive of their lives as belonging to their being. In our moving onward with time in our life-and-activity as adults, we come into
opportune occasions when we are able to participate effectively in helping
secure ultimate reality. If we are fortunate, the onward movement of life
opens such opportunities up recurrently, with the transient conjunction and
propitious meshing of the particularities of the situations we find ourselves
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in and those of ourselves. In the measure in which we are able to make
good on the opportunities in question and to find ourselves entered anew
into the self-responsible enacting of a participation in which we connect
out of our increasingly-growing-deeper-and-more-complex selves, we find
something beginning to change in our sense of the meaning of such times
as times in our life and our sense of what we have entered upon in our
adult responsibility. For with our assumption of responsibility for our
lives and ourselves, we have become cognizant of those lives-- not just of
our activity, but of our lives as something we live in that activity-- as holding something at stake in them. Or more precisely, what is at-stake in our
activity includes (among other things) our own lives, and in particular,
their unfolding and their ingathering over time as we engage with the beings of our circumstance. Life is not simply a set or a series of activities,
although it is lived in-and-by-virtue-of such a set or series; but in the
living, our lives are meant to evolve, and in adulthood, this means evolve
with the strengthening and deepening of our capacity for responsibility and
with the increase in our capacity competently to take part in affairs. And
they are meant to gather together, in the resources, the threads of continuity and the discontinuities, and the building of our complex agency, over
time, so that we become more capable, more centered, more consolidated,
as well was capable of acting-- and thus, in our interacting, contributing-from profounder grounds.
The times of connecting of which we have been speaking are themselves all transient in their actuality and immediacy, as is the reality that
came to take con-crete shape in them for a while. All the more are such
times transient because for their realization they involve and depend on an
interacting in which other agents, temporal also in their participation in
activity and existence, are essential parties, and our interacting, so long as
it lasts, is dependent on their activity out of themselves as well, not simply
on our own effort. We meet, we come together, we join with each other
for a while as participants, all actualizing our own active being and, in virtue of the way that occurs and the way our interacting takes shape in expression of that, occasionally contributing to and helping to secure the
connecting in which ultimate reality is realized for a while. But while such
times come and go, we ourselves endure, and the connection achieved concretely in them, while transient in its immediate actuality, enters into our
active being and we carry it on into our futures when the interacting and its
connecting lapse. Thus participation in those times has an enduring
impact upon ourselves, upon our continuing but evolving taking part in the
affairs of life; such continued reverberation within us is many-sided, both
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in memory and in the changes such times made in ourselves. To take the
case of myself and the peculiar ongoing but relatively transient connecting
with the land, the trees, and the marsh hawk, which I have recounted: on
one level, that encounter functioned in me to strengthen my commitment to
a way of life in which such connecting was central, to fortify my
confidence in my venturing on such a path as making responsible use of
my (native and developed) capacities, to revive and expand my awareness
of dimensions of being and experience that provide food for reflection and
an understanding of life, to stimulate the sharpening of my attentiveness
and sensitivity to the nuances of the experience of such connecting, and to
aid in the eventual advancing of my understanding under the guidance of
such presence closely attended to in retrospect. On another level, and in a
somewhat different reference, the encounter strengthened in me a growing
sense of the depth of my indebtedness to a particular place and persons, to
what took place there in my childhood and youth and to those who
facilitated it; and it reminded me of how work-- physical labor on a farm-has a significant role in human life quite beyond the matter of income. And then, on a third level, and this time much later in life and in a quite
different place, the encounter contributed encouragement to my
disposition, living by that time in an urban area which by the topography
of its location combined in striking fashion the natural and the humanlyconstructed, to follow out an interest that had been developing in me, concerning public decision-making in an urban community relating to various
areas of civic life (air pollution, neighborhood and community planning,
open space planning and acquisition) that involved the way we humans
situate ourselves in landscapes and relate to each other and to nature in our
living-together there. Would it be possible, in the give-and-take of public
discussion and decision-making involving a considerable diversity of
persons with their differing perspectives, to further the human connection
with the non-human sides of nature? I knew from my youth that such
connecting was possible in farm life, but ... in urban life?
Because we humans are complex beings, with many sides to our active
being and with a variety of resources (original and developed) for engaging with circumstance, and because the circumstances of our lives are also
complex and invite the engaging through different sides of our being with
different facets of our circumstance at different times, once we initially become able to enact our responsibility for ourselves and our lives we can
not only find recurrent but different types of opportunity for participating
again in an inclusive connecting, but we can find the actuality of such
times working in us for a while, even a long while, after they have passed,
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and working in an “us” who have become different (and continue to become further different) under their impact, but who, as such, still carry that
earlier experience into the other situations and times of later life, and into
connecting with other persons and places and beings, and into connectings
which are different from the earlier one in part precisely because of that
earlier time. However, even with such a variety of times and occasions,
and such continuing on of the earlier in ourselves as enduring agents, life
is not simply a matter of such a manyness. As we ourselves become more
complex and inwardly integrated as agents and as the different times in our
earlier lives become entered into our later participation, so we can find the
life in ourselves becoming drawn together and inwardly connected in its
various sides and over its course. With that, our participation changes,
and what we can give, can contribute, grows greater.
As we shall see in the discussion of Chapter 3, with the transformation
of our initiative-capacity that enters us in youth into the assumption of our
own lives as our own, the obligation-mode in which the at-stake bears on
us as we venture to take part in life as self-responsible adults requires a
thoughtfulness on our part, a use of the capacity for reflective practical
judgment which we come into at that youthful time as well, a use concerning the living of our lives and not just the doing and undergoing of
this-or-that. There is a finitude to the life we live, and there is meant to be
a deepening and altering presence of the at-stake as life moves on and we
become more mature. But above all, if my experience is credible in what
it attests, there is the eventual accumulation, both of experiences of ‘real
life’ and of capacity strengthened and modified by various and (on the surface) quite unconnected experiences of such type, which gives rise, with
the help of a practical reflection that would sort out for us this matter of
living a human life, to the discovery and recognition of ourselves having
become involved, in assuming responsibility for our lives, not simply in
occasionally contributing to the securing of ultimate reality as life moves
on but in a task commensurate with our life as a whole, a vocation, a selfaware and life-long and life-integrating effort devoted to this matter of
helping creation to come to its consummation as best we can. In assuming
responsibility for finite lives and an endowment which are to be lived and
developed in activity undertaken under the sense of something matters, we
are meant eventually to discover what we are to do with our lives-- not
what job to take, what profession to follow, what role to play in society,
but how, in the way we live, we are to answer in a life-commensurate way
to an at-stake which claims us and calls for our continuing participation in
the con-crete realization of ultimate reality. If that participation involves
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the connecting of diverse agents out of a completeness of their selfhood as
agents and if such connecting is transient, then as our capacity for self-responsibility deepens and our competence for engagement in affairs becomes employed in the enacting of such self-responsibility and as we ourselves become fuller and more centered individually, we eventually recognize what the at-stake calls us to-- us in this fulness of our being as responsible beings-- is a life-long (to the end of life) and life-concentrating
(integrating past and future) vocational effort arising out of that achieved
fulness, such self-aware devotion of ourselves and our various natural-anddeveloped capacities and resources to working, in whatever we are engaged upon, in a way that would contribute (as best we can, given our nature and capacities) to the realization of being in its consummatory finality. It is in living that vocation-- one of giving from out of our own fulness
(our own integrity, genuineness, and our concentrating employment of our
past life and our potential) and giving our best in care for the beings with
which we are engaged and are connecting-- that we are able to find the
meaningful centering of our life-whole which represents the inward fruition of earlier times of the sort my walk in the bottomland woods and my
brief contemplative encounter with the marsh hawk represent. In such
living, life in its fulness begins or takes place in earnest, self-aware to the
creational at-stake in being and to the nature and meaning of its bearing
and claim on our agency as human being.

3. Resuming the creational dynamic of being
By its nature, philosophical reflection is concerned with the problematic of existence and is called forth in the con-crete ongoing of life in many
different ways. But when it is entered upon responsively in any situation,
inquiry begins with the inquirer assuming the standpoint of our agency as
human beings (we are seeking an understanding that is the work of the
human capacities in us), and proceeds as an effort to recover, in and for
thoughtful understanding, the nature and facets of that problematic. In
forming such understanding, the effort is to base it in-and-on the immediate disclosure of first-hand experience taken to be revelatory of that
problematic. I have been speaking of a particular experience of mine,
whose disclosive heart was formed by an awakening to presence in the immediacy of the wondrous recognition, ‘that we are, and that there is not
nothing’. Such disclosure, concerning being, is only possible to a being, to
someone who is and whose being is an active one; and as I have sought to
recover its nature and discern its import, I have been seeking to make clear
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the nature of being as unitary, as beings-who-are, including myself as one
such being.
What is most basic about us, as disclosed in the ‘that we are’ of wonder, is that in our being we are distinct as beings, other to each other, and
this in such way as to make being a universe of beings, a unity of distinct
beings. But this unity, as we discover it in wonder, holds more within it
than the simple-being-and-otherness of beings; it is a con-crete unity, in
which each being is not simply distinct as a being but, in its distinct being,
is different from all other beings in further respects than that primordial
one. Given that the disclosure of being/beings in wonder is a disclosure to
an existing active being of him-/herself and other active beings, the being
of all such beings manifestly includes an active side, or more fully,
includes an existence for a while as an active being which is actively
entering into interaction with other active beings. Further, the disclosure
in wonder is of beings connecting with each other out of themselves and
their own natures, connecting as they interact and interlink in their interplay. It seems, then, that being harbors within itself much more than the
simple-being-and-otherness of beings, and the question arises, how are we
to understand this ‘harboring more’?
It is fairly straightforward to grasp that being harbors space-and-time
within itself (where else could space and time be?), and harbors them as
the enabling factors for the existence and actuality of distinct beings as
agents and for their interacting with each other in their active sides. It is
also readily intelligible that, in virtue of this further side to themselves and
the initiating-out-of-themselves character of their active participation in
this interacting, distinct beings can become joined, connected, con-cretely,
growing together in a spatially-and-temporally enabled and conditioned
interactively-mediated fashion. But the key to the complex structure of
being lies in this, that (a) the simple-being-and-otherness of beings is being
in an incompleteness of itself, and specifically, an incompleteness in virtue
of the dis-connection of the beings which compose it, and that (b) in virtue
of this incompleteness of simple-being-and-otherness of beings, being
harbors a nisus toward its own completeness, toward a connectedness of
distinct beings which is formed out of themselves. Such connectedness is
something held within being as meant to be-- the meant-to-be of the nisus-and, specifically, as an at-stake meant to be secured by the space-and-timeenabled active side of beings as they interact; it is in virtue of this nisus
internal to being and toward its own completeness that there are the further
determinate elements we have found disclosed in wonder, the
indispensable mediating factors within being whereby being has the unity
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of a universe of beings.
In virtue of this at-stake, and the dependence for its securing on the interactivity of beings in their active sides, a fundamental but complex tension is entered into the heart of being. For what is at-stake can be gained
or lost, secured or not. It is as meant to provide an apt and proportionate
contribution to the con-crete securing of this connectedness of beings-this ultimate reality of being as being-- that beings have a ‘reason for being’ for their active side. Given the diversity of natures to those active
sides, the participating of different beings involves much that is different
in-and-for the diverse participants; in addition, the nature of ultimate reality, as a connecting out of themselves achieved by distinct-and-diverse beings in their interacting, is itself to some extent different because the connecting, while overcoming their dis-connection, maintains their diversity
and distinctness-- their diversity in nature and initiative-capacity, the different ways in which they operate out of themselves and interweave in
their encounter with each other, their primordial distinctness as being and
as initiators of activity. Even so, ultimate reality has everywhere the sameness of finality, of pregnancy with fulness and power, so long as it lasts.
If this is the overall structure of being, if we human beings find ourselves active agents entered con-cretely into existence and interacting with
other agents human and non-human, then in our very effort reflectively to
inquire and understand the truth of the problematic of existence we are
venturing in a particular direction (toward truthful reflective understanding), employing particular capacities (our receptivity, thought, and the
like), and in that venturing itself, we are acting responsively to the very
problematic of existence which we are seeking to understand. Our efforts
amount to an attempt, by ourselves as beings within being, to bring being
to understanding in the course of human life. While all human effort is
responsive to the same problematic, almost all is a venturing which, employing other particular capacities and moving in other directions than that
of seeking truthful reflective understanding, carries with it some interpretation of this problematic, of the fundaments of being. But rarely is this
derived from philosophical reflection, rarely is it formed as a conceptual
insight into the problematic of existence. Most often, it takes the form of
an individual reading developed with the help of the social context in
which the person lives and acts, and in particular, with the help of one religion or another. What is this seemingly influential power which we call
“religion”? Let us consider.

B. Mystery, religion, and philosophy
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1. The mysterious
We opened this chapter with a reference to the variability of our attention and awareness; let us open this second half of the chapter with a
continuation of that reference, noting what might best be called the modalities of the register of presence in our attention and awareness.
There is this constancy to our waking experience throughout life, that
through our powers of sense we find the face of other things, in its sensible
character, greeting us as what makes immediate register in us-- what is
given to us directly-- of the beings in our ‘there’. But our experience is
never a simple immediate register of this face. For one thing, it involves
interpretation, a reading of what is given and registering, formed within a
sense of something at stake. Thus our experience is, at least, a receiving
and reading of what is there by ourselves as caring beings. But more: given our being as active beings, and given what matters to us at the time and
the determinate concern-- generally a directly practical concern-- that animates us as caring active beings, we know a selective focusing of our attention under the guidance of a sense of relevance to our concern. Thus
our way of taking things in as we greet them and attend to this-or-that
practical effort-- getting breakfast, driving down the street, entering a
building, greeting and talking with someone we encounter in the hallway,
etc.--, not only draws into play an interpretative framework that enters into
our taking in, recognizing, and responding to, the beings given to our perception. Even more basically, it takes shape under the immediacy of our
sense that ‘something matters’ and, for the moment, under a determinate
interpretation of what matters sufficiently acceptable to us that we are engaged in this-rather-than-that effort; and that sense, so interpreted, fosters
much fluctuation in our register of what is greeting us, much inward variation in our attentiveness and notice, as we are on the alert in a changing
world for what bears on our concern and on our current implementation of
it. Indeed, in virtue of that sense, something unexpected can come into our
attention-field and, registering on this immediate sense and reminding us
of other and more important things to be doing, may lead us not only to
shift out of what we were in process of doing but, with that shift, to take
things in in a fundamentally different way, in reference to this new practical concern.
Simply in terms, then, of our receiving the given within the constant
functional structure of sense powers in ourselves and the sensible face of
beings, we know an almost perpetual shifting and selective emphasis both
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in the focusing of our attention within the global register of what is given
and in our letting this-rather-than-that become noticed and recognized, according it the status of what is ‘there’ in our experience; we also know a
continual accompanying subliminal and peripheral assessing and dismissing of much of the global given, taking place almost without our awareness
as the preliminary and continuing ‘other side’ in the assessing and selecting that highlights the relevant and focuses our notice. In all this selective
accepting and dismissing involved in our ordinary experience, there is a
further significant variable involved in how our taking things in allows
them in, namely, the degree of our attentiveness. We may not be interested in what we are doing at the moment, and our attention may wander,
our action be routine, and our notice take shape accordingly; or our interest may be relatively intense, and we ourselves, out there amidst things (as
the term “interest” suggests: “interesse”, Latin, “to be there amidst”), may
be ‘ingathered and all there’ in what we are doing, attentive out of a concentration of ourselves and noticing with considerable clarity, sensitivity,
and fulness, what is there, but nonetheless with regard to what is given
globally still noticing it only selectively and within the guiding framework
of our concern. Between such poles, there are many degrees of interest,
and in all, much variation as well in the degree of honesty and accuracy (in
interpretation) involved, so that what at first seems a straightforward and
simple matter turns out, on closer consideration, to be rather complicated.
All of this, and much else of a kind with it, x enters into our waking
experience throughout life, making our attention-and-awareness variable in
its functioning and in what it discloses to us. In the course of that same
life, something else is happening as we grow and develop in our agency,
something more significant for our purposes, namely: the initiative capacity whereby we decide-and-execute our activity evolves and transforms,
especially in the receptive side of that capacity, and with that, in our register of the at-stake and of all else (within and around us) as it is given and
taken up by us in that reference. This has considerable bearing on the register of presence in our attention and awareness as we mature humanly,
and introduces another type of variation altogether.
It is fairly easy to recognize, in the retrospect of middle age, how much
one missed as a child in the register of one’s grandfather, how much one
simply did not have the ‘ears with which to hear’, as Nietzsche might put
it. It is initially tempting to put this down simply to limitations in a child’s
experience, in his/her interpretative framework and understanding, and the
like, appealing to the innocence and naivete of the child, his/her lack of
sophistication. But there is something more fundamental involved here,
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and while recognizing the important differences introduced by (say) conceptual development and experience of the ‘world’, the “ears” and “hearing” I have in mind are of a different sort, made possible by a different
side of our nature, by our receptivity, but in this case, not by our senses.
In the natural course of the maturational development of human life,
we know not simply growth from a manifold initial impotence and dependence into a more complex and capable agency with some measure of
self-dependence but an enduring measure of interdependence; we also
know a human-nature-based developing, expanding, and deepening, of our
initiative capacity, including its responsive register of self-and-others and
of all that is involved in our being. In keeping with the nature of this maturation process, we gain-- or are meant to gain-- by youth sufficient capacity for taking our own life upon ourselves as our own and our responsibility, and we know in youth a receptivity, feelings and a sensitivity, that
have evolved to expand our register-capacity. The developing, expanding,
and deepening, that I would call to our attention at this point concerns our
receptivity to presence in a different direction from what the senses offer
with their direct openness to the sensible. It also lies in a different direction from the ordinary functioning of this capacity which, whatever the
time of life and the differences in capacities and circumstance, does not
enter us into the sort of connecting of ourselves and the beings of our
circumstance which enables us to escape confinement by the sensible.
In the Introduction to this work, I recalled the immediate register of
things in the vein of the magical by myself as an eight-year-old on a
venture to the river-bottom-land field. The distinctive quality of the register of presence (of what was around and what was inward both) in that
vein emerged in the course of a meshing, a connecting, a harmonizing, of
something in particular circumstance with, on the one hand, particular
factors in myself which readied me for that connecting, and on the other
hand, a responsiveness which had developed to the place of being able to
register this interactive fit in an express fashion and to make me aware of
an extraordinary connecting whose meaning went beyond the particular
and spoke (although I could not have comprehended much of this at the
time) to the matter of being and being alive. I was not ready and able yet
to find this connecting more than a joy, to which the particularities of circumstance contributed indeed-- the woods, the work going on, the mixture
of sunlight and shadow, even the mosquitos-- but which was no function of
those sensible ingredients of presence or of the beings involved. That joy
was rather the feeling-side of a register of myself-- my self as a child, with
limited capacity whether to take part in affairs or to responsively register
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what was involved-- being touched on in an inward readiness and drawn
forth to enter into a close and intense, even intimate, connecting with other
beings. I mean, on the one hand, it was myself penetrated by the beings of
circumstance, entranced and stimulated, excited and brought to reverberate, as I responded to their register in me by way of their sensible
particularities, so that I found myself raised up and empowered in this
complicity of outward and inward and able momentarily to take part in my
connecting with circumstance in a fuller, more complete, way than ordinary. I mean, on the other hand, it was myself finding in my responsiveness to those beings and their particularities an opening out into a
peculiar sort of self-awareness, that of myself in that functioning and connecting as being (as it were) on a frontier, venturing in the midst of a
‘wilderness’. The magic of presence that emerged that day marked a responding to circumstance which embodied the momentary consummation
of a growth of (still childish) competence as an agent and, accompanying
that, harbored an expanded awareness of others-and-myself, still a limited
and childish awareness indeed, but one whose emergence stretched the
child to the fullest of his still limited capacity. Thus the connecting that
was taking place was that of a still naive venturer who, in my still relatively incompletely developed powers, was unaware (say) of how much
the security and sense of having a place in this work world, provided by
my grandfather and uncle, enabled me to feel-- and to be-- so ‘bold’, so
venturesome, so much ‘at home’ there so far away from home, on that
‘frontier’, amid that ‘wilderness’. But it was a genuine and maturationallyimportant condition and awareness nonetheless, awareness of a self being
drawn together inwardly and made whole as a fledgling participant in
existence, and awareness of a magical ‘wilderness’ world in the midst of
which I had come alive. xi
Our human initiative capacity evolves, but not automatically, and not
evenly in all of its sides, let alone on all sides at the same time. Rediscovery of magic in other circumstances-- in Carle Park, in the early evening
darkness, across from my home in town, not ‘wilderness’ this time but a
haunting world of bushes, trees, open space, and growing darkness-confirmed in self-aware fashion that I was not simply changing but also
growing, growing stronger and more capable, growing more sensitive and
perceptive, moving forward in that frontier-venturing in this-way here (on
the farm) then in that-way there (in an urban park) ... and yet, still such a
youngster! Eventually, however, register of presence in the mode of the
magical transmuted into the strangeness of presence felt by the sixteenyear-old on the football practice field. When I say “transmuted”, I do not

Chapter 1. A creational universe

37

mean that something was added and made the whole different simply by
that addition, or that something else arose to displace and replace what had
been there before, something unconnected with that previous condition,
something new in that way. xii I have in mind the emergence of a both
quantitatively and qualitatively more evolved mode of the same receptivity, in which that receptivity is gaining in phases its own native fulness as
power to make being register in us in a con-crete and immediately-disclosive fashion. This register of strangeness, a sign of having entered into
the turning point of youth and its preliminary initiation into maturity, attested the evolution of the receptive side of my capacity to the point that,
as my own life came to register in some fashion now as ‘my own and my
responsibility’, this brought as its counterpart not simply a summons to reflection upon this matter of life, but as well, a thought-provoking strangeness of presence, marking the immediacy of the matrix for this ‘my own’
life and this re-flective mode of thought concerned with that affair of my
life and, more broadly, for this new venture in the living of life with its
more evolved and mature manner of connecting and being-with. As before, it was a time (in this case, rather brief) of being drawn together and
into an interplay with presences, but unlike before, a discovery of them invested with a puzzling but attracting strangeness that preeminently evoked
the play of reflection in me; in this somewhat fuller, more complex, and
weightier togetherness, I found again a sense of being at home there, this
time ingathered and curious, in a moment of contemplation and musing
which was instinct with the playing of football.
In time my capacity evolved to the place where I could find myself on
occasion being initiated even more deeply into the mysteries of human life
in its adult phase, or to speak in the manner of the mystery-religions of
classical times in ancient Greece as the Platonic Socrates represents them,
being initiated into the inner mysteries. In regard to this further initiation
of the novice adult, as his overall capacity as responsible agent evolved,
strengthened, consolidated, and stabilized, as his nature filled out, expanding downward-and-upward and evolving a more delicate and profound
sensitivity, and as his particular capacities and skills became developed toward greater and more confident competence, it was possible for him on
occasion to enter again into a harmonious con-crete connecting with circumstance, comparable to the earlier but fuller now, and within the operation of his own greater overall capacity, the receptive side of his initiative-capacity became capable (to condense and simplify here) of finding in
such times several different things.
On the one hand, it could find an intensification of the strangeness into
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(on some occasions) various inflections of the wondrous or marvelous, and
(eventually) into the wonder of the sort I have spoken of in the first half of
this chapter, at the apprehension of the miraculousness of being. By the
“wondrous or marvelous”, I mean something akin to the magical of childhood times, but registering now in a “me” who was no longer a child. Its
impress on the receptive side of myself, in-and-to a “me” who could now
reflect, was not however to evoke the reflective-thought-side of my capacity; its appeal was rather more that of a call to let such marvelous presence
sink in and to steep oneself in it, and concomitantly, to simply feel and
rejoice in the excitement-- a quieter one than in childhood-- being evoked
in that presence, to savor in an aesthetic manner the world around me as it
set me inwardly to vibrating. It was, on the occasion, enough simply to
relish being here amidst these things and feeling the moving power of their
presence stirring me. In contrast, the wonder of the experience with which
I began this chapter, arising in a sudden metamorphosis of the increasing
force of the impression things were making on me, had an immediacy that
directly evoked in me a recognition that harbored a goad to reflection, to
an effort to understand the ‘whys’. Here strangeness seemed to have become transmuted not simply in its immediacy (thus the wondrous or marvelous) but especially in the thought-provoking force of that immediacy
(thus wonder). Its flowering in wonder evoked a more concerted, concentrated, intentness on understanding, in a being who was becoming more
devoted to reflection as lying at the heart of his life. Musing was not
enough, a more serious and capable concern to concentrate and pay attention, to explore and find what would help me understand, pervaded my
dwelling with an expectant attention on presences now.
On the other hand, such fuller initiation eventually involved a transmutation of the magic of childhood in which presence reached to me in a
more encompassing way, at the decision-and-executing heart of my being;
in this case, it was in the mode of the mysterious that I found presence
registering in me. The mysterious as I know and mean it is, like the magical and the marvelous, a mode of immediate register, arising within a harmonious con-crete connecting with presences. In the magical and the marvelous, we are made aware of depths in presence but are focused on distinct beings, not as repositories of what is in the depths but as appearing
transformed within the ‘more’ which the terms “magical” and “marvelous”
point to. In the case of the mysterious, it is not the distinct beings that are
emphatic; the register in this case, in the receptivity of a human being who
has evolved to the point of being capable of self-responsibility and is
ready for the fulness of responsibility in which the maturation of a human
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being reaches its telos, is an express register there of the immediate presence of the depths within being. More fully and precisely, it is the disclosive or revelatory register of those depths as regards a power harbored
there and felt as laying claim upon the decision-making-and-executing at
the heart of one’s active being and life and claiming one in one’s responsibility for one’s own life. In the initiative-capacity as it belongs to our nature as that by which we take part in existence out of ourselves, this claiming is received into ourselves not in a contesting or protesting, but rather in
a surprised and trustful welcoming, so ready that it is as if the claiming has
touched upon and released a natural well-spring of trust and willingness.
At the same time, there is also no understanding (yet) of the nature or the
meaning of this power, only the sense that, in heeding its claiming and
giving oneself over to its animating presence, one is (so far) responding
appropriately, and the baffling element in this presence, rather than as in
wonder provoking reflection, works to focus on the commitment to venturing in trust that ... . The ‘frontier’ at which the magical placed one has
deepened now, and the exploration of the ‘wilderness’ become much more
capable. But how, attending to presence as significant there, discern and
follow out the direction of the pointing of this power? For that, one needs
... ? Whatever is needed for the answering to be appropriate as a fully
human response, it is a vocational life into which we are being pointed as
agents responsible for our own lives whole, a life with a task and a work
to be done, a moral life with a responsibility not simply for our own life
and self but for participation in something grander, a life centered in a
commitment to a way of life-- of employing our capacities-- in which that
task is to be lived, in which work on that task is at one with living life, in
which one devotes one’s life and living to ... what? We will spend time
later answering that question. Here let me simply point to the direction of
the answer by referring back to the earlier part of this chapter and using
the phrase “devotes it to helping bring the consummation of creation to
pass con-cretely”. It is in this sense that life is meant to turn out to be, at
its fullest, a religious affair.
In pointing to these modalities I am speaking of something which becomes manifest in function of two variables: one is a certain sort of effective engaging and interconnecting of self with circumstantial beings, and
the other is the evolution of the initiative capacity whereby one takes part
in such effective interconnecting and, by way of the receptivity involved,
discovers self-and-others registering in the aura of these modalities as we
are interconnecting. The register concerns, in its fundamental reach, being
in its depth, and in its forefront, it concerns beings as, in the interconnect-
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ing taking place, they are manifest on the background of such register of
depth as is open to the human participant. That register of depth ever includes the at-stake in being as it concerns the agent in question, although
even here, such register is initially undifferentiating as regards a variety of
other factors in the being and situation of the person; a differentiating register comes only with time and evolution. And there are always further
elements of presence in the situation of an existent human being beyond
the at-stake which, as our initiative capacity evolves, become registered,
and registered more clearly, in ampler and deeper fashion, and the effective interconnecting of beings then shows-- and is registered in-- the modalities I have been enumerating.
No way of phrasing what I have in mind seems fully satisfactory to me.
The clarity of the sketch attempted above might be assisted by various
metaphors which can catch one or another aspect of these transmutations
in the mode of presence that we know as we grow more fully into ourselves. Thus: these transmutations seem to signify something like alterations in presence as the light under which we can see things in their presence alters the closer we come into proximity with the source of light hidden in the depths of being. Or again: they seem to signify something like
the increasing permeability of our active-being to things-and-self, our
capacity to receive presence into the increasingly fuller capacity of ourselves and to allow it to enter more deeply and clearly as we ourselves become more capable; in virtue of this, we find it both appearing differently
and addressing us and playing upon our responsiveness differently. But
however the matter is phrased, it concerns ourselves in our interconnecting
with circumstantial beings at various times along the way of life and connecting out of an amplifying and transforming initiative capacity such that
the measure and manner of our register of beings (ourselves and others)
and of the depths in being differs along the way, disclosing self-and-others
in differing measure and on different levels of depth, giving to the recurrent times a different-- and yet ultimately, cognate-- feel for what it is to be
and be human in being as a creational affair. xiii

2. Being-religious and religion xiv
In speaking of the modalities of the register of presence in our attention
and awareness, I have been addressing the human as a distinctive form of
being, one centered in a responsive initiative-capacity which (among other
things) makes of human participation in existence a maturational affair.
That capacity is meant to develop through exercise and learning, and its
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evolution-- and with it, our maturation-- is meant to eventuate, in youth, in
a capacity for taking responsibility for our own individual life and self, and
in mid-life, after further development, in a capacity for a fulness in responsibility that knows a witting and willing devotion of that life to a task of a
certain sort. As central element in that further development, we have
spoken of our initiative capacity as eventually opening us out expressly to
the depths in being and entering us into the modality of register which is
the mysterious. Ingathered in awareness-and-self-awareness of this sort,
we find ourselves con-cretely connecting with other beings in such way as
involves both (a) a revelatory disclosure in and for our attentive awareness
(one bringing factors in the depths of being to register expressly in the
immediacy of presence and to illuminate with their mysterious light ourselves and what is around us) and (b) ourselves being raised above our ordinary selves, enlivened-and-animated and pointed into the future by a
power at work behind the mind’s eye, one that seems worthy of trust so
that one listens and looks and seeks what it wants of us, what this energy is
impetus toward, what would be that way of life that would faithfully
translate this power and energy into deed. Entrusting ourselves to this
pointing, and seeking to enact our self-responsibility in a way commensurate with the revelation and pointing involved in such experience, we
enter ourselves upon a transformed life of responsibility-- a way of engaging with things, and of bearing our life and living it-- which is religious and
vocational in nature, marked by the recognition that the at-stake in our activity is in reality the at-stake in being as a dynamic happening, and centered thus on our task as one of working to bring the dynamic of being to
completion by helping to secure what is at-stake in it.
The being-religious which is embodied in this fulness of responsible
participation in the affairs of existence is not a function of religion as a
social institution, and indeed is not dependent in any way on religion. But
it is a possible-- and the only appropriate-- seed-bed and source for the
formation of a religion, and with it, for that different sort of being-religious which is shaped by participation in religion.
A religion is a social form which in some cases eventually attains the
status of a complex institution but which at its core is a unity of myth and
ritual. This core has the formal shape it has-- a unity of these two different
but complementary elements-- in order to enable it to work upon and foster the transformation of the decision-making-and-executing center in our
active being as adult human beings. For the adult initiative power by
which we enter into activity, bear our own lives, and venture to take part in
things responsibly, involves a re-flective side (practical thought in its life-
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commensurate form) and a decisional side, the issue of which is our undertaking the thoughtful con-crete effort whereby we live our lives. Thus in
myth, religion takes a shape fitted to address and to function in-and-for the
re-flective (witting) side of our adult initiative capacity, and to help instate
us thereby in-- and to foster and give shape to-- the disclosure-moment of
the being-religious that is being fostered; and in ritual, religion takes a
shape fitted to address and to function in-and-for the decisional and
executing (willing) side of our capacity, and to help instate us thereby in
(and to foster and give shape to) the commitment-moment of the being-religious that it would foster. The core of religion is shaped, then, to mediate, for its participants, their (re-)gaining first-hand cognizance of the
depths of being and their forming or strengthening the commitment to
what the power there calls for, namely, a way of life commensurate with
the universe in its full religious reality. Religion, then, has a practical
thrust, concerned with the capacity whereby we undertake all practice;
more specifically, its work is to aid in the culminating maturational transformation of the persons who participate in it, to help them finally to become (and sustain themselves as) witting and willing participants in securing the consummation of being as a dynamic happening.
When I speak of myth and ritual as the core of religion, I have in mind,
as “myth”, a sacred story which is shaped for, and whose meaning is accessible only in, a ceremonial telling and listening, while I mean, as “ritual”, a sacred action which is shaped for, and whose meaning is accessible
only in, a ceremonial performance. xv As complementary formal elements
central in the ceremonial fostering of the disclosure- and commitmentmoments of the being-religious that is to arise with their help, myth and
ritual are distinctively religious modes of speech and action which have
their original roots in the revelation of truth in religious experience and
which as social factors have the function of enabling others who were not
privy to the originating experience(s) to come, by way of these symbolic
forms and their functioning on ceremonial occasions, to find at the heart of
their own immediate experience the cognate inward truth-revealing presence of the depths of being. For our immediate purpose, it is myth that we
need to consider more fully, and to begin with, myth-making. xvi
The seminal religious experiences which, arising apart from religion,
open a person first-hand into the depths of being are always con-crete, thus
such that the immediacy of such revelation as arises in them involves the
particularity of the situation and of the person in question. The apprehension of what is being disclosed in this immediate register (a register which
is more or less clear, full, extended, sensitive) requires attention, so that
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the revelation, potentially limited by any incompleteness in the register, is
potentially further limited by inattentive or biasedly-attentive awareness.
Then too, the truth disclosed here, if it is to be apprehended and communicated to others in one’s social group, must also be grasped interpretatively
and brought into speech that would communicate it. If this speech is to be
public speech, and thus formed to convey truth in a way that others who
speak the same language and know the same kosmos can share in it, then
the language must be shaped with such sharing in mind. Finally, to share
the truth being apprehended and to do so in a ceremonial form of public
speech, its function on such an occasion-- not simply to formulate and convey something but, more fundamentally, to help enable others to experience that truth in their own persons and to share it in that way-- must also
be kept in mind in the shaping of the communication-vehicle.
When we would share with each other the events of our lives, we use a
narrative or story form. The disclosure of the sort that we are speaking of
here is, ultimately, of the dynamic of being; unlike the events of our lives,
this dynamic is not a temporal affair, and yet it is such that temporal
language seems appropriate-- as symbol-- for embodying it. The fundamental form of myth is one which characteristically renders the dynamic of
being in an account of creation ‘in the beginning’. In his effort to communicate this dynamic as it has become con-cretely disclosed to him and
discoverable to the members of his social group, the myth-maker transforms ordinary narrative to make his story symbolize (say) the making of
this kosmos we find ourselves participants in, treating that ‘making’ as if it
were an event in time and relating what happened ‘in the beginning’ to this
kosmos as we see and know it in our living-and-acting. Selecting the
disclosive elements in the revelation, entering them into a narrative that
unavoidably (whether intentionally or unintentionally) simplifies and emphasizes but brings out the creational action that gives rise to our kosmos,
he gives shape to a narrative account which, for the myth-maker, holds
open and brings into attentional focus the truth of the revelatory experience and adequately (so far as he can judge) interprets it; and further, he
creates a narrative which is so adapted (a) to the potential listener on a
ceremonial occasion (who apart from what happens on the occasion may
have no first-hand acquaintance with the matters being revealed) as well as
(b) to the occasion itself of the telling, that the teller, telling the story on
that occasion, would enable the listener, allowing him-/herself to be drawn
into the telling-and-story, to find the original revelation first-hand, but in a
cognate disclosure taking place within him-/herself on the occasion. xvii
Myth does not have its meaning, or claim truth, as a descriptive state-
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ment (of fact). The latter holds truth in its own words (understood literally, but also, if taken allegorically), whereas myth claims truth as an adequate symbolizing vehicle for effectively rendering and communicating an
original revelation to listeners who already have access in their own persons to the depths needed for such revelatory communication to occur. It
is the function of the occasion, and more precisely, of his/her participation
in the occasion (thus of the intensity and concentration aroused, the supporting and reinforcing presence of others likewise intense and concentrating, etc.), to promote the needed receptive matrix for the listener to be
able to find the telling-and-story giving rise in him-/herself to a first-hand
cognizance of the depths of being that is cognate to that which engendered
the myth. Given such a matrix, the participant can find the words of the
story taking on their meaning as focusing attention upon and intending, in
symbolic fashion, the originally-disclosed truth, but now, not as something
in a distant experience of someone else but as inward to the participant’s
own present experience. Thus the original truth (of the creational whole in
its source and creational nisus) is communicated not by having been captured in words and handed over by voicing those words, but in virtue of
the dynamic of participation in the telling and listening as an enabling matrix for the effective working of the symbolizing pointing and interpretative holding-open of the story.
Such communication, however, is fully achieved only if the listener
takes part in a way that is in keeping with the way myth communicates,
and many participants fail to a greater or lesser degree in that regard. The
actual apprehension of such revelatory presence by different listeners depends importantly upon the capacities they bring into the occasion and
their engagement with the elements of the ceremonial situation. In order
to achieve a listening that would be commensurate with myth, the listener
must allow him-/herself to become intently given over into the listening, to
be gathered in by the story, and to be released from the attitudes and dispositions of the everyday; the listener must also allow his/her released
capacities to function in free responsiveness to the immediacy of what is
happening, and especially to what is happening inwardly, reflexively. If
the amplified openness called for does not arise, or if the revelatory character of the immediacy of the present is unrecognized and the interpretative-reference of myth to inward presence is missed, the listeners may well
find some meaning in the words, according to the way they take them into
themselves-- but not the meaning that is intended in myth. In that measure, the consummation of myth’s power to communicate revelation will
be incomplete in the con-crete, and its truth claim will be misinterpreted.
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Yet even if the appropriate conditions are present, myth is symbolic in
nature and, depending on how its symbolizing is being grasped, may point
differently for different participants into that same revelatory presence, to
say nothing of being understood differently in its interpretation of the truth
being pointed to.
Because myth is symbolic and con-cretely so, there is variety both in
the myths human beings have created and in the way any myth-- thus all
myths-- has been received and has operated in the receiving person.
As for the creating: What is being communicated symbolically is the
one truth-- that of being in its creational nature-- as revealed in a con-crete
situation. Such disclosure not only involves differences in the particularities of the person and situation, and more importantly, variability in the
depth, fulness, and the like, of the revelation of the one truth involved; but
the symbolic renderings whereby that truth, as revealed, is to be shared unavoidably involve rather different symbols (that is, different myths) for the
further reason that the symbols are formed in-and-by the myth-maker
drawing on what of his/her experience and of the experience of those persons with whom he/she would share this revelation seems fitted to help
make possible the sharing he/she would effect. Symbols differ in their
power to attract and focus our attention, in their aptness and completeness,
and in a number of other regards that relate to their pointing us into what is
being disclosed; but above all, for any particular symbolic form to be
intelligible enough to operate effectively in a meaningful way, it must fit
the experience of the world and the horizon of intelligibility of the persons
involved in the ceremonial occasion. The multiplicity of primordial myths
which symbolically render the nisus of being in the different religions is
not a sign of different truths being claimed, but of the one truth (of the
creational nature of being) being pointed to differently, out of different
con-crete experience and in a symbolic mode that does not require that the
differences mean conflicts or contradictory claims. xviii
As for the receiving: Myth, as symbolic ceremonial speech, requires of
the participants that they make such speech their own as they are apprehending it; each participant does that for him-/herself as the symbolic
speech unfolds in the course of the ceremony. Now a verbal symbol such
as myth is formulated in words whose literal meanings are employed to
give shape to a narrative-image or complex of images that is meant to be
taken as symbolizing something; and while that symbol can be taken in as
a symbol, and is meant to be so taken in, the literally-articulated image can
itself also be taken literally, to the detriment of the image as symbolic image. Thus as a participant takes in the myth, there are a variety of ways in
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which he/she may take up with it, there being two different modes (literal
and symbolic) and in the latter case a variety of different ways in which
the symbol can be taken to symbolize some matter, just as there are a
variety of different ways in which the matter itself (the creational character
of being) can be symbolized. Supposing that the participant’s participation in the ceremony is indeed effective in its inward recall of the truth
being meant in the myth, it remains that that participant may miss that truth
altogether in its immediate presence (if he/she looks in the outward direction for the matter being symbolized, or simply has literalized the symbol or ...) or different participants in the same religion may regard it differently (via different appropriations of the pointing of the same symbol).
Because myth as a symbolic rendering of the origins of things relates
back to the world as the participants know it, being an account of that
world’s origins, and because that world, so far as it is referred to in myth,
is described straightforwardly, the presence of a literal description of the
world within myth as a symbolic narrative invites a literal reading of the
heart of the myth itself, and thus a ready misconstruing of its symbolic nature. All the more is such a reading invited because the function of the
ceremonial telling of myth is a practical one, namely, to help us find the
appropriate support, confirmation, and guidance, for the commitment of
our ongoing lives and our participation in affairs to an engagement which
is heedful and self-aware to such truth. Those affairs, however, are the
locus of ordinary speech, with its literalistic emphasis, and making the
connection of the ceremonial with them again invites a literal reading of
the symbolic. In the ceremonial telling-and-listening itself, however, the
emphasis is on recovering truth in its immediacy to the participant’s
awareness, and while the narrative symbol which functions within the ceremony that would foster such awareness of immediacy must be appropriated by the participants and that interpretative appropriation is in each
case ultimately dependent upon the participant, how differently the inwardly revealed truth is grasped by different participants (in virtue of their
different apprehension of the mediating symbol) is, within the ceremonial
occasion itself, secondary to the effective recall of the participant to truth
by whatever appropriation of the symbol he/she effects. But because the
symbol, as interpreted, is meant to be carried over into everyday life and
action, to provide a framework of intelligibility for living and acting in the
world and to have a guiding function there supportive of the truth that has
been directly registered inwardly in the ceremony, how such interpretation
is made and carried over and brought to function in everyday-life-and-action is of considerable consequence for the nature of the being-religious
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that arises in virtue of participation in the religion.
When the interpretative appropriation of the symbolic misses or denies
the symbolic character of what is being appropriated and literalizes what is
in nature symbolic, any recognition of the occasion-enabled inwardpointing function of the symbol vanishes, and the vital pointing-into-immediacy symbol becomes replaced by story which is readily taken literally
and as a dogmatic account. This detachment of the words of myth from
the inward, and even from the ceremonial matrix and myth’s function
there, not only brings myth into a limited horizon of intelligibility that
suppresses its true nature and meaning but also inevitably injures significantly its ceremonial function. Much then comes to be done and said in
the name of religion which is, in truth, quite impious and unfaithful to
religion, let alone to the religious life. Even so, such a manner of beingreligious remains a manifestation of religion, attesting its ambivalent
working as a social creation.
To sum up this matter of being-religious and religion: The evolution of
the initiative-capacity whereby we human beings take part in the affairs of
existence is meant to culminate in a fulness of responsibility which harbors, among other things, a receptivity open to being in its depths and a
responsiveness in virtue of which we can live and act cleaving to a power
at the heart of being that tasks us with helping to secure the at-stake in the
dynamic of being. Thus the fulness of life is found in a being-religious
which can take shape quite without the help of religion. But given the native connection of human beings and the drive to communicate and share,
the impetus of such a being-religious can, in some persons and on some
occasions, build toward the formation of a social institution whose purpose
is to aid the natural evolution and consummation in question. That is the
womb-- the sole legitimate womb-- for the genesis of religion. The beingreligious which is to emerge with the help of a religion-- of any genuine religion-- carries an inflection by the myth-and-ritual that form the core of
the religion and that have been instrumental to the emergence of that
being-religious. xix The instrument involved, however, is not like an assembly-line machine which turns out identical products. Supposing we are
considering a genuine religion, what issues from participation in it varies
enormously. What is meant to arise with the help of effective participation
in the ceremonial occasions which form the working-places for myth and
ritual is a being-religious which carries over beyond the ceremonial setting
and into the living-and-acting of ordinary life. That being-religious, the
defining core in a way of living-and-acting in which the religious person
has become able with the help of religion to hold to the power at the heart
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of being, is a spiritual mode of being human. Thus while enabled with the
help of myth-and-ritual, such being-religious is not constituted by them
and their terms but founded in the spirituality reached with their help, in
the first-hand cleaving to the power in the depths of being which they help
open us to. Centered in a decision-making-and-executing which is formed
in the person’s own best exercise of his/her judgment as he/she is heedful
above all to the immediate presence of the power in the depths of being,
that decision-making-and-executing are indeed inflected by the terms of
myth-and-ritual as the spiritual person can discern their relevance. But
while the spiritual person looks to the terms of myth-and-ritual for support
and reinforcement, he/she is not confined by, let alone dominated by, those
terms, and certainly not by those terms when their meaning is interpreted
in detachment from spirit. This is the issue of religion at its best, a way of
living-and-acting inflected by the terms of myth-and-ritual but infused with
spirit and centered in an exercise of judgment as to the con-crete effort
called for to be equal to the summons and task of a religious life.
It is not, however, the commonest outworking of participation in a religion. For there are other ways of being-religious (in a sense inflected by
religion), which are quite different in what is happening inwardly in them,
and outwardly as well in virtue of that. For example, there is that manner
of being-religious which, while arising out of a participation in the ceremonial that generates the matrix for an efficacious symbolic pointing of
myth-and-ritual inwardly, is not formed in recognition of such pointing as
at the heart of the inner happening on ceremonial occasions (even supposing that the depths of being are being brought into presence, they left
unrecognized) xx but is formed rather in a holding to the forms and the
terms of those forms (whether grasped as symbols in some other sense [allegories, say], or grasped literally) and in the determined steering of ordinary life-and-activity by the compass of those terms. Or for another and
extreme example, there is that manner of being-religious which is formed
out of only nominal participation in ceremony, one that brings no inward
presence at all (or to speak of), but which insists nonetheless on the dogma-horizon of ‘faith’ or ‘belief’ (holding to literal truths) or on the wisdom
of the ‘ways of our forefathers’ who created the ceremonies, as ultimate
guide for the living of life.

3. Contrast of religion with philosophy
In the Introduction to this work, I spoke of how I became involved in
the re-flective inquiry which is philosophy, namely, when what was hap-
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pening in my life directly evoked re-flection; I also recalled the characterization of philosophy that I eventually formulated as a self-understanding
of the endeavor I had come to find myself participating in. I have approached religion in this chapter from an analogous perspective, initially
addressing as primordial not institutions but religious experience, the firsthand discovery of the depths of being in the modality of register which I
have spoken of as the mysterious. Religion as a social institution is, in its
meaning, an offspring fashioned out of such experience, and has a sound
purchase in the nature of things (including the human) only as such, as a
social form that is to foster and support the natural maturational transformation that enables human beings eventually to live-and-act in consonance
with the full creational nature of being. But as with philosophy, so with
religion: there is much that goes under these names, whether they are selfascribed or applied by others, which does not belong to the essential in
either one. For in both cases historical developments have con-cretely expanded the essential in numerous ways and entered much into both which
makes them more complex than I have described them. xxi
Keeping the focus on the essential in each case, let us conclude this
chapter on the overall creational nature and structure of being by briefly
contrasting philosophy and religion, focusing on their different ways of
relating to the problematic of existence that lies at the heart of the structure
of being. Let us proceed by recalling each in its roots in human nature and
by noting the character, the complexity, and the contrast, of their concern
with the problematic of existence and the creational structure of being.
As we have seen in our Introduction, we human beings find ourselves
in an existence, at the heart of which is a problematic, something at-stake
such that it matters how the various beings involved in existence interact.
We also find ourselves there as having an evolving initiative-capacity, responsive in nature, and responsive in a way that registers the at-stake as it
concerns us and thus makes our interactive-activity a venturing and a risking which would help to secure what is at-stake. The structure of this initiative-capacity makes receptivity and attention, awareness and concentration, the matrix for the operation of thought in the decision-making, which
operation brings the interpretative power into its discursive play under the
conditions which that matrix provides. In our practical decision-making,
we are ever giving shape to our effort under a receptivity-registered sense
of ‘something matters’ and with some interpretation of what that is, at least
what is at stake in the particular venture we are undertaking. Now the evolution of our initiative-capacity in its various sides and in its function of
employing our diverse particular capacities in various activities in a more
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or less skillful way is meant to bring, in the transition time of youth, an initial completeness to that capacity, one with which we take responsibility
for our own lives and from then on enact this responsibility (well or badly)
in our venturing.
Part of the transformation in capacity that is involved in this evolution
in youth is the expansion of our self-awareness, to find our own life now as
‘our own’, its end impending and singling us out, a temporal whole able
now to be felt in the immediacy of its presence as such and to be held in
mind for our attention and awareness; and with this expansion of immediate register goes the expansion of our capacity for practical thought, in
our deciding-and-executing focused heretofore on activity in the form simply of this-or-that deed and on the relatively circumscribed reach of connections and consequences bearing on what we think matters, would we do
‘this’ or not do it. With the discovery of our life as ‘our own’, we are
drawn to recognize the at-stake in a larger reference than a particular deed
and impacts, that of our activity as actualizing our own individual life, and
to regard what we are about to undertake in that perspective, as part of
building a life for ourselves in which something is at stake. Thematic for
practical thought become in this way practical re-flection is a life which,
the more and longer we live it, the more complex it becomes and the more
in need of being seen and understood in its various sides and dimensions,
including in particular its temporal wholeness. An individual life, marked
by our assimilation of social factors from beyond and lived under particular conditions (including, but not exhausted by, social conditions), we
have taken responsibility in our venturing-here and venturing-there, in our
forming these-connections with these-persons and those-connections with
those-persons, for the actualization of that life and its distinctive potentialities. This involves us in exploring and experimenting, testing out possibilities, in discovering what values and directions are important to us and
what are less important, suffering setbacks and making advances, coming
upon particular opportunities and possibilities and weighing and assessing
them in what they might mean for us, with our life-whole being now the
backdrop for such weighing and assessing and deciding and venturing on
this-rather-than-that.
When practical thought expands to include an element of re-flection,
our thought still remains in service to con-crete decision-making-and-executing. For while re-flection operates with an enlarged field for its exploration and with an expanded reference-context for its grasp of this-or-that,
responding to the call to think on what we are doing or thinking of doing
not only as having implications within this now-visible larger immediate

Chapter 1. A creational universe

51

temporal matrix of our life whole but also as relating to its continuing and
unfolding over time as a matter of our responsibility, the thinking in question still has the same function of providing an express interpretative grasp
of aspects of the situation and the condition of the agent that bear on his/
her activity achieving something at stake. How well carried through this
clarificatory and supportive functioning can be on either level (that of
practical thought or that of practical re-flection), and how effective such
thinking is in aiding the forming of initiative, depends on several variables,
and these include how the matrix for thinking is constituted-- what it opens
thought to, how it registers presence (outward and inward), what it allows
or fosters in the way of attention, and the like. And that in turn depends on
how our active being, centered in our initiative-capacity and ordered in a
way that is more or less supportive of the effective working of that capacity, has come to be constituted. But whatever the constitution may be
at any time, practical thought and practical re-flection are defined as practical by the role they have in decision-making-and-executing, that of supportively providing an amplifying, connecting, and confirming, which
draw on the working of receptivity and attention, awareness and concentration, and which, through the meanings that deliberative thought introduces, enable a complex ingathering and orienting of the agent in doingthis-rather-than-that.
At times, however, and in some persons, the practical re-flection of the
novice adult can serve as the vital stem in the humanly essential for a
particular branch endeavor, that of philosophical re-flection and inquiry as
a distinctive human activity. The aim of such re-flection is no longer
practical, the thinking no longer in service to accomplishing this-or-that,
the reference no longer simply to an individual life. Instead, re-flection
ventures on a path of inquiry seeking simply understanding and truth, and
while the matrix for exploration, study, and thoughtful discernment, remains an individual life and while the problematic which inquiry would
understand is accessible first-hand only in and through the living of that
life, the aim is an understanding of the problematic of existence as something in which all humans-- indeed, all existents-- are involved and to
which humans are responding in their activity, and an understanding which
grasps human life as human in that connection. If practical thought and
practical re-flection are aimed (to speak oversimply) at discerning the
good in a fashion instrumental and helpful to a con-crete venturing, philosophical re-flection is aimed at truth and understanding alone.
Although philosophical re-flection is not a practical form of thought, it
is nonetheless undertaken from the standpoint of the human agent caught
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up in the problematic of existence and responsive, in his/her active endeavor, to that problematic. Furthermore, since such re-flection seeks to
discern the character of this problematic and what is involved in it, and
that includes the truth of these matters of human being and activity as they
are constituted in their place in the problematic of existence, such re-flection eventually would provide (among other things) some kind of self-understanding of practical thought and practical re-flection and of the affairs
of practice as these pertain to a human agent: for example, of the at-stake
in being as it relates to activity in general and to human activity in particular, of the ground within being of obligation and of the good, of the
essence of the moral, etc. But such re-flection is not itself in service to decision-making-and-executing, nor is re-flective inquiry aimed at discovering truth which would have a practical function and bearing. Such inquiry,
such understanding, and such truth, are thus not practical in nature. xxii
And yet, as philosophically re-flective understanding increases over
time, it represents a conceptually-articulated expansion of the self-awareness with which responsible life-and-activity are being lived-and-done and
it thereby provides to the person in question some intelligibility to and reassurance about the larger context within which practical decision-making
is taking place and having such impact as it does. In this way it enriches
practical endeavor by bringing, as accompaniment to it in the agent, the illumination of its discernment of an overall and general intelligibility present in the matrix of activity. In addition, philosophical inquiry depends on
the same agential-condition-and-matrix as any activity of the person in
question and avails itself of its access to the problematic of existence for
its own effort to understand that problematic. In the course of its inquiry,
it explores this condition-and-matrix, the activities arising out of it, and the
initiative and initiative-capacity by way of which this arising occurs; and
in so exploring, it may indirectly contribute to an improved practical functioning of thought, without itself being practical. For example, as such reflection focuses on the matter of (say) human agency, it may be drawn to
pay attention to practical affairs in a way that takes notice of, and draws
out for re-flective understanding, facets of them or of decision-making amidst them, facets that are important but may often be ignored or dismissed or misunderstood in the ongoing particular venturings of life; and
in so bringing them to attention, it may be reminding us of matters which
are of practical importance in much or all venturing. If so, it would do this
not as part of a practical thinking which sizes matters up for a particular
practical venturing or even for seeing a particular venturing in the larger
own-life-perspective, and not even as part of a reflexive assessing and
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learning better to decide and act; it would do this rather as part of a reflection simply seeking truth about this matter of human practice and
turning up matters notice of which happens to be of practical significance
and can be recognized and integrated into practical thought or re-flection
at one time or another or can lead to an alteration in our individual way of
taking part in affairs. Or again, the exploration of activities, in virtue of
the attention and notice that are involved in exploring, may itself bring
about in the re-flective agent an amplified sensitivity to and understanding
of facets of activity which in turn, carried as an available resource into the
forming of all active effort, can at least augment the powers at work in that
forming and enhance the witting character of the active efforts of the
inquirer quite beyond his/her re-flective inquiry itself. In this way, re-flective inquiry may further actualize part of what belongs to us as humans
who are meant eventually to live-and-act with cognizance and self-aware
understanding of being and life-and-its-meaning. However, the expansion
and enrichment pointed to in these two examples represent indirect achievements of philosophical inquiry; they do not, because of their contribution to the enhancement of practice, make the re-flection in the course
of which they were generated itself practical in nature.
In short: As an essential part of its concern with the problematic of
existence, philosophy is re-flectively attentive to the matter of activity and
our being as active, and in particular, to the character of the initiative-capacity which makes for our distinctive being as beings. And yet, in what
may seem at first sight a paradox, philosophy’s thematic concern with
what is essential and central in human nature and being as an active affair,
while essential to its concern with the problematic of existence, does not
make philosophy itself part of the humanly essential, a capacity which
every human being as human is meant by nature to develop and to bring
into play as essential to human engagement with the affairs of life and
existence. It is rather a particular endeavor of a particular human agent,
and one that few human beings are fitted by their particular nature to carry
on to any great extent. In this way, it contrasts with what is part of the humanly essential as it evolves and comes in time into its own fulness, including our global receptivity to (self-and-other) beings, our self-awareness to ourselves as active and responsible beings with a life of our own to
live, and with such awareness, both some interpretative reading of what we
are aware of and some practical re-flection about life and activity and the
way we are to live our lives. Within our essential self-awareness, philosophical re-flection seeks (among other things) its conceptual self-understanding of the human, and indeed, its self-understanding of itself as a
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particular and distinctive activity.
One final point, important for the contrast with religion that I wish to
draw: The re-flective effort which is philosophical is engendered and takes
shape within the same agential matrix centered in the same initiative-capacity on which all particular efforts depend, and operates in its seeking
for understanding and evidence with what such a matrix provides. Because the evidence available at the standpoint being assumed in such reflection (that of a human agent), and the exploratory and investigative effort being made there, are significantly dependent on how the initiativecapacity is itself constituted and operating at the time, the understanding
which we reach in philosophical inquiry, including the conceptual selfunderstanding of the human, is limited by enabling conditions (our maturation as human beings, say) which are not a function of thought itself or
of the measure of the agent’s capacity for thought. Whatever we reach in
this setting in the way of understanding, then, is at best tentative, an
attempt reflecting both the evidence made available to us so far by our
own living-and-acting and our own agential maturation up to the time and
the measure of skill with which we are able at the time to discern and interpret it in its relevance to an understanding of the problematic we are
inquiring into. That means, philosophical inquiry depends above all for its
fundamental advancement, first, on expansion, purification, and sensitizing
to nuance, of the receptivity that belongs to our initiative-capacity, then on
the strength of the courage, honesty, and commitment to truth, that belong
to the essence of its distinctive endeavor, and finally, on the force and
adeptness of intellect with which what receptivity discloses and courageous and honest concern for truth frees attention to notice is able to be
brought to conceptual account. It is the fullest realization of the humanly
essential-- of the initiative-capacity of the distinctively human agent-which provides the matrix most suited for re-flective inquiry to succeed to
the extent humanly possible in its search for the truth of the problematic of
existence.
In the first part of this chapter, I have been suggesting that philosophical inquiry, carried out in a disciplined fashion over time and through
some part of the course of the evolution of our initiative-capacity, issues
eventually in an insight into being which grasps the latter as a happening
whose nature is that of a creational dynamic. Not only that, but it grasps
the human as one form of existent active being which is meant eventually
to recognize its own being as creaturely and with that its own responsibility as such a creaturely being. If human life is eventually to be lived responsibly, in consonance with reality, then it is meant to take the eventual
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shape of a religious life. Earlier we have also spoken of how, in the course
of the evolution of our initiative-capacity, we may eventually discover the
mysterious con-cretely, in the immediacy of experience. With that, we
find an opening into a religious life entered by a commitment made responsively in, and out of, such experience. Included in the embracing task
of such a life can be many and diverse forms of activity as medium for its
work, including that form which is philosophy or the truth-seeking reflective inquiry that would attain conceptual insight into truth. Such insight, into the problematic of existence and, with that, into being in its full
nature and into human being and its full nature, would then represent an
issue of a religious life, in which what is involved in that life came into full
conceptual self-understanding. xxiii The fit between being-religious in this
manner, and being-philosophically-inquisitive-and-insightful, is a potential
harbored in the nature of both, provided that being is such as we have been
claiming and that being-religious and being-philosophically-inquisitiveand-insightful have the natures we have been ascribing to them. xxiv
If religious experience relates to philosophy in such ways, it is also the
seed-bed for religion, an impetus to the birth of the vehicle through which
many human beings find help for the maturing of their initiative-capacity
and themselves as agents and for entry into a religious life. As we have
already noted, the core of religion as a social institution is myth-and-ritual,
and the function of religion (put briefly, and for the purpose at hand) is a
practical one, to assist members of a group in the enacting of a responsible
way of life that is apt to the creational nature of being. The contrasts between philosophy and religion that I would like to underline center on
three things. One concerns the matter of the social, one concerns the understanding of truth, and one concerns their relation to the practical.
1. As for the matter of the social: Philosophy is an individual endeavor, whose nature is what it is in virtue of the nature of being and of human
being. But the actual realization of this possibility of individual re-flective
inquiry is con-crete, and seen in the historical beginnings of that realization, it first arose indigenously in three places (India, Greece, China), in
the 8th through the 6th centuries BC. In each case, the cultural-civilizational matrix for the birth of philosophy was one in which religion already provided the extant horizon of intelligibility and the ordering vision for life in
the society in question. But philosophy arose as an individual endeavor
which represented a break with this traditional horizon, both with tradition
as authority (for that could not be authoritative for the inquiry which is
philosophical), and with the particular traditional visions, including those
belonging to the extant religion(s) in the society. The break took some-
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what different shapes in each of the three cases, reflecting (in part) the
determinate social conditions and, especially, the religion(s) in question.xxv
But more: In each case, philosophizing itself developed its own historical
traditions, so that the undertaking of such inquiry by later thinkers in the
traditions was in each case its beginning-again and the tradition a series of
beginning-again’s. Since all three beginnings and the beginning-again’s
included in them arose in a social and historical context and, given the
con-crete nature of such re-flection, the actualizing efforts adapted themselves those contexts in one way or another as they differentiated themselves from what else was present in them, the philosophizing in every
case was colored by the traditional horizons against which it took shape.
Thus while philosophizing is an individual affair, philosophers are members of a particular society and the matrix of their reflective inquiry is both
socially-inflected inwardly and socially-constituted outwardly; moreover,
philosophers interact with each other, simply as society-members but also
as thinkers, so that philosophy becomes in these ways part of the social
fabric, even though it is not itself a social institution, like religion, and
aspires to an understanding which goes beyond the-social and is seated in
the human as nature constitutes it.
In contrast, religion is a social institution, a social form in its essence.
Its beginnings lie, in meaning, in individual religious experience, and its
shape arises in important fashion out of creativity that develops the mythand-ritual that form its core and enable others on ceremonial occasions to
find and connect with what is disclosed in that individual experience. But
such experience, while itself taking the originator beyond the-social (both
the forms and meanings, the institutions and customs, of the society, and
the social dimension itself in the human being), is itself con-crete, and the
creativity issues in forms that are not simply to foster a connection of
members of a society with the depths of being but to offer a reading of the
implication of those depths for participation in the determinate character
and context of ordinary life and activity. Thus the social and traditional,
and the particular, are entered inherently and constructively into the mythand-ritual that form the core of the religion, and the meaning of that core is
actualized on ceremonial occasions in which the members of the group
gather to jointly participate in those occasions. Thus religion is an occasion-centered institution of a group of human beings, maintained as a traditional social form; yet it is not only begun in a way that reaches beyond
the social (but institutes this particular social form) but it is also meant to
function, on certain occasions and for the participants, to (re-)instate connection with what lies beyond the social. Even so, it is a social form itself,
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and meant to have bearing on how life in the society is to be carried on in
virtue of the ceremonially-enabled touch with the creational ‘beginning’.
2. As for the understanding of truth: Earlier, xxvi I have used the word
“truth” to stand for being as it manifests itself in and for a human apprehension that without distortion takes such being to itself as it is. Primordially, then, truth is something immediately registered and apprehended; but
our human capacities are such that understanding (in all of its various
forms) requires that apprehension be developed further via interpretation
and other capacities, if we are to have a human understanding of the truth.
As a truth-seeking-and-understanding endeavor, philosophy inquires with
the aim of bringing the truth of the problematic of existence into an insightful conceptual apprehension, and if inquiry into the problematic of
existence eventuates in insight into being as a creational affair and into human being as a type of creaturely participant in existence, then such inquiry issues in the claim that being is the happening of a universe of beings
in which the human among them are meant to find a religious life, in some
form, as the life most apt to the nature of things. xxvii The understanding
arrived at is not a matter of conjecture concerning something which is not
directly presented in experience (in that sense, theoretic) but rather of an
adequate interpretative grasp in discursive conceptual terms of matters of
immediate experience. Because philosophic inquiry is an individual and
con-crete affair, rather different views of the whole and of the human have
taken shape on the strength of such inquiry, and within them, rather different views of the ways of life in which human agents were implicated by
the structure of the whole and by their own human nature. Likewise, rather different views of how the understanding sought would be constituted,
how it could be gained, and how (when gained) it would properly function
in the living of those ways, have also emerged. But these represent (as
does this present work) attempts re-flectively to address the problematic of
existence and to bring it to a conceptual understanding which would adequately express the human capacity to bring the truth of the problematic to
concept. In reality, the diversity of philosophical perspectives represents
only diverse attempts at understanding, all to be measured against the
problematic itself and, regardless of how they seem to measure up at any
time given the evidence available then and the limited skill of any
measurer, all likely to fall short when measured against the standard of
perfection for human understanding. The understanding claimed in any
instance, then, is at best tentative, to be held in the suspense of possibly
limited evidence and limited skill in conceptualization.
In contrast, religion claims to harbor a revelation of truth, but when
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properly understood that claim is rather different from the philosophical
claim to understanding, even when it relates (as it most obviously does in
the myth-side of religion) to the same truth, that of the problematic of
existence. In the view of philosophic inquiry being developed in this
chapter, we have been claiming that such inquiry eventually arrives at an
understanding of being as creational in nature and of human being as
centered in an evolving responsive initiative-capacity which makes, in that
universe, the fulness of human engagement in existence one which enacts
the living of a religious life. Not all philosophical inquiry makes such a
claim, indeed often philosophy is pursued with a hostility to the religious.
But taking the claim being developed here, one that seems close kin to
what is claimed in religion, let us notice several significant differences.
a. Considering the myth-side of religion in particular, there is a
fundamental difference in the way truth is being claimed to be brought to
the human mind: in philosophical inquiry, it is as discerned in a conceptual
apprehension, but in religion (in myth, as it has its nature and meaning in
its function on ceremonial occasions), it is as having come to immediate
apprehension and apt symbolic rendering in the myth-maker and as being
brought to immediate presence and apprehension in the participants in the
occasion of the myth-telling and in their discovery of myth in its pointing
as a symbolic pointer into the same (previously revealed) truth. Myth is
itself what I think might best be called an indicative symbol; that is, it is
not a conceptual rendering of truth, nor is it re-presentational in a literal
fashion, but rather it is (1) functionally significant (2) of what has come
into the immediacy of experience in the person for whom the narrative is
meant to make sense of presence sufficiently to enable the person to responsibly live life in witting fashion in virtue of this disclosure. xxviii The
signifying-- the truth-pointing-out-- in which myth has its being takes place
through a symbol (the narrative) which interpretatively renders the disclosure of immediacy, but the symbol does not render that disclosure as a
likeness or copy of it meant to correspond to or re-present that disclosure
in straightforward and literal fashion. As symbolizing, the symbol focuses
attention by way of its own structure, but what is elicited as significant in
the symbol’s pointing can be understood only by further interpretation
which makes what is being intimatingly pointed to via the symbol intelligible in non-symbolic conceptual fashion. Myth is a symbol pointing
beyond itself into truth, one whose symbolic functioning may bring truth
into view more or less fully, and one whose truth-as-it-is-being-signified
requires recapture in thought if it is to be understood. The claim of myth,
then, to disclose truth is rather different from that of a philosophical
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concept.
b. There is also a fundamental difference in the point of such discovery of truth as is being achieved, say, by the participant in religious
ceremonial occasions and by the re-flective inquirer who is conceptually
rendering the truth that has become manifest. The latter, as inquirer, is
concerned only with understanding truth, and more precisely, with a conceptual rendering of truth that can withstand criticism and that makes the
best possible use of the evidence available. The point of religion, however, is not such understanding but rather fostering the natural transformation of the human initiative-capacity which enables the human being to
partake, wittingly and willingly, in a way of living-and-acting that is commensurate with the creational character of being. This involves helping
bring the human being to apprehend truth in the immediacy of his/her own
experience on ceremonial occasions, and to be able to maintain touch with
it and live by it in the movement of commitment beyond those occasions
and into ordinary life and its affairs. For the practical work of transformation to be achieved, a conceptual rendering of the truth disclosed in such
immediacy not only is not needed but would also not be helpful, indeed for
most persons would be ineffective, and worse, distracting and counter-productive; what is needed instead is a symbol that could be effective for all
participants in its pointing into immediate presence, and more broadly, an
efficacy to the dynamic of ceremonial occasions such that the symbol can
work effectively within the participants in the occasions to point to truth’s
immediate presence and to open the way to his/her direct response.
In the course of the development of certain major religions, and beyond them, in the development of human conceptuality in two of those civilizations in which philosophy eventually came to birth, religion itself developed an added component beyond the essential, one which we call (using its name as it developed in the Western tradition) theology. (In the tradition of early India, it would best be called brahmanical reflection.) What
is distinguishing about theology is the emergence within the institution of
religion of a conceptuality which, taking myth-and-ritual as authoritative,
seeks to interpret them as conveying a truth that can be articulated conceptually and defended, the latter being called for especially as conceptuality evolves outside religion and religion requires defense. That it is tradition-bound, and explicatory of ritual-and-myth and of various components of this core of religion, distinguishes such theological thinking from
philosophy. The con-crete relation of the two-- theology and philosophy-has differed historically, even within the same tradition. But structurally,
we can single out a common focal point for possible tension and conflict
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as regards this matter of truth.
The narrative form of myth invites, as central in the symbolizing whole
which it is, a personalization of the depths of being and the power present
there, so that structurally, the story line begins at the ‘beginning’ of time,
and begins with the god(s) (or distinct divine beings, often represented as
male and/or female) as power(s) at work; and the story line provides such
an account of the acts and events in which the origin(s) of ‘our world today’ are visible as can, in recalling us to that ‘beginning’, place us amidst
the impetus harbored in that ‘beginning’ toward some future to be lived into by us in this-way rather than in that-way. Because such a narrative is
formulated with the then-current state of the institutions of the social group
in mind, and more broadly, in keeping with the then-current state of knowledge at the time, the myth can speak pointedly to the people for whom it
was originally shaped and speak regarding life in the world as they could
readily see it and see themselves taking part in it. This inclusion in the
narrative symbol (myth as symbolic story focused on the ‘beginning’) of
the non-symbolic (the descriptive elements relating to the world ‘today’,
and perhaps to legendary times preceding ‘today’ but not ‘in the beginning’) can be addressed theologically, and philosophically, in different
ways, with quite different consequences.
The first is an address which detaches the myth from its ceremonialtelling setting and from the functioning there in which it has its genuine
meaning and power to point to truth. Here the symbolizing which I am
claiming is the essence of myth is dismissed or disregarded, and the sense
of myth as symbol in this sense-- as indicative symbol-- missed. Such an
abstracting is common to much theology and to all philosophical approaches that I have so far encountered, even though it is not inherent in
the nature of philosophical inquiry. Such an address misses truth both as
myth points the ceremonial participant to it and as the myth-maker sought
to bring it into his/her symbolic story.
The second is an address which, relating to the detached story as somehow claiming truth, seeks its meaning and the nature of its claim either by
an allegorical reading of the narrative or simply by literalistic interpretation. In the former case, the matters which the narrative’s characters and
events are taken to stand for and (in some cases, at least) be figurative representations of (to ‘signify symbolically’, but in a rather different meaning of the phrase from what I mean when speaking of myth as an indicative
symbol) are conceptualized and substituted for the figurative representations, and the conceptual translation is then considered from a ‘rational’
perspective and (in the case of theology) explained and defended as a re-
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presentation of truth, or (in the case of the philosopher) explored and considered for the light it might throw on the problematic of existence as
he/she addresses it. Whether the approach is allegorical or literalistic,
whether the procedure is apologetic or critical, myth is regarded as (actually or potentially) representing truth, and whatever the assessment as to
how well it does this, myth has become totally lost as myth as I understand
it. Indeed, thought can take this mode of address to myth to an even further extreme, as commonly occurs in studies of the human which aspire to
be ‘scientific’. In these approaches from the outside, it is common not
only to take the myth out of its ceremonial context and to consider its story
line alone, but to treat its obvious effort to provide an intelligible framework for understanding life here-and-now as expression of a kind of prescientific but theoretical thought-venture, reflecting thus a primitive (prescientific) explanatory concern that was distorted and conditioned by much
ignorance, fear, and superstition.
If we would properly understand the relation of religion to truth, however, we need to approach myth (sacred story) in its ceremonial setting and
functioning, and to pursue from that perspective the numerous questions
that can be asked about it and its complex and distinctive relation to truth,
quite different from that of the philosopher’s conceptualization of truth, let
alone the scientist’s grasp of what is objectively there. For example: How
full was the originative disclosure in its immediacy? How discerning and
full was the interpretation which originally rendered that disclosure? How
effective was the symbolic account the myth-maker developed in pointing
him/her back to what was open in the immediacy of the originative experience? How well does the story-account hold the revelation open for the
myth-maker, let alone point someone who did not participate in the experience in question into its revelatory meaning? Even more, how well do
the ceremonial occasion and the telling work to convoke in the listeners
the inwardness needed to enable the story to have the matrix within which
its symbolic pointing can operate as intended by the myth-maker?
3. As for the practical: We have seen that while philosophy includes
inquiry into practice, it is not itself a form of practical thought and only
indirectly contributes to practice. For example, its conceptual formulation
of the problematic of existence introduces, as resource present in and
available to the agent, a conceptually-formed orientational-horizon for the
witting engagement with circumstance, a purportedly-relevant-to-anyhuman-being horizon additional to that present in the particular interpretations that are at work practically in the individual’s decision-makingand-executing. Yet in regard to all such readings of the problematic of
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existence-- both the directly practical that is involved in the interpretations
at work in the decision-making, and the re-flective that is available to the
agent as supportive indirectly--, these are all secondary factors in the actual decision-making to the receptivity and awareness, attention and concentration, in virtue of which the con-crete decision-making takes shape
within immediate disclosure of the factors involved and finds there also
the initial impetus for its forming in this-way rather than in that-way. If
the supportive (here the interpretative and the philosophically conceptual)
can operate as effectively supportive of the immediately disclosive and can
inflect rather than dominate the decision-making and its exercise of judgment, then the reading which they introduce can indeed aid such decisionmaking and the practical can benefit from (among other things) the philosophically re-flective if and when the latter is called into play. The alternative is a dominance whereby the interpretative and conceptual are employed as sufficient surrogates for the immediate, and decision-making
utilizes those surrogates to steer by, without reference back to immediacy
beyond what the conceptualizations bring to the fore. In the case of philosophically re-flective insights, which are generally too universal and abstract for direct use, such use would also mistake the meaning of such ideas
as re-flective; for these are articulations of immediate presence whose reflective meaning is discernible only as that immediate presence and
character are also being registered and held to in a way that reaches quite
beyond what is rendered conceptually and held to as what makes such
ideas relevant but tentative, at best to be affirmed and employed in keeping with that status.
In the case of religion, we have urged that it is in essence a practical
institution addressed to human beings in their distinctive initiative-capacity
and shaped to function on ceremonial occasions to foster the transformation of that capacity. It is meant, then, to facilitate an initiating and
carrying on of activity in our ordinary life which adapts our ways of livingand-acting to the nature of being. Yet the actual achievement of such transformation is not the work of the institution by itself, but depends most importantly on the manner of participation of the participants, on their enabling and allowing myth-and-ritual to work as they are fitted to do and on
their responding to what that working accomplishes. Essential to that participation, and to the effectiveness of the working of myth-and-ritual, is an
inwardness in the participants which enables the participant, in keeping
with the meaning of the symbolizing work of these forms, to find and
maintain responsive touch with what lies beyond these forms in the depths
of being, the disclosed-in-its-truth presence of the power in the depths of
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being. In the measure in which this participation succeeds, the issue is a
being-religious which, while inflected by these forms, is neither a function
of them nor confined by them. The achievement is rather a condition of
responsibility which, while inflected indeed by the terms of the religion,
transcends simple acceptance of those terms (however understood, whether literally or symbolically), being centered back in the depths of being as
holding a presence being responsively cleaved to first-hand. This sort of
transcendence, while retaining the terms as inflecting the condition, involves a spirituality that, reaching beyond any terms, knows a freedom to
interpret those terms-- and whatever else depends on them-- out of the
first-hand acquaintance with what they symbolically point to. In this
sense, there is considerable kinship between the being-religious I have
spoken of that is not dependent on religion, and that which is, with the
significant difference of the presence of the institutional terms in the one
and not the other.
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NOTES

i. I usually hyphenate “concrete” in order to underline that in those cases I am
using it with its etymological sense in mind, that of the Latin concresco, that is,
“to grow together”. Commonly the word is used for the specific and particular, or
the real in contrast with the abstract; these do not represent the meaning of concrete as I use it, even though that with which a being ‘grows together’ (other active
beings, say) is something with a specific and particular element in its character and
is something real. I am emphasizing the connecting (of active beings, say) and the
realizing (that is, actualizing) of something that is taking place in that connecting.
ii. I hyphenate “reflection” in numerous places, in order to emphasize that I
am not referring simply to “thinking” or “thought” but to a specific mode of
thought, one undertaken from the standpoint of a human agent cast back on him/herself as responsible agent and needing to think something through from that
standpoint.
iii. The terms “actual”, “actuality”, and “actualizing” can have two very different but connected meanings. They could signify the emergence of a being as an
existing center of activity beyond its simple selfhood, thus of an actual center
actually participating by its activity in the realm of actuality; this is in contrast
with a being in its simple being, which is pre-temporal-and-spatial, pre-existence.
[“Emergence” refers to the creational act; such emergence is not itself a temporal
affair, but what emerges is an existing time-and-space enabled-and-conditioned
active center.] However, the terms can also be used in a different meaning, to
signify the actualizing in that existent center’s activity of its own determinate
potentiality as an existent being; in this meaning, “actualizing its being” refers to
the actualizing of the active being of the existent, that is, of the capacities and
powers that belong to it as actually existing. Such actualizing is a temporal affair,
whereas the becoming actual that occurs in the emergence of an existent active
being in the act of creation is not temporal. For kindred thoughts to “simple being”
and “interactive existence”, one might consult Spinoza and the distinction he
makes in his Ethics between the existence of things insofar as they follow with
necessity from the nature of God and their existence as finite and determinate
members of the common order of things.
iv. For the internal complexity of the ‘now’ and the ‘here’, see the discussion
in Chapter 2. The 'never' of the now-never-then and here-never-there which mark
the here-and-now of every existent, that is, the 'not's' which space-and-time (as
enabling conditions for existing beings) introduce as accompaniments to the ‘are’
of existing, negate existence; they are not the 'not' of non-being, which negates
being, and with it, would negate spatio-temporal existence altogether, together
with space-and-time.
v. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part IV, “At Noon”. For a study of this work of
Nietzsche’s, see Chapters 13-14 which conclude my larger study of various works
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of Nietzsche’s, entitled The Well of Eternity.
vi. I speak of “ultimate reality” here (or elsewhere, of being in its “ultimate
fulness”) with the overtones of the etymological sense of “ultimate” in mind (from
Latin, ultimus, “last, final”). For within the dynamic of being, the at-stake is the
meant-to-be culmination and completeness of being, which is to arise in and
through activity and to bring the be-coming of being to its end in fulness from its
beginning in the sheer being-at-all of beings-diverse-in-self-as-beings. The atstake at the heart of being, then, points into being in two directions-- back to its
‘beginning’ in the simple-being-of-beings-other-to-each-other, a ‘beginning’
which the at-stake discloses as by itself incomplete, only a starting point, and onward to its ‘end’ or final issue, the meant-to-be culmination of being in its ultimate
concrete fulness. Between this ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ is the interactive existence
which forms the existential mid-point of being, in and for which that culminating
‘end’ is at once at stake and the final achievement of active beings.
vii. In some cases, the fulness of the active nature of a being includes an
evolved fulness at its center; for what this means in the case of human beings, cf.
the further discussion in Chapter 3.
viii. For a fuller discussion of this matter, in primary connection with human
being and activity, cf. Chapter 3.
ix. “Adequate” here means “according with the standards-and-measures of
this maturational meant-to-be”. See Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of this
matter.
x. We get a revealing perspective on our ordinary experiencing when, whether
for a moment (as in a simple pause to look) or for more than a moment (as in
boredom), the practical concern animating our registering of presence drops away
and our attention, often minimal at such times, gives us us things simply ‘there’,
greeting us with many an expression on their face but with that familiar sensible
face itself obtrusive, themselves swallowed up behind it-- certainly so far as our
senses go, since they are super-ficial by nature, but even so far as the impress of
other beings on us through our senses is concerned. We can realize at such times
how much our experience is not an unfiltered receiving of the given but inflected
by interpretation and inference, by care and selectivity, by different degrees of
attentiveness, so much so that it is impossible to think of it as a simple ‘letting
things be’.
xi. Childhood is marked by a growth in overall capacity as an agent, including
a developing receptivity which, while still quite limited, can make us aware, when
we are functioning effectively to the limit of our limited capacities, of ourselvesand-other-beings in this mode of the magical. At the time, we can recognize the
distinctive feel of such times-- the discovery of ourselves made joyful and excited
amidst and in engagement with things and the register in this mode of ourselvesand-others-coming-together-con-cretely in an interplay that carries a sense of
purposiveness or meaningfulness--, and know it is different from other times of
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pleasure, enjoyment, and the like, even though we have no word, no distinguishing
name, for such times. It is only in retrospect that we can even discern expressly,
understand, and put into words, that the animating joy and excitement are in some
way registering the depths-in-being and have something in the way of depth to
themselves accordingly. It is such times which are being interpreted, in the
imagery of times of ascent to the heights in the pre-existence of the soul, by the
Platonic Socrates, and affirmed as essential to our evolution as human beings and
to what, in adult life, we come to learn-and-know in an act of recollection. (See
my discussion of recollection in Loving and Dying, Chapter 4 of the treatment of
the Phaedo, 52-61.) Spinoza also seems to glimpse something of the difference
between ‘joy’ and ‘pleasure’ here, when he differentiates-- within joy (laetitia) as
it involves body and mind together-- pleasurable amusement (titillatio) from joyousness (hilaritas) and makes the difference turn on whether one part of the
person is affected more than other parts (that is pleasurable amusement) or all
parts are equally affected (that is joyousness). (See the Scholium to Proposition
XI, Part III, of the Ethics.) Spinoza is not speaking of childhood alone, but the
sense of joyousness involving the whole person fits with the sense of joy and
inward integration I have in mind in our participation in the magical, in contrast
with much of so-called pleasure (of food, of sex, and so on), which involves a
focus on particular parts or aspects of our being.
xii. If it weren’t for the confusion with a Hegelian or a Freudian usage, what
is taking place could be spoken of as an Aufheben or ‘sublimation’, the emergence
of the higher-and-more-fully-evolved from the lower-and-less-fully-evolved. It is
the same receptivity that is involved, and an evolution out of itself in the mode-or the measure and manner-- in which it opens us to the fulness marking the
connecting we are taking part in as existing participant agents in a creational
universe.
xiii. The preceding sketch is a simplification, and if one takes it as more than
suggestive, it is too neat. For not only does life not unfold following any such
progression-pattern, but its meant-to-be includes the capacity to retrieve what is
missed in its own natural time, and even to be entered into an earlier-than-meantto-be realization of this-or-that. Nonetheless, the schema has roots in the fundamental meant-to-be of maturation and needs to be placed back in the reader’s own
experience of maturing to avoid being taken in by the simplification.
xiv. The account of religion which follows is developed at further length in
my Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy, Part I (Chapters 1-6 and the
Postscript to Part I), 1-72.
xv. The story and action are “sacred” in several ways. As for myth, it is a
story or narrative account which brings the self-revelation of the depths of being
(the mysterious, generally grasped as the divine) to speech; it is a story the
creation of which is divinely inspired, and the telling of which on ceremonial
occasions is meant to bring the listener-participants back into touch with the
depths of being whose self-revelation was impetus to the story-creation; and
finally, its content brings the nisus of being into a narrative symbol of an act/acts
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of ‘creation’, of pivotal creational ‘events’ in which the divine/the-depths-of-being
is involved as active power. Thus myth is sacred story as a divinely-inspired
narrative account of a ‘drama’ in which something is at stake, which embodies
revelation concerned with the creational action of the divine and whose telling on
ceremonial occasions is meant to enable listeners to gain-or-recover cognizance of
the divine in this creational activity. As for ritual, it is a symbolic action in which
the participant-performers, carrying out the action on a ceremonial occasion, are
inwardly ingathered in a reference of the human-as agent back to the depths of
being and are entered into a dedicating of life-as-an-active-affair to the directive
power in those depths. NOTE: It is absolutely critical for understanding what I am
saying, and for the meaning of the story which functions as myth, that we
recognize that the meaning of the story as myth is discovered only in and through
the heightened and expanded awareness of the participant in the ceremonial
occasion, or in and through some comparable awareness in someone who tells or
listens to the story. We live in a literate culture, and are so used to taking up with
“myth” in its written form, that we unconsciously bring to bear in our attempt to
understand it presuppositions that do not relate to speech in a ceremonial setting.
The disclosing achieved in and through the story in that setting is nothing contained in the words themselves, and thus something accessible simply by study of
them as they might be apprehended as meaning something on any occurrence and
in any sounding of them, quite apart from the actual context of their functional
use. Quite the contrary: Apart from the ceremonial setting and its telling in that
context, the myth-story is not myth; the dynamic of the ceremonial occasion (the
earnestness, the concentration and ingatheredness, of the participants, the sense of
the serious and holy, and the character of the voicing of the story by the speaker-a voicing which re-inforces the concentration, intentness, participation of the
listeners from out of their deeper selves) helps enhance and empower the
responsive powers of the participants so that they can “see” beyond what their
“normal” functioning discloses. The horizon-defining speech which is myth is
shaped to have its distinctive disclosive force and way of meaning in the
ceremonial telling and listening, within the dynamic of that happening: it is as
uttered and heard there that it is myth, is the disclosive speech it is. (Cf. HHMP,
III/21-24, and IV/44-45.)
xvi. As for ritual: as I understand it, ritual is ceremonially-performed sacred
action, which is that side of religion which addresses us in our need to live our
own lives willingly and which helps shape the second moment in the forming of a
religious being in ourselves (the moment of commitment). Unlike activity in other
contexts, which is defined by its instrumentality for the producing of certain
results and is organized and carried out under this purposive reference, ritual is a
settled pattern of activities whose character is formal and symbolic and which is
defined by its religious function. The ritual-action, as performed on a ceremonial
occasion, is meant to call forth the divine in reference to the human, to enact in
formal and symbolic fashion the willing referral of the human back to the divine
(the responsive yielding of one’s active being and a committing of that being
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which is-- and is to remain-- faithful to the summons of such divine power), and
by entering such capacities and life-involvements into their place in a life
dedicated to following out the summons of the divine, to evoke a divine response
that is supportive and favorable. Participation in ritual on ceremonial occasions,
thus, to meant to recall the participants back into the immediate presence of the
mysterious in the depths of being and to enact in its immediate presence the
willing commitment of human capacity-and-involvement to a life dedicated to
following out the summons of that power. In this way participation in ritual is to
shape the willing side to the being-religious which is to be the issue of taking part
in religion.
xvii. The telling-and-story thus has something like what the Platonic Socrates
would call a recollective function.
xviii. The relation of myth to truth, thus, is a complex one. Formally, truth is
being as it manifests itself in and for a human apprehension that without distortion
takes such being to itself as it is. Because being is itself articulated-- the face of
things, actuality, being-in-its-fulness-of-final-reality--, truth is being as it manifests itself in one or another of several references. In these different references,
how truth is disclosed and how it is appropriately rendered may well differ. Myth
has the function of mediating in communicative fashion between an original
revelatory presence to the myth-maker of the truth of being in its creational nisus
and the discovery of a cognate revelatory presence by listeners. Thus myth-making begins in the self-revelation of being as regards its creational nisus, as this
aspect in the depths of being enters into immediate apprehension in the originative
revelation; this truth, as interpreted by the myth-maker, is what the symbolizing
story he/she creates is formed to communicate, and the symbol(s) involved are to
function to point participants in the ceremonial occasion back into this truth as an
element in their own immediate presence. But whether such truth is actually
communicated depends on the participant’s response to the symbolizing story,
his/her enabling it to point to the self-manifestation of being as something that has
entered into the field of his/ her immediate apprehension in the ceremonial occasion. And finally, there is the participants own interpretative apprehension of the
cognate revelatory presence he/she discovers, his/her understanding of the truth
being communicated in immediacy. There are limitations, distortions, misreadings, and other inadequacies possible in the reception and interpretation of truth in
the various revelatory, formative, receptive, and interpretative, situations, so that
no absolute disclosure of truth can ever be presumed to be the case. But the heart
of the communicative effort concerns the truth of being in its creational nisus, as
something disclosed con-cretely to human beings. (Cf. HHMP, VI/56-65.)
xix. Thus Buddhist spirituality is rather different from Christian spirituality,
and internal to each major religion there may be sectarian differences which affect
the spirituality that is achieved with the help of the religion. Myth and ritual,
while symbolic and functional as pointing via the symbolic into the depths of
being, are meant to foster the discovery of those depths in their immediacy and a
responsive holding to the power in that presence as what is primary, both in the
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ceremonial occasions and in the being-religious which is to rise out of the
transformation of the participants on those occasions. Thus while the symbolic
forms are meant to help bring participants in the ceremonial back self-aware into
the presence of the depths-of-being, they do so as providing an interpretative
guidance to us concerning what to make of such presence, which we must in turn
make something of by interpreting the symbolic; and thus as the ceremonial is
meant to send us off into subsequent participation in the activity, events, and
changes, of life ahead, readied to take part in appropriate fashion, that fashion is
one in which the immediacy is primary, the symbolic and the interpretative is
supplementary and secondary, even if also important.
xx. It is quite possible to see, in what is stirred up inwardly on ceremonial
occasions, only emotion, say, and to miss altogether any revelatory element, even
when presence harbors such an element. It need not harbor such an element, of
course, and the excitement may in reality be merely emotional and of no cognitive
significance, however much it may be felt, say, as reinforcing one’s ‘faith’.
xxi. In the case of religion, I have stopped short of treating one important but
(in human history) fairly recent development, namely, the employment of writing
in the functioning of some religions, especially major ones like Christianity,
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism. Where this has taken the form of
writing down myth, and especially where recorded myth has become open to all
participants in the religion to peruse and make what they can of the narrative
account, this has rather significantly altered the way myth has come to be
understood and to have a role in the religion.
xxii. If one attempts to turn a reflective understanding to practical (i.e. pragmatic) use, by (say) taking one’s claimed-understanding as pattern to steer one’s
own functioning by, one becomes a play-actor, not an agent interacting con-cretely
with circumstance but a role-player, and distorts the actualization of nature in this
regard.
xxiii. Given the nature of re-flective ideas, that they discursively and
conceptually articulate matters of experience, bringing presence into the
intelligibility of the conceptual, then it is questionable whether an adequate insight
into the creational nature of being is possible before the inquirer’s responsible
participation in existence-- and in particular, in the activity of re-flection-- has
already discovered the mysterious con-cretely, in the immediacy of first-hand experience. Such discovery, of course, may be quite variable in the con-crete, and
even such as not to be recognized in its import.
xxiv. Philosophy is a discipline of inquiry which can be occasioned in many
ways, and can be pursued in many ways. First-hand religious experience is hardly
a common, let alone an indispensable, occasioning or directive force for such
inquiry, although if the truth of being is creational in nature, confirmation of any
such insight would depend on evidence disclosed in such experience.
xxv. For accounts of these three beginnings, see my three studies: The Beginnings of Philosophy in India, The Beginnings of Philosophy in China, and The
Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece (see also, in the case of Greece, Homer and
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Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy).
xxvi. See Note 18, above.
xxvii. It is because we see, in the beginnings of philosophy in the three places
and times I mention above, rather different but kindred attempts to understand the
problematic of existence in a way that addressed, with some directness, this matter
of being as a creational affair and of human being as a distinctive form of agency
in that creational whole, that those beginnings have a continuing relevance and
helpfulness to our philosophizing today. See my three works: The Beginnings of
Philosophy in India, The Beginnings of Philosophy in China, and The Beginnings
of Philosophy in Greece. To observe briefly: In early India, we find various ways
of understanding the creational structure of being in the Upanishads, especially
ways employing the notions of brahman (holy power) and _tman (self).
[[Comment on the variety, but the basic differences between the Upanishads-- and
the Gita-- and what I am doing, when it comes to the structure of the happening of
being? ]] In China, we find the kindred but contrasting ideas of Lao-zi and
Zhuang-zi, the two main figures originative of the Daoist tradition of
philosophizing in early China; with the former, there is the ‘mother’ Way and her
creatures as wayfarers, while with the latter there are a number of (mostly playful)
‘names’ for a ‘creator’ other than its creatures (for examples, the “Great Clod”, the
“maker of things”, “Heaven”, “Strange Source”, “non-being”), put into the mouths
of one or another character in the stories Zhuang-zi uses almost exclusively to
communicate his thought. [[Note the absence of the creational in Confucius, its
presence in Mo-zi?]] In Greece, we find the development from Heraclitus to
Parmenides, and after the latter’s thematization of “being”, “non-being”, and
“seeming”, the Platonic and Aristotelean muting and specifying of this path of
thought for conceptualizing the universe as a unity. [[ (a) “Being” appears as a
central theme in some of the early Greeks, but not exactly being as I am talking of
it; thus (b) given the way Parmenides started and Plato and Aristotle followed up,
the focus of express reflection left “being” behind in favor of the ‘cosmological’ or
'metaphysical' structure of the world, and then as the Judaic-Christian language
became entered into philosophical inquiry (and the reverse: as the Judaic and
Christian religions developed ‘theological’ reflection), that structure of the world
became grasped through notions of creation which make God as an entity
(personal) the beginning-point of the creational dynamic. Only with Heidegger
does re-flection expressly return to “being”. [[CH1-CM11]]]]
xxviii. I have an etymological overtone in mind in speaking of an indicative
symbol (indico, from the Latin in-, “in”, and dico, “speak” and particularly, “point
out in intimating fashion”); myth is a narrative which comes alive as the
intimating speech it is in the ceremonial occasion and in the presence of the truth
it would point the participant to.

Chapter 2
Space and time, and science
A. Starry skies above
For us human beings, experience is a continuing affair, and even in
that ongoing involvement of ourselves with our circumstance which we
think of as quite ordinary, both what we experience and our experiencing
are complex and incredibly varied. It is not simply that what we
encounter in the circumstance of our existence is diverse and changing,
or that the inward functioning of ourselves in our interacting with
circumstance is also continually shifting and changing. But in virtue of
the fact that the continuing register in us of both outward and inward
takes place with the help of our powers of attention and awareness, we
engage with what we are encountering and register both sides of the
encountering as a global mass that is differentiated in presence and
appearance, and as regards our apprehending, is diversified (for one
thing) into conscious-subconscious-unconscious. Given that attention
and awareness operate in the forming of our activity as a venturing in
which something is at stake, our agential condition as beings who care is
the matrix for such forming and thus for our paying attention and becoming and being aware. Therefore the formative powers at the heart of our
involvement give rise to an experiencing, the immediate given in which-
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- whatever else it also is-- is ever being felt in the vein of ‘something
bearing more or less significantly on our venturing’ and is registering
primordially as such in the decision-making-and-executing of ourselves
as active beings. In terms of attention and awareness, a significant amount of the diverse and changing factors in our experience is found at
the periphery of our conscious awareness and attention and is continually
being dismissed by us as irrelevant, unimportant, unworthy of express
notice, because we are preoccupied, our minds already focusing elsewhere, on other (interesting or important or ... ) things. Yet even in what
we are consciously attending to, whether it is a part of our current
circumstance or something at a distance in time and/or space (in memory,
say), there is change in what aspect of the matters with which we are
preoccupied is coming to notice as we entertain, consider, or attend to,
them under our sense of ‘something matters’.
This sense of ‘something matters’ makes our participation in the affairs of existence such that, as we receive presence into ourselves, we are
usually ready to shift our attention quickly when something registers in
us and catches our attention as seeming to matter more-- as (say) a
disturbing distraction, or even, as at times it happens, as enticing and
inviting us to divert our attention and take note of it. Such intrusions
reflect that our more or less attentive regarding is not simply continually
sorting out and selecting among impressions and thus emphasizing
certain things while dismissing much, but is also a taking in and
registering which is usually on the alert for a mattering which is not
confined by what is currently guiding our sorting out. Depending on the
degree of our concentration, our engrossment or absorption, and the like,
and on how much what we are involved in matters to us, such impression-making things-- sometimes from around us, sometimes from
within ourselves, and sometimes in a conjunction of the two-- may not
only intrude effectively but, depending on what they touch on in us in
the way of care and interest, may take our attention completely away
from what we have been focused on, at least for a moment. And yet in
the presence of conflicting solicitations for our attention, we may also
successfully block out such enticements, more or less aware of what we
are doing, and concentrate all the more intently on what is occupying us.
If simplification and focusing amidst the globally-received enables a
conscious attention to and awareness of certain things among a mass of
what is nonetheless being received and registered and responded to
somehow (even if in the manner of indifference), the confluence of
inward and outward factors that are changing can readily bring shifts in
attention and awareness that take us by surprise, even startle us. I
remember a springtime evening in the early 1970s when, after a three-
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hour graduate seminar that had occupied me and engaged all ten of us in
rather intense and interesting discussion over much of the time, I walked
down the staircase to the first floor of Sparks Building on the
Pennsylvania State University campus and headed for the doorway, the
evening’s work still returning to mind in this-aspect then in that-aspect.
As I pushed open the door and, moving through the opening, was ushered
out into the evening air, the warmth and darkness embraced me, and
relaxing in my response to it, the release of my attention and awareness
from the evening’s work and the concentration that it had involved came
to completion. I descended the small number of outside steps and moved
down the short sidewalk out into an open area bounded by Sparks behind
me, Pattee Library on the left and another building straight ahead, which
was obscurely visible through the screen of a few trees; coming in from
my right, and leading up to the Library steps on my left, was the end of
a mall and walkways, leading from downtown State College into the
campus and lined with tall trees. As I started across this relatively
enclosed open area, letting the presence soak in-- the smell, the warmth,
the buildings, the trees--, I looked upward to what was a starry-sky
visible above the trees and buildings. Suddenly, it changed: no longer
stars, but now small lights standing out of the darkness between them, a
visible array of light-points above just up there. It was as if I had become
released not simply from the work-related filter for my attention and
awareness but even from the ordinary twentieth-century American filter
for taking in the context of life. Disoriented for the moment, I immersed
myself in presence, but without (at least much of) the interpretative
element a twentieth-century person such as I was at that time would
unconsciously employ. And as I let the lights impress themselves on me
and dwelled with the immediately given in unhurried contemplation, I
was soon transported back mentally to the early Greeks whom I had just
been teaching and to the very different way they would have read the
same immediate impress of what we would both call a star-filled sky. A
brief moment of reflection (‘I wonder ...’) ensued, on how this same
appearance might have been interpreted and (as interpreted) have worked
upon someone contemplating it in another age-- not ancient Greek, not
contemporary-- and with a different understanding of what was being
encountered; then followed a thought on the contrast in experience of
such a person-- or an ancient Greek, for that matter-- with someone like
myself, with my modern-science-refracted interpretative sense of those
specks of light and the way in which that sense led me to grasp the darkness as significant of a spatial expansiveness and those lights as quite
distant stars-- how different would be the way that same array of light
and darkness in the nighttime sky would enter into the living of the lives
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of those others and of myself! And finally, as I felt my response to an
expansiveness which (reading it the way I was) seemed spatially and
temporally without discernible bound, I also found the responsive rise
within myself of ambivalent feelings: on the one hand, feeling dwarfed,
being 'at sea' in a vastness which we only minutely register in the
immediacy of our experience and at best only penetrate conjecturally
with our changing but purportedly improving thoughts, being without
direction amid such an unending world that seems so little hospitable as
glimpsed from an earthly perspective, and yet, on the other hand, feeling
joy and curiosity in finding myself amidst so much for us human beings
still to discover and explore, so much that reaches beyond the ordinary
circumstance of our earthly existence and, however much we may be
oblivious to it almost all the time, is nonetheless there all the while. And
yet, I will die ignorant of most of what is to be discovered about the ‘out
there’. The dual challenge--- both that of being overwhelmed and disoriented by the outward, and that of dying largely ignorant of this context
life involves me in-- provoked something else to rise in its turn, a sense
of life as nonetheless an exciting adventure which harbors inwardly
something which was-- or promises to be-- a match for such challenges. i
With that recall to myself inwardly, my contemplative and re-flective
moment ended, and turning my eyes away from the sky and dismissing
my thoughts about its register in me, I moved across the remaining open
space before me and around the library and went on toward home.
Had that been a more recent time, a night in the twenty-first century
when the Hubble telescope pictures, interpreted through a complex theoretical framework, could have entered my reflections, the intervention of
that instrument and the operation of that framework would have
amplified and intensified the resonance of that bare visual presence in
and to my musing. The pictures, by magnifying and bringing close the
visual presence of the heavens, give strength to the register of those
points of light: the visually small and close (right up there!) is the
perspectival presence of extremely distant (and only theoretically
grasped) light-sources in an indefinitely large, even expanding, spatial
expanse-- so we now think! For our present purposes, however, what is
important in that brief encounter with the night-time sky is not the sense
that would have been intensified by Hubble, but rather, two other things:
one is the loss by the heavens of its interpretative mantle and the
realization of how much our experience is interpretatively inflected; the
other is how, as genuine knowledge advances and enters into our way of
taking up with circumstance, we find a challenge arising, to understand
this knowing which we are accomplishing and to learn how to live with
it.
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1. Here and now ii
In Chapter 1, we spoke of space and time as enabling conditions,
within being, for existence and existent active beings. Let us expand
upon that notion, and do so by noticing certain usually ignored-- and
when noticed, usually misinterpreted-- features of the ongoing existence
which is ours every day.
a. Time and temporality
In the interacting in which we take part in existence and have our
being as an active affair, we find ourselves ever active in a present which
has a complex spatial-and-temporal character that is a function of the
enabling conditions of space and time. Looking first to the temporal side
of that present, we notice that our active participation in the interacting
which time enables is, in each participant, ever taking place now, in a
now which is ever moving yet ever itself (the same yet different, the same
in being different), and in a now which has a directionality to its
movement because it has its own inherent beginning and ending such
that its movement is toward its end, away from its beginning. Thus it is
ever diminishing the (future) time between itself and its end and ever
augmenting the (past) time between itself and its own beginning.
Expressed more fully:
a. As the now which co-enables (with space) our active-existence,
the time of our existing is ever the same from the beginning of our living
and acting to the end, and yet this stationary and unvarying side to time,
the unmoving now of our ongoing involvement, is ever matched by the
flow and fluctuation, the newness and difference, of an ongoing side of
that now. What passes in this sense does so only in tension and contrast
with the unvarying, and the time of our existing is the unity of these two
sides to the now.
b. The movement of time involved in this internal tension and
contrast of stationary and ongoing is enabled by bounds that are internal
to the stationary side of the now and are determinative for the moving
side: an end introducing the future and the futural as the direction of
time’s movement, and a beginning introducing the past. Without such
bounds, there could be no moving side to time and no direction to its
movement. Time is actual as a currently ongoing-now which has ever
already left behind one of its bounds and has ever not yet reached the
other, and whose moving is a continual transforming into itself-ascurrent of the not-yet of its end-bounded future and a continual being
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transformed into the no-longer-current that is augmenting the actuality
of its beginning-bounded past. In this actualizing of itself time is
continually making itself last, and this, by continuously diminishing and
increasing (respectively) the future and past harbored in its bounds.
So far, time, in the form of such an internally complex and structured
now, is one enabling condition for active-existents, itself actual as everand-continually being structurally concentrated into the ongoing-andlasting that is going on somewhere between its own beginning and its
own end. In virtue of time as itself so constituted, our existence is
temporal as
a participational initiating-and-carrying-on of activity from out of ourselves, in the forming of which our whole active-being is temporally concentrated and available (somehow) in-and-to this initiating-andcarrying-on. Thus we find the onward movement in our enabling time
matched by our continuous participational initiating-and-carrying-on in
the current ongoing of our now, and we find ourselves continuing to exist
as whole-beings whose constitution is internally altering and its balance
shifting in a way reflecting the role of future and past in this initiatingand-carrying-through: the potential (future) of our endowment being
maintained but altering as it is in process of being realized, say, and the
amplified participational resources (past) being retained as they are
developed from our original endowment. Thus our basic temporality is
such that future and past, potential and developed resource, enter continuingly-but-changingly into the initiating-and-carrying-on which are
taking place in the ongoing now of our enabling time. (More on this in
Chapters 3 and 4, when we consider the distinctively human.)
In our active existence, the present has further features of its temporal
complexity in virtue of the way time functions in coordination with space
as a co-condition enabling active-existence. But to discern that further
feature, we need first to consider the spatial side of the present.
b. Space and spatiality
Space is the enabling condition for our existence as an active participation in an interacting, such that (1) our participation is ever out of ourselves here but (2) is connecting us with other beings who, spatially from
our here, are there, yet who in their own right are active in their own
here’s and who join with us in the interacting as themselves being active
out of themselves in those here’s and interacting with us as we are
entered into their there’s. This here-there-here structure to the nature of
space makes it complex in its own way.

a. For one thing, the here of our own distinct being-- the primordial facet of space as enabling an individual active being-- makes us
relate to every other being spatially as there, but that there is not the
primordial spatial place of the being of others, indeed of any active being.
Rather, the there is only a spatially directional affair that is defined from
a here that constitutes the primordial place of a finite being and that reflects the finitude of that here and of the being which occupies it; as such,
the there reflects the collective character of space from the perspective
of one of the collected places, and attests that while the here is distinct it
is not isolated but essentially referred spatially to other here’s. Space is
the collective unity of unique and finite here’s, each different from all
others and there to each other; and that unity of the unique and
contrasting here’s enables the actual existence and the interacting of
diverse active-beings, each active out of its own here-place and entering
into interaction with other beings which, for it, are spatially there.
b. For a second thing, the primordial here not only has a
secondary there correlative to it but is also marked by an internal
differentiation belonging to it as finite; for to enable an active being
participating in an interactive-existence to enter into an interacting and
to connect with other beings, our here is inherently differentiated into an
inwardness within which we initiate activity (the activity of ourselveswhole) and an outwardness which, as the obverse to the inwardness,
bodies us forth or overts us spatially toward others beyond us. This
overtion is such as (1) makes our inwardness private and first-personal,
unshared with and inaccessible directly to the others with whom we
interact, thereby making private the locus of our initiative out of
ourselves, while at the same time (2) it opens us out spatially toward
others in such way as fits us for activity as something that, while initiated
out of our inwardness, is an engaging with others and therefore is primordially directed spatially beyond ourselves and towards others there.
This overting not only makes our active-being itself overt (we usually
speak of it as bodily), and thus enters our being into the public domain
as located in public fashion (according to the terms of the public side of
things) in relation to that of others; but it also makes for a public and
overt side to our activity and our interacting as well.
In virtue of space, then, while we can never be directly cognizant of
the inward side of the others with which/whom we are interacting and
thus of their activity as it is being initiated by them, we know directly the
outward side of that activity as it manifests itself in our there and we can
take up with those other agents as having this overtness to their active
being and their activity. Since the reverse is true-- we are ourselves, and
in the activity by which we are interacting with others, made overt by
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our and our activity’s outward side--, we interact in such way as includes
our encountering each other in this public realm. In this way our interaction, involving an inwardly-initiated activity carried on in the interacting and having an overt or public side, can be one stemming from and
connecting diverse centers, each active out of ourselves, while enabling
us all to maintain ourselves as diverse centers.
In sum, so far: Each being, absolutely distinct and distinctive as a
being among the beings of being, is enabled by space and time to exist
and to be a separate active being in an existing which is likewise its very
own, singular and distinct under space-and-time, so that the activity
whereby it takes part in existence takes place ever now and ever here, in
a here and now which is its very own and unable ever to be occupied by
any other being. Further, since the enabling of existence is to make
possible a connecting of beings which, while distinct among beings
within being, are so far forth simply other to them and unconnected with
them, this existence and activity of an active being are constituted by
space and time to be an interactive existence, the participation in which
is via activity in which each being maintains its own separate being as
agent while connecting, in its activity out of itself, with other beings
acting out of themselves.
c. The present
So far we have considered the temporal and spatial sides of the present separately, but not yet taken up with another side involved in their
conjoint functioning as enabling conditions. Existence is an interactive
affair, the internal augmentation of being whereby distinct beings can
connect and being can gain its ultimate finality in con-crete fashion.
Now active beings exist so far as their activity is a taking part in an interacting with other such beings. In that interacting, the diverse heres-andnows of the diverse beings which are actually linking form an encompassing present which, due to the complexity of the here and the now of
each being and due to the diversity of beings (and thus, heres and nows)
that are involved, is itself complex temporally and spatially. Let us consider that present and its complexity in two main steps.
First step: In any interacting, we active beings participate out of (a)
the current nows actualizing the disparate (distinct and different) evernows of our different beings and (b) the diverse (distinct and different)
but ever-heres of our different beings. And we interact as whole beings,
with all the complexity that that involves, given (say) the difference
(spatially) between outward and inward sides and (temporally) between
(say) different times of life in which we find ourselves in the ongoing
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movement of our own time, and (say) the variety of capacities
(undeveloped, well or badly developed) at work in the activity of any
being but making different contributions to that activity, having different
roles and impacts, enabling different connections with others and
connections on different levels. In the present which includes, say, my
interactive-engagement with others, there is an essential con-currency of
the interacting beings which is being actualized at the heart of this
present to the extent that the interactive-activity of the beings involved,
formed in each in its own ongoing current now and formed by what is
essential in it as a distinctive agent (its initiative-capacity), connects us
as centers so that, as we interweave con-cretely in our activity, our activebeing and our participation in the interacting are made con-current. iii In
that con-currency of our being in our interaction in the present, the whole
being and whole time of each of the various existent active-beings
participating in the interacting is concentrated in the currently ongoing
side of its own now and in the initiative being formed and carried out in
it; as a result, the con-crete character of the connection being formed
unites beings whole for a while, but in an interactively-achieved uniting
which may be quite fleeting.
Now as a facet of this con-current being of agents with each other at
the heart of the present we are considering, the diverse active beings, in
virtue of the two-sided structure of their spatiality, present themselves to
each other as con-fronting each other, appearing face first, so to speak.
In contrast with the private character of their inwardness, the
outwardness of such interacting beings makes them part of a public
‘realm’, a spatial realm which in principle includes all beings (but see a
qualification to this, set forth in the following subsection). Each being
appears as a member of that public ‘realm’ in virtue of the spatial
outwardness of its being (its size and shape, say) and is located and
positioned in the spatial field in question relatively to other beings as
their outwardness enters them also into that field. I put the term “realm”
in single quotation marks because there is danger in speaking of this
outward aspect of the spatiality of beings as a distinct realm. For while
collectively it is indeed a realm or field, with distinctive features of its
own, it is no self-existent or self-contained realm but only one facet of
the actuality of diverse beings, the space-enabled-and-conditioned
outward aspect of active beings which are actual as whole beings acting
out of themselves (thus out of their own inwardness). To hypostatize this
outward facet and to treat it as if it were a separate entity, let alone were
actuality itself, is to misunderstand its status. Thus I seek to remind us
of its true status by speaking of it as the face of beings or things. In any
case, we not only find ourselves as active-beings entered into this ‘realm’,
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being members of it in virtue of our own spatial outwardness, but
because of its public accessibility to us human beings given our nature
and capacities, we can make the effort to attend to it in abstraction from
all else. Disregarding all else and looking only to those spatiallyoutward features of the being and interacting of beings which are evident
aspects of those beings and their interacting, we can take those features
up as if they formed an isolated and self-contained realm. As the focus
of such attention and of study under such an abs-traction and its taking
for granted of what such a facet is a facet of, this is (physical) ‘nature’ or
the field of study in what we have come to call “physical (or natural)
science”.
Looked at more closely:
a. This public realm is, spatially, an articulated field of area-occupying things with mass or bulk. The outwardness of each knows its own
internal differentiation of its three-dimensionality, into (say) outside surface and interior mass and structure. That surface which we present to
each other, the forefront of ourselves as we open out to others, is the
surface of what I call the face of beings; for even the interior, reached by
penetrating the surface (cutting it open, for example, as in surgery, or
reaching it more subtly in brain-scans), belongs to our face, an initially
hidden sur-face but still part of our forefront when it is exposed. This
interior (of others, and of ourselves) is quite a different spatial affair from
(their and our) inwardness; it is part of the complex outwardness which
forms (properly speaking) only the face of things-and-self, our face.
b. While the various active-beings are all entered into this realm
and entered as so structured, their situation as active-beings is not the
same as their location and position within this realm. The situation is
defined primordially by reference to active-beings as agents with theseor-those capacities for interacting, which capacities enable and dispose
the (potentially) interacting agents to actualize this-or-that possibility of
interaction. Agents in a situation are indeed located in the outwardlyspatial realm by virtue of their own outward side-- you can locate me as
indeed over there, in the corner of the room, sitting at the table--, but
their situation as agents involves much that does not belong to
outwardness but rather to inwardness, and not simply their own
inwardness-- it was an awkward situation last night, when talking with
my son Walter over the phone, he began conceding he was in a funk over
his life, communicating his feelings and thoughts on this 49th birthday of
his. It was a situation of father and son communicating out of themselves.
In short, a situation is an interactive-activity-referent affair of beings
whole, not simply a positional one within the outward realm of spatiality.
Whether all the beings that compose the immediate circumstance of an

active-being are part of its situation as agent, depends on whether those
beings are such that the agent could-- and might be disposed to-- interact
with them (or is actually interacting with them) in the sense of “interact”
which involves active beings connecting in such way that, initiating their
participation in the interacting out of themselves, they make their
presence felt to-and-in each other as active centers on the strength of that
functioning, reaching more or less into the inward heart of each other
depending on the capacities out of which each is operating. Such connecting is defined-and-delimited primordially (but not wholly) by the capacities brought into play in the forming of activity in the various activebeings in question. In contrast, the overting which enters the activebeing into a location and position in the public realm, simply places it
amidst others in the realm of outwardness, locates it relatively to the
others in the outwardly-spatial field, and makes possible (via proximity,
say) various forms of interacting with them.
This overting, however, also does two further things which
complicate the situation of agents and affect the nature and possibility of
interacting.
(1) It introduces another set of variables. For the outward sides
of beings, their face, what we generally call their bodily side, while integral to the active being and mediating for its activity, have their own
character beyond their spatially-outward features, and also their inherent
structure and conditioning force as part of the outward ‘realm’; they have
as well their own capacity to be impacted and for their operation to be
modified in the processes that pertain to such outward features. Our body,
for example, is not simply the outward side of our active being, but an
organic affair, with a structure as such and a functioning which goes on
as we are involved in our interacting-- our blood pressure rises, say, our
food is being digested, and the like; so long as we participate actively in
existence, we are ever entered, in virtue of this character to our bodily
being, into a broad system of forces and functions which are not
themselves interactions of the sort I am speaking about, though our
participation in any interacting depends on the continued operation of
such factors within the agent in question, or more precisely, within
his/her body. Thus because the overt side of our being and activity is an
integral element in that being and activity, what happens according to
these variables--rises in blood pressure, say, or lack of oxygen in the
lungs-- affects our body as our outward side and as the overt functional
element in our activity, thus affects the interaction-- makes a difference,
say, in our capacity to do-this or do-that (cataracts on the eyes modify
our capacity to see, a broken finger limits our capacity to perform music
on the piano).
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(2) It enables an interacting with other beings, indeed, but one
which does not have to be-- indeed, inescapably will not be-- thoroughgoing, an interacting of all with all, not even with all in the immediate
vicinity. For while the interacting I am referring to here involves the face
of the various beings (including our own) as an integral element in it, its
actual reach is not a simple function of outwardly spatial proximity but
primordially depends, for one thing, on the capacities involved in the
active-being itself and in the various active-beings that form the activebeing’s circumstance and, for another thing, on the character of the actual
exercise of those capacities in each participant. Contingent on how various the other agents and their essential capacities are which are present
in its spatial context and proximity and on how those agents are entering
into activity employing those capacities, the interacting that an activebeing is actually entered into is more or less rich and complex, and more
or less direct, head-on; but given the character of the capacities involved
and the inherent finitude of their reach, there will be active-beings in (say)
the larger spatially-outward context with which a human being (say) is
not directly interacting, indeed not even actually interacting at all. And
yet there may nonetheless still be connections as well as disconnections,
conditioning impacts, and the like, related to the overt sides of the active
beings in question and a function of their spatial locations and the processes that mark the outwardness of the various beings. iv
Second step: In our active-engagement with others out of our
ongoing now, we are venturing under a sense of something at-stake in
our effort; something matters, and we care, and that care animates our
attention and awareness. As a result within the immediately given we
notice-this rather than notice-that, dwell-on-this rather than dwelling-onthat, dismiss-this-from-consideration in favor of that, and so on. In all
of this, our attention and awareness move within the opening provided
ultimately by space-and-time, probing what manifests itself within the
field of our sensory receptivity and operating in our paying attention and
becoming aware as part of the forming of active effort that is primordially an outward-reaching engaging with what is circumstantial. Given
the nature of the opening provided by space-and-time, such paying
attention and such awareness are part of a direct cognizance of inward
and private aspects of ourselves and our activity, and of a direct
cognizance of outward and public aspects to these as well; but in regard
to the others who confront us as beings in our circumstance, we are open
directly only to their presence as effective in the interacting and,
concomitantly with this (indeed, in a way that initially obtrudes for our
attention and awareness, given that this is what our senses alone directly
present to us), to outward aspects of their face. Given what from within
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moves and motivates us in the decision-making that gives shape to our
initiative in the outward thrust of active effort, we seek to connect the
inward aspects with what confronts us; the latter’s register in us, our
attention to it, our interpretation of its character and meaning, are steps
in the decision-making process which brings the two together and issues
in our response in the situation. In this way we contribute to the
definition of our own situation: not only selecting what from beyond
enters into it as engaging us, but even more, determining how we take
up with what we are directly engaged with and how we organize and
apply our energies, and venturing accordingly in this-way rather than in
that-way.
Now in our assessing and deciding, not all of the potential
participants in the interactive-present in which we are participating
appear to us distinctly and expressly in the sensory field of our own hereand-now. Our sensuous and sensible register, which is directly of facets
of the face of beings, is limited and crude, and the filtering-and-selective
process inward to our sensing further restricts what is allowed by us to
come into the conscious and even the sub-conscious register and in what
way. Moreover, not all that does register in that sensory field is
concurrent with us in the sense that belongs to the basic components of
interactive existence. Whatever appears in the sensuous field of our
perception is, indeed, contemporaneous in the sense that its register in
our sensing makes us cognizant now of something other than ourselves;
but, for example, the light-sources in the nighttime sky are not concurrent with us in the interactive sense, since there is no inter-acting (let
alone mutual connecting) involved with such distant stellar beings, while
the glowing-light that manifests the presence of something is contemporaneous with our sensing. Nonetheless, as we act out of our here-andnow, there enters into the various fields of our receptive (here, sensory)
capacities an array of features which disclose to us the surface of the face
of beings (including ourselves), and provides the initial orientationfeatures for our initiative and our executing of our activity. Amidst this
plethora, we are usually focused on what we are registering of the
outward through one or another of our special sense-powers, especially
our sight. As part of our orienting ourselves, we early develop a crude
sense-- and along the way refine, eventually to arrive at a complex sense- of the spatial and the temporal as we are involved in these, and implicitly to this, a sense of space and time themselves.
In the encompassing interactive-present within which (say) a human
being is engaged with others, and on the strength of our register of a
shared sensory field holding (in its immediacy) (at least some of) the
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overting-outwardness of what is there (circumstantial to us: but also, reflexively including the overting-outwardness of our own here), we find
ourselves con-fronted with a spatial field which, when noticed in terms
of its evident spatiality, is occupied by voluminous ‘things’ which are in
reality simply the outward side of various active-beings (ourselves included). By reference to jointly accessible features and events in our
overlapping sensory fields, we human beings can together make a public
determination of ‘space’ by way of the spatial, pointing out an agreed-on
there and, given that orientation-point, going on to locate such spatial
things out-there in a reference-field that embraces them. Because it is
the same there-thing (a tree, say) which from our different heres we agree
on in this way, we proceed in this determination with our focus on the
there, all the while taking for granted-- but also ignoring and not
including-- the (spatial) inwardness (not “interior”, remember) of the
heres of our diverse beings, which are in actuality the loci (within our
here) of our initiating of the activity which (among other things) achieves
the public determination of ‘space’ (as well as the public measure of time:
see the discussion below). Now what appears directly in this way is in
reality only a secondary facet of the spatiality of active-beings who, in
their being, exist-and-act out of their own heres-and-nows; it is a feature
of themselves in the overting-outwardness of their being. But the
obviousness of that facet to us, and its public (and thus, able to be shared)
character, together with the primordial outward-reaching of activity itself,
make this determination of space significant for us in orienting our
interactive-activity, so significant that we come to take it simply as an
obvious and accurate determination. But contrary to common opinion to
this effect, it by no means exhausts the spatial, let alone reaches to the
nature of space as co-condition (with time) of existing-active-beings.
Indeed, it is not even the primordial dimension of the spatial. We have
mis-taken a facet of spatiality for space itself, and learned to employ this
useful fiction v in our daily lives quite oblivious to what we are doing.
Likewise, in our participation in the interactive-present of existence
just referred to, we register (at least some of) what is there
(circumstantial to us, in the public face of things) as a sensory field that
includes other human beings with whom we are interacting and who are,
from out of their own here-and-now’s, likewise opened out on a sensory
field that embraces others who are, spatially, there, including ourselves.
Sharing with each other an interactive existence on earth which harbors
this sort of overlapping sensory field, we can define, within the
interactive-present just spoken about, a shared public measure of time,
established by reference to jointly accessible features and events in our
overlapping sensory fields. The sun and its movement, in particular, is a

common measuring device, leading to notions of day and night as units
for measuring time as it indirectly manifests itself within our joint public
present and by way of the outwardness of the public. This public
measure, while enabled by the diverse ongoing nows of the diverse
beings who join in the establishment of the measure, is formed by
abstracting from (but taking for granted) the full nature of the enabling
conditions of the measure-establishing activity as an activity, including
time as enabling condition of our existence and (ironically) of the very
activity in which such measurement and its standard are established.
Even though this public (and thus indirect and secondary) measure of
time does not give us an adequate view of the nature of time, its ‘now’
and ‘moments’ being at best denatured and truncated versions of the
ongoing-now in which the enabling condition which is time has its
actuality, it establishes a public reference point for active beings that is
sufficient (at least for immediate practical purposes) for the dating and
measurement purposes that lead to the institution of this sort of measure.
Any direct measure of time as enabling condition of active-existenceand-actuality is found, however, only inwardly, in the activity and life
enabled by time, and is not itself a public measure.
Now in both cases, as we form and accept into-and-within ourselves
such a determination of space and measure of time, the ordinary engagement in which they were formed, or at least, that in which they seem
plausible and come to function as orientation-factors, involves an obliviousness to space and time in their full natures and their actual functioning
as conditions. Within that obliviousness, we are disposed to mis-take
facets of space and time, of spatiality and temporality, for the full nature
of these, and to reduce the present (as the con-crete unification of space
and time, the spatial and the temporal, in an interactive situation of active
beings) to certain facets of itself, namely, to the public presentational
faces of presences in their location and their movement in the agreed-on
field of the there of various observers. Thus because our activity is primordially directed toward other beings and, spatially seen, is outwardly
oriented, we are prone to confuse-- or fail to distinguish-- the here of our
own place of being with what can be located of our being in the there of
the public location of beings-- including ourselves-- via their
outwardness. Likewise, we are prone to confuse-- or fail to distinguish- the now of our own time of being with something being measured by
way of the contemporary outwardly-discernible movement which forms
the outward reference-point within the present for time as subject of the
publicly-determined measuring scheme. In both cases we are claiming
to render what actually are enabling conditions for our existence and
activity by focusing on the there (a secondary feature of spatiality) and
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what appears there (primordially, beings-- including ourselves-- in their
outwardness), rather than recalling those conditions as they are in their
character as conditions; that is, we are seeking what we have direct
access to only inwardly by attending to what we are referred to in our
outwardly-directed activity. Since space and time are enabling factors
which condition the beings they enable in such way as to give such
beings direct access to themselves (to space and time as conditions and
in their full nature) only inwardly, we miss them in their nature and miss
the fulness of our own spatiality and temporality if we seek to understand
them by focus on the outward.
Nonetheless, we find such outwardly-focused orienting readings of
space and time, of the spatial and the temporal, sufficiently useful that in
ordinary life we have no obvious reason to raise further question about
them. For given our concern as active-beings with immediate circumstance, our cognizance of ourselves as temporal in our being encompasses also what is manifest to our senses in the outwardness of the
others in whose midst we find ourselves, and encompasses as well the
outwardness of our own activity. Therefore in our active engagement
with others we can connect the temporal advance we know inwardly as
we engage with circumstance with the movement and changes which we
find outwardly in circumstance and which reflect in some measure the
ongoing activity of others, and with suitable timing we can project our
effort in such way as to intervene in what is going on and add our own
change-impetus to what is taking place already in our circumstance; in
the interacting with each other which has such a forefront, we can avail
ourselves of the public determination of space-and-spatiality and the
public measure of the temporality of things, together with a datability
that rests in a commonly agreed to frame of reference grounded in the
public measure of time, and acting in anticipation and with a timing that
intends an anticipated connection in future, we can orient ourselves by
way of the public and act in concert with the changes in circumstance.
Since we are engaged with other active beings in such way as ever
involves our direct encounter with them in their forefront, such orienting
of ourselves can well obtain even though our engaging with the beings
we encounter takes us deeper into them than their face and involves an
interlinking of ourselves as temporal which (potentially, at least) is fuller
than anything that is visible on or by reference to the face of things.
Usually this does not happen in such way as to bring us to question our
orienting spatio-temporal framework and the ideas we have of time and
space. But occasionally there come times-- ‘starry-sky’ times, for
example-- when something happens that not only deepens our
connecting with things but in fact actually breaks the obliviousness of

our everyday whose terms we are inclined to carry over as indisputable
even into experiencing for which they are in fact inapt. And yet, on most
such occasions even then, we do not recognize the character and meaning
of all that is happening in such times and do not let what has emerged as
our obliviousness has dissolved bring us to recast our sense of the spatial
and temporal and our ideas of space and time. We see its significance,
rather, in other directions. Thus we do not follow up on the ‘inward rise
to meet the challenge of dwarfing outward immensity’, and consider the
inward in its own right, even when it holds what seems to give us strength
to be ‘equal’ to that dwarfing, indeed, to be ‘superior’ to it. If we only
consider ourselves from the outside, we will ask the wrong questions and,
mistaking the inward for the interior, miss what is being revealed to us
in all immediacy and with considerable strength, misunderstanding the
disclosure. It takes patience to pay attention without being steered by
our pre-conceptions and to let the strong contrast of inward with outward
make itself felt sufficiently that we can reorient our thinking, recovering
the way things are happening and following out the genuine contrast in
structure.

2. All at once?
In our reflections so far, we have been pursuing inquiry as-- and from
the standpoint of-- an existing active human being seeking clarity
concerning the problematic of existence in which we-- all beings-- are
involved and, as part of this, concerning the creational nature of being,
then the nature and role of space and time within being. Starting from
the interactive-involvement in the con-crete existence we already enjoy
as we are inquiring, we have been seeking to explore such disclosures of
its problematic as our involvement holds, and probing carefully the
various facets of that problematic, to reach the ultimate factors making
it what it is and to grasp its character as an affair which we all share in
as human beings. That has meant utilizing disclosive experience that
seems to reveal more than we ordinarily notice, and in particular, reveals
that the manner of our own involvement (our attention and awareness,
for example) in activity-- including the activity of inquiring-- has more
importance for our understanding than we might ordinarily acknowledge.
It remains a question, however, given our capacities as human beings,
the purchase of our inquiring within being, and our seeking for the intelligibility of being from within, how far our efforts can take us. We can
only reach out into existence and existent beings from where we are: in
the one direction, that of depth, reaching back (as it turns out) to the
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beginning-point within being as a creational affair, and in the other direction, that of the horizontal, reaching out into other existing beings and
back into ourselves as we find others-and-ourselves interacting with each
other in a present at the heart of which is a con-currency of ourselves and
at least some of those beings.
At this point in our inquiry, three questions concerning time and
space are important for us to consider and answer so that we may fill out
what has been set forth so far and prepare for what is to come.
a. First question
First question: Can we determine, from our standpoint and the disclosures of our experience, the ‘where-and-when’ of the act of creation?
In Chapter 1 we spoke of being as creational in its internal nature, and in
particular, spoke of the presence within being of an act of creation which
expresses, first, the incompleteness of being as simply the unity of the
plurality of beings in their initial distinctness and otherness to each other,
and second, rooted in that incompleteness, being’s nisus toward its own
completion. Beginning from itself-in-its-incompleteness, being would
overcome its incompleteness in an act of self-becoming, and that means,
as first step, by way of an act of creation whereby being as the unity of
distinct beings other to each other is entered into an existence in which
the various beings which constitute its internal diversity are interactive
with each other, the merely-distinct-and-other having gained the
determinateness of an active side out of which each actively participates
in the interacting in which being is actual. This actuality of being, the
con-crete unity of distinct beings as diverse and interactively-active
beings, is the needed medium in-and-by which being in its own
completeness is meant to arise, in the form of a certain con-crete interconnecting of diverse active beings that is achieved as issue in-and-of
the ongoing interacting of those beings. Because this creational selfaugmentation of being takes place by way of the enabling conditions of
space-and-time, each of the various active beings in this existential unity
of being exists in-- and is active out of-- its own here-and-now. In their
con-crete interaction with each other, such beings establish a complex
present with a con-currency of beings at its heart; it is in this interacting
that the completion of being is meant to arise and the act of creation to
achieve its meant-to-achieve end.
Having considered (in the earlier part of this chapter) the structured
nature of the time and space which make our existence as agents possible
and having briefly noticed the basic spatial-and-temporal character of
that existence, we can see fairly clearly that the question “‘Where-and-
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when’ did this act of creation take place?” is inapt, if it is intended in its
most obvious sense. Its only answer in that case is, “No-where and nowhen”. For the act of creation is not itself a temporal affair, something
occurring in time (as the question, if crudely understood, supposes), but
rather a part of the internal ‘dynamic’ of being. Quite the contrary to
itself being temporal, it is rather the ‘act’ in virtue of which time-andspace themselves jointly have a place within being such that temporaland-spatial beings can exist and, with that, temporal affairs. In that ‘act’,
being as the unity of all distinct and incomplete beings is ex-tended into
existence “in unison”, “all at once”, but in a meaning of those phrases
that accords with the nature and structure of the dynamic, and is not temporal. In virtue of that ex-tending, the initial plurality internal to the
initial unity of being exists as temporally-and-spatially diverse active
beings, each with its own “here” and “now” and actively interacting with
others so as to give con-crete character to this amplified kind of unity,
that of actual existence.
Now because we are ourselves among the active beings enabled to
exist in virtue of the presence and functioning of space and time in this
‘act’, in our activity (including our inquiring) we are participating in
existence and entering into its interactivity out of our own here-and-now,
and it is in this activity that we have access to space-and-time as enabling
conditions for ourselves and all other beings, and to the act of creation in
which these conditions have a function. In the measure in which we
become self-aware in our active side to our being held forth into
existence here-and-now, our access is such that, while the ‘ex-tending’
which is holding us forth into existence takes place at no time and no
place because it is not itself (as ‘act’) a spatial-and-temporal affair, our
discovery of that act and of the existence-and-activity enabling
conditions it harbors is made in the here-and-now of our existing and
acting, and from our perspective as existing-and-acting it would make
sense to say that the ‘act’ of ‘creation’ is, has been, and will be, ‘going
on’ ‘everywhere and all the time’ (whenever and wherever there are
existing beings). Or put in another fashion, the single unified act of
creation, in giving rise in unison to all active beings-- and that means, to
being as a single encompassing con-crete universe--, gives rise to all
here’s-and-now’s at once-- not at the same single moment in time, but in
one act giving rise to all active beings and with them to all their enabling
now’s. Properly understood, this does not make all now’s contemporary,
nor does such creating make the ‘act’ itself something temporal or spatial.
The way of speaking in question, using ‘temporal’ terms for the
atemporal affair that gives time (and space) a place in being, reflects our
own existential (spatial-and-temporal) being and our (spatial-and-
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temporal) access to the act of creation and to space-and-time, and seeks
to bring to mind those preconditions as they are discernible from the
standpoint of the spatial-and-temporal existence they enable.
The reason for raising, then dismissing in its naive and crude
meaning, this ‘where-and-when’ question is twofold. One part of the
reason is that, in taking our stand at the standpoint of re-flection, we
know a ready and forceful invitation-- one grounded in the character of
our spatiality-and-temporality, stemming from the way we avail
ourselves ordinarily of our opening out to each other in our interactive
existence, and conceded to in the formulation of the question taken
straightforwardly-- to proceed in a way that is oblivious to our only direct
access to space and time as enabling conditions and to ponder the
question of the nature of time and space by way of their most obvious-but truncated-- aspects. We have seen in earlier discussion in this chapter
how this obliviousness can lead us to the inadequate notions of space and
time derived indirectly from our efforts to measure time and locate
outwardly-spatial things. While such obliviousness as infects our
express concern with time and space in the ordinary mode of interacting
with each other may not be harmful practically, it is quite injurious to a
re-flective effort which would search out the problematic of existence,
and its focus of ourselves on the ‘obvious’ ‘out there’ can reinforce
relatively hidden presumptions on our part which we can carry into reflection and allow, quite without recognizing what we are doing, to guide
our thinking surreptitiously. vi The other part of the reason is that the
need for self-critical awareness as regards the act of creation and timeand-space is especially urgent in pursuing the next two questions, discussion of which we turn to now.
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b. Second question
Second question: Can we determine, from our standpoint and the disclosures of our experience, the ‘how many’ of the multiplicity of beings?
We can probe into the depths of being so far as our experience discloses
them, and know a bound in this direction (the beginning within being),
and know about that beginning that in it being is in its most fundamental
side a unity of distinct beings; but can we know about this plurality of
the distinct, how many beings are involved, how great this plurality is,
whether a finite or infinite number? If we know at least that there is
multiplicity, we also know that being is creational in nature, and when it
comes to the act of creation, even if we can not know directly from out
of the discernible nature of that fundamental side how great the manyness of the beginning is, the augmentational first-moment whereby the
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active side of beings comes to exist is nonetheless not simply an affair of
a plurality of individuals (the rise of the active being of the initial
multiple distinct beings, however many they are) but is in its nature an
interactive and interconnective affair, given the nature of the enablingconditions of space and time by which the multiple individual active beings come to exist. This interactive and interconnective nature to existence belongs to it as the medium for the achievement of the reason for
its own emergence, namely, the consummation or completion of being
as a con-crete unity arising as issue in-and-of the interacting of the
multiplicity of distinct agents. Now if we can know what is involved in
interactive existence because (and so far as) we ourselves are among the
multiplicity of participants in such an interacting and interconnecting,
does that make it possible for us, in a horizontal exploration of what our
participation involves us in, to be able to understand how great the
multiplicity of the active-beings is?
Given our distinctive access to active beings and our capacities for
understanding, we can know both ourselves and that (more or less
extensive) actual plurality amidst which we find ourselves, so far as these
show themselves in our experience; and we know in that way an
interactively-formed present of various beings presenting themselves to
each other and making their presence known in-and-to each other in
virtue of their activity. We know as well that the active-beings involved,
each finite in its own active being, include both an inwardness which
harbors capacities which have a limited interactive reach and an
outwardness which includes a manifold of processes and structures and
manners of modifying and impacting other facets of outwardness that, in
virtue of being inherent in the outer, thereby also enter indirectly into the
interactive-activity of active-beings and into the present being
constituted in that interacting. But while we have reason for thinking
such conditions and features belong universally to active beings, the
question arises: Does understanding them advance our effort to
understand this matter of the measure of plurality? Does it point us to
plausible experiential evidence for supporting our thinking one thing
rather than another on that matter? Let us consider this closely.
The joint enabling conditions of space and time, operating together,
are severally responsible for different facets of-- and jointly, the
integrated character of-- the spatial-and-temporal side being introduced
in the act of creation into the encompassing or universal plurality of
beings within being. Each distinct being, as existent and active, has its
own here-and-now: here-and-now’s are as many and diverse as are active
beings. The here’s being introduced primordially provide the spatiallystructured seat and medium for the interactive-activity of a being in its
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existence, and the now’s provide the major temporally-structured locus
for the initiative-forming-and-carrying-out of activity (that is,
participation in interactive-activity) out of the agent’s own being and
thus for the actuality of that being and its activity. The bearing of these
spatial and temporal structures (separately and together) on our question
(of the manyness of beings) can be set forth in the following two steps.
First step: Each being exists as participant with other active beings in
a con-crete interactive plurality. Since each individual is finite not only
spatially and temporally but in terms of its activity-capacities, the
plurality involved in the present that marks any participant’s situation is
a limited one also. For the activity-capacities, given their determinate
and finite nature, only enable an interacting which is limited in reach if
it is actually to connect active being with active being, each acting out of
its own nature and self. But spatially, the situated individual’s here is so
constituted by its inwardness and outwardness as to be referred to the
here’s of other active beings by way of the directional pointing of its
there. Given the three-dimensional extensional character of the outwardness of all active beings, the there of the here of any such individual
being among beings would seem to direct that being immediately to a
boundlessly-expansive field (the face of things), and thus, since that field
is occupied by finite beings each with its outward as well as inward sides,
to infinite such beings. This disparity between the limited plurality that
marks an interactive set of beings and the boundless directional reach of
the there of the participant whose standpoint we are making (for our purpose here) be the situation-defining anchor for our consideration holds
for all the other participants in this initial situational plurality. Thus
when we consider any of these other participants and their activitycapacities as situation-defining anchor, a different (but likely overlapping) plurality is involved. Thus no interactive-situation, even if it is
finite, is completely isolated and self-contained since its participant
members, being diverse inwardly, are themselves anchor-points in-andfor situations which have a different participant-membership from the
initially-considered situation. This expanding reach of diverse-butoverlapping situations extends indefinitely in principle, so far as the
inclusion of other individual members is concerned, and would seem
able to encompass and match in this overlapping fashion the beings of
an endless outward-spatiality. This would not, however, make for an
infinite interactively-defined situation, but only for an infinity of such
finitely-limited situations. In short, in the tension and contrast between
inward and outward and between interactive-situation of an active being
and the outward field involved in any interacting, we would seem to have
one ground for thinking active-beings (and thereby beings in their

distinctness within being) to be infinite in their multiplicity.
Second step: Each being exists and acts not simply in its own here
but in its own now, and exists as temporally finite. The implication of
that finitude in this case is that existence for each involves a havingbegun and a going-to-end of its existence; and that means that the creational act that augments the initial distinctness of an individual being to
give it an active side enters it not only into an ongoing now for its own
continual current activity but places that whole existing active side in the
middle of a realm of likewise transitory beings, giving it inherently a
coming-to-exist that happens amidst other already-existent and finite
active beings and an end-of-existing which likewise happens amidst
other (but in this case) continuing active beings. In its ongoing interactive existing, then, such a being is not only engaged with other active
beings which come-and-go in its present, but just as its there directs it
toward those others spatially, so the then’s of its temporally-directional
futural and preterite references reach beyond its bounded now and point
it endlessly to other now’s of other beings in what is past and what is
future beyond its own now. Given the nature of time as a finite now
amidst other finite nows which, in their own right, have the same in-themiddle-of place and relation to others, that would seem to imply again
an infinity to the multiplicity of finite temporal beings involved.
In short: If we can not discern the measure of the plurality of beings
within the unity of beings which is being by direct consideration of being
in its incompleteness, still because this incompleteness is occasion for a
nisus and (internal to that) an act of creation and because the enabling
conditions for that creation are space-and-time, we can indirectly have
reason for thinking of that plurality as an infinity. For while space-andtime, each separately and both together, introduce finitude into the existence and existent beings that they enable, because of the way they do this
and because of the nature of the finitude introduced there are reasons
(enumerated above) for thinking that beings in their initial distinctness
as well is in their active existence are not only plural but infinitely so.
c. Third question
Third question: Can we discern, from our standpoint and the disclosures of our experience, any intelligible ordering of con-crete existence?
From that standpoint we have seen how, in its initial distinctness as
beings, being is incomplete, and this incompleteness is matched by a
nisus that ex-tends the power of being to include an active side to the
distinct beings and an interactive existence in which there is something
at-stake in-and-for the interacting of those beings, namely, the meant-to-
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be consummation in which being overcomes its own incompleteness (so
far as possible). There is, then, a ‘purposive’ factor involved in the
structuring of being as a creational affair, and thus at least one ordering
principle for any ordering of con-crete existence. We also noted earlier
that, given a creational act in which space-and-time function as enabling
conditions, there is a spatial-and-temporal character to the existent sides
of being that emerge; that character obtains in sides whose determinateness in each case amplifies the initial distinctness of beings in a way that
orders existence and existent beings around activity, the initiating-andexecuting functioning of beings as active beings. There is, then, a
complex set of ordering principles relating to the beings forming the
medium for the achievement of the meant-to-be of creation, and with that,
further principles for an ordering of con-crete existence. We have, finally,
just been noting that the spatial-and-temporal existence and interactive
activity of active beings is finite, both in the spatiality and the
temporality that are involved and in the determinate capacities that mark
active beings and their activity. The discussion on this point needs to be
taken farther, to make clear what the finitude in question introduces in
the way of principle(s) that would be involved in any ordering of concrete existence.
We each find ourselves existing here-and-now, and con-cretely that
means, here with those active beings there that form our current circumstance and with which we are interactively existing. In virtue of the
enabling conditions of space and time, our existence is for each of us
active beings finite, limited temporally and spatially and limited in terms
of interactive-activity-capacity. vii It is also an interacting of finite active
beings in which something is at stake, and in which, in their activity, the
participants in existence make a difference in many-- but again, limited- ways, depending on how they take part. That difference can be seen in
reference to what is at stake, or it may be considered simply in regard to
the alteration in actuality that is being produced-- for example, the
production of what did not exist previously, making actual a possibility
that was latent in what formed current existence. Activity is inherently
an efficacious affair, and this, primordially in a dual direction, as
affecting what is other-and-beyond the agent and as actualizing the agent
itself.
Now as finite and interactive, such existence is also a dependent one
in several ways. Beyond the obvious one that for there to be interacting
there must be more than one active participant so that interactive-beings
are interdependent in that sense, it is also the case that, as regards any
participant, the others involved must be so constituted as to allow, and
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more positively, to provide sufficient support for, its existence and functioning as agent, that it may be active out of itself and participate in the
interacting. If a favorable con-crete context is requisite for current and
continuing existence and makes such existence a dependent one in this
second sense, it remains that such interdependent and favorablysupported existence is inherently bounded temporally; just as it has not
gone on forever in the past, so it also cannot go on endlessly in the future.
Thus it is also dependent in another-- a third-- sense. For the act of
creation, in giving to the distinctness of beings an existence as a temporally-finite active beings, enters each amidst others in a way that
implicates its existence-and-active-being in a dependence-reference for
its coming (and going) amidst the other temporally-finite active beings.
Specifically, since interactive existence is inherently an affair of the efficacious interacting of diverse active beings, each active being is
dependent on such efficacious interacting of already-existent active
beings for its coming into its own finite existence: it has been brought
into existence by ... . Our having-begun and taken our place in an
efficaciously-interactive existence implies, as its necessary temporal
correlative, a reference to what was there before us as holding what accounts for our coming into this existence which in our activity we enjoy
as having begun and as not yet at its end. Our existence then finds its
place in existence as an order of genesis, and primordially this means, an
order of existing beings whose coming into existence was the work of
others that existed before it and that engendered it in their interactivity.
Internally, then, that encompassing universe of active beings which is the
issue of the ‘at once’ of the act of creation is a spatial-and-temporal affair
with (at the very least) an ordering which is that of genesis.
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With this, we have several principles for an ordering of con-crete
existence: a creationally-‘purposive’ one, a spatial-and-temporal set, an
activity-articulating set, and a dependence set. But existence in the concrete, while embodying or attesting to such principles, has a
determinateness of nature and particularity which makes it not a simple
function of those principles. If there is an effective ordering of con-crete
existence that is intelligible to us human beings, the discernment of it
would appeal to such principles but go quite beyond them. And the
inquiry which would represent the effort to discern that order and
coherence would begin there where we are con-cretely, and accurately
understanding that “where” and that “are”, would work outwardly and
inwardly in the con-crete to find such reasons as we can for thinking
there is order and coherence therein and that it is of such-and-such
character.
Where are we? How do we launch and carry on inquiry there, how
do we reach into the con-crete, how far can our discernment reach? In
what immediately follows in the rest of this chapter and in the last halves
of Chapters 3-4, we will begin to answer such questions by developing
an account of the various directions which the con-crete nature of things
holds open for human exploration and understanding. But we can say
this in advance: in all the disciplined ways in which we can explore and
understand the facets and dimensions of the con-crete universe looking
for its order and coherence, our knowing and understanding are achieved
only within an abs-traction or focus and concentration that limits what
we grasp in the approach involved.
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B. Science, Greek and modern
1. The Greeks and science
One discovers philosophy only in first-hand fashion, out of one’s
own ongoing life, for it is an effort responsive to a problematic which
concerns us directly in our living and which, on occasion, comes to the
fore and evokes in us, thrust back upon ourselves, a thinking-- re-flective
thought-- that would understand what is so problematic and baffling. In
my own experience of such discovery, recounted in part in the
Introduction to this work, I found my way into it without knowing what
was taking place and what I was getting myself into. But there where I
found myself was also a place at which a long tradition was available of
something which went under the name “philosophy”, something which
eventually could help me understand what it was that I was doing. It is
unlikely that someone who had no tradition and context of philosophical
inquiry at all would find his way into philosophical reflection and be able,
on the strength of his own reflexive grasp, to understand from the start-or even for a while after that start-- just what he was doing, what
possibility of thought he had ventured to begin the realization of. That
would have been the state of things for the various venturers who
initiated philosophy among the Greeks in the 6th and 5th centuries BC.
What happened early in the 6th century was that something genuinely
unprecedented in Greek civilization was being undertaken by various
individuals. As I suggested in my accounts in The Beginnings of
Philosophy in Greece and in Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy,
there were antecedent supportive factors, such as the poetic achievements of Homer and Hesiod, and there were concurrent challenging factors in their eastern Mediterranean world which, as the Greeks
were making their way out of their own Dark Ages, spoke to something
that was seeking realization in themselves and in response to which they
could define themselves in their own distinctive nature.
One of the ways in which such response took shape was in inquisitive
venturings which, as they developed and began to sort themselves out
over time, eventually (at least by the end of the 5th century) turned out to
be the initial phases of several different things. Such thoughtful inquiry
took shape and initial direction in a context that already involved knowledge developed, on the one hand, in observation of nature: the apparent
movements of the heavenly bodies, well recorded by the Babylonians for
religious and astrological reasons, the records expressing recognition of
the periodicity of astronomic events and even of eclipses; and on the
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other hand, knowledge developed by the Egyptians as part of surveying
land along the Nile river, given its flooding and perpetual re-configuring
of the landscape, also represented a context and element of interest to
some Greeks. None of this, or the knowledge of plants and animals
developed by observation and as part of the practice of medicine and the
practice of agriculture, represented the work of science, or of philosophy
for that matter. But the Greeks of the 6th through the 4th centuries BC
knew a rich and diverse flowering of their intellectual nature in a whole
range of directions, a flowering that sought to infuse coherence and
plausibility into knowing and know-how, as well as relevance to the
needs and the puzzlements of the time. Some Greeks learned to take up
differently with medicine, for example, and pursue it in a relatively
disciplined way, as a τέχνη (art, craft, infused by ‘reason’); others were
stimulated to inquiry of an only indirectly practical sort, and in various
individuals thoughtful inquiry took shape in a disciplined fashion and in
such way that truth, understanding, became sought as an end that was of
interest in its own right, and this seeking often enough had a comprehensive reach, attempting to include all being and to grasp the-all as an
intelligible whole. We have very little record-- only selective quotations
and references-- of the earliest efforts at such trans-technical inquiry, but
it is plausible to see in them something in which distinctions which
would emerge in time between different sorts of undertaking had not yet
been developed. In the language of the time, all these efforts of inquiry
(ἱστορία) sought wisdom (σοφία), and thus verbally could be spoken of
as realizations of the “love of wisdom” (φιλοσοφία); but what this latter
term meant in such usage was something different depending on the
speaker. And as we see in the seminal embodiments of inquiry-- figures
whom we have come to call philosophers, namely, Heraclitus and
Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle--, while notice was soon taken of differences in the forms of inquiry that these thinkers and others had been-and were-- undertaking, even among these four, where the question of
forms of inquiry had become explicit and thoughtfully addressed as
being of fundamental significance, there was no agreement on what was
taking place in inquiry except that it aimed at truthful understanding or
wisdom. In that regard, what the various forms of truth-seeking inquiry
saw themselves as sharing most evidently was a rejection of something
else, whether the accounts of poets (Homer and Hesiod) or of religious
figures or ... .
This awakening of an intellectual interest among the Greeks, and the
novel and creative venturing of individuals in various directions of truthseeking, issued in inquiry with somewhat different emphases in different
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parts of the Greek world. Thus in Ionia or eastern Greece, within the
Homeric detachment of the gods from the face of things, the challenge
of lyric poetry to the epic on the matter of the appropriate way to be
human, and the beginnings of the polis as a novel way of connecting
humanly, inquiry seems to have become preoccupied with the now-open
face of things and by the question of the unity of the whole. Hiddenly
reflecting the question of unity involved in the problematic of existence
as a philosophically re-flective affair, inquiry sought to make unity intelligible by way of factors on the face of things. Thinking the whole as
φύσις, and seeking to make intelligible how the variety of things hold
together in it, inquiry usually focused on one or more characters visible
in the outward face and sought to see the diversity as united in it/them.
One significant but only partial exception among the Ionians to this way
of inquiring into nature (ἱστορία φύσεως) was Heraclitus, the most
profound of the Ionian philosophers; from his more inward purchase, he
sought the unity not by way of the constituent elements of the whole or
their interplay and transformation, but by way of a unifying factor which
he spoke of as λόγος. In contrast with both emphases, in western Greece
(that is, southern Italy and Sicily) we find other emphases, whether we
consider the transplanted Ionian Pythagoras or Parmenides. Whether or
not Pythagoras moved to southern Italy to seek a more supportive
atmosphere in which to pursue inquiry as he understood it, he looked to
number as the key to grasping the whole as unified, but his main concern
seems to have been a more inward one, namely, for inquiry as a purifying
regime for the soul and, by enabling a corruption-free and living unity
with what-is, as vehicle for giving meaning to life. Here there is found
a different working out of the sense of unity, and (somewhat as in
Heraclitus) a stress on the moral realization of our active-agency and a
sense of an encompassing whole that is intelligible as cohering with such
an agent-- thus his peculiar use of “mathematics”. The most opposed
development of inquiry to that of the outwardly-centered and naturefocused Ionians, however, was that of Parmenides, the most profound of
these early Greeks. Seeking the deepest understanding of all in the noetic
apprehension of being, and contrasting being with the seeming of things,
Parmenides saw the Ionians-- and even Pythagoras-- as caught up in
seeming and the question of how it hangs together, and as missing
thereby what was most fundamental for understanding. Finally, these
diverse emphases came into concert with each other in Athens, partly
because of figures converging on Athens from the east and the west and
bearing the emphases with them, partly due to the Athenian nature and
interest; here the beginnings of philosophy in ancient Greece found its
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three culminating figures, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. It is in the latter
two, whose impact on intellectual developments beyond their time has
been enormous, that we find thoughtful inquiry gaining a fairly
sophisticated and detailed grasp of itself as a complex affair; here, too,
we find the clearest differentiations-- but with rather contrasting
character-- of philosophy itself as the most fundamental form of
inquiring, with subordinate and/or lesser forms. With this we see, among
the lovers of wisdom, the first significant acknowledgment of a
distinctive and different discipline, what we from our much later
perspective can see as natural science in its fledgling form but which, in
Plato and Aristotle, was still an expression of the “love of wisdom”.
Essential elements in the notion of science came into importance in Plato
and even more so in Aristotle, whose empirical and classificatory work
in the area of living organisms was underpinned intellectually by his
notion of the distinct discipline which he called φυσική (ἐπιστήμη) or
περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη. But in neither Plato nor Aristotle did science
itself come fully into its own, and with it, an adequate grasp of the
difference between science and philosophy. It was mainly features
which science and philosophy share-- matters of an ordered whole of
knowledge, say, and especially of reasoned knowledge articulating the
reasons (“causes”, “factors responsible for”) for something-- that became
emphasized.

2. Modern science
Science began taking shape among the Greeks of the 6th through the
4 centuries BC, in the novel and creative venturing in various directions
of truth-seeking which, without pre-established fields of study, let alone
those of today, harbored it in an as yet undifferentiated and incomplete
form in some of the venturesome inquiry involved. If in the subsequent
centuries, in Alexandria, something further of the fledgling natural
science was realized, it was nonetheless not until modern times, and the
re-birth of the Greek that forms part of the Renaissance in western
Europe, that we find science coming into its own, in the modern form we
speak of as an empirical and experimental affair. Even then, it took initial
shape in limited fashion and still knew itself as natural philosophy for
several centuries, until eventually it separated itself off self-consciously
from philosophy and was pursued no longer as natural philosophy but
developed and expanded now as natural science. On the whole, this
modern effort was a rather different affair in many respects from
anything which the Greeks knew, and as it has gradually defined itself
th
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more fully and self-consciously and reached to be all-encompassing it
has shown itself to be something very different from philosophy. What
is the nature of science (and in particular, of natural science or the
physical sciences), and how does it differ from philosophy, which I have
characterized in my Introduction as “a sustained effort of re-flection,
which is responsive to the problematic of existence and meaning and
disciplined to a responsible exploration of that problematic in a reaching
for conceptual understanding of it in its truth”? Let us consider these
matters in that order.
a. The nature of (natural) science
Both (natural) science and philosophy are disciplines marked by their
truth-seeking character and yet, while both are expressions of human
capacity that fits cognitively with the nature of things, they differ significantly from each other. Since in our Introduction we have already
spoken at some length of philosophy, let us start here with science, and
consider the fashion in which it draws on human capacity to seek truth
within the creational nature of being and within the enabling conditions
(time and space) of existent-beings, as these have been set forth in the
discussion in these first two chapters so far. viii
As with philosophy, the discipline of science is an undertaking which
forms an ingredient in the inquiring human being’s answering to the call
for self-responsible participation in affairs. Thus it presupposes not only
the creational nature of the universe but the adult human responsiveness
to the problematic of existence as bearing on the human being in the
mode of obligation. Within this matrix, it is a complex form of
disciplined inquiry which focuses outwardly on the face of things, ix and
abs-tracting that face from the fulness of interactive-actuality, it attends
to aspects of it as it comes to immediate disclosure through the sensory
capacities by which we register presence and seeks to secure a
knowledge or truthful understanding of those facets of the actuality of
existent-beings. In that seeking, it is a creative and methodical
application of thought in inquiry which, according to the fundamental
structure of its procedure, begins with the sensible face of things and its
making something (directly or indirectly) apparent as not yet understood,
and seeking knowledge as the truth of the way things are in regard to this
problematic matter, ends with the sensible face as well, in a testing which
confirms, confutes, or leads to the revision of, a proposed understanding
of the not-yet-understood matters that were being investigated and
intended to be understood. At the same time and all along the way, the
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inquiring, while dismissing from its focus both its own venturing and its
pre-conditions as a venturing, nonetheless retains an essential reflexive
awareness of aspects of itself-as-inquiry, and in particular, involves a
reflexive monitoring and self-critical assessing of the way inquiry is
being conducted, relative to the standards that are meant to be adhered
to in an inquiry that is properly scientific. When well conducted,
scientific inquiry issues in a tentative but evidence-and-reason-supported
knowledge of fact, but what defines it is the way it seeks such knowledge,
not any particular knowledge or accumulation of knowledge. x Whatever
other factors may also be or become involved in occasioning and
motivating such inquiry, what by nature inherently occasions and
animates it is an intellectual curiosity which leads the human being to
seek fuller awareness of what we are living amidst and which, when
satisfied, enables our living and acting to be enriched by that fuller
awareness. xi
More at length:
Science as we are concerned with it at present-- the discipline
whose essential nature is more or less adequately exemplified in what
are presently called the natural or physical sciences-- is a human
undertaking that is, in general, dedicated to the discovery in a disciplined
fashion of knowledge or the truth of the way things are, but more precisely, is such a dedicated and disciplined undertaking as is
a. addressed primordially to the public face of things, and
b. while beginning that address by attending to that face as the
human senses disclose it,
c. continues it by seeking to discern, with the help of a register
of the sensible aspect of the face that is as ‘free’ and attentive
and self-critical as possible, the character of various features
of that face in its own right.
In our ordinary interactive-activity, we relate to this face as our senses
initially disclose it, but in that activity such disclosure is continually
being filtered and interpreted in its bearing on our active engagement
with circumstance. Thus we find the face not simply as it shows itself
sensibly but as in that showing it concerns our activity and something atstake in it, thus as in our interacting it touches on desire, evokes feeling,
and relates as means to our ends, as ‘tool’, as ‘resource’, etc. xii Defining
the field of scientific inquiry involves, first of all, attempting to bracket
all that “subjectively” obscures the appearance ‘out there’ of the face
itself in its own nature, and allowing the face to show itself to us
undressed in this way, attempting to focus on what is “objectively
there”. xiii A further step in this defining of the field builds on the fact
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that in relating with other human beings and in dealing with circumstance
generally, we are drawn-- and are able-- to determine a public space-andtime framework for our interacting and orient our interacting with the
diversity of existent-beings within this. That further step is to abs-tract
this framework of space-and-time from all else and to attempt to focus
our attention and regard on what is determinable as located within it, in
disregard of all else. Now in so regarding the face as a spatio-temporal
system of diverse things occupying space and time, two things happen at
once: (1) the obverse of our focus and attention to the sensible in search
of the genuine face of things as it is in its own right is our dis-regarding,
our leaving out of our view, the enabling conditions of existent-beings,
namely, space and time themselves as creation-facilitating factors, while
(2) at the same time our focus and attention are centered on only one side
of space and limited aspects of time as these condition our active-being
and make of us spatio-temporal beings interacting with each other out of
ourselves. The scientific address to the field thus opened up operates,
then, with an intentness upon the appearance of the face under the
condition of this ‘leaving out of view’ and this ‘bringing into focus’, and,
taking this restricted realm as the field of its inquiry, would both purify
and refine the conceptualization of the spatio-temporal features of
existent-beings and frame ideas of the objectively discernible face of the
active-beings involved in interactive-existence. This ‘leaving behind’-of the creational nature of being, of time-and-space as enabling
conditions for creaturely beings, of creaturely beings as active beings
entered as spatial-and-temporal existents into existence as an interactive
affair, and of the full spatial and temporal features of that existence and
those beings and their activity-- is essential to the enabling of scientific
inquiry, and such inquiry with its specific focus and field is-- and can be- pursued only under-and-within the conditions of those ‘left behind’
matters. xiv
Given the preliminary orientation which provides the opening that
makes scientific inquiry possible, that inquiry itself proceeds to
investigate the field of inquiry methodically, to develop knowledge of it
in its objective character, as it shows itself in our encounter with it.
Speaking structurally, such inquiry begins primordially with face-to-face
encounter in which something puzzling is apparent and some
understanding which is not yet present is called for; and with specific
direction for inquiry being occasioned in this way by a particular
problem to be solved, a puzzling phenomenon to be clarified, it proceeds
then in preparatory steps
a. to explore, describe, classify, and conceptualize accurately
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what shows itself directly in sense, including the problematic
state of things analyzed so that what is problematic is apparent,
b. and to collect the already known and apparently relevant facts
(observationally-established, simply recording ‘nature’-asmet, together with facts that have been developed
experimentally, via observation in circumstances arranged by
the observer: actively asking questions and intervening, so as
to record what is visible then),
c. and to bring to bear already known and established theories
that seem relevant to the problematic matter,
with all this being preparation for
d. developing a hypothesized-account which, as formulated
within a larger theoretical framework (a coherent conceptual
framework that claims truth), is proposed as possible
explanation that would remove the puzzlement, solve the
problem. xv
In this process of forming hypotheses that are explanatory and predictive
representations, the beginning with the face in its sensible appearance
becomes almost immediately transcended. For in exploring the sensibly
apparent in the effort to analyze those features that are problematic, the
scientist often enough finds it helpful to break down the complex into
the simpler. Generally that means seeking to reach into the spatial
interior of the face of the things which dominate our experience of the
world, and frequently it means reaching quite beyond what we can
register with our unaided senses, and this, not simply on the micro-scale
(atoms and molecules, say) but also on the macro-scale (distant
constellations, say). xvi Recognizing the limitations to direct sensible
disclosure and to the immediate intelligibility of the sensible, then, but
seeking to find the intelligibility of the face in its own right and terms as
objective factor, inquiry would do this by appealing to explanatory
factors that may themselves never be directly manifest to sense but are
proposed to be responsible for the intelligible connections and patterns
that mark the face and characterize it as a diverse-but-unified objective
field. It is by such an intellectual detour, pushing thought into a region
that lies quite beyond anything that stands in the reach of direct
perception and imaginatively conceiving matters which elude the direct
sensitivity of the human sensory powers in virtue of scale, distance, or
whatever other limits there are for our sensibility, that empirical science
proceeds here, introducing constituent factors and forces-- initially only
hypothetically, but then with some evidence and indirect testimony-- that
are not, and cannot be, part of the sense-disclosed aspects of the face
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itself. Because such constituent factors are not directly observed but
only posited hypothetically, new evidence and new thinking may
challenge the existence of such entities and forces and hypothetically
posit something different; so we can at best only presume that something
like the currently hypothesized and posited factors do actually form components of that face of things which shows itself to us sensibly in some
of its features.
Finally, scientific inquiry returns to the sensible arena that was its
beginning-point as well. For
e. drawing out from the hypothesis some implications of it that
could be observed (that the theory-underpinned-hypothesis
would predict or that would be consistent with the hypothesis),
inquiry seeks in regard to those implications to confirm (or
disconfirm) the hypothesis by observation-- under certain
conditions and with various instruments-- of the sensible side
of the face of things (experimentally set up or not);
f. whenever fact does not confirm theory/hypothesis, there is
required a revision of the latter, and another test, so that
inquiry involves now the ongoing and repeated interplay of
theory and old-and-new-facts, with experiment and
observation as the vehicles for taking note of the variety of
facts and for the testing of the various hypotheses and theories.
If the rational side of modern scientific inquiry shows itself in the preceding steps, its embracing empirical character shows itself most forcefully in this final step. For whatever has been hypothesized and however
complex the posited factors and forces may be, the claim to be
explanatory must prove itself out in a way that can be confirmed by what
our senses disclose, even though that disclosure has to be interpreted as
to its meaning. Depending on the degree of confirmation provided by
this return to the arena of the beginning, we can claim evidence-based
knowledge with a strength comparable to the degree of confirmation.
Nothing that is concluded in this scientific inquiry will be confirmed
absolutely and with certainty, since new evidence, and better ways of
explaining the phenomena together with other phenomena, may well
become available and remind us of the limits to the plausibility of our
conclusions. In any case, plausible conjecture within a theoretical
framework, even conjecture which ‘works’ (that is, receives
confirmation indirectly, via observation and experiment), can never be
taken as necessarily signifying an accurate ‘picture’ of reality, even of
the face of reality.
In sum: The pursuit of scientific inquiry structurally involves, then:
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a. within the encompassing field (‘nature’ as name for the face of
things), the focus on something problematic, with description
and analysis to formulate what that is and to provide a
starting-point for the effort to understand;
b. with some reference to an already established theoretical
framework (various theories about areas likely to be relevant)
to guide research and to frame an address to the problem, the
development of an hypothesis that would address the problem
(form a proposed understanding of what is problematic), one
that can be tested empirically;
c. the testing by observation (with or without experimentation),
and the interpretation of the significance of the results as these
serve as evidence that relates to the hypothesis (confirming,
refuting, etc., including calling for refinement or
modification-- and even perhaps leading to refining or
revising of the encompassing theoretical framework, not
simply the working hypothesis itself: progress advances not
simply by adding to and extending a settled framework but
also by revising the basic framework itself); xvii
d. the connecting and, where possible, integrating of
theories on related matters, and more broadly, the reaching for
comprehensive understanding that would include all that
constitutes the face of things. xviii
In its procedure, then, scientific inquiry (in its nature, and as it is
coming into its own in modern times) is a distinctive combination of the
rational and the empirical, and that means:
a. it is observational (usually with the help of experiment), and
that means: its problematic start, its evidence, and its conduct
involve and require (ultimately) first-hand sensory experience
by the inquirer as observer;
b. it is technical, and that means: employs specialized terms and
symbols (particularly, mathematical) as well as specialized
equipment (to augment human observational powers, for example), thereby requiring training and familiarity that is beyond the everyday experience and competence of human beings in order to be aptly prepared to take part in inquiry scientifically;
c. it is theoretical, and that means: develops a proposed understanding, often by generalizing and in any case by hypothesizing, and by way of such hypothesizing, introduces
reference to much that is not registered directly in our sensory
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capacities but which is thought to be actual nonetheless and
to be so characterized as to explain (among other things) the
matters being investigated;
d. and throughout, it is object-focused and public, and that means:
its embracing field (‘nature’) is ob-jective to the inquirer, the
public face as it confronts him/her and any other human being
with the requisite qualifications (of sensory receptivity, of discrimination and interpretation) and the requisite attitude (of
objectivity and concern simply for truth: the capacity to
bracket other interests and attend with an emotional and
intellectual detachment to what shows itself ‘there’ to
someone intent on subordinating all such ‘subjectivity’ to the
discernment of this facet of actuality as it is, however we may
want it to be).
To conclude this initial discussion: So far, we have been treating of
the essential nature of science as a human possibility, one whose earliest
actualization was first ventured in ancient Greece but one whose actualization has been bringing it more fully into its own since the emergence
of the modern natural or physical sciences in early modern times in
Europe. As a form of human endeavor, scientific inquiry takes shape as
the distinctive activity it is when, taking up with what we encounter in
the interactivity of our existence, we establish (in this case) the
encompassing field for its inquiry; we do that by abs-tracting the face of
things from the wholeness of interactive-actuality and focusing on it as
the field (‘nature’).
Within this encompassing field we have
interpretatively selected out certain features of it as (temporarily)
defining lesser or specialized fields within ‘nature’ (addressed in
‘physics’, ‘chemistry’, ‘geology’, ‘astronomy’, etc.), but throughout,
much the same methodical procedure as that sketched out above has defined the scientific mode of inquiry, and knowledge arrived at in all is
gathered up into the reaching for a unified system of knowledge commensurate with all ‘nature’. Given its methodical procedure, scientific
inquiry reaches tentative conclusions (evidence-based and strength-ofevidence-relative) which are subject to revision as other evidence
accumulates or as limitations in the original hypothesis emerge into view.
We take such conclusions as having a claim to truth in virtue of having
been arrived at in a methodically sound fashion, one whose process
involves an effective answering to obligation in its multiple forms in the
conduct of inquiry and that thereby meets certain standards, making the
conclusion drawn worthy of our consideration as true with a force to its
truth-claim that is proportionate to the evidence. That is, the force of
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‘scientific’ conclusions depends on the quality of the effort that went into
producing them: not simply the gathering of evidence, its assessment,
the strength of the reasoning involved in drawing the conclusion from
the evidential-premises, but also the inquiry itself as having been carried
out with the appropriate concern for truth as primordial, with an effective
responsiveness to obligation, with an honest observation and judgment
and assessment, so that (say) we may trust that the evidence presented
has not been forged. That such ‘subjective’ factors are of high quality is
of the essence in inquiry as scientific, so much so that the only check on
the credibility of the results, namely, the replication of the experiment or
the process of producing the conclusions, itself is credible only if that
replication can also be believed to be grounded in the same high quality.
This point can be expanded: the truth-claim made in the conclusion of a
scientific inquiry is credible only in dependence upon, and under the
limitations imposed by, certain conditions. Those consist, on the one
hand, in the responsible character of the inquiry that led to the truth-claim,
and, on the other hand, in the theoretical framework (complex of theories)
involved, and the evidence for it (those theories), and even more fundamentally, on the original field-defining focus on the face of things. Ultimately, then, science-based claims to truth are credible and compelling
only within the recognition and acknowledgment that scientific inquiry
has been searching out only one aspect of actuality, that consisting of the
face of things, and that that aspect, as part of a larger whole, has not been- and perhaps can not be-- explored scientifically for how the larger
whole includes and conditions this part.
b. Science of life?
We have noted that the field for scientific inquiry-- the face of things
as it shows itself “there” in outward reference from the inquirer-- is established in a focusing of attention outward which dis-regards the creational and agential pre-conditions for such inquiry. There is a two-sided
question that arises at this point: What about a scientific inquiry into life?
The question reminds us, on the one hand, that life is a phenomenon
that seems plausibly to be part of ‘nature’, to fall within the field of scientific inquiry. But perhaps because in its initial phase modern science, in
its focus on the face of things, was dominated by concern with certain
facets of that face-- what constituted the special-field of physical motion
(earthly and heavenly) in inorganic ‘nature’--, and only gradually spread
beyond that, and because in the initial development of the scientific
mode of inquiry inquiry took shape with the non-living in mind and the
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living was essentially dismissed (reduced to a machine), when the living
was coming under scientific scrutiny in the 19th century and especially
when Darwin made biology (evolutionary biology) central again as a
field of study (as it had been with Aristotle, though not in an evolutionary
vein), there emerged questions about the aptness of science as a vehicle
for understanding life. Is life really intelligible in the mechanistic terms
in which inorganic ‘nature’ was apparently intelligible? Is the scientific
mode of inquiry appropriate, if it requires address to ‘nature’ in mathematical and mechanistic terms? In our characterization of scientific inquiry so far, we have characterized the scientific method broadly enough
to allow a scientific address to the living as a part of the field of ‘nature’;
but in what sense, and to what degree, can such inquiry really get to life
itself?
The question reminds us, on the other hand, that the scientific
inquirers who are involved are human beings, alive and active out of
themselves, and whose inquiring usually lies at the center of the lives
they are living. Yet in their inquiring, the very defining of their field
involves a dis-regard for the inwardness of themselves as active-beings
and of their interactive-existence as it defines itself in their interacting as
initiated from out of that inwardness. Thus life would seem to be visible
in their field of inquiry (and after all, the natural sciences include
something called biology as well as physics, chemistry, geology,
astronomy, meteorology, and the like), but it would seem something
simply to be taken for granted and excluded from the focus of their
inquiring as it is their own life and living.
What the two-sided question reflects is that life is something we
know (so to speak) from the inside as well as from the outside. We will
consider this matter of the scientific study of life more at length in the
Chapters 3 and 4, but at the present place in our discussion, it seems
appropriate to conclude our discussion here and to anticipate our
consideration in the discussion to come in the following way.
There is an ambiguity in the term “life” which in Greek is reflected
by the use of two different words, βίος and ζωή; the former is reflected
in our “biography” as the written account of someone’s life, the latter in
“zoology” as the study of animal life. Now the “life” that is treated in a
biography is something lived, not something organic, but the “life”
studied in zoology is something organic. The organic, as differentiated
from the inorganic, is the character of the face of certain active-beings,
but both organic and inorganic, as marking the face of beings, stand in
contrast with the inward (not interior!) as the locus of the activeinitiative that becomes increasingly many-sided and prominent in the
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actuality of living beings as their organic structure becomes more
complex. It is in the activity initiated inwardly that the living being lives
its life, and the life it lives, the life that becomes realized in its activity,
is different from, but in some fashion inclusive of, the organic functioning
of the outward side of its active-being. Now in science as we have so far
been considering it, the focus is outward, and so far as the organic
(“zoological”) element in the living being is concerned, it forms a feature
or set of features which can be addressed in the methodical fashion we
have so far attributed to scientific inquiry. But particularly as the living
being seems more like ourselves, and especially as it is in fact human,
we notice a significant limitation to such an approach to life: it does not
recognize life as something we live (the “biographical”). That should
not be surprising, actually, since we have no direct access to the inward
in any other being-- human or non-human--, only in ourselves. But we
know from our own experience of our own being, that it is in this inward
side of ourselves that what is primordial and of the essence in ourselves
as distinctive (human) active-beings lies. And because it is in being
active out of our inward nature that we live our lives, we have no direct
access to this matter of living our lives except in our own person. There
is no reason for not thinking of the organic or ‘zoological’ aspect of
ourselves, and addressing it with the same detachment and objectivity as
we do the organic in other living beings. But there are ready confusions
we need to guard against when we do this, and mistaken claims we need
to understand and to avoid. Two in particular have surfaced in the last
century and been given (for a while, at least) a scientific dress. One is to
confuse activity in the living with behavior (which is at most the overt
side of activity), and to assume that the latter is intelligible with the
minimum of anything like feeling or thinking or any other component of
our own experience of the inward side of our functioning; this
behaviorism treats all living beings basically as machines structured to
react to one or another stimulus from the outside, with this necessary
reference to “stimulus” and “response” being appealed to without the
needed discerning reflection as to the meaning it would genuinely have
to have if it played the role it is supposed to play. The other is to confuse
the interior and the inward, as well as the organic and the behavioral,
leading to the near (if not total) ‘identification’ of brain and mind, brain
functioning and mental activity, physiological functioning and operation
of the bodily side of ourselves in activity.
If life is an affair which, like our active-being (and indeed, in close
connection with it), is (so to speak) two-sided, and if one side is inaccessible to scientific inquiry as addressed to the outward and the face of
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things, then we are faced with a challenge, both to understand this
complex affair that is life, and to understand whether-- and if it is
possible, how-- life may come under scientific scrutiny and scientific
knowledge be gained of it. Scientific inquiry is a venturing which, by its
very nature, must rise to challenges to its claims and purported findings,
even to its initial projection of a determinate field within which there is
a ‘problem’ that is to be addressed. For in that delineation of a field for
inquiry, for example, the terms in which the scientist initially describes
that field are interpretative and themselves formed only as enabling basis
for inquiry, as part of the guiding framework for inquiry and not as
themselves a scientifically ascertained result of inquiry. Thus the most
fundamental progress for the enterprise of science comes with challenges
to its basic theoretical framework, including its determination of its own
field, and with the successful reworking of the framework or
determination, one that meets the challenge and advances an improved
framework or determination within which to undertake inquiry.
Similarly, it is possible to see fundamental progress made when the
presumption that certain methods are alone appropriate in such-and-such
an inquiry into such-and-such matters is challenged: for example, that
the mechanistic model, and application of mathematics, marks
responsible scientific inquiry throughout its proper field and indeed is
part of what defines the scientific, so that it is the only proper model for
scientific inquiry into life.
More important for understanding scientific inquiry, however, is the
grasp of it as involving certain pre-conditions, and of the resultant qualification to the truths it seeks and achieves. We have seen that all such
inquiry takes place in an abs-tract address to the face of things, and
involves ‘object’ and ‘objectivity’ as well as a commitment to truthregardless (thus honesty, obligation to accept ‘evidence’-- but to question
it also, if it seems challengeable). None of this is the fruit of scientific
inquiry, but these latter things are components of that inquiry and belong
to its defining nature. The crucial one for understanding the limits of
science, however, is the first one, the abs-tract address it involves, and
what that means. It is quite possible to undertake scientific inquiry and
to succeed in many regards on the basis of a mis-taken interpretation of
that field-opening address; but if that interpretation is a mis-reading (for
example, an interpretation that gives it a reality that does not genuinely
belong to it) and the pre-conditions are thereby being mis-understood,
not only would this eventually undermine the credibility of the enterprise
but it would mis-read the meaning of the otherwise credible fruits in their
place in reality. That is, in the scientific seeking for truth, for all its
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skeptical elements there are factors which enter into the abs-tract address
which opens the whole of the face to scrutiny and sets the parameters
within which inquiry is to proceed which are simple pre-scientific
presumptions: that the face is all, say, and is not simply the face; that
inquiry that seeks truth must be scientific, where that means such-andsuch. While science can proceed in good measure without understanding
its own basis, it would undermine itself eventually without appropriate
recognition of that basis. Scrutiny of the factors that enter into this basis
as preconditions for the activity takes us, however, into philosophical reflection.
More on this below and in chapters to come.

3. Science and philosophy: their contrasting natures
Science and philosophy are both forms of inquiry, intellectual and
truth-seeking, and as disciplined human undertakings they take their
shape within a creational universe and as expressions of responsible
adult human capacity.
The larger matrix of both disciplines is the creational universe within
which humans are space-and-time enabled existent-beings participating
as agents in the interactivity of existence. The immediate matrix of both
is human practice, and that means (employing here a specific meaning
of “practice” which signifies adult human activity whose undertaking is
meant to answer to the call for self-responsible participation in affairs):
both take shape within the adult human venturing which aspires, as venturing, to be part of an apt answering on the part of the individual to the
problematic of existence.
As forms of disciplined inquiry, that is, as forms of inquiring whose
undertaking in each case is governed by standards and obligations xix and
methods-or-procedures that enable results whose claim to truth is
credible because-- and to the extent that-- those results were achieved in
ways that measure up to the standards, science and philosophy can be
compared and contrasted in regard to:
a. the standpoint involved (what it is, what is required to attain it)
b. the problematic under which inquiry proceeds at the standpoint
in question
c. the capacities drawn on in responsive inquiry undertaken at the
standpoint in question, and the method of approach and
address
d. the nature and accessibility of relevant evidence
As for philosophy, we can say on these points: xx

Commented [26]: [[CH2-CM25]], also [[CH2-CM26]]
and [[CH2-CM30]]

Commented [27]: [[CH2-CM27]]

106

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

Problematic: In its venturing, philosophical re-flection seeks
understanding of the problematic that inherently marks existence and
which is ever being responded to by human beings in the living of their
lives but which comes to claim attention expressly at times in such way
as calls for practical re-flection. By nature, such a time is that of youth
for a human being, a time at which we are meant to assume responsibility
for our lives as our own and at which we are summoned to re-flection on
how we are to live that life for which we are now assuming responsibility.
Standpoint: Philosophical inquiry is a responsive activity which
universalizes the practical re-flection which, in response to the
problematic of existence that on occasion concretely calls forth that
practical re-flection, is part of assuming our lives on ourselves and our
forming of life-venturing effort (in this case, one of philosophically reflective inquiry). Philosophical inquiry is undertaken from the
standpoint of the human agent participating in an interactive existence
and assuming here a standpoint centered back in our common humanity
and seeking truthful understanding of this problematic as a human being
can discern it. What it is to be a human being, what this universe is in
which we find ourselves, and in both cases, these matters as brought
together around an at-stake in and for the activity of spatio-temporal
beings (humans included) and concerning the being of that universe:
these form the basic matters at issue in and for re-flection that would
address them as human, as aimed at an understanding that (in principle)
any human being would affirm.
Capacities and method: The capacities with which we enter upon
and pursue philosophical inquiry are the finite powers of temporal creaturely-beings; in virtue of the character of our human nature, we are
meant to develop our powers and to grow and mature humanly. Included
in this evolution is the capacity we enter on in youth, for thought that has
a re-flective function in our living-and-acting. Philosophical inquiry
universalizes the working of re-flective thought, and while this is
possible in some measure for any human being, only a few have
sufficient capacity of this sort to make such inquiry a life-long discipline.
The problematic which is explored in such inquiry with the employment
of this eventually-grown-into capacity is one which invests uni-versal
creational existence and bears directly but inwardly on our living and
acting. To gain apt access to this problematic and to the evidence needed
for understanding this matter, the philosopher needs to mature humanly
and to become fully (or become more fully) open in immediacy to the
fulness of actuality: that means, of human agency as individual and as
human, of the face as genuinely face-in-and-of-active-beings-in-their-
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wholeness, in short, of all beings as active-beings, participants in the
interactivity of existence. Even more deeply, it needs to remain-orbecome open to the creational nature of being. Philosophical re-flection,
being undertaken at the agential standpoint, involves exploration of such
immediacy under the guidance of the claiming-presence of the
problematic and the employment of all our responsive capacities in
service of a conceptual-re-flective-capacity responsive in this way. Such
use requires attention to and a remaining-open to the con-crete, and such
thinking, sensitive to creational and nature-harbored meanings native to
existence, requires the skillful and self-critical use of the most sensitive
form of all the responsive capacities that belong to human nature in its
mature realization, in order that an interpretation of what has become
open and is being explored be as apt as possible to what is to be
understood. Because we only grow into our maturity over time, the
capacity which we draw into use in inquiry at any time is meant by nature
to augment, so that patience becomes an important element in exploring
and assessing the disclosures of experience. But even more central to
such exploratory and interpreting re-flection is a morality of inquiry
consonant with the concern for truth, and one that centers in particular
on courage and honesty and involves genuineness of concern, all the
more because what is evidential is not public (though it is accessible in
principle to any mature and honest inquirer) and therefore does not have
an appeal to the-public-and-outwardly-accessible-to-all (that is, all who
have and employ the qualifications of the rational subject) as secondary
back-up for assuring that the evidence is what it is being claimed to be
and the interpretation of it as bearing on the matters under question is
plausible.
Evidence: Such openness to the fulness of being, and with it, relevant evidence for the understanding being sought, can only be first-hand:
the philosophically re-flective inquirer can find the relevant evidence
only as he/she is fully there at the heart of the dynamic of creation, and
is there self-aware. That means, for the fullest access to the evidence
he/she needs to be there as fully mature humanly in his/her present being.
As for science, we can say on these points:
Problematic: Science enters upon its inquiry concretely in
response to something-not-intelligible as regards what is factually-so
concerning the face of things. There is, then, no single starting-place in
a single encompassing problematic as in philosophical inquiry, but the
character of the starting-point is nonetheless constant, namely,
something problematic concerning the factuality of the face of things, an
unintelligibility there that is challenging and that provokes curiosity on
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the part of the person in question.
Standpoint: In its venturing, science is focused outwardly and,
abs-tracting the outwardly-accessible face of things from all else, takes
the standpoint of subject seeking what is objectively so concerning that
face (the truth of the face in its factual character). And yet the scientist
who is assuming this standpoint is an adult human agent participating in
an interactive existence; he/she is simply narrowing his/her focus and
assuming this limited standpoint for the sake of discovering the truth of
the face of things. Science, thus, is not itself re-flective in nature, even
though its pursuit involves an adult and a (practically) re-flective agency
on the part of the inquirer. These are simply taken for granted and
ignored, so far as the focus of inquiry is concerned.
Capacities and method: Scientific inquiry enters us as temporal
creaturely-beings with finite powers into exploration of, and an attempt
to understand, the outward, the face of things; while in virtue of the
character of our human nature, we are meant to grow and mature
humanly, this plays no internal role to scientific inquiry, though the latter
depends on the achievement of an adult capability to operate in inquiry
as “subject” drawing on the sense-receptivity and the conceptual form of
rationality present in the adult human being, and employing imagination
in its reach beyond the sensibly-apparent to such possible rationallyconceivable factors as would belong to the face but whose character-andfunctioning might remedy the ignorance and the not-intelligible-state-ofthings which formed the starting-point of inquiry. In this employment of
capacities as “subject”, a number of important things go on. For one, the
inquirer provides for him-/herself a field in which to work, by abstracting the public face of creaturely beings (including his/her own face),
and his/her inquiry proceeds by focusing, exploring, and seeking to grasp
that face in its intelligibility as encountered feature with a character of
its own. For another, while the state of his/her maturing as a human
being is not significant in itself, the inquirer must be responsive to a
variety of obligations in this focusing, exploring, and seeking to grasp.
There is a morality internal to inquiry as a seeking for truth, and a reflexiveness concerned with the ongoing assessment of how the inquiry is
taking shape (relative to the standards involved). But because the
evidence which is integral to any conclusions drawn in such inquiry is
itself publicly accessible, there is a limited or secondary back-up for
assessing any claim being made, although one that itself requires
morality in the assessment-process, in order that error and forgery be
detected and the concern for truth remain pure. For a third, in this
employment of human capacities within the field and under the
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obligations of responsible thought, any scientific inquirer draws also on
the work of others; science is a collective enterprise, and often a
collaborative one, and because of the field to be addressed, the capacities
that need to be drawn on, the necessary training of those capacities to
enable their employment to be skillful, the facilitating acquaintance with
a range of knowledge developed by others, and the fruitfulness of work
co-ordinated with the work of others, the whole enterprise can be
understood to achieve progress over time, an advance of knowledge, in
a way that philosophy can not. It is true that genuine breakthroughs are
needed at times, and progress is not a steady march forward step by step.
Yet seen as a collective enterprise, with many contributions of different
sorts from many sources, science can advance our knowledge, providing
that we keep in mind that the “knowledge” that is gained is not some
absolute truth, but tentative-and-evidence-relative insight that must
always be recognized as (at best) limited insight and subject to criticism
and improvement. xxi
Evidence: The evidence relevant in scientific inquiry to a conclusion claiming truth appears in the publicly accessible face of things, although in most cases it functions as evidence only within a more-or-less
complex theoretical framework which makes its bearing as evidence apparent. Such empirical evidence, a hallmark of modern empirical
science, is public and open to any “subject” who has the appropriate
qualifications (in knowledge, training, etc.) to grasp what is apparent in
its evidential import. But the fullest maturity as a human being is not
among the necessary qualifications, either for discovering the evidence
first-hand or for assessing it in its bearing on a hypothesis. The morality
involved here is internal to the inquiry, and while it is a self-responsible
adult who is undertaking nquiry, the morality required does not demand
a high degree of maturity in the inquirer as regards the way he/she lives
his/her life; and in any case, the evidence-as-evidence does not depend
for its accessibility on such maturity, in contrast with the case of
philosophical reflection. Thus the empirical character of science is not
the same as the experiential character of philosophy, the latter being the
way experience is appropriately drawn on in re-flective inquiry, the
former being the way experience is appropriately drawn on in scientific
inquiry relating to the face of things.
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NOTES

i

In the conclusion to his Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant writes
words that express a somewhat kindred thought to mine: “Two things fill the
mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more
steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law
within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscured
in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before
me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence.
The former begins at the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and it
broadens the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude of worlds
beyond worlds and systems of systems into the limitless times of their periodic
motion, their beginning and their continuance. The latter begins at my invisible
self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity but which
is comprehensible only to the understanding-- a world with which I recognize
myself as existing in a universal and necessary (and not only, as in the first case,
contingent) connection, and thereby also in connection with all those visible
worlds. The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates me, as it
were, my importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet
(a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came, the matter which
is for a little time provided with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the
contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an intelligence by my personality,
in which the moral law reveals a life independent of all animality and even of the
whole world of sense-- at least so far as it may be inferred from the purposive
destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination which is not
restricted to the conditions and limits of this life but reaches into the infinite.”
ii
For further discussion of this matter, see also my Well of Eternity 45-51,
and my Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy, 47-53.
iii
Thus I use the term “con-current” here instead of “contemporaneous”, to
underline that the being which are joining are each acting out of the current now
of their own existence. I will reserve the term “contemporaneous” to mark other
things.
iv
We will enter a bit further into these matters in Chapter 3. Here we can
add: I am distinguishing between the situation of an active being and the outwardly-spatial field in which the being and its acting are involved. The spatial
field includes all the active beings that are present in it, but includes them in
terms simply of their outward spatiality and such spatial (and other) features of
their outwardness as may be part of them. The situation of an active being as
agent, however, is his/her placement as engaged with other active (human or nonhuman) beings, which beings are not necessarily limited to those positioned in
his/her proximity spatially nor are they inclusive of all those that form part of
his/her most immediate circumstance. The situation, while involving the
outwardly-spatial field as factor within it, is defined more inclusively, by
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reference to the inward-and-outward together, not simply to the outward. Thus
because interacting is an affair of beings-whole, it will be the case that in the
interacting, there is at work not simply the inward facets of the diverse agents
acting out of themselves but outward factors, not simply operating in their own
terms (for example, the particular terms of the human body as an organic affair)
and (say) maintaining the body as an vital organic system (we need our body to
operate in certain ways to maintain life and health, and to be capable of being
employed in the ways needed when we are acting instead of, say, impairing our
activity in virtue of the way sickness or injury is affecting this outward side of
ourselves as agents), but maintaining it in such way as enables its employment
in the activity of ourselves as agents. [In Chapter 3, we will be distinguishing,
for example, between our outward side characterized by qualities and processes
belonging to it in its own facial terms (the organic nature and the coursing of
blood, the breathing and heart-beat, etc.), and that outward side as it is employed
in our activity (the fingers as employed in playing the piano, where their
employment and movement does not belong to their organic structure and
functioning but embodies their suitability as work-accomplishing-features of our
body.] Our outwardness opens us to impacts and contacts from beyond, and to
connections, simply in terms of the processes inherent in it-- the sun’s heat can
bring perspiration and sap our physical energy on a hike, for example--; these
may generate a bodily condition that makes for difficulty in our hiking over a
long distance, since (say) we need a certain amount of energy to continue and to
make camp where we intended to. But so far as we register inwardly what is
happening to our body, this feeling of energy being sapped may evoke a variety
of responses-- for one, a determination to go ahead anyway and to draw more
deeply on our reservoir of energy. Now the sun’s impact on our body such that
it raises perspiration and saps energy is not a matter of interaction as I mean it,
but it is part of the situation of myself-as-agent whose being and activity involve
and employ this bodily side of myself, and more, a part which I register inwardly
and respond to, making the externally-outward as it affects the body and its
employment in my hiking become a factor which, registering in the inwardness
in which my initiative is responsively operative, is entered thereby into my
initiative and becomes operative within my determination to continue hiking.
Similarly, the circumstance to which we are related as a situated being is much
richer in active-beings than we are actually interacting with at any time, so that
because our circumstance and our situation are continually changing (both for
reasons relating to our inward side and for reasons related to circumstance), much
of what we encounter as we engage with other existent-beings we never actually
establish with any strength or depth (or even at all) an interactive-and-mutualout-of-our-selves-and-initiatives connection with, even though we may register
in our sensory-fields the surfaces and the appearance of such things in our
circumstance. Our situation, then, has complexity of many sorts included in it,
including diverse measures of interactive engagement with the various activebeings with which one is interacting somehow at any time.
v
Keep in mind that it is a fiction only as mis-taking a facet of the spatial for
space itself; as a rendering of that spatial facet itself, it need not be a fiction, a
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false or inaccurate representation.
vi

There is another side of the invitation to obliviousness, this time provided by
religion. For if the symbolic speech of myth is not grasped as symbolic and a
fundamentalistic (and literalistic) reading of the meaning of myth prevails, then
the presentation of the act of creation in a temporal vein can make even more
difficult the dismissing of pre-conceptions and pre-judgments which is essential
to the self-critical approach of philosophical reflection. Not only that, but even
in our re-flections we have found it helpful to speak of creation in a conceptual
language that uses time-metaphorical terms, even while claiming that creation is
an a-temporal and a-spatial ‘act’, part of the internal dynamic of being’s own
nature. This usage may also lead to confusion, and to careless thinking of the
‘creation’ of the ongoing as itself ongoing in that same sense, or to carelessly
confusing ‘creation’ with ‘genesis’, the a-temporal with the wholly temporal.
vii
Keep in mind that each being is also determinate, as are those beings with
which it finds itself. The structure of spatial-and-temporal existence for active
beings is one thing, the nature-and-particularity of the active beings whose
existence is so structured is another. To give an account of the former is one
thing, to give an account of the latter another. Thus while the spatial-and-temporal structure, and the structure of what it enables (namely, participation in
interactive-activity), may account for some of the terms in which we understand
existence, it requires reference to the determinate (nature and particularity) to
understand the “where” of the placement of our own singular spatially-and-temporally-finite existence in this-determinate-place (amidst these determinate
beings) rather than some other place. We are speaking here of the universal
structure, not the determinateness that must be referred to in order to understand
the determinate embodiment of that structure.
viii
We are not, then, simply describing the enterprise as it took shape historically, whether among the Greeks or in modern times, but rather seeking to set
forth the nature of the enterprise which is being actualized in more or less adequate and comprehensive form in the various historical conditions, and
actualized with various more or less adequate ideas of what was involved in what
was being undertaken. What in the nature of things, and of human capacity,
founds this enterprise as relevant to actual being and enters into its defining
meaning, is being formulated in the terms of the re-flective understanding we are
developing and claiming truth for, not the terms which scientists-- all, or even
any-- along the way historically would have used or would use today.
ix
The characterization of science offered in this chapter focuses on the natural sciences, thus on what initially dominated the modern-time realization of
the meant-to-be of science; that is the basic form which, up into (and perhaps
even through) the 20th century, has been taken as paradigmatic, although as we
shall see that is misleading. We nonetheless begin here, and in the next chapters
raise the possibility of science, or a responsible disciplined study, in another form,
addressing the human as human. In this regard, keep in mind that the face of
things is not even actuality in its fulness, let alone exhaustive of reality. It is
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rather an aspect of creaturely existent-beings-- the spatially outward aspect-whose heart is inward and a matter of activity-initiating-and-executing. Neither
of these latter belong to the face of things.
x
To anticipate thoughts in Chapter 3 here: When we are considering human
engagement with things, and in particular, a form of such engagement such as
scientific inquiry, it is important to distinguish three things: (1) scientific inquiry
as an activity defined by a meant-to-be that is how human capacity is meant to
function in the interactive-activity that is scientific activity; in this case, the
meant-to-be relates to our native capacity to know but is grounded not simply in
human nature but also in the nature of the creational whole within which knowing
is meant to take place; (2) science in its historical development, the concrete
realization of the meant-to-be, and one which shows historically a more -or-less
adequate realization of it on different occasions and in general over time; our
actual scientific inquiring has been recently coming into itself-in-its-capacity-togenerate-knowledge, but in the last century or so it has come into a question
about how far it can proceed. That question has two sides to it: one concerns
how far the use of technology can take us over time, enabling us to venture on
paths previously impossible; the other concerns whether the defining focus on
the outward does not limit what can be discovered in science as it is being
conceived, and open the way to a different undertaking which places the inward
at the center of the field of discovery, and requires a very different approach if
one is responsibly to explore and come to understand what shows itself in this
field; (3) science as, internal to itself and as part of its meant-to-be, it involves
thought which would improve its way of proceeding (realizing its meant-to-be),
and in this limited regard, science as internal to itself involving an internal-toitself-as-science self-understanding of its appropriate methods etc. (all along the
way, this internal-self-understanding has changed as the actual conduct of
science has become more adequate to its meant-to-be, with improved methods
and increased employment of controlled experiments and not simply unaided
observation, for example; such internal-self-improvement-thought is not,
however, fruit of the focus in scientific inquiry, but of the reflexive element which
belongs to scientific inquiry and relates to how well what is actually being
undertaken lives up to the meant-to-be and the standards implied in that for
inquiry that would secure reasoned insight. This reflexive element, relating
importantly to method, does not itself produce what science is meant to produce,
but is nonetheless an essential ingredient in science as a discipline/‘art’/knowhow that can produce knowledge.)
xi
Aristotle points us into this in his way, in the opening of line of Book I of
his Metaphysics: “All human beings by nature desire to know.” That desire
manifests itself initially in our affection-for-and-delight-in (ἀγάπησις) the senses,
and especially in sight, for more than any other sense it makes things known to
us and reveals a multitude of distinctions-and-differences. The culmination of
this native desire is to be found in the fullest form of knowing, namely, wisdom
(σοφία) or insight into ultimate reasons and principles (beginning-points).
Leaving Aristotle aside, the native curiosity in question draws us into an effort
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to know simply to be more fully aware, quite regardless of whether or not that
knowing has any pragmatic application or relevance.
xii

We are usually quite oblivious to what we are doing as we move through the
world and register it in its sensible presence. Without much thought, we
instinctively confuse our ordinary perceiving with sheer sensing, whereas in
reality it is sensing guided by an interpretative framework we use in registering
what we are sensing (seeing, hearing, touching, etc.). What we in fact “see” is
what registers after a filtering/selecting/regarding-and-disregarding allows what
we are receiving to register, so that our “seeing” reflects an emphasis and slant
which we in part are responsible for allowing to emerge. In ordinary intercourse
with the world, that emphasis and slant reflect primordially our interpretation of
the bearing of what is presenting itself on ourselves as engaged in this-or-that
and taking in things according as they have meaning (or not) for what we are
doing. Thus we do not register things in their face simply, but in some practical
reference to our own involvement and engagement with them: in reference to our
needs, our capacities to employ things and the capacities of things to be handled
by us and made to serve our desires, thus as as ‘resource’, as ‘obstacle’, as ‘threat’,
as ... . In the case of a scientific address to things, we seek in general to bracket
all that reflects these practical regards, and we also seek to dismiss the disposingforce of all the subjective elements that might dispose us to ways of taking up
with the face of things that color it emotionally or slant/highlight/emphasize or
limit it for subjective reasons or on subjective grounds. Even so, we still are
regarding things in a limited way, in their bearing on our inquiry, and interpreting
them and allowing them to register in this reference.
xiii
The distinctions of subject-object and subjective-objective have meaning
only within the fuller matrix of an actuality that is that of interactive-existenceand-existents/active-beings. There is no single active being; existence is interactive, the interacting of active beings. The spatio-temporal constitution of such
existent-beings means that their interactive-activity involves them whole, that is,
as initiating-and-carrying-out activity that carries their whole existent-being into
it. Now while their activity takes place with the functioning of their inward and
outward sides together, and thus the face of such beings and those they are
interacting with enters into the interacting, what the face itself represents as face
(as overt element in of activity that is initiated-and-carried-through inwardly) is
only one facet of the whole being. As the spatially outward side of the active
being, the face also has its own character, such that what is disclosed on the
surface of-- and in the interior of-- that face when it is considered in its own
character is not itself-as-face-of-a-whole-being but itself-in-its-own-constitution.
In the human case, for example, it is our body as organically constituted and
functioning, in contrast with its operation in our activity (my fingers playing the
piano, as contrasted with the blood flowing through them, their bone and
ligament and muscle structure and function). The face only exists and has such a
constitution as one facet of active beings involved in interactive-existence, in an
interacting with each other; but it is possible for human beings to focus attention
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only on this face in its own constitution and dis-regard the face as face of a whole
being. Now what is so focused on is indeed “there” for ourselves “here”, but not
“there” as itself wholly self-contained reality, nor “there” as “independent” of us,
existing out of all relation to ourselves or any other things. When we regard it
as “there”, when we “objectivize” active-beings and regard them simply in their
character as presences-there to ourselves as “subject”-here who has sought to
disregard all that is part of ourselves that would color what is present to us and
discolor (conceal or distort) the face in its own constitution, we are operating
within an interacting and operating to limit our attention and the factors central
to our attending; what shows itself to us then and is being regarded by us with
attention to its own constitution rather than to its being face in a fuller being that
alone is what is actual is what constitutes the “objective” world, spatio-temporal
“things”. In truth, the “objective” is what it is within an interacting, in an interactive-existence, and does not have an existence independent of that interacting;
but the face, or the objective facet, of active-existent-beings is truly “there” to us
in our interacting with them, and we are seeking by our objectivizing to allow it
to appear to us in its own constitution rather than in those features of it which
reflect it as face of a whole being or in those features of it which represent how
it bears on us as active beings in whose activity something is at stake and how it
appears and functions as so bearing on us in our activity and, more broadly, our
being active. The “objectively existent”, then, is the outward facet of beings
within an encountering, and within an encountering in which we are intent on
dis-counting and dis-regarding much and narrowing our focus to what counts as
the genuine constitution of what manifests itself to us as the spatially-outward
side of other beings and of ourselves as our own face is part of the field we are
focused upon. It remains a question of how well we can achieve this
objectivizing; the responsible inquirer takes many precautions, but his/her own
very presence and most innocuous actions may nonetheless be making the
encompassing situation-- and thereby at least indirectly, the operation of the face
of things and the disclosure of that face-- different from it otherwise would be.
xiv
Because the defining of the field of inquiry is a fundamental but(for the
most part) implicit part of the address to things in actual inquiry into this-or-that,
as science has gradually established its own capacity to seek truth as regards the
facet of reality it addresses and thus has established itself as a noetic-enterprise
with its own distinctive use of human capacity and its own groundedness in
reality, the abs-tracting essential to the establishing of its field has often been
ignored and various false presumptions have arisen about the relation to ‘reality’
which science and scientifically-achieved truth has, about the nature of reality
such that science has this relation to it, and along with this, about there being no
other acceptable mode of arriving at reliable understanding. The definition of
the field of scientific inquiry, while foundational for science, raises philosophical
questions, and on this matter, I would claim that the meant-to-be of science is
that of a possibility-- human capacity and nature-of-things character grounded-of a cognitive/noetic relation to reality which is a relation to the face of actuality
(‘objective face of things’ and ‘fact’), and not to reality in any exhaustive fashion.
The mis-taking of the former for the latter is coming into prominence as science
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seeks to incorporate the human in its field without adapting itself in recognition
that this alters the field itself, and the appropriate address to it, in fundamental
ways. See the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4.
xv
In speaking structurally, I am making exposition difficult, for scientific
inquiry does not start from scratch as my exposition is presenting it but operates
within a collective enterprise that is well underway and which therefore already
provides, as part of the start of any inquiry, a complex framework of theories and
long history of experiments and observations within which any new undertaking
is set. These provide a context which gives internal direction and unity to
scientific research (seen simply in terms of the advance of knowledge: so far as
the applications of knowledge gained, and the funding for research, drive it from
beyond the simple interest in knowing, the directions taken can be quite
otherwise than those of pure research). In any case, the development of
hypotheses and of theories (including theories of broader and narrower scope) is
of accounts of the same general nature, in that they are purported
descriptions/explanations which provide reasons that, if true, would account for
known facts or for different sets of previously unrelated facts (a unifying
explanation, then) and would enable one to know other things besides those facts- to anticipate future facts, to grasp the factors at work in making those facts be
facts, etc. The hypotheses (narrower) and theories (broader) are formulated
within areas of the overall field of scientific inquiry, which areas are specialized
sub-fields set off by their presumed distinctive character (physics, chemistry,
etc.); in current science, things are developing at a pace that even this segregation
into broad and separate fields is being challenged, with previously separate fields
merging or overlapping and new fields being created as the advance of
knowledge calls for it. The ultimate aim-- and a guiding ideal-- is a single
inclusive system of scientific knowledge (as in Kant’s ideas of reason).
xvi
Keep in mind that this ‘going beyond’ the sensibly apparent does not take
us into the inward, but whether seeking to fathom the interior or to reach beyond
the sensible on the macro-plane, all that is invoked that goes beyond the sensible
still belongs to the face, that is, to the outward side of the spatiality of activebeings. The scientific going beyond the sensibly apparent does indeed lead to a
fuller account of the face, but it works within the abs-traction whereby the face
is detached for attention from actuality-whole and is ignored as what it ultimately
is, namely, one facet in a fuller actuality, and one conditioned in its own character
by that fuller actuality in which it is ingredient. As we will see, forgetting this
can lead to confusing the interior and the inward, and thinking one might
encounter feelings and ideas by cutting open the brain, as if inside that mass of
gray matter there were feelings and ideas in the same sense as there are electrical
impulses, synapses, and the complex set of organic functionings.
xvii
The appeal to evidence that is discernible on the face of things as the
senses disclose it is crucial, but it increasingly involves considerable complexity
and interpretation, as in cases where the sensible factors that serve as direct
evidence are, say, instrument readings, and where what are being registered on
the instrument are readings requiring interpretation according to a larger
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interpretative framework that determines the meaning of such readings.
xviii

In his notion of “reason” and its “ideas”, Kant articulates the notion of a
single encompassing system, a comprehensive unified theoretical framework
where various theories are parts of a larger systematic account, and sees this “idea”
as expressing our unlimited drive to understand as rational beings. Thus we are
restless, dissatisfied, impatient, as rational beings with something less than the
whole of objective truth integrated into one body. We do not simply seek more
and more knowledge, and not even an accumulation of various bits of knowledge
to form a single body; we want a unified and ordered system, and are (so far as
we are indeed rational) seeking in inquiry into particular matters to respond as
well to this demand for ordering in larger connections. Such a drive, reaching
beyond any specific present inquiry and its occasioning problem, develops its
own guidance creatively under a sense of an inclusive rational system, and shows
itself especially in the effort to systematically integrate various ‘bodies of
knowledge’.
xix
Both undertakings not only presuppose the at-stake of the creational
nature of existence and the register of this in human responsive capacity (and in
adult human capacity, that register is in the mode of obligation, as a summons to
take part in affairs in a certain way); but they also internalize this summons to
activity within their own forms of activity as inquiry seeking truth, making “truth”
be what is at stake and what claims the inquirer within the activity. Although this
refraction of obligation as, in its basic bearing, concerns our active engagement
with circumstance in a responsible fashion makes truth what is at-stake for the
inquirer, since the character of the truth being sought and the nature of the human
capacity for finding that truth are different this internal refraction has characteristically different implications for the activity of truth-seeking inquiry in each
case. In science there are standards and methods related to the discernment of
objective truth; in philosophy there are standards and a way of proceeding related
to the re-flectively-discernible truth of the problematic of existence. Thus the
obligations that obtain within the different disciplines and bear on the seeking
and judging that are relevant to the truth being sought are different, even though
they express in their appropriate and different ways the same obligation to utilize
human capacity to find truth.
xx
For a more extended treatment of philosophical reflection, its standpoint
and the aptness of reflection from that standpoint, see my The Well of Eternity,
Chapter 3, especially pages 51-68.
xxi
Seen in historical perspective, as the primary form of science, which is
best exemplified in what are called the natural sciences, advanced by its focus on
the face, the objectivity of its address, and the methods of its inquiry and publicempirical-confirmation of claims, philosophy was increasingly seen as lacking
credibility because of the absence of these things, to say nothing of its seeming
inability to show progress. This was a misunderstanding of philosophy, and not
simply one holding among non-philosophers; for as re-flective inquiry, the
matters at issue and the experiential evidence and confirmation of thought are by
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nature nothing that can fall within the realm of the public. As a result there is
great difficulty in philosophically re-flective inquiry of assuring that the conduct
of inquiry is indeed responsible, and no simple external back-up by our senses
and the application of mathematics, by repeatable experiments with objective
features, to offer reassurance concerning the degree to which proposed evidence
could and should be taken as persuasive. As science has gained momentum and
scope, philosophy has further lost its impetus in the 20th century, and rather
desperate attempts, betraying the absence of genuine philosophical sense, to
salvage something that could go with some 'pride' under that name involve
narrowing the notion of “philosophy” and avoiding the grand aspiration which
marked traditional philosophy. The loss of confidence ended up in claims that
deny any basis for philosophical access to truth that is not scientific, that stress
the sheer subjectivity and arbitrariness of any such efforts, and, conceding that
all genuine knowledge now is scientific, would substitute (say) philosophy of
science, or linguistic analysis, or some other discipline of lesser pretensions for
philosophy in any traditional form. There remained, indeed, counter to this, an
existential and phenomenological ghost-form in which something like such
philosophy lingered for a while, with the figures of Nietzsche and then Heidegger
representing something like a significant renewed realization of philosophy. But
so far, there has been no genuine re-birth of philosophy.

Chapter 3. The human, in individual realization

Chapter 3
The human, in individual realization
We live our lives from beginning to end in a journeying, and throughout the oscillation of waking and sleeping and the variations in both and
the conditions in between them, it is always ourselves who, with
whatever self-awareness or lack thereof, are making the journey. Being
a constant active agent in our journeying, and given that in the majority
of our journey time we would have some form and measure of selfawareness, it would seem that we should know ourselves quite well. But
do we? Do we know who we are individually, or what we are as
individual human beings?

A. The individual human journeyer
1. Revealing places along the way
It was forty years and a number of lifetimes ago, when I took leave
of absence for a couple of years from teaching in Pennsylvania and
traveled west to a cabin I had rented in the few previous summers on the
Hamm ranch along Rock Creek in western Montana. I remember that,
on the second day after having arrived back, I had arisen to the sound of
rain on the tin roof of the cabin. While I was dressing, starting a fire in
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the cookstove, fixing breakfast, and washing dishes, alternative ways of
spending the day came to mind. The rain having let up while I was
finishing the dishes, the alternative that prevailed took me out into the
mountains.
Return to Rock Creek had brought a sense of relief and excitement
both. For at that time in my life, the region around there was home. I do
not mean simply-- or even mainly-- that I lived there, although I did, for
periods of time. I mean, more importantly, that it was a place that impressed itself on me in a way that matched my being and seemed peculiarly suited to foster and support the endeavors I needed to undertake
then. I found myself at home there. i The predominant thread in my
needed endeavors was the final effort to draw together and set forth for
others the fruit of sporadic reflections which, in the previous several
years, had come to seem to be capable of-- and to need-- concerted development and exposition. Such writing is not thinking, though it
presupposes and involves thinking. Nor is such writing, of itself, living,
though the effort to write had gradually become an element in my living.
That element, for me, involves not only thinking but reliving things that
I have done and experienced in the past, sifting through them reflectively. Even more, it presupposes, for its most effective accomplishment, a place which can draw me out actively into it, and which in so
doing can sustain my efforts to write by placing them in a rhythm with
an effective engagement with my immediate circumstance as well as
with thought. When I can persist in that rhythm adequately, I move
alerted continually to what I live by, to what animates my action and
demands my reflection and writing.
Thus it was that on that morning, drawn out by the feel of the country
in the kind of weather marking the day, I drove several miles back into
the mountains behind the cabin, then hiked several more miles, up and
out into the open. The rain had ceased, but the clouds held low, obscuring
the peaks of many of the mountains; the highest of those that were still
visible showed a scattered but appreciable covering of pure white snow.
As I wandered along the back of a ridge which sloped off sharply on both
sides-- on one, into wooded terrain, on the other, into an open meadow- I found myself brought alive in the presence of what was around me.
That enlivening presence made itself felt through a definite face. The
mountain slopes were articulate, their major contours supplemented by
the line of tree masses and single trees and open meadows and rock slides.
That articulation, a mixture of the rough and the flowing, was basically
massive in scale, yet it held within its major lines a manifold of subtleties
and delicacies: myriad shadings of full-bodied but subtly contrasting
greens, which on the meadow side of the ridge were spotted with the

Chapter 3. The human, in individual realization

yellows and blues and reds of delicate wildflowers; the meadow was
populated by innumerable sparrow-like birds whose tiny clear calls
disclosed the emptiness and clarity of the air, which itself was not simply
clear and vibrant in feel but even rendered visible by occasional
snowflakes drifting on the flow of the wind. The height and shape of the
land were accentuated by the dark low sky, whose almost imperceptible
movement operated in conjunction with my own to reveal the steadfast
masses in changing line and contour. Such was the face of that mountain
country on that cold and damp summer morning.
The region around Rock Creek had many other faces, some of which
appeared at other times as face of a presence that brought home what I
felt on that day: that for the while this place was my place-- not mine as
owned by me, but if anything, rather as possessing me, as a place where
I belonged, as a place able effectively to draw me out into it to hike, to
fish, to help with stacking bales of hay or moving cattle, to move in forms
of enjoyable active involvement that I am capable of and to feel in close
touch with the things around. As it made itself felt in me, it matched my
soul, challenging and captivating me inwardly, evoking a sense of an
open future, and bringing home to me in contemplative moments the
strangeness, even the mysteriousness, of being.
It has not always been so. And yet, that that place was my place at
that time of my life, manifests something which has recurrently been so.
For in the movement of life over these seventy-odd years, I have come
again and again to find myself, in my active relation to different
landscapes and places in them, entered into them as at home in them, as
my places, sometimes quite fully, at other times not so fully.
Thus for example, as a child and youth I spent my school days in a
town and my summers on a farm. Both places became homes for me in
the fullest sense, but quite different homes, formative for me in quite
different ways.
The town-- really, two towns, twin cities, locus of a university at
which my father taught-- was a great place to grow up in. Something of
its character as a place where in my early life I felt at home is crystallized
for me in the memory of one fall evening. I remember a park, occupying
a large city block in the midst of a shaded quiet residential area. Trees,
bushes, relative seclusion prevailed over the park: the bushes, mostly
around the periphery, cut off the view of surrounding houses, while the
trees-- oak, elm, maple, a few pine-- were scattered through the park at
such intervals that their extending branches interlocked high over much
of the area. Still, there was grass-covered ground beneath, crisscrossed
by bicycle paths, particularly in the one area open and large enough for
football. It was October, the leaves were beginning to turn and to fall,
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the smell of burning leaves would soon fill the air. The atmosphere had
a tingle to it; partly it was the fall weather; partly the renewal and
eagerness not yet worn off from school started again after summer
vacation; partly life generally crowding back into the twin university
towns and bringing to them a subdued bustle, not intense and wearing
but nevertheless full and complex; and finally, together with all these,
the concentrating of interest on activity in town, so that the surrounding
flat farm land with its scattered woods was a utilized part of the place
only in an occasional excursion at the very time it was opening up to
view from town. For me on that evening, the park was central, all else
shaded off into a void; even more narrowly, the center of my attention
was an after-dinner football game lasting until dark. Then it was our
final down, with most of the field to cover, I sped downfield, straight
ahead, without deception. The pass came arching up, breaking out from
the background of trees and floating against the gray sky, descending in
perfect time with my movement. As I watched it come, striding full
speed ahead, seeming to float much as the ball seemed to, we appeared
to be perfectly matched. I reached up, gathered the ball in without
breaking stride, and slowed to a trot as I crossed the makeshift goal line.
As I walked homeward in the gathering darkness, there reverberated in
me the surge upward and outward which arose in the midst of that place
and that accomplishment: a surge that carried with it the town and
university and life as I knew it at twelve, a surge in which life was
pronounced good.
The feel of the farm-- that of my maternal grandfather--, and
something of the character of my participation in it as another important
place in my early life where I could feel myself at home, are crystallized
for me likewise in the memory of an evening, this time in summer. It
was river bottom land, a sandy ridge sloping off into the black ground of
the swamp, fifty acres cleared of the oak and maple, walnut and locust
and willow, that dominate much of the lower ground at the base of the
ridge. On that ridge, I had been working that day, the day hot and humid,
filled with the swelter of moist ground steamed by an unclouded sun.
Evening had approached, with the ridge about half ploughed and the
sandy soil baring its yellow-brown face smoothly and evenly. Left to
myself, I could not have finished the ploughing even if I had worked all
night. Yet with the fading power of the sun, the dampness of the air had
begun to bring cool and the smell of things with it. This, along with the
shifting light, had released things and myself into a perceptual aliveness
which the heat and glare of the day had held in check. And as I had
begun to see things distinctly, to feel and become related to them in a
strange sort of immediacy, the sound of the tractor engine reverberating
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in the altering atmosphere had begun to emerge clearly against the now
noticeably silent background of differentiated things. Its rhythmic
presence suddenly spoke of the isolation and aloneness of the place, cut
off from habitation and people. All this had brought alive the desire to
work on into the evening. And work on I did, turning on the lights as the
darkness crept from the shadowy lowlands up to the open ridge. The fire
of the sun died out, its pink and then pale white afterglow departed, and
darkness came to hold sway except for the tractor lights, which opened
out a clearing in the encompassing night. The moving centers of light
drew the mosquitoes, but I scarcely noticed them, so much was I caught
up in the pull and roar of the tractor, the twist and turn of the soil, the
pulsating currents of cold and warm air from the atmosphere and the
tractor, the shifting shadow-filled area of land entering into the altering
sweep of the lights.
In both of the cases of place that I just recounted, the places in question were much wider than a single field or a park: these functioned as
parts of the place that, on occasion, could bring the whole of the place
home to me by what I could be doing in and with them. Likewise, much
more than is caught in the recounting went into the making of the two
places as what they were for me as places where I could find myself at
home-- in each case, a complex expanse and landscape, but also a variety
of people, numerous living things and a multitude of components; for the
times in question are simply passing crystallizations of the sense of belonging and pointers to the place in which I felt I belonged, the place in
which I could be active in ways that let the place itself and what
composed it enter into me and become a lasting part of myself and my
life. But the “me” in question was, in both incidents, still the child, the
youngster, who may know a kind of magic, indeed, and a way of
gathering himself up into active effort in a place, but who is still innocent
of so much, so limited in his capacity to enter into a place in its
complexity and richness.
When college days came, another place became my place in virtue of
the measure of its match with myself as I was at that time in my life. The
characteristic feel of its presence as I entered into it-- and it into me-- is
caught in the memory of a winter night. It was cold, the snow was deep
and growing deeper. Having left the warm but confining quarters in
which I had been studying, I stretched and renewed myself as I walked
through the narrow streets, gathering in the magically forming and
dissolving world about me. A shifting blanket of snow muffled sound,
and with the swirl of its continued fall, it obscured shapes, lengthened
distances, erased old connections and built up new ones. Through the
play of white, the steadfast presence of the lofty structures of Eliot,
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Winthrop, and Kirkland Houses emerged, then the huddled mass of the
subway entrance and the stolid fronts of the buildings along the Square,
the curving wall and arching gate that entered me into the sheltered haven
of the Yard, the trees and mostly darkened hulks of buildings formed in
close but not confining occupation of space in the Yard itself, Memorial
Hall beyond, and then closely crowded tall wooden houses along the narrow streets of Cambridge. A sense of the old, but also of something of
indifferent appearance being outwardly renovated for a moment in cold
white, the swirl and flow of the transient cover raising into strikingly
different presence what otherwise would readily lapse behind its
relatively indifferent front, made the town seem more habitable now; but
it was the warmth and light that seemed to emanate from the college and
the Houses, as if the old were after all alive and vigorous, that brought
the whole to life and brought the deepening cover of white to glisten as
if it were an outward counterpart to life within. Recalled by the swirl of
white and the glow of light to the vital pregnancy and excitement of intellectual endeavor that was supported by persons working within
structures that seemed otherwise to form a stolid mass in a strangely
indifferent and impermeable urban environment, I found myself set to
thinking on this odd tension, and feeling strongly this place-- this urban
built-up place-- at least as a setting in which my having-to-do in some
vital way was mainly with people and what gathered us together there,
namely, learning, and not so much with the built elements of the place,
let alone with the natural setting. The Charles river, on the other side of
Eliot House, was almost the only sign of nature left, and one closely
hedged in by the urban. This place was a home, indeed, but in a limited
and one-sided way that matched something central in me and the reason
for my being there, and yet left an essential side of me untouched,.
With my entry into the teaching profession, another place emerged, a
rural place in another-- but still eastern-- part of the country, one held in
typical presence in the memory of a spring afternoon. A pasture, the
slope of a mountainous ridge: striking across these at an angle, I entered
the woods halfway up the slope. The fairly open and light woods was
composed of deciduous second-growth, dank, musty, almost suffocating
at times in its smell of vegetative decay; under its continuous but porous
leaf canopy, the ground was strewn with downed timber and brush. The
top of the ridge reached, I descended the other side, into the narrow
valley between ridges, through which a very small clear cold stream
trickled. Then angling up the next and higher ridge, I came out into the
open near its top, at a place where power lines had once mounted and
descended the slopes of the ridges at right angles to the ridge line. Along
the line of sight of the cleared right of way they had occupied, lay the
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main valley floor, about ten miles across before another series of long
low parallel ridges emerged to view. The distant ridges lay deep mottled
blue-green under a bland sun and through a hazy atmosphere. Their lines
and those of the valley floor in its rise and fall were mainly rounded and
gentle, but the enclosing extension in straight parallel dominated and led
sight down long converging corridors. Cultivation and peace were
bespoken by the valley's rolling fields and pastures, which were broken
into small segments by road and fence and house and occasional woods.
Slightly to the right of the main line of vision lay a small town, the
location of the large university in which my newly-launched teaching
venture was unfolding. Settled in at the foot of a ridge which took its
rise in the middle of the main floor so as to break the valley from there
onward into two smaller ones, it was a slow-paced, quiet, provincial,
relatively tasteless and unappealing, collection of buildings and streets,
though its structure and appearance were for the most part concealed at
this distance by its trees. In peculiar interweaving, the mountainous
ridges and valley seemed to hold the town in their folds, but yet, as if
thereby caught up in return into the civilized and tamed that it held in its
embrace, the country had itself a soft and fertile and unaspirant look,
with at best a hint of original wildness, ruggedness, untouchedness. Lush,
rich, fertile, gentle, yet bland, tame: such was the character of the face
through which the whole showed itself then. And yet while I lived here,
it became a home for me, even if not fully so. Indeed, even as I looked
from this distant vantage point, I carried within me a growing sense of a
venture in learning-- learning to teach, learning to re-flect, learning the
languages and thoughts of ancient thinkers-- which, for a while, could
find support in this place and find in its cultivated visage something of
the look of home. But as in Cambridge, so in State College: it was the
human interplay, and the adventure of learning, that was central, and for
which the place in its natural and cultivated rural side was more setting
than itself essential part of home. Eventually I needed a wilder place, a
different mixture of nature and the human, and one that energized the
variety of sides in myself together, to find myself fully at home.
When that need grew insistent enough, and the opportunity arose, I
made the break and settled in western Montana not far from Rock Creek;
again it was an urban area, Missoula, that I came to dwell in, but now I
could find it more fully my home than Cambridge or State College, not
the least for the effective integration of the urban into mountains, rivers
and river valley, something that had struck me visually long before when,
while in the Army and on leave, I had passed through the town in the
mid-1950s and had thought to myself, ‘one day I’ll come back here’.
Settling as I did down along the river across from the center of town, I
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ventured on my daily life amidst closely encircling hills and mountains
and along one of the two major rivers which entered the valley from
different directions and joined at the northwestern edge of the urban area;
and soon I became caught up in civic life, in neighborhood organization
and planning, in the establishment of a historic district on the south shore
of the river, in air quality and land-use and open space planning, as well
as part-time teaching (after five years away from a university) at the
University of Montana. And then there were the excursions out of town,
back to fish in Rock Creek and off to the Blackfoot River and down the
Bitterroot valley to the West Fork of the Bitterroot river, and to hike in
nearby wilderness areas, especially up Bass Creek into the BitterrootSelway wilderness. Until Barbara and I parted company in the mid1980s, it was life in a place that had much of the complexity, and the
possibility of diverse connections and involvements, that matched my
nature, and at the same time provided the freedom, the time and opportunity, to make my way amidst it much as I seemed to need to. And yet,
by the mid-1990s, I had grown to need a different place, perhaps a final
place, to finish life out and to complete the thinking and writing part of
a work that had started long ago and taken a decisive initial step in the
Rock Creek days I started out recalling here.
The recurrent formation in my life of a peculiar relatedness to landscape and place, attested in some measure and in some of its variation in
these incidents, is not the simple repetition of an identical experience but
the complex reinstatement of a growing-- a deepening and increasingly
complex-- relation. In the times of consummation of that relation when
they occur, I find myself each time connecting with the place around me
in such way that its working in and upon me and my own involvement
with facets of the place disclose us as matched in basic and challenging
ways and enable me to find myself at home there. In this connecting a
certain characteristic tonality and fulness come to obtain in and through
the differences in time and place and particularity involved in the
occasions.
Nevertheless, intrinsic to this relation, are not only certain constant
features, but as well a gradual transformation occurring in the course of
time. This transformation has its reason in one of the features internal to
the constancy within the relation. For in the times of fulfillment, what I
am connecting with always releases and strengthens me, but does so as
releasing and strengthening someone engaged in a movement. That
movement, accomplished in a venturing whereby I make my way along
the path of my life, has gradually brought to actuality in me an increasing
fulness in the human capacity with which I find and maintain myself at
home in a place. What could be my place in this way earlier in life might
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well not be able to be such a place later. If life is a journeying, and such
places are places we happen upon and enter into along the way, they are
such for us who are becoming different, and who yet are the same even
so.

2. The collapse of times along the way
It is one thing to recall different times along the way; ii it is another
to find oneself recalled, in a later time, back into the earlier time, to find
oneself so invaded by the past that it seems one is back there again, not
here remembering it but rather there in that past felt as itself being the
present. Back in the early 1960s, I had returned to the farm in southern
Illinois on the way back from Montana to Pennsylvania, and had driven
down into the river bottom land near the field where I had found myself
in the childhood ‘wilderness’ experience I speak of in my Introduction
to this book. This time I had gone past the turn-off to the field of that
experience and, going on a short way downstream, had stopped and
gotten out of the car to walk. It was a warm and sunny day, almost
summer-like, and I soon found myself pushing through some tall
yellowish grass which was growing not far from where the embankment
and the rather sharp drop to the river began. As I came beyond that patch
and re-entered the shaded part of the woods, I soon came to a stand at
the edge of another small opening in the trees, with the sun breaking
through the branches overhead and illuminating the next patch of grass
ahead; and then, without any warning, I felt the warmth and the light and
the flash of yellow in a way that I had felt in long ago in my childhood.
I had suddenly been transported back to a time in which ... there was no
time, or time stood still, or ... . It was the feel of time as a child, without
urgency, without pressure, its slow and unhurried movement allowing
yellowed grass to soak into me. As adults we become so much adapted
to schedules and clocks, to demands that we be here or be there at a
certain time, that meetings not last past a certain time, that we have
supper at 6:00 o’clock, that we forget the childhood days-- especially
summer days-- before we have entered into this adult time-driven world.
I had apparently become recalled back into one of those times I had spent
as a youngster down in this river country and for a while (how long, I
can not say) I was back there again, myself and this grass and sunlight
and heat and the quiet and the insects. After I had stood there savoring
the quiet and the still presence around me for some while, I began to
reawaken to my current situation, and as my boyhood self and way of
experiencing slipped away, I could feel: that was me alive again, that was
my childhood experience, I am not gone then, I am still that boy, that
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boyhood experience is still mine-- indeed, it had invaded my current experiencing and had recalled me back into it with such effectiveness that
for a while I had no longer been experiencing where and who I was as
that ‘where’ and that ‘I’ actually were but was ... remembering? feeling
again? reliving? ... with such force that for a while I no longer was aware
where I really was and who I was. Not that I ‘became’ someone else: it
was me who felt what I did, but not simply and straightforwardly the me
of the day of my drive down to the river but that me oblivious of himself
because he had been recalled back into his earlier self, and so fully
recalled that having become that self again he was no longer aware of
the truth of his situation. I was ‘myself young’, with nothing to make me
feel otherwise.
As one comes out of such strange times of discovery of the child
reviving in oneself, one has a peculiar sense of-- and access to the problematic of-- this matter of one’s own self. But how understand my self,
who am the same as-- and yet different from-- my youthful self, and yet
at the same time carry that youthful self within me in some hidden way
and can even on occasion revert into being him, not just remembering
him? The same, yet different-- indeed, different only because the same,
and the same only because different, yet in both cases, in a peculiar sense.
How do I make sense of that?

3. Human initiative and agency:
a first approach iii
In speaking of time-and-space as enabling conditions for the ex-tending into existence of the distinct-beings-within-being, we have grasped
them as making those existent-beings be active beings acting out of
themselves and their own determinate natures in an interacting with other
such beings. So far as time is involved, this means that at the heart of
the active-being of an existent being is to be found an initiative capacity,
or more precisely, such a capacity ever and continually underway in its
working, ever actually functioning and actualizing itself in the continual
ongoing of the now of the existence of the being in question. As this
pertains to us human beings, that means that one constancy that marks
our journeying and the self of ourselves in making our journeying is our
ever being in the midst of an initiating of activity, and functioning there
with-- and out of-- the particular determinateness of our active being
which ex-tends into existence the distinct-being-within-being which is
ours individually.
This active side of our human being, while centered in an initiating
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capacity of a distinctive sort (responsive in nature), is much more complex, with a richer determinateness, than its center alone. Spatially-andtemporally structured, it is a single unified whole marked by spatial
differentiation into an inwardness and outwardness, and as harbored
(among other things) in this spatial differentiation, by the initiating
capacity for the activity of the being-as-whole and by a bodily activityinstrument for the being-as-whole. In addition, the time which enables
our initiative-and-activity-functioning in an ever-ongoing-now is
structured to make the future and past belonging to the present of our
active-being ever converge upon the current ongoing-now, thereby
keeping the content of these dimensions of time continuously part of our
whole active being and making that content available for register and
functioning in the ongoing initiative-activity in our current now. That
means that our responsive initiating as human agents is ever being
formed and taking determinate shape in a functioning of itself (such as it
is at the time) at the point of convergence of the determinate potential of
our whole active-being (harbored in the future of our enabling present)
and of the so-far-developed-resources of that whole (harbored in the past
of our enabling present). In such initiative-forming functioning, we are
gathering up and responsively entering our active-being whole into activity, and that means, entering somehow into our initiating the determinateness of the full potential and resources of our active being that are held
in our future and our past, entering them as ingredient in, or supportive
factors to, that forming. In this way, all of the particular capacities,
native aptitudes and dispositions, so-far-developed skills, and the like,
are entered somehow into our activity-forming effort, where in keeping
with the character of the human responsive initiative-capacity
“somehow” can mean many things, including “in exclusion of”, “in repression of”, “in inattentiveness to”, and so on.
In addition, given that the ever-now of our activity is that of a present
in which we are interacting with others who form for us the spatiallythere circumstance of our interactive existence, our activity brings us to
engage with existent-beings that are concurrent with but other than
ourselves, and in that otherness, diverse and differently determinate in
many regards. Existing in their own here’s and now’s, such beings are
active out of themselves through their own initiative in their own
presents. In this interacting, we do not simply meet and perceive others- and over the course of time, different others--, but in that meeting we
find their presence and functioning forming (in some measure and in
various ways) the conditions within which we are (and can be) currently
active while concomitantly we are responsively incorporating facets of
current circumstance into the forming-and-carrying-out of our own
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activity and the living of our own lives, thereby bringing the determinate
character of circumstance not simply to operate as limiting condition
from beyond us but to enter into our own selves and, as so entered, to
become inwardly-effective factor in the con-crete actuality of our life
and activity. With this, there enters into our own functioning and our
own selves further and changing determinateness, both that of developed
capacities which carry the mark of past interaction and incorporation of
circumstance and that of what is being currently integrated in our havingto-do with circumstance.
In our engaging, then, we are becoming different as time goes on, in
the sense of becoming differently determinate in our own active being,
for reasons that lie in our circumstance and internal to ourselves.
Becoming different, however, is not all that is involved as we live and
act, nor is the understanding of our active being in its distinctive nature
complete simply by noting the contrast of constant initiating over against
the continual change and difference in the determinateness which our
own forming of that responsive initiating enters into it as it draws on our
potential and resources and integrates from beyond what we are
encountering. There are two further things, essential to our being as
human, that are involved.
One: The initiative capacity with which we are endowed as human
beings is not simply responsive in nature but is itself an evolving capacity.
In addition, many of the particular capacities and aptitudes with which
we are endowed are capable of development. In both cases, the
capacities are mainly potential in us at the start, and their evolution and
development take place basically by way of their actual exercise as they
are constituted at the time and with the help of a learning (both in and
from that exercise) in which we are utilizing our capacity to learn such
as it is at the time. Thus we know an increasing and changing
determinateness to our being in the form of something emerging out of
ourselves and our own natures as the already-present potential therein
becomes actual somehow.
Two: We human beings are living beings, and it is in and through our
activity that we live the life in us. That life is inherently limited temporally like our existence, a born-and-mortal life lived in the currently-ongoing now as a bounded whole becoming actual in our engaging with circumstance. Wherever we currently are in our lives, we are always living
it somewhere between our end and our beginning, and in that middle we
know a living and acting which is marked by the temporal integration of
our end (thus death, not yet but impending) and of our beginning (thus
birth, already happened) in the current ongoing-now of our existing.
With this continual integration of beginning and end in the middle, we
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live our lives whole as they are becoming actual in the continually
ongoing active involvement of ourselves with circumstance, and live
them in the ongoing middle as actualizing them in an unfolding, one at
any time given its character and quality as such, first, by the capacities
through whose exercise our life is becoming actual and second, by the
assimilation of the particularity of circumstance into ourselves as we
engage actively with what is there. Thus at different times in our life we
are living the same single born-and-mortal life with different actual
capacities, and as well with different potential (future) and different
resources (past) at the time, and living it in the encounter with different
others and with a qualitatively-altering responsive integration of those
others and of different factors inward to ourselves into the actualization.
Taking these two further features of our active being together, we see
ourselves as not simply constant in our initiating and yet changing in
virtue of what is drawn into such initiating, but as also essentially
evolving in the distinctively human initiative-capacity in us so that in our
engaging with circumstance, we are ever living our lives in an advancing
mid-point place between their beginning and end and in that living-andacting are ever changing and (at least, meant to be) evolving in the
capacity at the heart of our agency as a human affair. Thus in regard to
the humanly essential and the variety of developable particular capacities
in ourselves, we are meant gradually to become ourselves as the
individual human agents our nature means us to be. In that becoming,
we are not becoming something or someone else other than ourselves,
but are meant to evolve and develop toward ourselves in the fulness of
our humanity and, hopefully, are actually becoming more fully and
effectively our very own selves. In this evolving and developing, we are
coming into our selves (humanly and individually) with the help of
differences which enter into those selves both from beyond (especially
from other persons) and from within. Phrased as regards the heart of the
matter: We are gradually maturing humanly and as the individual human
beings we are, evolving toward the full maturity of adult human beings.
Our human being involves us thereby in a peculiar “becoming what we
are”, a becoming which is a gradual and fuller appropriation and
actualization of our humanity over time, in the manner of growth and
maturation. iv
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4. Human activity: a responsive venturing
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a. Learning
The learning which plays such a central role in our living and acting
as human beings is a complex affair involving many forms, and in every
case also a multitude of possibilities of mislearning, unlearning, relearning, as well as complete failure to learn, and in general, possibilities both
of learning well and of learning badly. Not simply that, but we begin life
not only relatively impotent in essential (initiative) and particular capacities both, but as well, relatively limited in our capacity for learning. We
must learn to learn as we are learning the various matters-- and most
basically, the matter of how to be a human being-- that are needed if our
becoming is to take appropriate shape. I say “appropriate” because at
the beginning our nature harbors not simply some actuality and
considerable potentiality but also various forms of meant-to-be whereby
it intends for us an evolution and development of our potentiality that
brings us to a determinate fulness as individual human beings. We know,
to put it crudely, a kind of ‘on the job training’ as human beings, whereby
the evolution and development of our native capacity takes place with
the help of an exercise and a learning of-and-with the very capacity in
question as it is constituted at the time. We always experience our human
being, then, in this mode of being ever in the midst of actualizing our
humanity over time.
Especially in the initial phase of our evolution and development humanly and individually, but in reality throughout life, the inward
development and functioning of ourselves as humanly-and-individuallycapable active-beings is taking place along with growth and changes that
relate to the outward side of our being, and along with the development
of particular capacities for action that are intimately related to such
physical growth and changes. This needs be, since activity is of-and-by
ourselves in our whole being, with different sides to ourselves having
roles in it which are different and developing in ways and according to
conditions and terms that are their own and not those of other sides of
our being.
b. Knowing how to venture with something at stake
The most fundamental form of our learning from the start is learning
how to exercise our initiative capacity so as to be able to participate
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effectively in interactive-activity. This means learning the know-how of
the exercise of a decision-making and -executing capacity which is
responsive to an at-stake that concerns us and which, claiming us by way
of our responsiveness, we are concerned to help secure. All our activity
is a venturing responsive to this claim and animated by this concern:
something matters, matters to us, and we are concerned in such way that
our concern enters us into activity in response to this mattering. What
matters, we do not at first know, given the impotence that marks our
actual capacity at the beginning; and we spend our life, we develop and
learn, in a concern-animated venturing in which, trying out this and that,
we are seeking (venturing under this-or-that interpretation of it) to
understand, and to help secure, what really does matter.
In reality, what matters is the meant-to-be of creation, which in virtue
of the creational act is at-stake in the interactive-activity of existentactive-beings. To each active being is allotted a role in the securing of
this at-stake that is appropriate to its being and situation. In our human
case, our activity is by nature undertaken with responsive powers which
(even allowing for our initial impotence) do indeed register this at-stake
in its bearing on us, but are not able to disclose to us what it is. Instead
we undertake activity with the help of an interpretation of the at-stake;
the general character of that interpretation depends upon our capacities
at the time. As these develop, we can gain a fuller, clearer, and more
distinct, register and awareness of the at-stake that claims us, and
eventually a fuller and clearer understanding of it. In any case, from
beginning to end we venture with the help of (among other things) what
interpretatively we are able to make of the at-stake’s claiming at the time
and proceed under the sense that what matters depends in some measure
for its securing on our venturing. To our venturing amidst circumstance
there belongs the risk of failing to (be able to) help secure what is at
stake-- what is truly at-stake and what we are taking to be at-stake-- as
well as the possibility of successful achievement in either or both regards.
c. Knowing how to act inter-actively
In our creationally-formed interactive-existence, the variety of
active-beings, including ourselves, exist as beings in and through whose
interacting the act of creation is to be brought to completion and consummation. But “activity” has a different character in different such activebeings, and how it is able to function in this way thereby differs in the
different types of being. Even in our-- the human-- case, activity is not
a uniform thing from the beginning to the end of our existence, but a
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complex and evolving vehicle for creational realization, reflecting the
developing character of the capacities, essential and particular, by which
it is formed and carried through.
Because we know an interactive existence, we human beings are-- so
long as we are-- continuing agents continuously active out of ourselves
in an interacting with those continuing beings, likewise continuously
active out of themselves, who happen to form the circumstance of our
existence as we form part of the circumstance of the existence of those
others. Given this placement of ourselves amidst-and-together-with
other beings, we find those others con-fronting us, but more properly and
fundamentally, placed over against us as beings acting out of themselves,
so that the fundamental character of interactive existence is an oppositional one in this limited sense, that each active being is in a beingplaced-over-against-others (thinking “op-pose” etymologically). While
this placement enables each to have the in-dependence of its own initiative, at the same time it makes its own existence dependent on-- and
its activity conditioned by-- other beings active in-dependently out of
themselves. This type of continuing-to-be with other continuing-to-be
active beings enters a distinctive tension into the interactive-activity in
which the various agents are venturing to help secure the at-stake of
creational existence. That tension, concerning beings which are temporally-finite in their existence, reflects the fragility of such existence and,
more specifically, its vulnerability, in the interacting, to injury and even
termination, as issue of the way the interacting works out. As a
responsive affair, our venturing-- that of human beings-- is formed
through a responsive initiative which makes us sensitive to this fragility
and vulnerability, and thus to our existence, and to the venturing in which
we enact that existence, as ex-posing us to a threat primordially
stemming from others but having roots in ourselves (our inherent
finitude, the fragility of our existence, our several-sided dependence on
circumstance, our vulnerability). We know, then, as living human beings,
a ‘readiness to protect ourselves’ side of active effort, that we may continue to be and be active as human beings; and since it is human effort
that is involved and a human being that we have, that is a readiness to
maintain our continuing existence as an active existence in which,
claimed by the at-stake and animated by the sense that ‘something
matters’, something beyond our own continued existence concerns us as
what we are to help secure in our continuing activity. Self-protectionand-preservation, while an element in our venturing, is not the natural
ultimate horizon of human life.
In addition to this tension relating to the continuing of existence as a
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con-crete interactive affair in which something is at stake, the op-positional structure of active existence means that our active-venturing
involves an exploring of what we are placed amidst, ourselves animated
by whatever it is that moves us to engage in this direction rather than that,
in this fashion rather than that; and in that exploring, we encounter other
beings and register their presence and their activity with such capacity as
we have at the time. Finding beings in-dependent of ourselves in their
existence and activity, yet venturing amidst them under the sense of
something at-stake and as ourselves having-to-do with other beings
moved out of our own need to try out something, we venture as testing,
as seeking to bring to clearer and more intelligible presence, as assessing
and judging, as looking for a connecting that answers to our sense of
what is at stake. A second tension arises here. In its narrower form, it
reflects our essential interconnectedness with other human beings: to
become fully ourselves as humans, we need other human beings, we need
their help, both to be ourselves and to achieve what we seek to achieve;
and that means, most basically, we need a connecting with other human
beings that is re-assuring and supportive, answering to the trust with
which we reach out and strengthening the confidence we may have in
venturing. The tension here relates to the presence of such reassurance
and support: there is no guarantee of such needed favorable presence.
What is most fundamental to be learned in this connection is something
central to what it is to be a human being, to be active as a human being:
even as we are in-dependent in our active being, we are inter-dependent
in our humanity, and this, in a way that we need others in ways that they
may not be able to answer to, so that we need also to learn to venture
without that needed support, indeed even against the force of unfavorable
opposition from others. In its broader form, this tension is present in our
interactive-venturing as it brings us into connection with non-human
beings as well as human beings. All other beings are, indeed, other, with
their own in-dependence from us in their initiating, and entering into
interaction with us out of themselves and their own initiative capacity,
whatever it is. That otherness and in-dependence can be frustrating to us
in our venturing, especially as non-human others can not relate to us as
humans can and our connecting can not have the same mutually adaptive
character and the mutual supportiveness achieved in that which it can
(but by no means often does) when the others are human. Then-- but
also in the case of our relation to other human beings-- not feeling the
supportive presence of others, the assertive employment of such
capacities as we have-- and in being active, we are asserting ourselves,
putting ourselves forward-- can become aggressive in character, turning
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the op-positional, whose ultimate meaning is to enable a joining together
of the diverse, each from out of itself, in the effort to help secure the atstake, into a conflict of diverse agents, and especially one in which we,
given the limited scope of our responsiveness and capacity to interpret,
act insisting on our own need and our interpretation of it and not accepting the ultimate standing of others as to be respected in our venturing.
Thus we make the ‘world’ revolve around ourselves and subordinate
others to ourselves.
d. Activity as doing, then as responsibility-enacting
Given, then, the op-positional dimension of active existence, a dual
tension belongs to human activity from the start, that relating to
continuing existence and that relating to the character of connecting with
in-dependent others. It is within a register of the at-stake, amplified by
the register of these two tensions, that what is by nature the form of
human activity that is meant initially to be developed begins to take
shape. Supposing a sufficiently hospitable circumstance for an active
human being to continue to exist, as initially undertaken activity is by
nature a more-or-less confident venturing amidst the various independent beings that constitute the agent’s circumstance; in this
venturing, the agent engages with those beings in an effort to achieve,
within his/her sense of ‘something matters’, an end, goal, purpose, as a
result produced by the activity. How this effort takes shape depends, in
part, upon the human context, and in particular, on the presence and
strength of the elements of trust and confidence, of acceptance and
support, in the relation of human-with-human in that context. v It
depends subsequently on the learning that arises in-and-from the effort,
and on the strengthening or weakening of those interpersonal-relation
elements just mentioned in virtue of the success or failure of the effort
and the response of others both to the effort itself and to the agent’s own
response to his/her own success or failure. In addition, in virtue of its
natural constitution this effort is also meant to actualize-- in the making
of the effort, in the engaging itself (and not as its produced result)-- the
life and vital-energy native to life; and even as its intent-and-focus is on
‘results’, it is meant to develop and (when successful, or at least, when
we learn from our failures) to strengthen in us not only our initiativecapacity, but also the particular capacities employed in the activity and
our capacity to employ such capacities confidently and effectively.
The two just-noted features of our (human) activity as we have so far
considered it-- an achieving of results, and the actualizing of capability
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for initiating and carrying through successful result-producing-- are part
of our active effort from the beginning onward, although the actual concrete character of such effort (including, say, the measure of confidence
involved in the venturing) varies depending on the way in which the
effort is formed, the capacities being employed and the state of development of those capacities, and the like. A third feature meant eventually
to mark our (human) activity comes to do so if, when, and as, the
initiative-capacity with which we engage in activity evolves to the point
where it can give activity its fullest form, namely, that in which it is
enacting and expressing our responsibility for ourselves and our lives.
For by means of-- and in virtue of-- our decision-making-and-executing
of activity we are meant eventually to actualize in ourselves the capacity
to assume and take responsibility for ourselves and our lives in the
undertaking of what we do. When our initiative-forming actually
involves this capacity, then activity as we give it shape embodies,
expresses, and attests, this capability in its very constitution, and we live
and act as adult human beings.
e. Inflections of the at-stake
Despite this complex and evolving constitution of human activity,
from beginning to end our active effort is ever responsive to the
creational-at-stake and is animated by a concern to help secure what is
at stake, namely, the consummation of creation. Nonetheless, given that
our activity itself is always a venturing which risks failure in all regards
and even risks the continuing of our existence, and given that it is itself
meant to be an evolving affair in function of the evolution in the
capacities whereby we shape and take part in activity, there are
subordinate inflections of what is primordially at-stake, relating to effort
as, in its function as a vehicle whereby that at-stake is to be secured, a
self-developing affair that can fail, whether simply to be adequate or
altogether. For if our active effort can not take shape in such way as to
achieve intended results, if we do not evolve in our capacities as agentdoers, and if our activity does not come to be constituted in the complete
form of self-responsible effort, we will be lacking the ability we were
meant to reach into by our nature, and with this, will lack the ability to
help secure the ultimately-at-stake as we were meant by our human
nature to be able to do.
Thus all along the way, there are two further conditional and subordinate inflections of the at-stake, relating to active effort as able to be
result-producing and to that effort as developing our doing-capacity-and-
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doer-capability; and eventually there is a third, relating to our activity as
self-responsibility-enacting.
All of these are secondarily and
conditionally at-stake in human activity, given that our activity is primordially concerned with the ultimate-at-stake and meant to help in human
fashion secure that ultimate-at-stake, and given that that activity, in
virtue of our human nature and the meant-to-be development-andevolution in the capacities whereby we shape and take part in activity,
risks failure at any time in fundamental regards relating to its own
constitution as a sufficient vehicle for the fully human participation as
active agents in that securing.
f. Decision-making, its structure and dynamic
While serving its creational function, activity takes shape in us in a
deciding-and-executing, in a forming of initiative, which in human
beings has by nature a distinctive structure and dynamic. We have
already seen that within the enabling of time-and-space our decisionmaking-and-executing is ever going-on in the inwardness of our being in
the ever-ongoing-now, and is taking shape through a responsive
initiating-capacity operating within its spatio-temporal matrix. vi
The structural and dynamical beginning of our decision-making is
with a receptivity which receives, registers, and discloses self-andcircumstance to-and-for our initiative-in-the-making in the currentlyongoing-now, taking in the active-beings involved (via facets of them
extant and operative within our present) and doing this in reference to an
at-stake whose claim upon us we are ‘already’ receiving-and-registering
in ourselves and which is of concern to us in our active engagement with
the beings with whom we exist-and-interact. Our responsive receptivity
to the ultimate-at-stake as (out of the depths of our now) claiming our
active effort and its forming in our here-and-now provides the horizonand-attention-concentrating factor within which all else is received,
registered, and then attended to for its bearing on our decision-makingand-executing. When, outwardly, concurrent presence is received, its
features as currently-actual con-fronting circumstance being taken in via
the outwardly-sensible register of circumstance in its immediacy, this
receptivity opens us to circumstance as we are currently engaging with
it and to the beings composing it and engaging with us; correlatively,
inwardly, when our own self as active-being is received, our currently
actual condition or state in the ongoingly-interactive-engagment with
concurrent presences is received and registered in the inwardly-sensible
immediacy of our disclosure to ourselves, including the moving forces
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already present in us and potentially operative in our decision-makingand-executing.
Included in this initial receptivity-matrix are two factors within our
present which are not themselves current actualities, namely, the future
and the past as inherent in the now of our existence and as harboring
(future) our own native potential, and the meant-to-be’s relevant to it,
and as holding (past) the variety of already-developed resources and
prior experience and learning that we have accumulated in life up to the
time. By nature, we are endowed with potential at our beginning, both
as relates to our decision-making-and-executing capacity and as relates
to other and subordinate capacities; and, at least in the case of the
decision-making-and-executing capacity, that potential is to be realized
under a meant-to-be which depends, in part, for its actualization on our
responsive register of it and our heeding or failing to heed it. As we
develop in the course of time, the relevant potential and its meant-to-be’s
change, but both are latent in our actuality seen whole, which is not
exhausted by what is current in that actuality. Likewise, by our previous
activity, we have developed our various capacities, aptitudes, etc. and,
by experience and learning, have accumulated further resources that are
meant to-- and can-- enter into our decision-making-and-executing
capacity, but, depending on the way they have been developed, enter
either supportively for our decision-making-and-executing or in ways
that hinder, obstruct, distort, it.
The initial receptive-discovery just characterized in its range (as
including the at-stake, thence all else) is not a passive matter, for the
receiving is incomplete without a welcoming, an embracing, an including, a taking in and taking up, and this, in a bringing the being-received
to bear on the forming of active effort. The dynamic of the decisionmaking thus involves: (1) in virtue of the register of the at-stake, and the
responsive character of this such that there is concern or care on our part,
we take up and register whatever else we are receiving (without and
within) in attentive/inattentive careful/careless fashion, and (2) in this
taking up, we sort-out and filter what is being received (outwardly and
inwardly) so as to bring certain things forward for our attention and
regard and to dismiss others (which while dis-regarded are nonetheless
being received-and-retained, but in the manner of dismissal from closer
consideration), and (3) attending to what has been brought forward we
assess its importance and relevance for our decision-making-andexecuting. (4) In this receiving/ registering/attending/assessing, we
attend to and assess what has come to the fore on the backdrop of a
register of our potential (future) and our resources (past) as the temporal
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convergence of our being makes these available in the current decisionmaking, and utilize these as a reservoir which can be drawn on and as
together enabling a forming of activity differently depending on what is
available, what in it seems relevant, and how it is (and is able to be)
drawn upon.
The structural dynamic involved in our decision-making reaches its
conclusion (5) in the summative-and-selective judgment in which the
decision to act is taken, with what we take to be sufficient consideration
of the matter to venture in this-way rather than in other ways in our
response to the claim of the at-stake.
In all this, what has come to our attention of the circumstantial
context, which in its full nature is in fact more or less favorable,
opportune, and congenial, or unfavorable, misfortunate, and difficult, for
us in virtue of its mixture of actual and potential, may not be what is in
reality most significant, for in our register and assessment of this context
as offering an opportunity for activity on our part we may miss, misassess, mis-take the importance and/or relevance of various facets of it,
and form our engagement under more-or-less significant mis-judgments.
Likewise for what has come to our attention from within, of motivational
forces (for example) rising in offer of themselves as acceptable for our
acting upon; our decision-making involves much that remains unconscious to us in its functioning, including our acquiescence to this-orthat as acceptable to us, and considerable room for mis-judgment is
provided by our ignorance of our own being, especially as we develop
and have a greater and more complex past at work in our current being
and functioning as part of the matrix pressing on our effort-to-decide
with its own force.
However the dynamic works itself out, it is the functioning of our
responsive decision-making-and-executing capacity in this naturallystructured way that gives shape to our initiation-and-carrying through of
activity. In every moment of the dynamic-- in the appropriating of the
at-stake as claiming, in the selective drawing-on (future, past, and current)
factors which are received in the global receptivity we start from, in the
simplifying and the ‘enabling to be prominent and emphatic’ that seeks
to furnish for attention and assessment what is sufficient for decisionmaking, in the attending to and assessing of these factors in their
relevance and importance for the formation of an active engagement with
things which answers aptly to the at-stake as claiming-- the capacities at
work, more or less limited as they are at the time, may do their work well
or badly. The constancy of this structure, however, is complemented by
the developing nature of the capacity-and-capacities involved, and the
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possibility of learning to do better, and do it with more.

5. Evolving humanly
If there is this natural structure and dynamic to our decision-making,
there is also a nature-intended development in the capacities which
operate and co-operate in this decision-making, and thus as the evolution
in capacity takes place, considerable difference in the way such decisionmaking actually works at different times to give shape to-- and enter us
upon-- activity as issue of its ‘making’.
As for the essential capacity itself, in the meant-to-be that is implicit
in the initially relatively undeveloped potentiality of this capacity human
nature intends a specific type of development over time of ourselves as
centers of initiative, and to the extent to which we succeed in developing
in accord with this meant-to-be, we know a growing more capable
humanly in our decision-making and our taking active part in the
interactivity of existence. We mature as human beings.
This development is meant to take place in phases-- not simply in an
adding-to and complexifying way, but over time in gradual fashion, in
ways that build toward times in which our capacity for initiative is meant
to enter upon fundamental transformation. As meant in our nature, the
times in question are times crucial for the unfolding of our human nature
in regard to what marks human maturity, namely, responsibility or the
capacity to participate in existence responsibly. Because it is through
activity, and in particular, the functioning of our initiative-capacity, that
we live our life as a human affair, our life is therefore characterized as
an affair of growth and maturation and an affair of responsibility.
This phased development of the essential in us is meant to take place
through the exercise of the capacities in question, such as they are at the
time, and with the help of a learning which is meant to enable such capacity to be exercised in improved fashion in future. Because that exercise
enters us into activity as a venturing responsive to the claiming force of
the at-stake and formed to help secure what we have judged (and perhaps
mis-judged) to be at stake, it ever risks failing as regards doing-asachieving; we act with limits to our judgment amidst circumstance as a
context of other beings engaged in their own venturings out of
themselves, thus as subject to numerous possibilities of opposition,
obstruction, frustration, hostility, and the like. But more importantly
here, it risks inadequate and distorted development not simply of our
essential capacity but of our particular capacities as well and of our
manner of employing them. All the more is this so because at the
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beginning we are relatively impotent, limited both in our essential
capacity and in our particular capacities; and thus the capacity/capacities
with which we originally venture are not only themselves minimal, but
our capacity to learn from our venturing is as well.
In short: In the evolving and unfolding of the humanly essential in
ourselves, as in the development of our particular capacities, there is nothing automatic, let alone automatically successful, only (in the case of
the essential) something meant-to-happen and to happen (for one thing)
in basic dependence upon our own venturing and our learning but also
(for a second thing) under conditioning by circumstance and thus in dependence on sufficient favorability and support from circumstance.
Much mis-learning, relearning and unlearning, as well as apt learning,
are involved in this development as it actually occurs, and even much
learning to learn. Thus we may, or may not, actually develop in a way
that adequately accords with the meant-to-be, that adequately actualizes
our potential as it was meant-to-be. Indeed, many of us are basically
adult ‘children’ whose living-and-acting reflects failure to have learned
well how to be a human being, whose growth has been arrested, stunted,
distorted, in fundamental respects that relate to maturation.
a. Initial phase of maturation: infancy-and-childhood
While occurring over time in our ongoingly-continuous engagement
with circumstance, the ongoing-and-becoming being of ourselves
involves a meant-to-be maturing which is to occur as an unfolding in
phases. Included in the unfolding are crucial transition times in which
the fundamental transformations as regards responsibility are meant to
take place, and those transformations involve us in altered relations to
the life in us as well as to what is at-stake in our activity.
Put elliptically, the first phase of our lives-- we speak of infancy and
childhood, to designate this phase in rough fashion-- is a preparatory one,
in which we are simply enacting the life in ourselves in our activity as
we are incrementally and accumulatively developing in various ways but
especially developing the capacities integral to active effort on our part
and in particular to the decision-making and -executing which concern
that effort. All the evolving inward conditions-- all the learning and
developing of particular skills, all the sharpening and expanding of the
range of judgment, all the learning to deal with frustrations and obstacles,
impacts and consequences, etc.-- and all the developing of our capacities
to do-this-or-that are, also and essentially, preparatory and building
toward something beyond themselves. Toward what? Not simply
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towards a taking part which, as achieving, involves a capability
effectively at work in this-or-that form of interactive-activity, and not
simply towards an agential-character in which the various developing
inward factors of our native endowment are becoming actual and gaining
a place in our active being in some measure of integration so that as
agents we are resourceful ‘doers’ of varied things, but towards ...
something beyond effective doing and an agency exhaustively occupied
with doing.
From the start, even in the forming-and-executing of activity with the
minimal actual capacity of the time, we register in the immediacy of our
responsive powers, and interpret, the at-stake that claims and concerns
us. Because our capacity is limited, and as it evolves with exercise and
learning, our register-and-reading of the at-stake characteristically
evolves as well. Put oversimply, the infancy-and-childhood efforts in
and through which we initially learn human action-- or more precisely,
learn to ‘do-things’-- take shape under and strengthen in us for a while
an awareness-and-sense of the at-stake in which, given the promptings
of pleasure and pain and the dominance of ‘desire’ in the motivation of
the effort in which we venture responsively to the register of the at-stake,
what seems ultimately at stake to us in this time of life with our limited
responsive capacities is ‘our own ego’: ourselves as ‘doers and enjoyers,
both of the fruits of our deeds and of the competence of our doing’,
ourselves as competent in achieving ‘what we want’ and ‘getting our
way’. This is a characteristic and usually healthy early-life misrendering of the at-stake, one which has its legitimate but limited purchase in reality in the first two subordinate and conditional inflections of
the at-stake mentioned earlier. But not only does it take these inflections
as if they were the ultimate at-stake, it also interprets these in regard to a
relatively impotent ‘self’ who not only is as yet immature but whose
immaturity does not involve capacities which have developed to the
place where a deeper and more accurate sense of the matter could emerge.
Such as we are and can not help but be at the time-- relatively limited
and undeveloped--, we can not register differentially and reach beyond
interpretatively this sense and reading yet, although in contrast we can
fail in many ways and enact our developing being in a way that makes
for an unhealthy ego-and-egoism. This mis-reading is, however,
something which we are meant to grow with the help of but eventually
to outgrow.
b. Initial transition time: youth
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The first and primary transition time is that of youth. In virtue of the
transformation that is meant to take place then, we are to come into our
adult humanity in a preliminary way. In terms of responsibility, the
transition time is one in which, out of a natural evolution in our powers
at this time, we are for the first time entered into the discovery of our
own life as ‘our own’ and are summoned to assume responsibility for our
own life with such capacities as we have developed so far. We are no
longer simply to enact our life in our activity, but to enact it from now
on with some awareness of it in its wholeness and as something whose
further ongoing-and-unfolding we are to take responsibility for now and
into the future.
As to its wholeness: In the discovery of our own life now as ‘our
own’, we discover its temporal bounds in our own person. Toward the
future we feel now the impending of death as our very own-- not as
something ‘we all know’ happens, not as something happening to others
around us, but as singling us out and registering in our receptivity as a
still distant but inevitable and looming eventuality. In counterpart to this,
we find a distance emerging between ourselves and our ‘infancy and
childhood’, that time of life which has been ours up to now and before
which we are aware of nothing: it is ours, indeed, but now ours as
something we have moved beyond: we are no longer in it, we are no
longer ‘children’, we resist being ‘treated as a child’.
As to our responsibility: In this youthful middle-ground between
birth and death, with childhood behind us and adult life ahead, the time
of transition is by nature meant to be infused with aspiration. For here
at the beginning-again of our lives, our nature provides its own inspirational directional pointer into the future of the life we are taking responsibility for. Aspirational longing claims us as pointing us toward something ‘higher and better’; but claimed by its appeal and guided by its
pointer, to what do we aspire con-cretely? What constitutes that ‘higher
and better’ in our own case? We are called into a decision-making which
is not simply about this-or-that action or course of action, but about this
life we are in the midst of assuming responsibility for. Thus responding
to nature’s directional pointer (it is not the only directional factor, of
course, but it is our native pointer), we find ourselves summoned to reflection-- that is, to thinking ‘our own’ thoughts about life and the way
we would take responsibility-- and find ourselves responding with the
determination, in regard to this life-ahead, to think for ourselves and to
act as our own best judgment dictates.
In this taking life upon ourselves in response to what seems life’s
own summoning, we find the claiming of the at-stake registering now in
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our amplified responsive capacity in the modality of obligation, though
the source of this claiming (the creational nisus within being) is still
registered in undifferentiation from life itself and its own aspirationaland-appellative-urging to its own unfolding; and with our response to
such summoning in the mode of obligation, we enter upon morality as a
natural affair, or more precisely, the morality of responsibility as a
creationally-derived and human-nature-inflected affair.
It is in such a transitional middle-ground-- between childhood and
that fullest maturity of ourselves toward which aspiration ultimately
points us-- that we enter upon the initial venture to take responsibility for
our own lives, no longer simply to enact life but now to enact it with
some awareness of its wholeness and its being ‘our own’, with some reflective thoughtfulness commensurate with life and its meaning, and in
a morally-mindful taking responsibility for its further ongoing-andunfolding. In this transition, it is the future that is meant to dominate,
but within a peculiar temporal mixture: in an aspiration toward the
‘higher and better’, and in an eagerness to live our own lives, but in
awareness of death’s impending which, registering faintly as still distant,
serves as reinforcing counterpart to our eagerness, underlining the
imperative summons to begin venturing now in the time of life ahead,
for that time is not endless, one does not have endless time. And then
there is the ambivalent sense of ‘no longer a child’, wanting ‘parental
support’ perhaps but of a different sort than when one was a child,
knowing a childhood of one sort or another (having prepared us well or
badly or ...) and wanting (something different in life ahead, or something
kindred and continuing, or ...).
Even so, how we answer to this summons to responsibility, and with
it, to re-flection, depends in good measure on how well we have been
prepared by earlier life for the transformation and carrying out the work
of the time. If youth brings the opportunity to begin the outgrowing of
the mis-reading of the at-stake and with it the ‘ego-and-egoism’ founded
on it, it is an opportunity whose aspirational reaching has an appeal
which can allow this mis-reading to endure, even if under some
modification and muting that adjusts it to the ‘adult’ world into which
one is entering. For we can, say, see ourselves now as ‘rightfully’ ‘in
control of’ our own lives, and this can strengthen our sense of self-asego, especially if we prove ourselves capable in our participation in this
adult world.
c. Adult phase, maturity and our fullest responsibility
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The transition time of youth has its later counterpart, a mid-life completion time when the first form of responsibility-- self-and-‘own-life’responsibility, the capacity to engage in activity in such fashion as takes
responsibility for the life one is living and for its unfolding and
realization in-and-into the future-- is meant to have become effectively
amplified and to reach into its fullest form. This mid-life time is not, like
youth, closely connected in its natural timing with specifics in our own
growth physically, but instead is meant by nature to come at the
conclusion-- and as the culmination-- of the time allotted by nature to the
early adult exploring-and-trying-out in which the preparations needed
for our finally becoming fully grown-up are meant to be accomplished.
But just as youth is meant to open up for our attention and awareness a
basis (our own individual life-whole and its nature) for an assessing and
judging that is our own and, with this, a summons to re-assess for the life
ahead the normative bases on which we would live our own lives, so
mid-life is meant to open up a deeper basis with a comparable function
and introduce a comparable summons relating to adult life as we have
been living it and would live it on to the end.
Early adulthood is like infancy and childhood, a time of preparation,
but this time, in a rather different sense and form. For in early adulthood,
we are only beginners in what we have just become, still novices in our
novitiate as adults, trying out what it is like to live our lives in response
to aspiration, exploring this world we find ourselves in as adults and
seeking how to participate in it in keeping with our sense of ourselves,
and in all this, meant to gain increasing fulness to our being as adults.
That trying-out, exploring, and seeking, and that fulness, have several
sides.
One side: In the matter of enacting self-responsibility in our interactive-activity, it involves exercising and learning, strengthening and consolidating, our capacity for a decision-making concerning activity that
has a whole-life-reference, gradually enhancing it toward a culminating
competence and moral sensitivity in which our responsibility for our own
life, for developing further and employing our native endowment (and
what has been built with and upon it) in keeping with the reaching of
aspiration, becomes actually carried out with increasing effectiveness.
We are meant to be learning how to take part as self-responsible beings
and to take care of ourselves-as-having-capacity-and-potential in our
participation in circumstance as we encounter it.
A second side: In our having-to-do with the circumstance in which
we find ourselves, and in particular, in the various sides of a selfresponsible life (sustaining our existence, engaging with others as an
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adult, developing and employing skills in adult work, etc.), we not only
are learning and developing the particular capacities and skills,
knowledge and familiarity, to achieve in such way as to be able to ‘make
our way in the world’, but, in gaining self-confidence in the course of
exercising our responsibility as we develop as agents our increasingly
complex particularity-nature and learn how to draw it into play, we are
discovering and beginning to develop such creativity as is ours in the
employing of our particular capacities, in bringing them into play in a
distinctive creative fashion.
A third side: While doing these, we are not simply living the life for
which we are taking responsibility, but as part of our responsibility we
are trying to find out what we have gotten ourselves into, what the
genuine native potential and the circumstantially-open possibilities for
this life of ours are, and how we may best actualize the potential
entrusted to us in the circumstances open to us. Two questions lurk in
our minds as we monitor and assess: ‘Is what I am doing now what I
really want to do with my life?’, and ‘Are there further transformations
that are part of life ahead?’ Finding the answer to the second requires,
in an obvious way, patience, but not simply that; it calls for an
attentiveness along the way, a sensitivity to life’s own inherent signs, and
an openness and readiness (should signs of such a meant-to-be transformation appear) to heed the summons involved. As for the first, the
other two sides of our trying-out are building capability (moral, reflective, creative, and practical) in ourselves, but doing so without as yet
any assured answers to (first) what we, as we are becoming more capable,
are to dedicate our lives to and exercise our capability on behalf of, and
(second) to whether what we are trying out is actually enabling us to find
a satisfactory answer to that first question.
In early adulthood, so far as our nature provides direction we are
initially guided in our trying-out-and-testing by the aspirational reaching
of youth and what it raises and excites or quickens in us of particular
capacities when we begin to interpret its meaning in practical reference
and to find certain opportunities for participation in affairs enthusing us,
others appealing to us but ..., others leaving us indifferent, and others
repelling us. In youth, aspiration initially seems to point-- so far as youth
can discern (and a significant amount is not yet discernible)-- simply to
a higher-and-better self, together with an interactive-relation to other
human beings in which association with them as one makes a life and
living for oneself is likewise to embody the higher-and-better. The future
prior to death seems open-ended, with aspiration pointing to the ‘higherand-better’ simply in the indefinite vein of ‘more’. In the con-crete
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realization of aspiration, our maturation as responsible adults takes place,
on the one hand, in the contingent harmony of appropriate opportunity
for the exercise and development of self-responsibility, and on the other
hand, in the successful augmentation of capability in the exercise of our
essential capacity in the course of our early-adulthood exploratory
venturing. In the course of our initial learning to live and act as an adult
human being, there is a question lurking in the background (‘what do I
really want to do with my life?’), and at times it takes on some urgency,
especially as adult life advances. It is as if, as we reach to become better
and more capable human beings, we are meant to ‘do something with our
lives’; and yet ... what is it that this odd question is pointing us toward?
What does it mean to ‘do something’ with a life? What is a life, such that
it is important to ‘do something’ with it, or to use another phrase, to make
something of it, make something worthwhile of it? It is as if as living
beings we have something to devote ourselves to, to give ourselves over
to. But what? Why to that?
We have noted recurrently that activity is a venturing, that failure in
our effort to help secure the at-stake is an inherent possibility, that our
growth and maturation are nothing automatic but require a learning effort
which can serve us badly. Nature equips us both to succeed and to respond constructively to failure, and, in the case at hand, gives us time for
our trying out, our testing and assessing, our developing morally and
creatively as adults. But by nature that time is limited, and is meant for
a learning and growing whose issue is meant to be our mid-life entry into
the fulness of our human capacity for responsibility. If indeed we are
able to develop and grow as cumulative issue of our trying-out and
testing, that entry occurs in a transformation that brings to completion
the first (youthful) transformation of our capacity for self-responsibility. vii For in it the natural augmentation of the disclosive side of our
capability as a human agent has enabled us finally to find in sufficient
differentiation from what it had previously been confused with, and to
become distinctly aware of, that to which the self-and-life for which we
have assumed responsibility is meant to be devoted. And with awareness
(however we interpret what we are aware of) of the creational nature of
being and its ‘end’ as what concerns us, we find ourselves initiated into
a fully-grown-up-humanly living and acting and entered into a life-task
in working on which the mattering of achievement-in-doing and realization-of-capacity-for-effective-doing are visible as subordinate, as meant
to serve a capability of engaging that answers self-aware to what
ultimately matters, namely, that creation come to its culmination with the
help of existent-active-beings, including ourselves. It is to this
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culmination of creation that our life is ultimately to be devoted, to activeengagement in which helping to secure this-- to help to bring it to pass-is the character of our living and acting.
Such dedication is always con-crete, it involves taking up with and
becoming immersed in particularity and searching out how the task of
participating in securing the ultimate at-stake and doing this as ourselves,
with our unique capacities and creativity and our unique be-coming and
the wholeness of our individual life, can be carried out in the most
effective way. The transformation involved in this transition is a filling
out of the meaning of responsibility which transforms it from simple selfresponsibility for one’s life whatever that life harbors for one, whatever
it implicates one in in virtue of one’s nature, to self-responsibility for a
life discovered to implicate one, in virtue of one’s ownmost nature and
its be-coming, in a witting and willing con-crete participation in the
securing of the ultimately at stake. Such discovery thus enters one into
the task of helping work out con-cretely-- of helping discern and
undertake the con-crete realization of-- being’s fulness, and operating
out of a responsiveness to the dynamic of being, bringing our selfresponsibility to its own fulness in a responsible commitment of our lives,
of our potential and our past as well as of our current actuality, and this,
as a life-long and life-commensurate dedication and devotion. In this
way we make the evolution and development of our original endowment
issue in a worthy answering to the claiming-and-obligating heart of the
uni-verse.
The working-out of which I am speaking is one defined (so far as I
have been talking about it) with reference to our nature and the nature of
things, and has no correlation with a particular job, profession, role or
project, since it concerns the wholeness of our life and our be-comingbeing, not simply a limited social function of our adult life, and since it
concerns beings in their own right and wholeness as active out of themselves, not beings categorized in social-meaning terms. What is constant
in the ongoing con-crete working-out of our responsibility in this full
form is what is called for in the dedication, namely, the moral strength
and practical judgment, the courage and commitment in the face of
challenges and distractions, and the recognition of the many-sidedness
and the wholeness of the life to be lived in this dedicated fashion, to name
some obvious factors.
In sum, then: According to the preceding sketch, our life as human
beings is an affair of growth and maturation, which seen in this reference
involves us in two transition-times (or a transition-time and a
completion-time) and three major phases of our life. The first transition
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time-- that of youth and our entry upon self-responsibility-- presupposes
the early life (infancy and childhood) development as preparation, and
involves our moving beyond this first phase in our coming into the needand-initial-capacity to live our life in an assumption of responsibility for
it as ‘our own’. But life is oriented beyond the initial aim at self-responsibility, independence, to a fuller responsibility which presupposes the
achievement of self-responsibility but augments it. The second
transition time-- the completion-time of mid-life and our entry upon
human-vocational-responsibility-- thus presupposes a second phase, that
of the early-adulthood consolidation in our capacity for selfresponsibility and self-confidence in the employment of our particularcapacities, and involves (as issue of the trying-out-and-testing) an
augmented capacity which this time brings us into the need-and-initialcapacity to live our life in self-aware and dedicated responsive service to
creation, in effort dedicated to the con-crete realization in extended
fashion of what is in reality ultimately at-stake in existence-- not simply
in ‘my’ existence, but in existence as an interactive affair of existentbeings. In such dedicated effort, we are entered into a task, a work, and
a passionate involvement in and response to a calling out of the heart of
being. Carrying this out over time is the ownmost in self-responsibility,
in which we assume responsibility in-and-for a working on a task which
draws on our deepest and fullest self and the wholeness of our life, and
makes us sharers in the ultimate consummation of creation, the
realization of being in its fulness. As active-beings who are human, we
have a share in securing this consummation, along with all other active
beings; and we are meant (out of our own nature and out of the nature of
creation itself) to participate in this eventually-and-ultimately as a matter
of our own vocational-and-self-committed undertaking, as the way we
ultimately fulfill the self-responsibility that is central to human life. But
the ongoing of life is bounded by an end, the extending of our
participation in such an undertaking is thus finite; and moreover, the
capability with which we venture in this extended fashion is itself vulnerable, and may disintegrate before death, in the debilitations of old age,
say, so that the extending may be even shorter. For that is part of our
humanity, that we are called to venture on such effort at this peak of our
life as human beings, but we are capable of that at best only for a while.
In even briefer sum: To be human is to be (as having be-come) a responsible participant in the interactivity of actual existence. The
flowering of our responsibility, as the mature capability of ourselves as
human beings and the telos of a human life come fully into itself, is a
continuing
self-responsible
and
creative-potential-actualizing
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participation as the singular human being one is, in an enduring
engagement with circumstance which, in embodying and making-concrete a responsible whole-life-integrating address to active-beings as
creaturely beings, is one’s contribution (one’s best effort at contributing)
to the consummation of creation. At its heart is a clear-sighted register
of the at-stake of creational existence and a responsive commitment
which, heedful of the claim-and-obligating-force of the at-stake, would
dedicate one’s life to con-cretely helping take care of securing what is
at-stake.
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1. A science of life?
Toward the end of Chapter 2, viii we approached the question of a
science of life, and taking note of the two-sided meaning of “life”,
recognized that in its outward side life is open to the scientific address to
nature in the sense of objective scrutiny of the face of active-beings. This
has, indeed, been central in what have come to be spoken of in modern
times as the biological sciences. But as a disciplined study of life-- and
that means of life whole--, biology can not bring that outward side into
focus for exploration and study as an aspect of life if, in emulation of the
natural sciences, it restricts itself simply to what is open to it directly in
the face of things, namely, the organic. To grasp the organic as it truly
is, as an aspect of life, requires reaching beyond the face of things and
including the inward side of life-- the inward and outward sides are
different but inseparable, and there is life only with both. Because
modern science began with the natural (physical) sciences and the study
of life sought to emulate those disciplines as paradigms for a responsible
inquiry into matters, this side of the study of life, essential given the
nature of things, has been downplayed historically, but it makes itself
evident as quite unavoidable-- and at the same time, controversial-- when
life is grasped as an evolutionary phenomenon and the human is regarded
as one of the later life-forms emerging in this evolutionary history of life.
If we construe the responsible and disciplined study of life as something more than a natural science and as requiring an approach to its distinctive field (namely, life) that is more complex than that of the natural
sciences, then we are compelled to see it as starting from the only full
and direct entryway into the field which the nature of things and the nature of our capacities for inquiry offer, namely, ourselves, we human
beings, we inquirers into life. We are ourselves living, and thus are
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directly cognizant of life in its inward and outward sides together, life in
its spatially-differentiated wholeness, but also life in its temporallydifferentiated wholeness. But this direct cognizance in both spatial and
temporal reaches is ours only in the case of our own person, each
individual his/her own life alone. For you are not aware directly of the
inward side or of the futural and preterite sides of the life in me, nor I in
you. And that is the strength, and the weakness, of our access to life
whole: it is first-hand, but therefore restricted in each of us to our singular
being alone. We have to make our address to the life in any beings other
than our own individual selves depend upon our access to life in
ourselves, in us human beings, and utilize ourselves to infer from life in
its spatially-and-temporally-differentiated wholeness in our own being
to the character of the life-- life likewise whole as spatially-andtemporally-differentiated-- in other living beings, including the life even
of other human beings than ourselves.
But how far-reaching is that access to life which we have in our own
person, and how sound is our understanding of what we have access to
there? Then further, how sound is the inference we make from this starting-point? If re-flection leads us to think that all existent-beings are
active beings, and that life is something lived by active beings in their
engagement in activity, then we would need to distinguish what enters
into the constitution of activity itself, temporally and spatially (inwardly
and outwardly), from what enters into the constitution of life, likewise
temporally and spatially (inwardly and outwardly), and yet connect the
two. How well does the beginning-point of our inference to the life in
others enable us to do this? to reach into life and activity in their unity
but difference in our own person, to become aware of these in direct disclosure, and to understand what we are aware of and what is being disclosed? Even then, how do we know in what way to form our inference
to the inward and temporal life and activity of other living beings from
what we know of ourselves? How do we know what to make of any nonhuman inwardness?
The complexity that makes for difficulties in using ourselves as such
a starting-point for inference can be made apparent if, working within
our thoughts on space and time (Chapter 2), we consider and expand on
certain points in our discussion of the human earlier in this chapter.
As we saw earlier, under the enabling conditions of space and time
we are existent-beings active out of ourselves in an interactive existence.
As such, we know a being of ourselves whose temporality means that
our activity takes shape, and our life is actualized, in an ongoing-now so
constituted that the potential of our being (our future) and the developed
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resources of that being (our past) converge in that now as available to the
ongoing decision-making and -executing at the heart of our being-active.
We know as well a being of ourselves whose spatiality has its own complexity. For first of all, it involves an articulation of the ‘here’ that is the
spatial-locus counterpart of that ongoing-now of our active effort and its
shape-taking, so that we know a differentiation of our active-being into
inward and outward sides; secondly, within this differentiation, the polar
articulation is such as gives primacy (so far as concerns the initiatingand-executing of activity) to the inward, and a subordinate place to the
outward, just as the temporal structure gives primacy to the ongoing-now
within the inclusive temporal locus of such effort; and thirdly, the ‘here’
in question stands in tension-and-contrast with the ‘here’s’ of other active
beings, and in particular, those which form the circumstance of our
existence and in interacting with which we share in that existence.
Now in virtue of these complexities to the temporality and spatiality
of our being, we are active-- we initiate our active efforts and maintain
or adapt that initiative as we execute those efforts-- in first-personal vein,
in the operation of our initiative powers in the ever-ongoing-now which
the temporal articulation of our active being introduces and in that
private side which the spatial articulation of our being into inward and
outward sides furnishes. In that initiating-and-executing we not only
draw on powers, resources, and potentiality, that are harbored in the
inwardness of our being, but our decision-making itself, involving
various activities (for example, putting our attention on and thinking),
takes place inwardly, in the privacy of our being; at the same time,
harbored in that inwardness is the vital-energy which is the inward side
of life and whose actualizing in the initiative-activity is an inward and
temporally-concentrated affair as well. Finally, because among the
capacities harbored in our inward side are those by which, activating our
bodily side, we enter ourselves whole into activity so that we (say) play
the piano, our own body, so far as it is our own and integral to ourselves
as active beings, does not simply overt us finitely toward other active
beings but, given that overtion, serves as instrument or vehicle which,
inwardly activated by us in an activity-functional way, makes our activity
overt as behavior while nonetheless being a first-personal affair. As so
activated and functioning, our body is itself, as our own, uniquely and
privately accessible to us, being simply the bodily side of ourselves; and
yet it also, as the outward overted side of ourselves, makes us public.
From the outside, to others and even to ourselves when (say) we look at
ourselves in the mirror and say in disbelief ‘that’s me???’, there is
nothing visible of the first-personal in the overt or bodily side of
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ourselves, not even to ourselves; to others, there is simply ‘his body’,
‘that body’ with its directly discernible features (head, neck, limbs, trunk,
etc.), and ‘his behavior’, ‘those bodily movements’ which form the
behavior or overt side of the activity which I am undertaking out of an
initiative taking shape within and in an employment of my capacity to
(say) move my arms and hands. If the third-personal usage (“his”)
indirectly acknowledges a (latent) first-personal agency, that is only
presumptively done.
Let us more fully consider our condition, and some of the
complexities involved in it, by way of two examples.
First, let us focus on a particular action and underline a significant
distinction and its manifestation in the realm of the outward. Consider,
for example, my act of playing the piano; taking for granted my being
seated at a bench or stool, my position in relation to the keys above and
the pedals below, and my posture, let us focus on my use of my arms and
hands in playing music on the instrument. As features of the bodily side
to my active being, my arms and hands are parts of a organized body
which, as living, is the outward side of the life in me; the parts of my
body are organized to be interdependent and form a unified whole
structurally and functionally. Inherent in that whole and significant for
the outward side of the life in me, there are processes occurring-- the
heart beating, the blood coursing, nerve impulses being transmitted-- that
have a role in the maintaining my body as a functional living organic
whole, while there are other processes going on-- physiological changes
taking place as muscles in the arms and hands stretch and contract, say- which are of a more localized significance, though not unconnected
with what else is taking place in that organic bodily whole. All such
things enter into the constitution and functioning of the overt side of my
active being in its organic aspect. But in my playing, my arms and hands- those features of my body that otherwise are simply parts of this organic
whole-- have their fundamental function, as instrumental in my playing.
That is, they are able to be employed by me in activity which is initiated
and maintained inwardly, and as overt and visible to an audience, they
provide the behavioral aspects of my activity. In this instrumental and
behavioral role, the functioning of my arms and hands is not itself a
physiological process, even though the arms and hands I am using in my
activity are features of my organic side and, at the same time as they are
functioning instrumentally, are marked by various ongoing organic
processes which are continually integrating them as parts into our bodily
whole as an organic affair. The trained execution of my fingers in the
playing, however, is not one of these organic processes.
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The connection yet difference in the standing and functioning of my
arms and hands as organic parts and as activity-instruments is complex.
For instance, with the normal physiological functioning of my body, it is
possible for me, through practice and training, to bring my fingers to
operate in a fashion skillful enough to make the music sound something
like it was meant to sound. This training and skill concern my fingers as
instrumental to an inwardly-initiated activity, but their operation in this
instrumental vein and its improvement through training presupposes that
normal physiological condition and functioning of my body which
makes such instrumental functioning viable. If I have injured one of my
fingers-- broken a bone in it, say--, physiologically speaking there is
disruption in this part of my organic side and the activation of restorative
processes. A finger which is physiologically damaged and still in the
process of healing will ordinarily also make piano-playing difficult or
impossible, that is, will affect the viability of activity that requires certain
instrumental functioning of my fingers. But the broken bone, and all that
is attendant on it of altered physiological functioning, is, as such, only
an affair of the overt side of my spatiality in its organic constitution and
functioning; the viability of the finger (broken or not) as functional
element in playing the piano, however, concerns the operation of this
feature of my overt side in my activity itself.
In brief: As enabled by space and time we are active beings, whose
spatial-and-temporal constitution ordinarily gives our activity an overt
aspect which others (and we ourselves) see, from the outside, as behavior;
this behavior is not identical with activity whole (which involves a significant-- indeed, more decisive-- inward side), nor is it identical with all
that is discernible in the overt side of our active being, for example, with
physiological processes and movements which belong to them as physiological. Behavior requires for its intelligibility some reference to the
inward and to the initiation out of it of the activity whose overt aspect is
behavior; the physiological does not.
Second, let us take another example of activity, namely, our visual
perceiving of things, and underline other distinctions and connections,
this time focusing more on the inward. When I am engaged in seeing
things it is in part through powers resident in my own inwardness, which
powers I employ in a certain way in the activity in question; but this
employment-- my receiving-and-registering of the sensible impression
of what presents itself visually, my attending to what is given, my noticing and recognizing, and thus my sensible-apprehending of things-presupposes and involves the concomitant employment, as cooperating
element in the activity, of my own eyes and my own brain. In this case,
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the employment by me is of my own bodily organs in co-operation with
the employment of my own inward capacities, in an employment of the
whole of my being in the activity, thereby enabling the latter to be what
it is. The employment by me of my bodily side-- and the bodily
functioning which is involved: the focusing of my eyes, for example-- is
not itself the receiving or the attending or the noticing-and-recognizing
or the sensible-apprehending that enter into and co-constitute my
perceiving, but is the physical side of that activity of mine, the
functioning of my body as it is being-employed not by my inward powers
(which I also employ) but by me, the agent in question who has both
sides to my active-being. Given their different character and standing in
my being (the one side inward, the other outward), there are differences
in the way these factors are (and can be) employed by me and in the way
they (can) function. As bodily organs, my eyes have a continually persisting spatially-outward constitution-and-status which is integral to
their capacity to help in my perceiving but which makes them subject not
only to various impacts and influences from ‘out there’ even if I am not
using them to perceive but also to various disorders in the physiological
functioning of my bodily organism as an integrated whole (illness that
affects the eyes, for example). But as my organs and in my perceiving,
my eyes show nothing in their objectively-discernible organicallyconstituted-and-operating character that itself constitutes my perceiving;
the latter takes place with them, in an employment of them as my eyes,
as eyes being employed by me whose eyes they are, and with the help of
their functioning in that employment. So far, then, there are (for example)
at least three different aspects to my shifting the focus of my eyes to see
something I was not looking at before: there is the continuing operation
of the objectively-constituted organ as a bodily part (the organic
processes going on in the eye that maintain it as an organic part), there is
(in the overt and discernible movement of the eyes, if not also of the head
and whole body) the manifest side of an inwardly initiated and inwardly
sustained effort (the behavioral character of the eye-[head/body]movement), and there are the changes in the operation of the eye (its
focusing of light, its narrowing pupil width, and the like) that are meant
to enable me, as I use it, to see-- to receive, attend-to, notice, apprehend
visually-- with a different focus under the altered conditions.
From this simple delineation of our own being made possible because
of our unique access to it, we can see five variables entering into our
being-active in virtue of its spatiality. One is our spatially overt side, and
counterpart to it is a second, the spatially inward side; our active being
as a unitary whole is spatially differentiated in this way internally to its
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here. Then third, there is the character of our spatially overt side, our
bodily side, whereby it is constituted to operate in activity whose
initiation and executional center is inward-- not interior, but inward; thus
limbs, hands, fingers, and the like. Fourth, this overt activity-functional
side of our being is constituted in its own terms to be an organized whole,
in which some of the organs are simply that, part of the organic fabric of
our overt side (the heart and liver, say, and the stomach and kidneys),
while others are fitted to be functional for various forms of inwardlyinitiated activity (fingers and hands, eyes, legs and arms, and brain, for
example). All of the latter are like the former in this regard, that they are
interdependent parts of a single organized whole which has a relatively
interconnected set of physiological functions and complementary
processes that, working together, make it a single living bodily whole
(the external side of life). But they differ from the former to this extent,
that they fit that whole for various forms of activity the initiative and
executional center of which is inward; they are overt instruments in our
activity as whole active-beings. Finally, there is the inward counterpart
to this organic character to our body or outward side, namely, the vitalenergy which is drawn on in our inward initiating and whose
actualization in the course of the engagement in activity that is issue of
that initiating is part of our living of the life in ourselves.
It is fairly apparent, then, that the spatial polarity of our active being,
while it differentiates, does not compartmentalize, divide, separate,
isolate. The five variables that I just pointed to operate together in a
structured way.
Something similar is the case with the complexity introduced into our
active being by our temporality.
Continuing the example set forth above, consider this time the visual
perceiving of a Bruegel painting. It takes some time before we are able
to see something in the manner of aesthetic contemplation, for that
activity is an affair of a complex and learned mode of visual perceiving.
Temporally, our activity is ever taking place in the ongoing-now of our
active-being, with its convergent future and past. As in the ongoing side
of our present our initiating activity brings into play the variety of
capacities our nature makes available as endowment at the start, we grow
and develop, and we mature humanly; and throughout this, what
constitutes our current actuality, and the correlative potential (future) and
accumulated resources (past), alters as we appropriate the potential and
build up the resources by way of venturings in which we exercise such
capacity as we have at the time. At any time, then, our activity is the
realization of some potential (future) in ourselves and a drawing on some
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resources (past) we have accumulated. In the course of the ongoing of
our active participation in things, we (among other things) learn to see,
for while we see with our eyes and the beginning of seeing is to be found
whenever our eyes our open and there are appropriate conditions (light,
for example) for circumstance to be visible to us, seeing as a human
activity involves a receiving-and-registering of the impression of what
presents itself visually, an attending to what is given, a noticing and
recognizing, and thus a sensible-apprehending of things; and in
consequence, it becomes more complex as it takes place in a more
capable human being, into whose seeing enters not only a richer and
more complex functioning of ourselves in these regards but an
increasingly rich and complex accumulation of resources, elements of
which are called forth from the background and enrich our seeing as what
is registering visually is registering. For the most part, our visual
perceiving is a supportive part of our engagement in activity, and such
practically-inflected seeing ordinarily involves a rather selective register
of what is seen: not simply a differentiation of what is focused upon from
what is seen only peripherally, say, but how what is focused on is taken
in and in what terms, whether with only a passing glance which registers
something familiar but not worth notice, or with a passing glance brought
to turn back to something unfamiliar which as we passed it by had
‘caught our eye’ because of that unfamiliarity, or in a pause brought on
by recognition of something familiar but out of its ordinary place, and so
on. The variations in quality and character of seeing when taking place
in a supportive or secondary role in a practical context are numerous, and
different in virtue of many variables related to the way we are engaged
practically and the place of the seeing in that regard. Then there are times
when the practical is suspended in its attention-directing and interpretative-framework role, and seeing, released from its practical reference,
can for a while become a dominant activity, a simple pausing and noticing, say, a “really looking at” what is there to be seen, even a dwelling
on it visually and an allowing it to soak in and register in a fuller way
than normal. Again there are numerous variations in such seeing, from
that in which we become deeply absorbed in-and-by what we are looking
at, to that which does not hold us with any strength, to ... . Eventually,
as we mature we become increasingly capable of visually perceiving
something which, like a painting, has been created for seeing of a
particular sort, for aesthetically-contemplative seeing. Such seeing
involves a receiving which enters the painting into an attending which
draws on a variety of developed-and-learning-enhanced capacities and a
complex of resources and life-experiences which enable what is being

149

Chapter 3. The human, in individual realization

received and being attended to and inspected visually, as it evokes
various of these facets of our being, to complicate and deepen in its
register in us. The seeing which takes place in such contemplation may
be, from the outside, no different in appearance (as behavior) from seeing
in other forms, but the various forms are actually quite different in
character as matters of human visual perceiving.
From this rather elliptical recall of visual perceiving in some of its
many forms in a human being (I have left out of account numerous
factors, including especially the social and historical factors that would
contribute to seeing a Bruegel painting as contrasted with a Ming dynasty
landscape painting), we can observe time-grounded variables that enter
into our being active in addition to those related to our spatiality. The
most important of these include, first, the convergence of potential
(future) and accumulated resources (past) in the forming-and-carryingout of currently ongoing activity, so that the whole life and being of the
active being is entering somehow-- but with different content at different
times-- into the activity; second, in virtue of the maturational character
of human life, there is the initiative-capacity in its current form operating
in that forming-and-carrying-out, this capacity being meant to develop
over time and thereby to function differently in the forming-andcarrying-out according to the stage of life and development we are at;
concomitantly, there are, third, the particular capacities being drawn into
play, capacities developmental in nature and enabling to different forms
of activity over time as the agent gains in capability, and to executing the
same forms with different skill levels at different times; fourth and finally,
there is the element of learning over time in both the second and third
variables, with its many types being integral to the development of
capacity/capacities, with its potential of mislearning and partial or
inadequate learning, and with its issue in retained learning that functions
in ongoing activity and makes it take shape differently. All of these timegrounded variables belong to our being on its inward side and concern
the nature and character of the forming-and-executing of our activity out
of that side of our being.
Now the question arises: given what our spatial-and-temporal complexity introduces into our being as active in the way of such variables
as we have enumerated in the preceding paragraphs, how can we use this
sense of ourselves as alive and active human beings as starting point for
making reasonable inferences as to life’s inwardness in living beings
generally, and in particular, in those that are not human? In outline, such
a procedure would involve the following.
The beings to whose inwardness we would infer confront us in their
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outwardness, and it is that alone to which we have direct access. If we
are to infer to the inwardness that is present, there must be features of
that outwardness, whether organic or instrumental or both, which serve
as reliable indicators of a certain kind of inwardness being present. But
that presupposes a connection of outward and inward that is both reliable
and knowable. Our first procedural question would then be: Is the
connection of our own outward and inward sides within our whole being
such that the outward, whether simply the organic structure-andfunctioning of our body or whether instrumental in our activity and
manifesting our behavior, would give anyone observing us from the
outside a reliable indication of our inwardness? If so, then the next
question would be: Can we use the discernible character of that
connection as a basis for analogical inference in regard to other living
beings whose nature is not human? Whether such inference starts from
the organic structure itself, or from those facets of the organic body
which seem to be instrumental to activity, or combines the two, we would
seem to have, in the nature of things and of our own being and capacity
for understanding, an avenue for inference to what is (likely to be) found
in the inwardness of the other living beings.
Questions abound concerning such a procedure, and plausible
answers are hard to come by. Analogical inferences are notoriously
unreliable, and in this case, when it comes to what we think of as less
complex forms of living things, with their considerable apparent
unlikeness to the complex form which we humans are, the analogical
connection is quite limited. And if that is so in cases when we can
confront the living things in the present, and observe their functioning
(behavioral and organic) under varying conditions and in various settings,
then the connection is even more tenuous in those cases when we seek
to read life in an evolutionary vein, and (so to speak) give life to forms
that have long ago become extinct and are known to us only in fossil or
other relict forms. But beyond the matter of the reliability of analogical
inference, and the lack of any direct evidence concerning the inwardness
in other living beings to support one conclusion over another, the whole
procedure depends first of all on the well-groundedness of the starting
point, and that means, on our having an adequate self-understanding of
ourselves as existent-active-beings, and especially of those facets of
ourselves which are being used in the inference-making. Are we
knowing enough about ourselves-- about the nature of our own inward
and outward sides and their unity in ourselves-- to be able to take
(features of) the outward side as a reliable sign of the nature and
character of the inward side of ourselves, and in particular, of ourselves

151

Chapter 3. The human, in individual realization

as living beings? There is a particular need for assurance here when the
matter of reading life as an evolutionary power is involved; for if, in the
effort to fathom what makes life such a power, we misread something
out of our own inwardness-- concerning the nature and place in the living
of the drive for survival, say-- and, as part of our making intelligible the
evolutionary movement and the living beings that carry it, project this
uncritically into the living beings which carry the evolutionary
movement, we end up with a reading of ourselves and our forbearers-of the life in early human beings and in human beings in the course of
history up to and including ourselves-- which, to the extent that the
objective ‘facts’ of evolution do not obviously refute it, reinforces the
distorted view of ourselves involved in the idea we originally projected
rather than confirms the truth of a well-formed hypothesis.
Given the preceding considerations, we can conclude: The nature of
things, and of our own capacities for understanding, ground the
possibility of biological studies that are more than forms of natural
science. Given the “more” of a more complex field, whose defining
requires a different abs-traction from that which suffices in the case of
the natural sciences, such studies also require “more” of any address to
that field (namely, life) that would issue in understanding it. Such studies
require not simply attention to the phenomena which objectively
constitute the realm of the organic and apprehension of their distinctive
character (structure and processes) and the way in which (say) chemical
processes take place in that realm; they require as well an attention that
integrates the objective scrutiny of such phenomena with a conjectural
inference to inwardness, and with an interpretation of behavior, that
requires for its starting-point an understanding of the human in order that
its focus on the organic and on overt movements which seem to represent
behavior grasp both in their full context, as indeed the outward aspect of
life and the outward manifestation of inwardly-initiated activity, and not
simply as a more complex level and order of physical-and-chemical
phenomena. A study concentrating on the latter can advance remarkably
even while simply taking for granted the inward and vital, but it remains
only a truncated study of life.

2. ‘Psychology’: the disciplined study of the living
individual human being
We inquirers into life overall can and must inquire into the life in
ourselves in order to carry out our broader inquiry into all forms of life
in their spatial-and-temporal-wholeness. For that broader effort, we may
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not need to take the inquiry into the life in ourselves as far as we could.
But when we attempt this and become inquirers seeking simply the truth
of the human (life, beings) in all its varied facets, then we have entered
upon what I am calling anthropic studies. This is that part of the study
of living beings in which the living human being who studies living
beings studies him-/herself, expanding on the self-knowing needed for
grasping life whole and for developing biological studies as disciplines
concerned with life in that wholeness.
As in the study of life generally, the field of study here-- human life- is broader than that of (natural) science. There is, of course, that side- the organic-- which in all life forms is open to scientific scrutiny as
marking the face of living active beings. But in the human case we
inquirers have access to the inwardness of the life we are concerned to
understand, because we live life in first-personal fashion. With the
openness this brings, we are open to the activity, the forming of activity,
in which life-whole is being lived: indeed, our very endeavor of inquiry
is one form of that activity. And because we not only live human life
ourselves but are able to communicate with other human beings who
have comparable access to human life in their own persons, we seem to
have in this field of study an access of such a several-sided sort as makes
our inquiry quite promising regarding its potential for achieving genuine
understanding. At least, that is the appearance at first sight. But in truth
the situation is much more questionable.
a. The nature of the discipline
A significant amount of what belongs in a study of human life is
public, for our activity is oriented outwardly and includes an outward
(behavioral) aspect of itself, and our living has its outward organic side
while the activity-mediated living of life that actualizes the vital-energy
that belongs to the inward side of life is a living in active interplay with
the beings of circumstance and indirectly manifests itself in the public
sphere of that interplay. Nonetheless, our own perception and thought
concerned with the public aspect of human life is not itself public, and
while verbal communication in a shared language connects diverse
human beings center to center with the help of the public, even when
speaking of the most straightforward aspect of the public-- the immediate
face of things-- there is no assurance of common understanding of the
meaning of the language being used when anything subtle or demanding
is involved.
More importantly, however, the study of human life, when it is
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inquiry seeking what is fundamental in the human, turns back upon the
inquiring human being as a spatio-temporal agent and turns perception
and attention to that primary side of our agency in which we are
deciding-and-executing activity out of the privacy of our own being and
out of the current state of our being in the middle of our lives.
Communicating about such matters, we are speaking with each other
about the side of our being which is private to each of us and thus about
what we are individually experiencing inwardly. In this case, it is quite
possible for us in the ordinary conduct of life to speak in ways that make
ourselves sufficiently understood about such things for the purposes at
hand, but we are concerned here with a discipline of responsible thought
and speech that is obligated to formulate and communicate truth with
accuracy. The fact that the medium of our communication is public, the
language we use has common publicly recognized meanings, and any
specialized jargon we develop and use has meanings publicly recognized
by specialists, does not overcome the fact that in all cases we must each
make what is public our own personally and in our interpreting it may
not end up granting the ‘same’ meaning to the ‘same’ words; nor does it,
more fundamentally, assure us that the inward matter each human center
is apprehending with a claim to understanding is the same matter, for it
is not a public matter which third-parties could also discern together out
there, as in the case of the intersubjectivity of communication in science
concerning what is objective. In the latter case, the public accessibility
of the matter to be understood and of the evidence offered for
understanding it in this-way rather than in that-way also provides a way
for others to counter the entry into the inquirer’s approach of distorting
‘subjective’ factors that affect the evidence and the claim but can not
themselves be directly observed; there is nothing comparable in the case
of that side of anthropic studies which is concerned with the inward, nor
indeed for that aspect of the concern in those studies with outwardly
discernible behavior where what is in question is not observable ‘fact’
but the public side of activity that is responsive (say) to meant-to-be’s
and social-meanings and whose determinate meaning, in truth or in the
agent’s own mind, is therefore nothing directly observable.
At the beginning of this chapter, we took note of some of the major
features of this human life which we live in first-personal fashion and
which is the matter to be understood in anthropic studies. What makes
us human is our distinctive agency, one centered in capacities whereby
we initiate activity out of responsiveness to the at-stake and venture in
this way or that, trying out and experimenting with such capacities as we
have at the time. In virtue of the operation of our capacity to initiate, we
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live life in a continual venturing and learning, and as an affair-- indeed,
an ad-venture-- of growth and maturation. This means that the life in us
is actualized in such way that its unfolding is not automatic but depends
on our own efforts first and foremost, on our responsive register,
interpretation, and heeding of native meant-to-be’s; thus life becomes
actualized in the course of time and in such way as involves learning,
meaning mislearning and failure to learn as well as success in learning.
In virtue of our venturing, the human in us can well become inadequately
actualized as we come to live and act in this-way rather than in that-way,
and thereby our own personal access to human life can become distorted
and our capacities to perceive and understand this matter, intimate as it
is to us, can become malformed and dysfunctional, inadequate to their
meaning and in their functioning. Simply being a human being and
doing human things is not sufficient to enable us to understand well and
accurately our own life and nature, whether that means understand our
own individual self or, more broadly, understand what it means to be
human.
What is called for, then?
I have alluded to something which I am calling anthropic studies;
taken together, these would be commensurate with the disciplined
inquiry into the human in all its aspects, and that would involve, overall,
two intertwining branches with different emphases, and a third and
encompassing study which addresses the concrete realization of the
human in its enduring existence over the centuries. In modern times we
have come to call the one branch “psychology”, the other “sociology”,
and the encompassing study “history” (historiography). In all three cases,
I have in mind what in the nature of things is there for study and the
human inquiry appropriate for discovering its truth, and in each case this
means something broader than the studies which those terms might
initially bring to mind, given their current reference. In this chapter, I
want to address only the first, and thus, with the caution that while the
social is a dimension of the human that reflects the essential connection
of human with human and thus an essential side of the human, I will not
discuss much of that in this chapter but return to it as focus in Chapter 4.
Let me re-phrase my question, then, and ask: What is called for in the
inquiry which I am thinking of when speaking of that form of anthropic
study which I am calling “psychology”?
Within the larger field of human life in all its aspects, psychology is
focused on the root factor of how we individual human beings engage in
activity and live our lives, that is, on the various facets of our active being
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and on the functioning of those facets in our active participation in existence. The aim is an understanding primarily of human nature, that is, of
the capacities that it natively involves (essential and particular), of the
way we bring them into play and, engaging in active interplay with the
world around us, live our lives as a human affair, and of the
developmental meant-to-be’s which our nature harbors and which
provide a standard and measure of ‘healthy human being and be-coming’.
The heart of the matter to be understood is the use of our initiativecapacity, the decision-making-and-executing whereby we venture
forward doing-this rather than doing-that and living in this-way rather
than in that-way, and the factors that bear on all this. Those factors do
not all lie within the human being, like the native meant-to-be’s; the
actualization of the human in an individual is always under conditions,
in an interactive engagement with circumstance in which the individual
is taking what he/she is encountering into his/her own be-coming and,
altered by its contribution, is receiving its influence as a more-or-less
significant factor bearing on his/her active being and his/her active effort.
The searching out the con-crete for the relevant factors and functioning
is an activity which, first and foremost, is dependent on the inquirer’s
own being and development humanly and on his/her cognizance of
activity and life in the wholeness open to each of us only in our own
person. Now as I just suggested, inadequacy in the inquirer’s own
maturation humanly makes for a standpoint out of which inquiry takes
place that is itself inadequate and a searching out, discovering and interpreting, which is undertaken with essential capacities that are defective
in some-to-good measure. Not only that, but because we live life in the
temporal fashion that is ours as human, in an advancing which even at
its best brings life-as-temporally-whole into express visibility at earliest
in youth and brings a fully mature perspective on life-whole even later,
we are not in a position to pursue the more fundamental sides of
psychology with an eye on the phenomenon whole until well along in
our lives. In this and a number of other regards, the demands on the
inquirer in psychology-- and in some measure, in all of the anthropic
studies-- are much more like those on the philosopher than those on the
(natural) scientist.
Actually, the situation is more difficult even than so far suggested. It
is part of the inadequacy in our development that (for example) we do
not simply fail at times in our venturing but, in virtue of the way we learn
and mislearn, we come to resist acknowledgment of failing and live in
denial. This is one of the numerous ways in which, inwardly, we work
against ourselves and what we genuinely need if we are to mature
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humanly, and countering or unlearning those ways is an integral part of
our being human which we must learn. Given the need to find some
standpoint in which we are not at the mercy of our own failings, it is
tempting, especially with the example of the paradigm which (natural)
science offers for responsible inquiry, to seek indirect routes to
understanding this matter of being human. And indeed, this seems all
the more plausible because what we would understand in understanding
ourselves is human life whole, and that means (among other things) as a
“psychosomatic” affair (using that term as a convenient but rough
indicator). Since the bodily side of ourselves is a part of the face of active
beings which has a distinctive organic character, it is subject to objective
scrutiny scientifically and if we could just know the connection of what
is discernible there with the inward, we might think we could understand
ourselves in this circuitous fashion. But in fact physiology, and such
things as brain-scans and disruptions of chemical processes in the brain,
while detecting or attesting things the knowledge of which contributes
something to our understanding of our own life whole, do not themselves
take us to the essential but rather offer opportunities for strengthening
our denial, made all the more difficult to resist because of the apparently
credible garb of science which the discernment of ‘facts’ wears. The
interior, however, is simply not the inward, nor is the unity of the
spatially diverse sides of ourselves and the functioning of a spatiallyunified agent anything but a preeminent problem, not something which
can be treated as ‘solved’ by the simple declaration that thinking and
feeling are nothing more than brain-functions. Whatever the spatiallydifferentiated reality is that is being thought in this muddled way, it can
not be that of such reductionism, or more broadly, any ‘reality’ that
denies the reality of obligation, since all thinking that claims truth would
be impossible but for the reality of obligation. Thus the claim that
thinking is simply a brain-function undermines itself in the mind of any
intellectually conscientious judge.
This matter of denial is only one aspect of a larger complex of difficulties emerging because of the absolutely crucial way the inquirer’s
own being is precondition for apt psychological inquiry. Because our
activity is ever formed in the ongoing-now under the availability and
pressure of (for the point here) our personal past, to fully fathom the
human we need a standpoint, and a way of inquiring at-and-from that
standpoint, which is fully mature, one in which our inquiring is free of
distorting pressures and is self-aware and self-critical, so that inquiry is
not unconsciously and inadvertently steered, confined, slanted, and
thereby undermined as a responsible endeavor. The importance of such
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freedom is extreme, given that the inquiry does not concern something
‘objective’ nor involve ‘objective’ evidence that could serve as counter
to the bias that can enter into the inquirer’s address to matters.
Is it possible that a different sort of counter is feasible here? Science
knows an important place for intersubjectivity and collaboration in
observation, experiment, hypothesizing, and the various other activities
that are part of scientific inquiry; is there a comparable possibility of
working together and of inquirers helping each other to understand in
anthropic studies, including in psychology? It would seem in principle
to be so, but the grounds for such cooperation being actually fruitful are
rather different in the two cases, given that the standpoint for successful
individual inquiry is different in each. Within its field of study (human
life) the aim in psychology is an understanding of the nature of the
human agent and in particular of the concrete actualization of the inward
side of that agent (the “psyche” of a “psychosomatic” being). That
nature, and that actualization, are discernible only in the con-crete, and
with the con-crete there enter particularities which, while integral (as
conditions, as influences, as incorporated meanings) to the actualization,
are not themselves inherent in the essence. But they have a role in
introducing into the actualization differences which make a difference
but which must be distinguished from the essential, and from human
nature itself. Moreover, to human nature belongs meant-to-be’s for the
development of the essential (our initiative-capacity, the medium of our
maturation humanly), which are not discernible or ’evident’ like
‘empirical fact’ but the agent’s responsiveness to which is crucial to
his/her evolution. These are particularly central since the human in its
essence is an affair of growth and maturation. Here, the concrete particularities of circumstance-and-self may favor actualization that is
adequate to the meant-to-be’s, or may obstruct such actualization, or may
be indifferent, and this, differently for different individuals and at
different times of life. Disentangling matters here is an extremely complex task and one requiring considerable sensitivity and judgment.
Finally, there is the difference in character and functioning of factors
according as they operate consciously or unconsciously or
subconsciously or in peripheral consciousness: that is, there is much
within the agent which is not readily accessible to his/her conscious
perception and thought. In searching out and sorting out all such
‘psychological’ things, the sensitivity and experience of the inquirer and
the disclosive and maturational matrix in him/her are crucial for skilled
inquiry; moreover, the complexity of the concrete and the need for
appropriate weighing of factors of particularity that are likely to far
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outreach what any one inquirer might have first-hand experience of make
the task difficult for any single inquirer. Thus where there are other
inquirers with other and diverse experience and skills and judgment, and
co-operation is possible, that would indeed be helpful. But to be helpful
in a fruitful way, each of the co-operating parties must be apt and
responsible inquirers in their own right and also have the relevant
elements in their own experience, the appropriate self-critical approach
to their understanding, and capacities adequate for communication about
the matters in question. Then their differences and their kinship as
inquirers can enable their co-operation to be fruitful in advancing the
understanding of all concerned.
b. ‘Psychology’ and philosophy
In the opening of this chapter, we spoke at some length about the
human, and more narrowly, about the living individual human being. But
the discussion there, while concerning matters that fall within the field
which psychology explores, was not the fruit of that study. Rather, it
emerged from philosophical inquiry. What, then, is the connection between the two disciplines?
In the introduction to this work, we spoke of practical reflection-- not
practical thought, which is concerned with a particular action or situation
in which action is being undertaken and is part of the decision-making
process for that, but practical reflection, such practical thinking as
emerges first with the discovery of our own lives as our own and takes
shape in the assumption of responsibility for that life. Such re-flection,
practical and also part of the decision-making process but putting activity
into the perspective of life and its meaning instead of simply focusing on
the particular action or series of actions at hand, is an individual’s own
thinking regarding his/her own life and how he/she ought to live it, what
is at-stake and important in it, and the like; and while as re-flection it is
centered back in the standpoint of agent, it involves the agent assuming
that standpoint as an individual taking responsibility for his/her
individual being and life and being thoughtful concerning his/her activeengaging as life-actualizing and life-whole-bearing in its meaning. Such
reflection, interpreting the at-stake (good) in the individual’s life and
taking it as something to be achieved in and through activity, would serve
in decision-making (practical deliberation and deciding) and in activity
as a larger and reinforcing horizon for the practical thinking (deliberation)
concerning what is to be achieved in particular action; and this practical
reference to the inquirer’s own life is defining (and limiting) for the effort
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to understand. As in this way having a place in an adult human being’s
ongoing answering to the problematic of existence, practical re-flection
is meant to help the individual help secure, in his/her circumstances, the
ultimate con-crete ‘good’ in the form of the ‘practically best possible
given the match of capacity and conditions’; such reflection is not aimed
at truth for its own sake, but at the best insight available to the person
and acceptable to the agent at the time (and it is a test of the person, in
what spirit he/she ‘accepts’ such an understanding as sufficient as regards
truth, given the circumstances). This best or most acceptable
understanding is to re-assure and strengthen the individual’s orientation
of his/her engagement with things, making it square with his/her own
being responsible for his/her own life
In contrast, while philosophical reflection shares with practical reflection its emerging as possibility with the discovery by an individual
of his/her own life as ‘one’s own’ and with the taking responsibility for
that life, it is not oriented to decision-making but simply toward
understanding the problematic of existence which defines the condition
of all active-beings, human included, and thus, toward understanding
(among other things) the human in its being caught up in this problematic
and through its decision-making living and acting responsively to the atstake in such existence.
In the pursuit of such inquiry, the
philosophically re-flective inquirer assumes the standpoint of the human
agent participating in an interactive existence, as in the case of practical
reflection, but assumes it in this case simply as a human being taking
responsibility for a human life and being, not as an individual taking
responsibility for an individual life and being. The matter to be
understood in such reflection is the ultimate problematic which defines
the activity-situation of any and every (human) being, not just of some
individual in certain particular circumstances, and which calls in every
case for activity as vehicle intended in the nature of things to help secure
an at-stake defined by that problematic. The understanding to be
achieved is one having a valid claim universally upon human beings, one
utilizing human capacities effectively and apprehending the truth concerning the human condition and meaning in human life, and that
includes the preconditions to human existence. And finally, philosophical reflection seeks simply truth, and while its issue in insight could
be drawn upon in decision-making, it is not in its own nature a part of
decision-making nor undertaken to provide something which is a part of
that. To the extent that it becomes practical in its results, it is as in its
universal claims supporting the ideas of practical reflection which
interpret in determinate individual-relative fashion the at-stake in life and
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activity, which determinate life-referent ideas in turn support the
practical thinking by which the agent is guided in his/her participation in
life and activity in some particular circumstance. ix
Both forms of re-flection are different from the thinking which is
central to anthropic studies, including psychology. For, to begin with,
anthropic studies generally, and psychology as part of these, address a
determinate field (the human) as to be inquired into, explored, and understood; neither form of re-flection, practical or philosophical, is defined
by reference to a determinate field. It is true, this field of anthropic
studies-- the human-- holds an agency which not only is entered into the
problematic of existence but in virtue of its essential responsive
capacities is also active in ongoing response to the at-stake harbored in
that problematic. But the focus of psychology is not on the problematic
itself, but on human nature and the ‘how’ and ‘how healthy’ of its
functioning under conditions and in this problematic situation. This field
is complex, and its exploration is a complicated affair due not simply to
the complexity of the field but to the demands upon the inquirer relating
to such access to that field as involves an unbiased and undistorted
openness to the genuine complexity. In this regard, psychological
inquiry and philosophical inquiry share a common standpoint to this
extent, that inquiry is undertaken as the endeavor of a responsible adult
human being taking the standpoint of a human agent and seeking truth-in the one case, concerning matters in its field, in the other, concerning
the problematic of existence itself--, without that seeking having a
practical context and meaning.
While it is not the task of the psychological inquirer to pursue reflection on the problematic of existence, the field of psychology (the
human) is not simply inherently involved in the problematic of existence
but in its essence also responsively opens out to that problematic. Given
this focus, in his/her inquiry there will have to be some interpretation of
the at-stake which lies at the heart of that problematic, made as part of
the conceptualizing that seeks to define, as a horizon of intelligibility for
the sake of more focused inquiry, the bounds of the psychological field.
That conceptual interpretation would best derive from re-flection or a reflective source, but historically speaking that has not been what has
happened. Quite to the contrary, the pressure of the (natural) sciences as
paradigm for responsible inquiry has led in modern times to a development of psychology that not only has sought to emulate the approach
of such sciences to their field in its approach to its own field but has
drawn its own conceptual framework, implicitly if not explicitly, from
an overview of ‘nature’ and then ‘life as an evolutionary phenomenon’
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formed as the natural sciences and biological studies were developing
their notions of the (inorganic and organic) face of things. But this
simply meant compounding the obliviousness at the root of the limited
abstracted notions of time and space utilized in defining the ‘nature’ of
the natural sciences and the obliviousness of the biological focus on the
organic as if that were life whole, with the deeper obliviousness to the
full meaning and implications of the reflexive character of inquiry into
the human by a human being. The result has been progress, advances,
but encased in inadequate theoretical frameworks that confine and distort
what might well be or become genuine insight but is not allowed to
flower as such.
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NOTES

i

It is worth noting that the Platonic Socrates, in the Phaedo, speaks of the
various ‘homes’ or ‘dwelling-places’ of the soul, and of her own proper knowledge (literally, oikeios: of the house/household/home, what is one’s own) as
being acquired in her own proper dwelling-place. Cf. Loving and Dying, 74-76.
Another connected but slightly different use of the notion of “home” is to be
found in Homer’s Odyssey. These two, the Platonic and the Homeric, are well
worth thinking together, and also in connection with the sense of finding
ourselves at home in the meaning I am giving to the phrase.
ii
I speak of this also in Loving and Dying, Second Coda, 237-243.
iii

The discussion in this and the next two sections (3-5) of this chapter will
be incomplete in a number of regards, but especially in that it disregards (postponing this for discussion in Chapter 4) the presence and working of an inte-

gral element in the phenomena being considered, namely, the social. We
are seeking in these sections to focus attention on human nature and its
native meant-to-be’s, although even here we are ignoring the communal
meant-to-be that is part of the matrix for the social. There is, however,
no realization of human nature and its meant-to-be’s without the social,
whose presence is rooted in human nature but requires of us human
constructs which are to function as inflecting our being and activity. That
enormously complicates consideration of the matters we are focusing on,
and any account which would do justice to human activity and human
development would have to make the presence and the role of the social
and social meanings an extremely important theme in the understanding
of the human. Chapter 4 will address the social, and Chapters 5-6 will
take into account some of the particularities of history, of individuals and
circumstances, and expanding the consideration of the human into the
con-crete, introduce a number of variations on the themes being
discussed in these sections.
iv

Nietzsche is especially helpful in this matter of our becoming, having made
it thematic from the start and reconceiving it as he himself developed and his
experience brought the matter home to him over and over in different ways. See
my study of Nietzsche’s thought in The Well of Eternity.
v
A reminder: Although individual human activity involves other human beings in many ways, and at bottom, involves the interdependent being of ourselves
as human beings, I am focusing discussion in these sections (see Note 3 above)
on the human in other regards and postponing discussion of (say) the communal
meant-to-be of human nature and the social until Chapter 4. Even so, I am proceeding here with what is coming in Chapter 4 in mind, and formulating what I
am saying about individual human activity within an implicit sense of things
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important aspects of which will only be expressed explicitly in Chapter 4.
vi

It might be helpful here if a reader would consider the discussion in my
The Well of Eternity (223-2280) on motivation and responsive decisionmaking as Nietzsche saw these.
vii

There is no assurance that we will develop and grow during this time. Indeed, it may be that our entry into this time is itself defective, the way we assume
responsibility for ourselves inadequate, so that we start in a way that works to
our disadvantage in that regard and we are be able to develop and grow during
this time only as circumstance, in one or another guise, calls into question our
inadequate assumption of responsibility and enables us to be recalled to ourselves
and to the potential we have been inadequately actualizing, so that we have
another chance. If our nature gives us time-- that of early adulthood-- to settle
into this matter of adult life, that time is not measured in months or years; it
represents a limited but indeterminate stretch sufficient (in principle, under
favorable conditions) for the evolution that needs to take place, but how quickly
that actually happens, and if it happens at all, depends on the interplay of
circumstance and the person’s own manner of taking part in affairs. I am
sketching out a meant-to-be implicit in human nature, one whose possible
inadequate con-crete realizations are innumerable; likewise, the variations in
pace and length of time before what is meant to happen can actually happen are
considerable, and yet there is a too slow and too quick, and a too long as well.
If, perchance, the allotted time passes and we have no sense along the way of
finding what is in keeping with the aspiration in us, we may well have had at
least the peripheral and fleeting-but-recurring sense along the way that
‘something is missing’, without this necessarily being traumatic; it is, however,
an intimation that (say) we are losing time and perhaps opportunity for finding
what we were meant to find. And when we come to that time in our life when
this preparatory phase is meant to culminate in the completion of our becominggrown-up, and we are not yet prepared, this latter may well register in us as a
kind of hollowness to our life, one which raises questions and calls us to a
reassessment concerning how we are living and ‘do we really want to live life
out in this fashion?’ For the completion-time is one which naturally calls forth
in us re-flection on life, as did youth, but this time from in a place well along in
the life we have assumed responsibility for. That assessing may amount to a
reaffirmation of how we are and have been living, of what has been happening
to us along the way; and a looking forward to a concentrated and effective
engagement in the task we are discovering now as ours in life; but almost always,
if not always, it discovers to us a measure of dissatisfaction, regret,
disappointment, and even such unhappiness as leads us to scapegoat, seek to shift
responsibility for our condition, and in one way or another to live in a state of
denial, at least as far as our own complicity is concerned. There are innumerable
ways of living in denial, including (say) insisting on an interpretation of what
can not be avoided recognition which gives it an acceptable face if one does not
look too closely.
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ix

In B.2.b, 101-103 above.

One might see my The Well of Eternity, 53-59, for more discussion

of the re-flective standpoint as an agential standpoint.

Chapter 4
The human, in the communal dimension
In Chapter 3, I spoke of my settling in Missoula in the mid-1970s, in
a growing urban area in western Montana, twenty-five miles or so from
the Rock Creek area that I had in the previous fifteen years found to be
a place where I seemed to belong. Settling in town was a kind of
compromise. The place itself was long familiar to me, it held friends I
had known for years, places where I shopped and resupplied for my stays
out on Rock Creek, and a University and department whose resources
and members would provide support and an intellectual atmosphere that
could be helpful for the undertaking that I looked forward to, that of
completing some of the seventeen or so book-manuscripts that I had been
accumulating but never finding time finally to finish. I would be free to
do that, and Barbara likewise, to engage seriously in the weaving that
she was beginning to feel was a calling that much appealed to her. Then,
there was the Blackfoot River off in one direction, and Rock Creek in
another, and the Bitterroot River in a third, and wilderness areas and
national forest areas in all directions: it would take more than a lifetime
to take advantage of the opportunities for outdoor activity afforded by
nature in the nearby region, to say nothing of the readily accessible
farther reaches of Montana and Idaho. For a few years, at least, we could
occupy ourselves in our individual ventures with enough time and money
on hand to make them possible as full-time affairs, and see how things

worked out.
I did not realize it at the time, but even as we were making the move,
the beginnings of something else was taking place: the formation of a
neighborhood association was underway as we moved in, led by Bruce
Bugbee, Henry’s son and my new neighbor. This ‘something else’ resonated in me, and the appeal of activity in a direction that I had never
before been drawn to, that of civic concern, soon broadened. Missoula
itself was changing, with a considerable housing boom, and the
integration of the urban and the natural in the setting of the town-something that had so struck me when I had first seen it in the mid-1950s- was becoming threatened by less than sensitive development up the
hillsides visible from the center of town, back into the Rattlesnake valley
in encroachment on the town’s watershed and proposed wilderness-andrecreation area, and along the rivers. Indeed, in all directions housing
and strip commercial development was radiating quickly without the
kind of thoughtfulness about the whole that seemed to me called for.
I had, of course, done my undergraduate and graduate studies in
larger urban areas, and had taught for twenty years in a relatively small
town whose population scarcely exceeded the University student
population. Living in town, and finding that relatively congenial, was
nothing new. But my sense of things, strongly formed by farm life as I
had grown up, had been advanced much farther by exploration in nature
and particularly by the summers and years-off spent on Rock Creek, than
by urban life. Only teaching seemed an exception. I soon found myself
wondering how far the sense of connection, which I had found in
teaching but mainly with nature and as mediated by activities (work,
fishing, hiking, and the like) which connected me mainly with natural
places, could be realized more broadly in communal human activity and
relations in an increasingly urban setting. It turned out to be eighteen
years of active community involvement in a variety of directions that I
was entering upon, getting to know the community from a variety of
perspectives and to talk and act with community members from a variety
of walks of life. Missoula proved to be a remarkable community not
simply for its location and setting, but for the active involvement of its
citizenry in community affairs. Long ago a gathering place for Native
American tribes at the confluence of the rivers, with the white man’s
appearance (at first, mostly in the form of missionaries and traders) and
especially with the building of rail lines that expanded its connection
with the larger and growing American world to the east, Missoula
became a series of things but, at the time I came to take up residence
there, it was beginning to leave behind its timber-mill pulp-mill phase
and at the same time it harbored a university that was growing large
enough to have a significant place in the community without dominating

it, as Penn State had dominated State College. Increasingly a regional
medical and retail commercial center, Missoula was in the midst of a
burst of commercial and residential development, with numerous
problems that the community needed to face and resolve if its growth
was to provide a livable setting for an increasing number of persons with
a wide range of experience and interests.
As might be expected, the experience of taking part was mixed, especially as what I sought in the variety of areas in which I was active
(neighborhood, open space, historical district, urban expansion) was to
voice a feeling for the whole as a distinctive and complex place and a
concern to think about the implications of what we were doing and
becoming for a long-range (fifty to a hundred years, say) future.
Planning ahead, and community involvement in that planning so that
officials would have a relatively informed and concerned citizen body as
context and support for their exercise of leadership and management in
their areas of community decision-making, were important to me, whether in virtue of the philosopher in me or simply in reflection of my own
particular nature (that being part of what made the philosophical concern
with the comprehensive and encompassing congenial to me). The
complexity of the human interaction, the variety of the perspectives and
values encountered, was instructive and challenging, as was the
opportunity to see close-up the way others took part in affairs in which
the community good was at stake. But perhaps because I had known two
homes growing up, one rural and peopled by relatively uneducated
persons, the other urban and much more sophisticated and educated, and
had felt myself at home in both places, I found myself drawn into a
leadership role as an activist citizen, with a special concern to urge
inclusiveness (of people and perspectives) and respect for differences,
and at the same time to recognize the limited claims of any single
perspective and the need for adaptation of proposed change so as not
simply to enrich the larger context but also to strengthen and to expand
what was already present and alive in its own way in the immediately
affected area.
Life in Missoula drew out a side of me that had remained relatively
undeveloped up to then, but in the end life there was something I needed
to move beyond. It was something, however, that contributes much to
the thought which follows, not simply in this chapter but in Part II of this
work.
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A. The communal meant-to-be
In the three preceding chapters, we have seen that the structure of
being involves a creational dynamic in virtue of which the activity of
time-and-space-enabled active-beings participating in an interactiveexistence is meant to be the vehicle for securing the at-stake which is the
consummation of creation. But how the different active-beings take part
is different in different cases in this sense, that as activity itself involves
different initiative powers as well as different particular capacities that
can be brought into play, so the sort of role that the active-being can-and is meant to-- play in helping such consummation to come to pass
will differ.
We have seen that, in the human case, the distinctively human initiative-capacity is a responsive one, and one meant to evolve under a maturational meant-to-be. As regards the sort of initiative in question, the
creational meant-to-be and those meant-to-be’s (including the maturational) that are implicit in human nature as essential elements within it
are such as come to register (inwardly and immediately) in the forming
and carrying out of activity, and this, in accordance with their structural
status and linkage: the creational meant-to-be that determines the
ultimately at-stake registers as claiming our initiative (and eventually,
claiming clearly and differentiatedly in the mode of obligation), and the
human nature meant-to-be’s (for example, the maturational that means
the evolution of our initiative capacity itself) register as bearing in
appellative or soliciting fashion upon such actual responsive initiativecapacity as we have at the time, so that the activity being undertaken,
and the securing and realization of the meant-to-be in both dimensions
(creational and maturational), importantly depends (so far as it depends
on us) upon how and how well we hear and heed the meant-to-be’s and
how we interpret and act on their claiming and appellative soliciting.
Thus in a fairly straightforward sense, it is part of our being as human
beings that out of ourselves we bring ourselves over time to such realization of our own initiative capacity as an evolving affair as we do-- not,
however, without this bringing being under conditions, and not without
failure of a number of different sorts. Nonetheless, that evolving necessarily depends on our effort and on a sufficiency of that effort (with the
capacity we have at the time) to enable the evolution to take actual shape.
We can not, indeed, deliberately make it happen, yet it does not happen
without our making an effort responsive to the ultimate at-stake and to
the appellative presence of the meant-to-be’s of our own nature. In all
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this, the unfolding is something meant-to-be, the medium for the
accomplishing of that unfolding is active effort which is responsive to
the at-stake and to the activity-prompting-and-soliciting presence of the
human-nature meant-to-be’s, and the unfolding takes place to the extent- and with the measure of adequacy-- that the responsive-activity, under
the conditions it is operating under, is able to take and sustain the shape
which is suited to bring the potential in the agent to be an actuality that
accords with the meant-to-be. All of this whereby we be-come ourselves
humanly-- that is, make actual in us what was at the start the potential
human being in us, make it our own in actuality-- takes place inwardly
to ourselves-as-agents and (so far as our nature, in the cited meant-to-be
side of itself, is concerned) in inward interplay.
Now included in our human nature is another meant-to-be, the communal meant-to-be, which also relates to us (first and foremost) in our
initiative-capacity (what makes us distinctively human agents). In that
capacity we are meant to connect with other human beings in ways essential to our own being as human, and in particular, to our own maturation
as human. In virtue of this meant-to-be, we are not only naturally drawn
(‘like to like’) to other human beings from the very start, out of a felt
affinity (gregariousness), but given that this feeling forms a matrix which
mutually disposes human beings initially toward each other as human,
we are thereby prompted and supported in achieving what is an
indispensable inter-personal connecting out of our essential capacity.
The interplay of human beings which is being fostered in this way is
meant to be the primordial medium for the developing and exercising, in
the diverse human beings in question, of the distinctively human
(essential, but also particular) capacities in those individuals, capacities
which require other human beings for their adequate development. In
outward terms, we human beings know a lengthy infancy-and-childhood
period of dependence in many regards, the most obvious being a physical
dependence on conditions and in particular on other human beings if we
are even to continue to exist. But this lengthy period of outward-related
dependence is congruent with the lengthy time needed for our inward
development; we need help from others who are older and (eventually)
from those older persons who are self-responsible and relatively
independent as human beings, if we are (say) to develop our own
particular capacities and to become (among other things) members of the
society into which we were born. Such inward development requires
active-effort on our part as an indispensable factor for its taking place;
but it also depends on active support from others, helping us each evolve
out of ourselves by teaching, encouraging, reassuring, helping us gain
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confidence, providing opportunities and occasions, helping us use those
opportunities and occasions, etc. Not only that, but we need others to
join with us in joint endeavors or to meet with us in different endeavors
which benefit from their intersection, if we are to develop various capacities which can not be developed in any other way (for co-operative
action, say, or for competitive effort). There are many things possible to
us in principle which we cannot do without others as participants in some
fashion or other.
Now this communal meant-to-be relates us, in meaning, to any and
all human beings. It is, however, always realized con-cretely, in a
proximal inter-personal fashion, between a limited number of individual
human beings who, in virtue of circumstantial opportunities and
prompted by selective affinities, are drawn together and form groupings,
such as family units, which represent circumscribed and particular realizations of the human-to-human connection in which the universal reference of the meaning is being achieved locally. In the con-crete interpersonal connecting involved, we learn to associate with each other, that
is, we learn to connect as human beings, but do this in ways that are
facilitated by particular social meanings which we learn and,
assimilating, make our own, each in our own way, through the
functioning of our own capacities and initiative. Central here is language,
but just as important, and perhaps overall, even more important, are
patterns of behavior, attitudes, values and norms, holding the status of
social dictates. Eventually, as groups grow larger and more complex, we
also find institutional structures for a broader social life-together.
The communal meant-to-be, locally realized in limited groups and
with the facilitation of social meanings of various sorts, does not intend
simple association however, but rather a more fundamental connecting
of human being with human being. At its fullest, the intended connecting
is that of a mutual center-to-center connecting which, while assisted by
social meanings and the association they facilitate, is formed out of our
essential initiative-capacity as an evolving affair; thus the connecting, at
its fullest, depends on a maturation of the individuals in question into the
fulness of human responsibility as persons and human agents and
involves in that fulness an enacting and mutually recognizing of their
inter-dependence as fully mature human beings. Along the way of the
inward evolution of the participants in question, is the development of
an agency whose particularity-- and especially, whose particular
capacities-- operate in the con-crete connecting as integral but contingent
factors enabling it to be and have the character it does. As assisting all
along the way also are the various forms of association, from the

167

Chapter 4. The human, in the communal dimension

encompassing society down to (say) the family and various forms of
limited personal association; these all integrate, and build on under one
interpretation or another, the differentiations of the human such as age
(the older and younger) and sex (the male and female), as well as those
which mark the diversity of particular capacities and aptitudes, of forms
of activity, of needs, from person to person. In all cases, the forms of
association and their formative social meanings have, humanly, the
function of facilitating the development and actualization of the various
facets of our human being and of assisting in the achievement of a
connecting which, while inflected by social meanings, is more than social, more than a mere associating. And specifically, central to the forms
of association whose meaning is to assist the growth and maturation of
individual human beings in a comprehensive way is the differentiation
within the social between the family and the society at large, and in terms
of the function of the social generally, the difference between the conventional or society-embodying and the spiritual or society-transcending.
In short: we are, by our human nature, not simply meant to evolve in
our essential capacity (mature humanly) but to connect with each other
out of the community and inter-dependence of our nature, connecting
primordially in a con-crete way according to a meant-to-be that concerns
us first and foremost in our essential-capacity and that in meaning relates
us universally to all other human beings. The realization of this side of
our humanity (that of our interdependence humanly) interweaves with
the maturational so that in our humanity we are as be-coming ourselves
in a way that is meant to make us social-political-economic beings who
are ‘more’ than that, are fully responsible human beings, spiritual and
civilized.
Taking the preceding as a preliminary sketch, let us now expand our
view of the human in this regard, by considering more fully this matter
of social meanings, association and socialization, and social institutions,
and connecting this matter with the other side of the human which we
considered in Chapter 3, that of individual maturation.
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Our human nature is so constituted as to depend, for its full actualization, upon the mutually supportive interplay of two things: our
enacting our essential initiative capacity in such way as enables it to
evolve in adequate fashion under the maturational meant-to-be, and our
interacting with other human beings in such way as enables us, as we
develop with their help in our essential capacity and in our particular
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capacities and as we come to live-and-act as adult human beings, to
connect with each other in adequate fashion under the communal meantto-be. The interplay involved is brought to con-creteness in our
initiative-engendered participation in the interactive-activity of
existence. i But if our common nature as human beings is so constituted
as to require of us a con-crete mutually-affirmative and mutuallysupportive connecting in order to come to full realization in ourselves
individually and to make our human being fully our own in actuality, the
space-and-time-conditioned existence and active being of ours means
that the medium of interacting, because of the finitude introduced by
space-and-time, does not directly involve all human beings as the human
beings with whom we con-cretely interact. The congruent human
presence from beyond ourselves that supportively complements our own
effort-making and whose complementary working is required for the
adequate evolution out of ourselves of what is essential to ourselves humanly is provided by some among human beings, concurrent and nearby
and able directly to interact with us. We are entered con-cretely, then,
into an inherently limited situation, and, starting from the con-crete
character of the initial situation we find ourselves in at birth, we are
meant eventually, as that initial situation and its components change and
we continue being active in other (but always limited) situations, to become capable of living-and-acting as self-responsible human beings able
to connect center-to-center with any and all human beings that we
encounter in the different situations of life and to realize in con-crete
fashion with whatever others are participant in the situation the essential
inter-dependence of our existence as human beings.
As ingredient in our nature initially disposing us toward each other
we have a felt affinity for humans whereby we are by nature instinctively
drawn to other human beings: we are naturally gregarious. But coming
together as human beings involves mediating factors which are the work
of human creativity. As instrumental for effecting the connection with
other human beings that we are disposed to by our nature and that would
accord with our human nature’s dual meant-to-be (of maturation and of
community) in con-crete fashion, human beings have the capacity to
form and respond to social meanings, to human creations with agreed-on
meaning and accepted social-group standing which serve as facilitating
factors, first of all, for our interacting as a participating in a group of
associating human beings, but more fundamentally, for our participation
in the mutual connecting of diverse human beings out of ourselves and
our shared human nature in which we are becoming ourselves humanly
and sharing in the work of helping creation achieve consummation. Such
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social meanings, con-ventional in character, are a shared reference-point
and bridge facilitating our coming-together (con-venio) as human beings,
that is, facilitating the actual linking of human-with-human in
distinctively human fashion that realizes con-cretely the dual meant-tobe of human nature.
The meanings which have standing as social meanings and have a
facilitating function are interpretative in nature, embodying an interpretation that ranges over all that pertains to the present human condition of
the group, over all that is actually becoming registered in the immediacy
of their experience of life in the conditions they find themselves under,
but with an interpretation that reads all this in the light of an
interpretation of the ultimately-at-stake (what is good and bad, what
gives meaning to human life). Thus the group, as an ongoing society, is
composed of human beings who are each and all engaged in an answering to the problematic of existence which, within the society and by each
as member of the society, is being ventured under a distinct collectivelyheld reading of that problematic as it bears on human beings. The
various social meanings thus include an understanding of this matter of
being human (thus, of the maturational and communal meant-to-be’s of
human nature), and with this, of the various inescapable particular facets
of a human existence: the need to provide for ourselves (food, water,
shelter, protection from the elements and other beings, human and nonhuman), for example, and the sexual differentiation among humans and
thus reproduction and the family and the extended period of initial
dependency; they also include the significant features of circumstance
and the conditions of the group’s existence and life, including nonhuman
powers but also humans with alien (or at least different) ways. The
interpretation of these matters in the light of a reading of the at-stake of
existence grounds a way of life-together which is articulated by way of
values (including social morality), roles, structures, and mores (customs),
that embody and are shaped by these meanings. This way of life-together
defines the association of group members as members of this society who,
in their living together, are (a) disposed by that way to connect with each
other in a fashion that gives a place to each other and each other’s activity
as all belonging in the associating group, and who (b) seek in that
connecting to make something of life in the concrete circumstance of
their existence, this ‘make something’ being understood by way of the
social interpretation of the at-stake of existence.
The facilitating function of social meanings is a complex affair. Such
meanings are learned by each member of the society, and this, initially
in an assimilation and incorporation of them from without. For that to

Commented [4]: [[NOTE 3]] [[also NOTE 4]]

Commented [5]: [[NOTE 3]]

170

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

occur, the assimilating party must make the significance of such
meanings his/her own, and that requires a personal interpretation of the
social meaning in question. Thus social meanings, even as they have a
social standing as entered into the interplay of human beings and making
of it an associating, are recognized by the various parties as such only in
and through their own personal readings of them, which may well differ
somewhat, even in important ways and to significant degrees, although
to facilitate effectively the differing personal readings must have not
simply a common reference but a relatively close reading of the meaning
of the meanings. Despite differences in personal readings, the social
meanings as social provide a frame of reference to the interacting parties
for grasping the meaning of the activity of each other; and insofar as their
assimilation, given that the meanings are interpretations which reflect
and embody the social reading of the at-stake of existence and thus of
what claims human decision-making and -executing, enters those
meanings into the assimilating party as embodying social dictates (how
we ought to act and live and regard this-or-that as ...), they also provide
a basis for public expectations-- that as a member of this society, a person
will act in such-and-such a way, or that his/her action in such-and-such
a way has this-or-that meaning and calls for this-or-that kind of response.
More importantly, as assimilated normative dictates which via the
interpretation that is involved in them bring the ‘ought’ of the at-stake to
bear inwardly on the formation of the person’s participation in interaction, they function as a shaping force which, as functional for-andwithin the con-crete inter-connecting of human-center-to-human-center,
helps the interacting parties realize the dual meant-to-be of their nature.
Even so, indispensable as they are, social meanings are only one factor- one meant by their nature to be a facilitating and helping factor-- inand-for the formation of the con-crete connecting of diverse selves; that
connecting, however, not only involves more than social meanings but it
is also meant to go beyond a mere associating and to involve an effective
coming together of the diverse parties out of their very own personal
selves-and-centers. Ultimately such facilitating, and the entry of diverse
human beings within a group into an associating with each other and into
acceptance within the society as a member of it, has its meaning beyond
itself, in helping humans in their nature to reach to a fulness of that nature
in which they can (and are meant to) function beyond confinement by
any social terms, to interact in an inter-personal and communal way-- or
indeed in an inter-creaturely way with all beings-- that is more-andbeyond social terms and their interpretative rendering of life and life’s
meaning.
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Then too, there is this, that while belonging in a society involves
incorporating into one’s own person such meanings, the assimilation involved may vary not simply in virtue of the personal interpreting that is
required, but also because an individual may partially resist (say) a
certain dictate involved, or accept it only as modified, or ... reject it
altogether, so that while incorporating and accepting some segments of
the concatenation of meanings, he/she rejects others (while recognizing
them and being aware of their effective acceptance by others) and
becomes deviant in some regards. Thus while social meanings, as
assimilated-within, are meant to facilitate in a supportive way a livingand-acting (thence a growing) that is normatively- and valuatively- and
group-acceptable, in actuality a society holds members who have indeed
accepted such meanings and who act on them habitually (their disposition to this-or-that being enacted without thought) but also-- and
perhaps all members in some measure represent this ‘also’-- those who
reject or reinterpret in personally idiosyncratic ways the social meanings
meant to be operative in members of the society. As a result, in actual
society-mediated interaction the living-together that is meant to embody
the social meanings and give rise to a certain orderliness and regularity
does not always involve interaction which is according to the norms, but
often one marked in some degree by deviant behavior and attitudes (the
extreme of which is regarded as criminal), which are likely to have their
own sort of characteristic and typical contrasting character and to enter
their own characteristic and typical disorder into life-together. Since in
any case the social meanings that are operative only form a relatively
coherent system but one in which conflicting values-- and institutions
which embody those values-- are likely to be present as well, even the
orderliness which those meanings would institute when not simply
incorporated but unqualifiedly accepted by members is one likely to have
inherent tensions and conflicts expressed within it, and with these a
characteristic disorder of sorts, and perhaps also characteristic ways of
lessening or adjudicating these tensions and conflicts. In short, participation by members in the interactivity within a society involves not
simply enactment of the norms and expectations based on those norms,
but also the expectation that what one actually will encounter probably
will diverge from the norm-- although, with experience, one can perhaps
recognize forms of such divergence that are a common enough part of
ordinary life to themselves form a pattern that can be anticipated.
There are two aspects of the facilitative functioning of social
meanings worth more extended attention. One is the usual way in which
such meanings become entered into the being of every member of society,
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in the process of socialization by which the young and undeveloped are
accepted into the group as they learn and develop. The second is their
role in giving shape to the institutions which compose the functioning of
the society as an organized whole, and which, depending on how
developed the human condition is in the case of the group in question,
have differing range and complexity as well as different relations to one
another and different importance and priority in the common life of the
members of a society.
a. Socialization and growing up
A human society is a group of human beings who, in their interactiveinterplay as particular individuals, ii are facilitated in their connecting
with each other by their having assimilated into themselves, and by their
continuing to participate in, an ongoing concatenation of social meanings,
one that is changing yet relatively stable and coherent. Among other
things, those meanings organize relations among the members, assign
differentiated roles, and thereby operate to create patterns of social
interaction characteristic of the group. Since that concatenation has force
in their interactive-interplay by way of each person’s interpretation of its
constituents as he/she assimilates the meanings and knows them as (for
the most part) dictates bearing inwardly on the responsive forming of
his/her effort and disposing him/her to this-or-that way of acting, those
human beings know themselves (so far forth) as society members
associating with each other, therefore as (to that extent) disposed toward
a shared perspective (values, goals, understanding) and as recognizable
by each other as carrying out various of the diverse roles appropriate for
members of the group.
Such a concatenation, carried and maintained in the interplay of concurrent individuals, endures beyond the lives of the individuals
composing the group at any time by being transmitted to new members
(usually the offspring of the current members) who are being
incorporated into the group in the course of time. As regards the young,
this incorporation-- this handing on into new hands (traditio) the
traditional ways-- takes place as a process of socialization. [There is a
somewhat different process of acculturation for persons of another
society being entered into that of the group.] The enduring of the
concatenation depends ultimately on the ‘how’ of this assimilation into
new individuals and on the degree and manner of the public reinforcement of those meanings by other members of the society. Leaving
aside changing conditions of life which force adaptation, with a new
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generation socialization may still mean some modification of meanings;
for tradition does not exclude change, even if it tends to mute it, to
conceal it under old dress, or in other ways not openly to acknowledge
it, but to give the stamp of continuity to past and present. And because
the concatenation, while forming a relatively coherent system, may also
be complex enough to harbor diverse emphases and tendencies, the new
generation may bring modification in many forms, including that simply
of a shift in emphasis that gives a somewhat different feel and coloring
to the whole without obvious discontinuity with the past.
What assimilation and continuity reflect is the crucial place of
learning in human being, including especially learning to be a human
being. We accomplish our essential learning-- that by which we be-come
as a human being, mature in our humanity-- in a way that enables us to
evolve out of ourselves and do so in phases. But the learning which is
crucial to this evolution of the initiative-capacity whereby we are by nature already human but as possessed of potential in that regard that needs
to be developed, involves more than the exercise of that capacity as we
actually have it at the time and self-learning from that; it involves support
and reassurance from others (love, affection, encouragement: being
active is a risky affair) and the active appropriation of something from
others as part of the way they are of aid to that evolution. Part of what
is appropriated is (elements in) the concatenation of social meanings,
which each makes his/her own, interpreting and re-shaping them as they
are ac-cepted into his-/herself and making them (in some fashion)
functional elements in his/her own evolving makeup. Learning to be a
human being always initially involves learning to be a human being
according to this society; not that the two are identical, but that as one
learns the former one’s society is encouraging one to learn it in the latter
form, however much one may reject this-- indeed, to be human, one may
always eventually have to reject the latter as a mere given that is to be
accepted.
(1) Socialization from birth on, and social dictates
As living and active human beings, we know a temporal finitude
which means that we were born and that we will die. According to the
way of nature, our birth means our having been engendered by other
living beings, and specifically, by the particularity of a sexual act
inwardly initiated by antecedently existing male-and-female human
beings. Once born, we find ourselves not only with parents whose sexual
productivity has led to our engendering and birth but also initially part
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of a family in its core form, that of male-and-female-source functioning
now as supportive matrix (as mother-and-father, not simply as sexually
productive) for a child entered into the early phase of the meant-to-be of
human be-coming, with its extended period of the dependence of the
new-born during the time of its growth (outward), development (outward
and inward), and maturation (inward). For if the life in us, as finite,
knows birth and death, and thus knows its own beginning as the emergent
issue of the antecedently alive acting in this sexually reproductive
manner, as human that life also knows a be-coming centered in the
humanity in ourselves, and the need for an immediate matrix of a sort
suited to be supportive to the early period of be-coming and its special
needs. In that way and to that extent, such a functioning of the
engendering parties as parents and of this small group as family answers
in initial and immediate fashion to what the interweaving of the two
meant-to-be’s of human nature calls for.
It is in the relatively impotent condition of the new-born that we
begin our essential learning, and other forms of learning as well. We
begin with capacities (including learning capacities) that are relatively
circumscribed, undeveloped, and able at first to function in only limited
directions and fashions. If it is exercise of our capacities, and learning,
that are necessary for our movement beyond the relative impotence of
the new-born and for the eventual realization of the potential as a human
being that is part of our endowment at the start, that movement is not
simply made under the impress of conditions and therefore in such way
that our actual humanity takes shape in a fashion which in some measure
reflects those conditions. It is made especially with the help of other
human beings, and first of all, of our immediate family, and this means,
among other things, with the help of the assimilation of a concatenation
of social meanings. For in the initial efforts of our infancy, our
participational reaching-out is responded to by our parents in ways that
are inflected by the social-meanings that they have assimilated and that
they will be (implicitly and explicitly) conveying in their interacting with
us and thereby introducing as terms to be registered-and-heeded in our
association in this family group. As carried by this parental activeoutreach, those meanings are an important element in the circumstance
of our being, the particular circumstance which we encounter and must
make something of; and in the interaction with our parents, we begin the
gradual assimilation of them, including the already-extant humanly-andartificially-created interpretation of this natural group itself (the family),
an interpretation which gives it a determinate significance which is
conventional and becomes traditional in the measure in which the parents
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succeed in handing this interpretation on to their offspring. For the
(nuclear) family is not simply a natural meant-to-be matrix group for the
young but a natural group being concretely actualized in every case
under this-or-that interpretation, in virtue of which that group is looked
at in the society as having this-or-that character-and-function but not
others.
A human being is distinguished by a responsive initiative capacity
which is meant to evolve and, all along the way of that evolving, to enter
us into a connecting human-with-human that involves (among other
things) social meanings as facilitating elements. Central to this capacity
is the power of attention (focusing, regarding and disregarding, attending
in different directions and ways at the same time, coordinating elements
of this complex attentiveness while leaving them different, and so on),
and with it, the power to draw on particular capacities and to
responsively attend to presence as it catches our attention and stimulates,
provokes, evokes, or touches, our initially trusting outreach into the
world. At first our responsive capacity is quite limited, including our
power to register and interpret; likewise with our capacity to do things,
to initiate activity in which our limited particular capacities are exercised,
to operate in a coordinated and purposive way. As we develop and enter
more of our potentiality into actuality, we become more complex in
further ways, not simply learning the concentration needed for doing
this-or-that but also expanding our capacity for multi-tasking as well as
developing unconscious levels on which we operate at the same time as
our conscious attention is working on its own track. In the development
of ourselves taking place in our interacting with other human beings,
indeed with the multiple facets of our circumstance, we are not simply
actualizing the potential already present in ourselves but in the interpersonal connecting we know we are entering social meanings into
ourselves as our capacities allow them to register and be interpreted and
incorporated, and are thereby becoming ourselves in a way inflected by
those meanings.
It is a while in our early interacting with other human beings and our
assimilating of social meanings before we can begin the actual development of a capacity which crucially amplifies our connecting humanwith-human and augments the capacity we have for assimilating such
meanings. That capacity is the one of speech, the use of recognizable
sound to signify and communicate meanings. By means of it, we humans
articulate and communicate about (among other things) our agreed-on
values, the ways of living-together which express those values, and the
‘world’ which is the social-world of those who assimilate those values-
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and-ways and embody them (somehow) in their interacting with each
other.
It is likely, however, that the meanings that have the earliest and
greatest impact on the shape our development takes are those that make
for patterns of behavior (including customs and laws), gestures, attitudes
toward this-or-that, with their values and norms (their determination of
the acceptable vs. unacceptable, good/right bad/wrong, and their reading
of what is ultimately at-stake and why); for by interpretatively carrying
the claiming force of the at-stake, which already registers in us in the
immediacy of our experiencing, into our evolving initiative-capacity and
its employment of particular capacities, such meanings dispose us to act,
regard, feel, etc. in this-or-that way as the (socially) proper-and-right way,
and in our associating with other members of our society to grasp the
meaning of the variety of facets of our con-crete interactivity in this-way,
in accord with such meanings, with the significance they dictate. Thus a
human being, as he/ she evolves by nature inwardly, does so in such way
as is entering him/her into a place in an organized social life while at the
same time developing him/her inwardly in such way as enables a functioning in that life (his/her inward integration of developing capacities
and forces fits him/her for such a functioning). This inward development
is an actualizing of capacities in his/her own nature, but in no way the
only possible one.
The assimilation of social meanings in the process of socialization is
a complex affair, taking place within the encompassing inter-personal
dynamic of the child interacting with others, particularly with his/her
parents. In no case is this assimilation-- the process of socialization-- a
simple process of transference of such meanings whole and unchanged;
for meanings, by their very nature, require for their reception and
assimilation an intermediating receiving into ourselves, interpreting, and
accepting/rejecting/ pretending etc. that gives what has been assimilated
a rather different status in the assimilating-agent depending on the ‘how’- the mode of assimilation-- in question. To become a part of us, such
meanings require personal (re-)interpretation for their significance to be
made out by us and for us to respond and act on them in our activity. But
not only that: while such meanings may (under our own reading of their
meaning) become accepted into ourselves and become part of us and
acted on as ‘second nature’ (habitually, their disposition to this-or-that
being enacted without thought), they may also be partially resisted by us,
or modified in ways that twist their meaning beyond what is acceptable
to others, or they may simply not be accepted at all but carried only as
something we know but reject (meaning that socialization has here failed,
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or at least failed to be thoroughgoing). Whatever the success of
socialization, the ‘how’ of our assimilating is in turn reinforced--or
modified or rejected-- according as others (particularly, our parents)
respond to our apparent acceptance and conforming (or at times, nonconforming) behavior. What seems to us, given our capacities for
interpreting such as they are at the time, “acceptable” and such as ought
to be acceptable to others, may be opposed by them. In the response by
others to our assimilation, there is often tension and testing before
anything comes to be settled, and then, it is often settled only tentatively
and the tension reappears as the young person grows and gains capacity
and with it a stronger sense of his-/herself. In the degree to which the
assimilation fails and our development takes shapes which are not acceptable within the society, the evolving human being learns ways of
dealing with disapproval, punishment, and the like, based on the enforcement of social norms by others, making for a complex psychological development, much of it functioning then in an unconscious
fashion.
Basically, then, our assimilation of social meanings in the process of
socialization is variable in three important dimensions and ways.
First, limitations in our capacity to interpret what is being presented
and to grasp it in its intended significance mean that early on, even if we
can find what is presented to be in some fashion intelligible to ourselves,
we will later likely find that our initial reading changes as we become
more capable and discerning and more sensitive to different dimensions
of the situations-- those both of our original learning, and those of our
current being. In the case of the dictate type of meanings that foster a
certain pattern and/or attitude, during our childhood we find ourselves
confronted with these, but not simply as embodied in how others are
acting, rather also in the form of pressure upon us to embody them in
ourselves, or at least to act in accord with them. Such meanings in reality
are socially-established readings of the at-stake-as-claiming, which latter,
given our limited capacities at the time, registers in immediacy indeed,
but cannot yet register in us in differentiated fashion (as in the mode of
obligation) but only in undifferentiation from-- as refracted through-other factors, such as (for one) desire, or in this case, the pressure (in a
multitude of forms, from warnings and threats of punishment to rewards
and approval) coming from others (in particular, from those with some
sort of authority or capacity to intervene in our lives). Thus these appear
as dicta, ‘must be-or-do thus-and-so’, the dictates being backed up by
sanctions (positive and negative); presented to us as simply given and to
be accepted, we have, in our own immediate experience and current
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capacities, no way of finding first-hand a clue as to their proper grounds
and legitimacy, but at best we can receive a surrogate ‘explanation’ when
we balk or ask questions. I say surrogate, for the ‘explanation’ does not- and can not, given our limited responsive powers-- connect us in firsthand and intelligible fashion with the legitimizing source in nature-orcreation, but can only be a substitute for what alone could give any such
dictum genuine intelligibility and authority, namely, clear experience and
understanding of their legitimating ground: something beyond anyone’s
‘say so’ or ‘so you say’. Now this mode of working-- as dicta-- is one
that is meant eventually to be outgrown, but it is inescapable at the start
and up until the time of youth, however much it may provoke us to resist.
Second, assimilation usually takes place in an interactivity with
particular persons, and often with an inter-personal dynamic that significantly affects how we function in the interaction and thus how (in the
case of the pattern-and-attitude meanings) we make our personal reinterpretation, understand the meaning, and respond to the pressure to
accept-and-conform. For the learning which we are engaged in always
includes learning to be a human being, and how others are acting is
something we take in, even if it is not itself the focus of their or our
attention. Thus we interpret and respond differently when (say) we were
told by our parents we-should-do-such-and-such in one tone of voice, in
contrast with the same ‘should’ uttered differently. ‘He was angry, did
he really mean exactly what he said? or ...’.
Because of the
interpersonal dynamic and how we are able to fare in that, we may find
ourselves stuck in certain patterns of response, and become blocked off
from such growth of ourselves as would open the possibility of reinterpretation for us, or even the eventual possibility of finding the
claiming in a manner that differentiates it from dicta and that enables us
to form our own judgments about the appropriateness of what is being
conveyed in any dictum.
Third, as we grow our capacity to take in the pattern-and-attitude
dicta includes-- in addition to doing this under our own interpretation of
their significance-- the possibility of assessing whether what is being
dictated fits with our own being. And when this is so-- not ‘when it fits
or suits our ego’, but ‘when it resonates in keeping with the glimpses we
have of our very own being’, then what seems from the outside and social
point of view a ‘conforming’ with ‘social dictate’ in fact is something
rather different: not the introduction or production of ‘second nature’
(conforming-habit) in ourselves, but the discovery of how our own
nature can give meaning to social dictates and can be acted on without
contravening them, and may eventually become strong enough that we
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trust it even as-- and when-- it leads us to act contrary to such dictates.
That discovery, in childhood, is made in the qualitatively different
register in immediacy: like the immediacy I knew as an eight-year old
on the venture down to the river bottom-land, the excitement and magic
and the sense of ‘work’, in contrast with other enjoyments which did not
involve anything touching me very profoundly. In that time of childhood,
we make the social-meaning genuinely our own in the sense of breathe
our own spirit into it, in an interpretation and realization of it in which it
is beginning to accomplish one of its main functions, namely, to support
our evolution toward the responsible humanity that is ours in potentiality.
It is at the time when we are meant to outgrow our childhood that this
possibility of assessment comes into its own in its ultimate meaning.
In sum, then, so far: From the very beginning to the end, in our interacting with other human beings we are con-cretely realizing in some
fashion the communal meant-to-be of human nature which in meaning
connects all human beings in their essential nature as active-beings
initiating activity humanly and means for each of us a connecting,
possible and called for, with any other. But such connecting in every
case is not only marked by particularity (such things as our sexuality, our
temperament, our particular skills and aptitudes, on the one hand, and
places, persons, opportunities we happen upon, on the other hand) but,
in the operation of our initiative capacity and its responsive power, by
social-meanings. Such facilitating factors become ours through
assimilation, and this takes different forms not only in dependence on
our own capacities to interpret and our own ways of receiving (accepting,
rejecting, etc.) but also in dependence on our time of life and the
character of the capacities we have at that time for such assimilation.
The first phase of our life after birth, that of infancy and childhood,
involves us in the combination of physical growth, the initial
development of our initiative and particular capacities to the place of
some competence in ‘doing things’ (still child-things or things done by a
child in a child-way, as precursor of adult doing), and the initial
development of our feelings and emotions, the affective side of our being;
and in the midst of such a complex evolving, we become cognizant of
social meanings entering into ourselves via the socializing we are taking
part in and, by the assimilation of them which we are effecting, we make
them be a part of our being and this, in such way that they function as
facilitating elements in the interactive exercise of our capacities and the
development of ourselves. Childhood then is meant to be a time of development that is fitting us in initial ways for a life in which we engage with
others in our society, and thus is a time of a two-sided confluence: the
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initial development and integration of our initiative capacity for a
responsive participation in activity with an at-stake, of our feelings and
other motivational forces, of our particular capacities and their skillful
employment, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a socialization of
this evolution of our nature out of itself which adapts our be-coming
capacity as active being to the society in which we find ourselves.
Because without any complicity on our own part we simply find
ourselves at birth entered into an extended state of dependence and into
the society we happen to have been born amidst, the social context in
which this dual-confluence is occurring and its issue emerging defines to
an important extent the con-crete nature and meaning of our childhood:
in different societies, it is a rather different affair in many respects. But
the meant-to-be’s of our human nature intend an interplay of ourselves
with others which, while socially inflected, is not simply a matter of
association and society and is fundamentally a matter of measuring up to
the standards implicit in nature’s meant-to-be’s. Beyond socialmeanings, the interplay con-cretely involves the particularity of
circumstance, including people, and the operation of nature in ourselves
and others, and specifically, our native initiative capacity. Thus while at
first we have limited capacity, and even as it develops we still find ourselves unable to assimilate the facilitating social-meanings except as
dicta, it is possible for us along the way to find (at least occasionally) a
fortunate ‘contingent harmony’ (to borrow Kant’s phrase) between
‘ourselves evolving out of ourselves’ and ‘circumstance (especially,
certain individuals in our circumstance) supportively harmonizing with
our development’, and even to find (again occasionally) dicta which
resonate with our ownmost coming-to-be nature. It is also possible for
us to find our growing-up time occasionally a time of adventure, of being
ourselves ingathered and at-the-ready for apt responsively-mediated
engagement in new or more skilled forms of activity which, while still
ego-bound, may nonetheless enable us to augment our capacity for doing
and broaden our capacity to take part in socially-determined forms of
activity. But perhaps most fundamentally, it is possible for us to find our
way to a sufficiently integrated and developed personhood-- one
organized internally in a workable tension of conscious and unconscious,
of the acceptable and unacceptable, of the freely allowed and the
inhibited or restrained, etc., and headed by a sufficiently-developed
initiative capacity--, that we are ready (so far as nature goes) for the
transition-time transformation which belongs to youth and which opens
us in our nature out beyond this extended childhood time of dependency
into the time of the natural summons to take responsibility for our own
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lives upon ourselves. This-- youth-- is the time of the fruition of what
has been taking place in infancy-and-childhood and the process of
socialization. In particular, it is a time when the strengths developed up
to then make possible (in the form, say, of “adolescent rebellion”) a
fundamental re-shaping of the youthful being’s relation to socialmeanings.
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(2) Socialization, its issue in youth: subordination
of the social to morality, obligation
If childhood prior to youth is a time meant for building an
increasingly capable doer and achiever, it is also a time when his/her
initially quite limited initiative-capacity means a building of the agentself in the form of ego, where desire and the exercise of the capacity for
action in its doing-and-achieving-form are central to the building; at the
same time, the child is undergoing a socialization which, depending on
its character and strength, normally introduces some tension and conflict
with the ego-self around social-dicta that form constraints on this ego.
The tension and shifting balance in the various phases of childhood
growth can vary enormously, for numerous reasons. But what is most
significant is the inter-personal dynamic (especially within the family)
within which this building and its conflict are taking shape: one in which
the initial trusting out-reach of the infant into the unknown and alien
world is sufficiently supported (with love and affection, for one thing) as
to be able to evolve into confidence and confident-venturing. For it is in
and through this, and the learning that aids and augments the varied
capacity-building that is taking place, that a complex agent is forming
and his/her initiative-power is developing to the place we have been
calling youth, the transition time into adult self-responsibility. This
childhood forming involves development of a variety of inborn capacities under the conditions (and in particular, the social conditions) of the
time-and-circumstance, integration of these as they are developing so
that a complex set of capacities and motivations to employ them is being
formed, and evolution of the capacity to take active part in employing
them and in engaging with others using this set of resources-andcapacities. In all of this, the child is building toward being a person who,
in acting as a whole-being (with all of these factors having some role in
constituting that out of which the activity takes the shape it does), can
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act taking responsibility for his/her own life.
It is in this time when self-responsibility emerges as something meant
by nature to take place that a fundamental shift in the human agent’s
whole relation to social meanings is also meant to take place as part of
this assumption of responsibility. In this time that issues in the initial
entry into maturity (early adulthood, as issue of youth), taking part in
activity gains an added dimension, that of taking responsibility for one’s
own life (not simply for a deed as a ‘doing-this’) in one’s active
engagement with circumstance. What is to emerge from youth’s
transformed initiative-power is a capacity not simply to ‘do’ this-or-that
but to act in a way that actualizes one’s independence and autonomy as
a person responsible for his/her own life. For that to be the case, one has
to become dis-sociated from all social-meanings, which as dicta voice
the norms and imperatives of others that are simply to be accepted and
heeded; one can no longer automatically ac-cept (even under personal
modification) and act on such meanings in the life ahead that one is
contemplating as one’s responsibility now, but one needs to discover and
affirm what, in one’s own judgment, is the appropriate ground for living
this life of one’s own. What human nature summons us to, then, is a
morality of responsibility, and as part of this, a practical re-flection
commensurate with this responsibility for a life and not simply for this
or that deed. There is a distancing required, then, from society and its
social-meanings, and an assessing and judging of how well those meanings, by now incorporated (in further interpreted form, indeed) as dicta
divorced from the ultimate grounds (in creation and nature) for norms
(namely, the creational nisus), are enabling us to live our life and employ
our capacities in the way that seems called for now. What one knows as
the main guide in such practical reflection and assessment is nature’s
pointer in aspiration, and what it evokes in oneself, the capacities its
register rouses in us.
Any resolution to this matter of how one ought to live one’s life into
the future requires not merely coming to terms with the social as already
incorporated into oneself but also with the society which forms part of
one’s current circumstantial matrix and in the midst of which-- in
ongoing participation in which-- one is to live this ‘life of one’s own’.
Because the distancing and dis-sociating involved in the discovery and
affirmation of one’s own personal-selfhood holds in regard to the social
world as an ongoing interactive-context, one is at a place of judgment,
with another and ‘natural’ standard, namely, that of the ‘higher and better’
of nature’s pointing in aspiration, under which one is judging the norms
of one’s society and one’s own life up to then. If mind-less (re-flection-
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less) acceptance of the-social is no longer in keeping with what is called
for in this stage of our maturity, the connecting of oneself back from
one’s place of assessment, judgment, and decision-making concerning
one’s own life, to this context of the living of one’s life needs to be
judicious. In particular, it must take the norms which hold there in the
‘world’ as agreed-on-socially and to which the others with whom one is
to have-to-do may still adhere, and thoughtfully place them in a
secondary place in one’s relating to others, secondary to the terms that
now make sense to one as how one ought to live in relation to others.
But at the same time one must recognize and acknowledge them as
entering into the reality with which one has to do and, without denying
the importance of them to others, must adapt one’s interacting with other
members of the society in recognition of this.
The capacity to do this well is a strength the potential for which belongs in human nature but is meant to develop actually and to be augmented in the early-adulthood life that is the proving ground for selfresponsibility. For the agent who is at that time novice at this matter of
being an adult human being and is testing out his/her strength for selfresponsibility, the ‘social meanings’ of one’s ‘society’ become a
framework and not a limiting horizon, iii and a framework which still (so
long as one remains a participating member of the society) exerts its
constraint, its channeling and pressuring on him-/herself, via dictates
which, as earlier put forth, he/she regarded as if they were ultimate. The
immediate task is not simply to take part with others in society, then, but
while doing this-- while relating to others and the environing world--, to
cope with the socially-reinforced pressure (due to their operation still in
others and the ‘world’) of the norms one once accepted into oneself and
still carries (even if as no longer ultimate) and to maintain a way of
participating that is in keeping with having come into one’s own nature
as a self-responsible human being. That means finding a way, having
transcended social-meanings as mere givens to be accepted (acting
conventionally, therefore), not to regress to conformity or pretense, and
instead, even while operating in a social setting in which those meanings
form the commonly recognized mediating fabric, to connect more
profoundly and fully out of oneself with the persons with whom one is
interacting. Our nature not a finished and complete affair at the start but
an endowment that is mainly a potential to be realized as we evolve out
of ourselves through taking part in affairs; it is also not finished and
complete in even the best realization achieved in youth and its dissociating from the social and its beginning (in principle) of the
subordination of it within oneself to something deeper in the way of our
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nature. We must learn to carry this start through in early adulthood.
Pivotal in the transformation in initiative-capacity which youth is the
time for, and with it, transformation of the young person’s relation to
social-meanings, is the discovery of morality as something other than
social-norms, or even social-morality. One has by nature the need and
capacity to recognize the moral (in the form of responsibility for one’s
own life and the strengths needed for responsibility, say), and that recognition is not a function of social meanings or social standards-and-norms,
indeed, is often enough made in the course of a rejection of these as
adequate for oneself. The normative-dictate of social-meanings may
have sanctions (punishment, say) behind it, but that dictate is not of itself
moral (however much it may clothe itself in that name: it represents right
and wrong, good and bad, in some form, indeed, but ... not morality); the
moral emerges only with responsibility, and this has a communal side
because the life for which one is assuming responsibility is a life with
others who must assume responsibility for their own lives, and one needs
to respect and connect with them as such. This is life as an ‘adult’ affair.
It is in this transcending of the social as ultimate horizon that the
social achieves its full meaning in individual development. Just as
family achieves the fulness of its work when the young are drawn out
into the larger world beyond it on the strength of the becoming which it
fostered, so the society into which the youthful now enter as adults will
achieve the fulness of its work when we are able to maintain this start in
youth and, even as we continue living within the society, to maintain
ourselves beyond it as itself able to provide by its meanings the
appropriate limiting horizon for our living and acting. iv
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b. Institutions and adult life
As noted earlier, social meanings have a second important facilitating
role, beyond the one operating in socialization. They are involved in the
structuring and shaping of the institutions which compose a society as a
functionally organized whole of diverse human beings. According to the
size of the group and the form and level of its development of social
relations (in particular, of roles, classes, and other such variables), life
together with other members of the inclusive group can be a quite
different affair in different societies. Especially if the society is of any
size, it is in fact usually a society of disparate associating-groups, a
conglomerate affair within which the (so to speak) sub-societies have
their own meanings-sets while at least acknowledging the inclusive one
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in some degree and form, if not always fully incorporating it. An immigrant group, for instance, is often a relatively clear-cut instance of this
sort. But when it is of some size with a complexity of social relations, a
society also develops ways of organizing that life together which gain
standing in their own right as institutions, formal arrangements with a
social meaning and function, enabling the group to meet various needs
and to achieve various purposes recognized as important by and to (some
or all) society members. As providing structured sets of publicly
recognized and accepted positions and functions for some members of
the society, such institutional arrangements are marked by accepted and
established ways of acting to achieve this-or-that publicly-accepted purpose or set of purposes. Within the inclusive society, the various institutions are more-or-less loosely/tightly connected (or left dis-connected)
with each other, and have (at least informally) a more-or-less significant
place in the society when seen in relation to the social-meanings which
embody the interpretation of the at-stake (the values, the good/bad,
important/unimportant) determinative for the society.
The basic institutions of a society develop in response to-- or in expression of-- the fundamental needs and problematic dimensions of the
human condition; thus they concern factors integral to our continuing
existence as human co-participants in an interactive existence in which
something is at stake. But while the basic needs and problems are constant, as human life over time becomes more complex and the need for
differentiating within the old-- and developing new-- meanings and
forms becomes pressing, the proliferation of institutions and of complexity within an institution grows sufficiently enormous as to readily
hide from view the fairly simple bases in question. There is one cluster
of institutions that takes shape around the reproduction of human life;
thus there is the family or a comparable child-producing-and-rearing
institution, with associated further institutions such as marriage. There
is another and (over time) increasingly extensive cluster of institutions
taking shape around the need to make provision for the sustaining of life;
thus there are (as they come to be called) economic institutions, arising
around the management of the household (so the Greek etymology of the
term “economy” would suggest), thus initially relating to the sustaining
of the family unit. There is a third and again increasingly extensive
cluster of institutions taking shape around the central place of learning
in being human; beyond the family or domestic setting and the process
of socialization, there come to be a variety of separately instituted ways
for expressly facilitating the learning that is essential (learning to be a
human being) and the learning that is indispensable for participation in
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the particular way of life of the society, learning relating to skills in the
economic sphere, say, or to the art of medicine, or ... . Then again, there
is within any group the need for decision-making relating to actions
undertaken by or on behalf of the group, thus the need for leadership in
the group as an inclusive society and ways in which those who take a
leadership role in the decision-making can maintain the allegiance of all
group members; thus there is in time the institution of governance, and
eventually, political institutions, as the groups become larger and more
complex and diverse internally, and as leadership in decision-making
becomes detached from family and clan and tribe settings and exercised
in a society whose membership has become more diverse racially,
ethnically, religiously, and the like, and whose members are spread out
over increasingly wide areas. Finally, there is the inter-connecting of
group members in regard to the problematic of existence and what is
ultimately at-stake in human life; thus there is the institution of religion,
taking many shapes and playing many roles but at its heart the social
institution linking group members in regard to the realm of spirit and
life’s meaning.
When societies become complex and institutions proliferate and
come to form the mediating framework for much of public life, the
complications which are visible simply with social meanings themselves
are apparent also in the operation of the institutions founded in such
meanings. For one thing, the persons who assume a role in any institution
are thereby active as individuals in ways that relate to that role and
institution, and know expectations and demands relating to that, not
simply relating to themselves as individuals.
This introduces
complications into the forming and carrying out of activity, and room for
play-acting in the enacting of a role. For a second thing, if a society, and
the social meanings involved, form a relatively coherent system, the
stress here is on the “relatively”. There are almost inevitably tensions
internal to any social system and its set of diverse social-meanings, to
say nothing of tension in the relation of the various institutional
structures to each other (even if these are themselves internally coherent).
The emphasis of certain values in one institution, others in another, can
mean conflict-- even considerable conflict-- within the same society as
the different value-emphasis comes into play in the same situation. And
for a third thing, there is the fact of tension and conflict in virtue of the
variability in interpretation of the meaning of the social-meanings themselves, as in the quite different interpretations (say) of the “life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness” that are found and affirmed in one of the
founding documents of our own political system; and this carries over
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into the functioning of the institutions founded within the socialmeanings, so far as how that takes place con-cretely depends on such
interpretation.
In any case, within any society whatever its social-meanings (values,
ideals, etc.), the actuality of social-interaction reflects two different but
connected things.
On the one hand, actual social-interaction always reflects a degree of
failure in socialization and the functioning of institutions, so that actual
conduct of society-members does not measure up to the ideal, to the
regularities and expectations (anticipations, co-ordination of activities,
meshing of purposes, etc.) that successful socialization would
presumably engender. For social-meanings, when assimilated, are always interpreted and acted on personally, and that usually means, differently by different persons; and in any case, the assimilation may
involve, in some cases, rejection, more or less hidden dismissal and (say)
reinterpretation by the person assimilating or (say) dissimulation and
play-acting. Thus if one looks with any care, the members of a society
are never perfect exemplars of its norms. For that reason (among others),
actual social interaction is not always (or even often) according to the
norms, and requires that expectations anticipating such exemplification
be a kind of background which, while not irrelevant, is lived out of with
the accompanying ‘realistic’ expectation that what one actually
encounters probably diverges from the norm-- although, with experience,
one can perhaps recognize forms of such divergence that are common
enough to themselves form a pattern that can be anticipated. Selfcritique within the society itself, then, opposing the vision of the society
as it would be if it lived up perfectly to its ideals with the actuality in that
society of much that contradicts them, is always possible, and often
pressing in this or that other regard.
On the other hand, actual social-interaction likely harbors genuine
success here and there. Such success is not a matter simply of socialinteraction that conforms well to the conventions of the society, of occasions when the ideals are lived up to-- that is never enough for success,
since the very meaning of social-meanings, as particularizations facilitating the realization of the communal meant-to-be, is to facilitate
something beyond the conventional. Genuine success is interaction that
embodies trans-social ways of being responsible and creative, and these
ways may not mesh well with the established system itself, since that
system is founded on interpretations which may well be defective,
incomplete and inadequate renderings, of the creational and humannature meant-to-be’s. Yet such tension with social-meanings-- even with
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those which are not defective-- would reflect the very success of the
system in allowing and supporting the growth humanly of its members,
and thus in facilitating the eventual emergence within it of individuals
that are not simply ‘products’ of their society.
In virtue of their functional nature, societies are not static affairs, not
even societies that stress continuity and tradition; institutional change is
part of the larger change in a society, involving adaptation to changing
circumstance, but also elements of innovation, of encounter with and
introduction of the alien (via trade e.g.). But above all there is the change
which stems with shifting emphasis within the values and norms of the
society with emerging generations and the resolution in new generations
of old tensions in new ways. Indeed, social-meanings, because of their
basic facilitating function, are meant to support a being-together of
beings which depends on our responsive-initiative-capacity. It is not
simply that this being-together depends thereby on an evolving capacity
so that those meanings (even when not themselves changing) are likely
to be being interpreted differently; it is also that they are meant to
function to enable a development-and-maturation in the various parties
interacting under them, and with success in this regard, to open up the
possibility for such persons in turn to modify, reshape, alter the emphasis
in, those meanings in such way that keeps the tradition alive with the life
of a living being whose fulness, to be alive, will introduce creative
change, including creative adaptation to changes in larger circumstance.
But this means that a successful society also creates change in the social
conditions which form the matrix for the upbringing and life of future
generations. The community of diverse human beings that is
maintaining itself as alive in its communal life is thus far from static, as
it is also far from making change simply for the sake of change.
Finally, because the social is not itself ultimate, but a subordinate
conditioning factor in human life whose functioning depends on the
variety of individual human beings who carry it, its function-- and the
forms it takes to achieve its functioning well-- is one that ultimately depends on how we interpret the social-meanings, on whether we can
breathe our own life into them or need to alter them to make them more
viable, and on a coming together of the members of the group for whom
those meanings are ‘their society’s’ that is able to enact developmentand-maturation in the various parties interacting under them. They are
human creations that are meant for this, to make for meaning-inflected
ways of our coming together and interacting, which ways are supportive
for the various parties individually as maturing-or-matured-beings and
for the forming of a community of diverse human beings with a future
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worth working for. In the measure in which the coming together and
interacting of the individual human beings who are members of the
society is itself a full embodiment of the communal/inter-personal
meant-to-be and thus a joining of self-responsible agents enacting the
morality of responsibility, there is for the while of such interacting, when
it is mutual, a civilized-life-with, or more precisely, a life-with which is
the human-to-human element in the civilized living-and-acting-ininteraction-with that marks the fullest con-crete contribution of humans
to the consummation of creation.

B. Anthropic studies (again)
1. Anthropic sociology
In Chapter 3 I spoke of anthropic studies, and focused on what forms
the central of such studies, namely, anthropic psychology; I spoke of this
branch of such studies as intertwined with another, and used the term
“anthropic sociology” to designate it, because it brings all that relates to
the human to focus around the communal meant-to-be essential to human
nature. Anthropic sociology is the disciplined and systematic study of
the factors and processes whereby this meant-to-be is actualized in
proximate fashion con-cretely, and that means in particular, the study of
social-meanings, socialization, social institutions, social roles and
relationships, and the ways in which these enter into human being and
agency as an affair of be-coming in individuals and as an affair of
communal/inter-personal connection between individuals. The abstracting which separates out this field for study and initially and
tentatively conceptualizes the demarcated field sufficiently to give inquiry a definite focus and a plausible orienting framework needs to
recognize the larger and encompassing whole from which the limited
area here is detached-- the human, and ultimately, universal existence--,
and to invite a study of this limited field that at least implicitly and at
times explicitly connects it to that larger whole. For while the latter not
itself the focus of study, it is nonetheless (for the study) assumed to be
such-and-such. It is especially important in this regard that the framework of assumptions concerning two facets of that larger context, namely,
the evolutionary nature of life (generally, and human life in particular),
and the creational nature of universal existence, be apt. As we have seen
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in Chapters 1 and 3, the creational character of being is crucial to understanding all beings, and if the framework of assumptions concerning the
larger context adopts instead (say) some notion of ‘nature’ derived from
the physical sciences as sufficient interpretation of beings and simply
takes it for granted, this does not provide a framework that supports
understanding the full nature of beings, and that includes, human beings
as beings, and more specifically, as beings in whose active existence the
consummation of creation is at stake. Just as importantly, when the
taken-for-granted as regards the larger context includes (as it reasonably
would) the view of human life as part of the evolutionary phenomenon
of life, it is important that the conception of the evolutionary that is
appealed to not be a truncated one. As we saw in discussing biological
studies in Chapter 3, the view of evolution can readily be truncated if the
study of life is dominated by focus on the (outward) organic side and is
not meaningfully complemented by an adequate reading of the inwardness of life so that life, including its evolutionary facet, is being grasped
whole. Such a grasp of life in its wholeness (a unity of inwardness and
outwardness) requires an adequate self-understanding of life by living
human beings. It is only a view of the evolutionary that expresses such
an adequate self-understanding of life (including human life) that can
provide the appropriate larger conceptual context that anthropic studies,
including anthropic sociology, can properly take for granted in
addressing the field of the human.
The standpoint of the disciplined and systematic inquiry into this
field is, fundamentally, that which is taken in anthropic studies generally,
namely, that of the human being as agent; and it is concerned with facets
of the development and functioning of the human agency that anthropic
psychology seeks to understand. Indeed, it is as part of that inward
functioning and development that there is the creating, assimilating, and
functioning, of the social meanings which make of the interacting of
diverse human beings an associating in a society. While to that extent
there are the same problems of responsible inquiry involved here as in
anthropic psychology, there are also further problems, complications
arising in virtue of the nature of social meanings. In anthropic
psychology we are concerned with the inwardness of the human as an
individual affair, and thus with the responsiveness of humans to the
inwardly-registering creational-and-human-nature meant-to-be’s as well
as to what constitutes outward circumstance; and we are concerned with
all these facets of the situation as they enter directly into account in
human agency. In anthropic sociology we are concerned not with such
facets of reality directly but with human interpretations of them, and
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more limitedly, with interpretations that have an im-personal status
integral to their status and functioning. “Im-personal” here means,
entered into the inwardness of persons (“-personal”) but not as belonging
to the person’s nature or being the person’s own creation (“im-“), rather
as coming from third-persons (“they”) and representing a collective body
(“society”) which, while it is “we”, is neither “I” as an individual human
being nor “we” as separate or simply-interacting individuals. Because
such meanings function as facilitating and mediating the interactivity of
human beings and their connecting center-to-center, it would seem that
anthropic sociology would have a mainly outward focus. But while a
significant part of the field is that of behavior and thus is overt and public,
behavior is part of the field only as the outward aspect of interactiveactivity whose initiative and crucial side is inward and whose facilitating
meanings, those which give the outward its social significance and which
make of the connecting of human agents a social affair, are also inwardly
located and operative, even if the “inward” in question is here multiple,
the dispersed one of diverse human agents. Not simply that, but the
presence and operation of such meanings in the inwardness of the participant agents depend on the further interpretations by each person, by
which social meanings are appropriated into the inwardness of a person
and are enabled by the persons in question to have their facilitating function in their own persons. Thus the focus of anthropic sociology on what
has im-personal and collective standing requires fathoming the inward
and attending to the dynamic of the functioning of the im-personal-andcollective due to the differing ways in which it is made a functional part
of the inwardness of the human beings involved.
To arrive at truth, inquiry needs to be apt in principle to (in this case)
its field, and if it is to have sound bases for its interpretations and claims
for understanding, it must avail itself skillfully of the inquirer’s access to
that field and proceed by making the best use of the available disclosive
and interpretative powers to explore, conceptualize and analyze, and
seek evidence. The field is quite complex, so that inquiry, while
fundamentally of the same nature throughout the exploration of it, will
also need to take rather different forms in adaptation to the character of
what specific facets are being investigated at any time. But the field is
also something into which any inquirer is already entered and with which
he/she is already familiar, although in a con-crete form which, while it
makes access something already granted, may well introduce distortion
into its disclosure of the field in immediacy, to say nothing of into the
attempt at interpretation and understanding. For it is the inquirer’s own
living-and-acting, including his/her inquiring, that attests his/her already
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being entered into the field of inquiry. He/she is a participant in it who
is seeking understanding of it, and that, not from the standpoint of a
participant in this particular society (let alone this particular sub-society
of that society) but from the standpoint of a human being.
In virtue of the inquirer’s status of already being included in the field,
it is not possible or desirable for the inquirer in anthropic studies to take
the natural sciences as model for responsible inquiry, for we do not have- and can not have, and should not pretend to have-- the distance from
the field which makes objectivity appropriate in natural science. As
human we are not objects to ourselves or to each other, and the attempt
to treat ourselves as such-- to confuse responsible inquiry in this case
with objective inquiry-- is disastrous. Responsible exploration in the
field of the human can not be properly carried out except by exploring it
in a way that is responsive to the distinctive nature of the field and to the
distinctive relation of the inquirer to that field. Because we are human,
and are already members of a particular society, we need to make the
best use of these facts; but “best” means, a use in which we are not
hostage to factors in ourselves-- including ourselves as members of a
particular society-- that would distort our vision of the human;
nonetheless it is a use in which we find available to ourselves, due to our
very being and sufficient realization on our part of the humanity in
ourselves, the resources for honest and unbiased inquiry. That means
that we must ourselves be mature humanly, for only in being that do we
have hope of being liberated from confinement by the social meanings
which enter into our engagement with things (liberated from being
‘typical or conventional Americans’, say).
More fully: We cannot explore the field of anthropic studies except
as something humanly familiar to us. If we remain ‘members of our own
society’, however, we are in no position responsibly and freely to explore
and discover what the anthropic sociologist seeks, the truth of the human
in this communal/societal dimension, both in its basic universal sides and
in the assessment of its concrete realization (what is universal there, and
what is particular). If we are to explore, interpret, and understand, the
human without unwittingly making what we register, notice, and
apprehend, fit with the particularity of the human as we have realized it
in ourselves-- including that of the socialization we have inflecting our
being--, we must do more than be objective, indeed do more than the
responsible bringing together of the inward-and-outward which is
needed in biological studies if life would be grasped whole. When it is
human life that is field to be inquired into, and in the case at hand
(anthropic sociology) when it is such life as inflected by social meanings
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and it is such life and such meanings that we would seek truth about, we
must be cognizant first-hand of the matters being disclosed and
interpreted in living a human life to its fullest, cognizant first-hand and
in an openness which reaches beyond our own interpretations (personal
and social) and registers presence in that beyondness. Social meanings
are not ‘facts’ as in the natural sciences, but meanings, interpretative
factors. But interpretative of what? Not of the ‘world’ as we see it in
our society (already a socially-interpreted affair), not of the ‘objective’
world of the natural sciences (the face of things denuded of socialinterpretation), but of ... interactive existence as human beings can be
open to it in its presence beyond our interpretations-- the creational and
human-nature meant-to-be’s, say, beyond our own reading of them and
in their registering in us as to be interpreted, to be made intelligible to
ourselves somehow. But because the social-meanings interpret (among
other things) matters that require the deepest and fullest experience of a
human being, as (say) in the case of religion, then we ourselves must be
able to register first-hand in our own living and being the very deeps of
the universe and allow the socially-posed interpretations of them to
interpret those deeps for us. It is this that is required of us if we are not
to interpose our own social interpretations, which are deep-rooted in us
and function unconsciously in us as well as in our conscious life, thus
are difficult to surmount. It is, indeed, difficult to be ‘beyond’-- yet carry
with us as subordinate-- our own readings, but if we have matured to the
place at which we are able to do this, we can appreciate-- without being- the members of another society, provided, that is, we can be open to
(and have the personality rich enough to register) the range of things
which are entered into their social world under their social-meaning
interpretation and can discern the social-meanings as im-personal
elements being further interpreted personally by the various members of
the other society. The social world into which things are interpretatively
entered is a whole whose elements have their meaning in connection with
each other as well as being interpretations of what we can be open to; in
our address to the elements, we must then see the social meanings we are
concerned with and need to be able to register and understand them not
as isolated and as such focal for our attention but as implicated with
others in the whole and needing to be understood in that context.
If the ‘objective’ can not be the ‘responsible’ here, not just any ‘subjectivity’ will do either. The fathoming of the inward in others in all its
actual depth and fulness is quite unlike the inference to the interior in the
physical sciences; as in anthropic psychology, it is a reaching to understand the inwardness of others in an understanding which is made
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possible only with the development of the inquirer’s own inwardness.
As in the case of the anthropic psychologist, the basic resources needed
are harbored in the fulness of the humanity of the inquirer and in the
capacity to be cognizant of-- and understanding with regard to-- the
common humanity involved. These resources serve a two-fold function,
as resource for the observable to sound against and for making sense of
communication addressed to the inquirer by others out of their own
inwardness, and as guide to the inward landscape of the human being
and to the side of the functioning there which is relevant to the social.
But for this resource to be utilized without what would otherwise be
distortion-- as happens when one uncritically assumes as filter the
meanings of one’s own social matrix (as one has interpreted these in the
course of incorporating them)--, the inquirer must be able to be liberated
from the social-meanings incorporated into his/her own being, without
becoming member of another society. Regression to infancy, of course,
would be of no help even if it were possible; and yet the infant or child
is often used as an image of the condition when one has been able to find
and maintain oneself in a spiritual fulness within which one is no longer
hostage to the social, even in that form of it incorporated into oneself.
While the field of anthropic sociology is complex, address to it takes
three fundamentally different approaches, one to come to understanding
of the field itself in its nature and structure, a second to grasp the relevant
standard(s) for assessing what is taking place in the field, and the third
to grasp the various concrete realizations of the social at different levels
under different conditions and to consider them both descriptively and
normatively.
As to the first approach: In the first part of this chapter, we have already pointed to the terms that seem appropriate for understanding the
nature and structure of the field. At least, to a philosopher reflecting on
the problematic of existence and seeking understanding of the human as
responsively involved in that problematic, these are what seem the
plausible features of the field. Central are social meanings, interpretative
renderings with an im-personal and collective standing and an association-facilitating function. It is meanings (in the plural) that are in
question, a collectively-shared concatenation with greater or lesser
interconnection and coherence in their rendering of the meaning and
nature of the human and human life, of the significant factors bearing on
these in and from the larger context of existence. These meanings have
the function of facilitating an ongoing society/social-unit of interacting
human beings, a function enabled by the socialization of the young and
of newcomers entering the group from without and aided by the pressure
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of group-members responsive to the communal meant-to-be of human
nature as it is being realized in this distinctive group. Included in the
concatenation are various components and segments whose meanings
cluster around certain universal facets of the human situation, while other
components and segments reflect variable facets of that situation, reflecting particular developments or conditions. As interactivity-facilitating,
the concatenated meanings introduce out of themselves-- in virtue of
their own terms and their interconnection within the concatenation-greater or lesser conflict or tension, establish closer or looser coordination of activities (with a reference to the socially-conceived good), and
enter hierarchical and lateral connections of sub-groups, of institutions
and practises. But the actual functioning of the meanings depends on the
interpretation which each member gives to them, and is in any case
basically dispositional, so that pretense and deceit as well as
idiosyncratic actualization are features of group life. As a result, there
are also pressures toward conformity relating to the interactive patterns
the meanings foster, if not institutionalized, then at least grounded in the
native gregariousness implementing the communal meant-to-be of human nature, and pressures toward orthodoxy in belief as well as practice;
and there is greater or lesser tolerance for deviation from the ‘norm’,
both as embodied in the meaning of the terms themselves but as in any
case embodied in the concern of group members for how far and how
well others embody the meanings and how far deviation can be tolerated.
Such are some of the significant features of the field being explored.
The very nature of the meanings, as interpretative in nature and as
relating back ultimately to the at-stake in existence and to a reading of it
and all else in the light of it, is to be facilitating, indeed, but for an
interacting whose at-stake is more than social-group-existence. The
second mode of address to the field that is conceptually delineated in
those terms is evaluative and normative in nature, in that the at-stake, as
what claims human activity through its responsive initiative-power,
implicates that activity in contribution to a task, that of the concrete consummation of creation. So far as that consummation has a communal
side, we are implicated in contributing to a community that, in terms of
the meant-to-be’s of creation and of human nature, is to be of a sort that
measures up to the standards carried in those meant-to-be’s. Focusing
only on what is directly relevant here, there is, in brief, the implication
of ourselves (proximately) in contributing to the actualization of a
healthy society as what we are summoned to as human beings, and
(universally) in contribution to the actualization of an inclusive human
community-- a healthy human community global in reach, a ‘civilized’
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community in its fullest realization-- as meant-to-be issue of the
communal meant-to-be of our human nature. There is, then, the task not
simply of developing the conceptual terms in which to understand the
field in all its complexity, but of discerning the standards implied in the
human condition in a creational existence and assessing the various
social interpretations and the concrete functioning of those
interpretations in actual societies in terms of those standards. How well
do they measure up in the actuality that issues from living under those
social meanings? Differing interpretations of social-meanings could-- in
principle-- measure up in practical reference to the standard in this sense,
that since the standard is con-crete, what measures up to it could include
different sets of facilitating meanings which work supportively to such
realization, even though the sets, taken in a truth-claim reference, might
not be true in the same measure. v But even then, effective supportive
working is not a function of the meanings taken in abstraction, but as
they are being further interpreted and acted upon by the members of the
society in question. A healthy society, thus, is not healthy by reason
simply of its social-meanings, but of the way the members of that society
are able to interpret and act upon them in such fashion as to connect with
each other in a healthy fashion, where the standard of health is that of
nature-and-creation, not of the society in question (or of any society,
even of an “ideal society”).
This brings us to the third mode of address in which inquiry into the
field of anthropic sociology is involved, that in which the actual societies
are investigated, their likeness and unlikenesses in the realization of thesocial discerned, their differences according as conditions differ, as scale
differs, as development of institutions differ, as presence of distinct subsocieties within the encompassing society differs, etc. All of this can
apply in address not simply to contemporary societies but also to earlier
societies of which sufficient record is still extant to enable some
reconstruction of their character. vi
I spoke above of the two central disciplines of anthropic studies, anthropic psychology and anthropic sociology, as intertwined, and as
kindred in the sort of responsible character to the inquiry which each
undertakes. In Chapter 3 I spoke as well of the contrast, yet measure of
kinship, between anthropic psychology and philosophy. Let me extend
that characterization here at the end of the consideration of anthropic
sociology. The basic difference between the two anthropic studies and
philosophy is not the standpoint for inquiry (that of human agency), nor
the need for full maturity as a human being if inquiry is to have open to
it the range of evidence needed for successful understanding of what it
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seeks to understand. It is that the two anthropic studies concern a limited
field within the universe, the human, whereas philosophy is defined not
by a field but by a problematic, one harbored in universal existence as a
creational affair that involves an at-stake in the act of creation, which atstake concerns all active beings as creatures participating in an
interactive existence and as meant to contribute in that participating to
the consummation of being as creational. The three are linked as seeking
truth, and all differ from the natural sciences (whose field is the
narrowest of all, being the public face of things) and even from the
biological studies, although one can think of anthropic studies as the
special form of biological studies that selects out human life as its field.
All of these, and philosophy as well, are disciplines whose own inherent
aim is understanding, knowledge, apprehension of truth, and this, as
issue of responsible inquiry which begins and ends in experience open
to human beings and which seeks a reasoned insight into what they
address, insight which is grounded in evidence open in principle to any
and all human beings, although under conditions of intellectual
conscience which any or all may fail to meet.
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2. History, historical inquiry, and historiography
The word “history” derives from the Greek and in its verbal form
originally meant “to inquire into or about”, and more broadly, “to seek
out what actually happened or was the case by inquiring of participants
and witnesses and others who might contribute to the knowledge being
sought”; but it came also to stand for the written (narrative) account of
what one found out by such inquiring, or as we would put it colloquially,
“what the story really was”. Thus three different things might be meant
in speaking of “history”: what actually happened, the inquiry itself that
sought to bring it to light in truthful fashion, and the account of what
happened based on what the inquiry brought to light. Not long ago, to
lessen confusion another (technical) word was invented and is
occasionally used by some for the third thing, namely, historiography,
and when I use that term it has that reference; in contrast with “history”
as the matter itself and “historical inquiry” as the inquiry into that matter,
historiography is the written account of the matter as it has been brought
back to mind in and through inquiry that seeks to ascertain what really
happened. vii
a. History
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The fundamental reference of the term “history” is to the adventure
of the human race on earth. The race exists only in-and-as the diverse
individual human beings who, as members of the race generated from
other members, share a human nature. Because as spatio-temporally
conditioned in our existence we individuals are finite, the race itself does
not exist as a complete and currently-actual whole at any time; the
concurrently existing individuals who at any time are the currentlyexisting members of the race are only the current participants in historymaking who are maintaining the continuous existence of the race over
time. Internal to that continuity are (for one) the elements of genetic
inheritance conveyed in the genesis of individuals and (for another) the
various factors (know-how, customs, etc.) transmitted through the
generations by way (say) of the education of the new-born and young by
the older and (generally)adult.
The adventure which is history, as enacted in the individual venturing
of a continuing succession of individuals over time who carry and hand
on a greater-or-lesser measure and diversity of accumulating particular
capacity, is an advancing affair keeping up with ongoing time, but not
merely that. Harbored in the human nature out of which that venturing
is formed are a responsive initiative capacity and two human-naturemeant-to-be’s (the maturational and the communal). The initiative
capacity makes our activity a venturing responsive to an at-stake (the
meant-to-be of creation), while the human-nature-meant-to-be’s intend
(respectively) the evolution of our initiative capacity as we exercise it
and an exercise of it which effectuates the con-crete connecting of
individual human beings with each other out of the commonality of their
human nature. Thus because the multiple and diverse individual
venturing that carries the adventure forward-- that active-engagement in
which each is living his/her own life-- is in each case formed in responsiveness to (among other things) the creational-meant-to-be and the two
human-nature-meant-to-be’s, the advance of history proceeds under
directional pointers and takes on actual shape both through the
particularity involved in the individual venturing and, even more
decisively humanly, according to how this responsiveness is constituted
and how it functions in the realization of those pointers and the
integration of particularity into ongoing effort. For our initiative
capacity always in some fashion registers and interprets, and integrates
into its forming of activity, both circumstance and the inwardly-claiming
meant-to-be’s; but it does so limited by-- and in reflection of-- where it
is in its development, and how it is constituted there, thus rather
differently if it has reached in adequate form the meant-to-be fulness of
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a capacity for responsibility than at the beginning of life. In virtue of
these directional pointers, human beings are pointed toward a
participation in existence the full realization of which I will speak of as
(individually) participation in existence as civilized human beings and
(communally) participation in a civilized global community. The nature
of these culminating conditions, we will consider in subsequent
discussion.
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, and in Chapter 3, as born
beings who live and act by way of a distinctive responsive initiative
capacity which is meant to evolve over time, we begin our active
participation in existence in a condition combining relative impotence in
our capacity (essential and subordinate) with extreme dependence. We
each need other human beings to enable us to survive as infants and to
help us in the initial childhood efforts and learning in which we begin to
appropriate our native potential as human beings, and in particular, our
capacity to initiate activity in responsive fashion. Given such initial
conditions-- and these continue in some form, since we usually live life
through amidst and interacting with other human beings-- the communal
meant-to-be harbored in our nature gains its proximate realization in an
association with other human beings facilitated by social meanings
which have been created by others and which we gradually assimilate
into ourselves as we interact with them. Thus given the spatio-temporal
conditions of our being, with the dependence and impotence of ourselves-at-the-start and the contingency of the presence of a limited
society of other individual human beings supportive to us until we are
able to ‘stand on our own feet’, we appropriate our own nature in a way
aided, and inflected, by a social-meaning colored interaction with others.
As we grow up, we find ourselves not simply living our lives as
participant-members in a determinate limited society, with our individual
venturing inflected by such meanings, but also becoming involved in
various forms of joint venturing by members of the society and even in
some measure in the collective venturing of the society itself.
Now the proximate social-meaning realization of the communal
meant-to-be involves (as we have also noted earlier) an assimilating of
the meanings which can vary in nature. As meanings, they are
assimilated under an interpretation of them by ourselves, and operate in
us according to our reading of them; and further, in that operation, while
they may become second-nature in us and function in us in such way as
to make us theirs and to that extent make us conventional members of a
society, it is also possible that we find such congruence of them (as we
interpret them) with our ownmost being that they can operate as
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reinforcing factors in a release into functioning of that being. In either
case, whether we are steered by or nature-released within such (publicbut-reinterpreted-by-us) meanings, in childhood we share in these
facilitating factors as enabling an association in the course of which,
among other things, we are meant to grow and develop as human beings.
In the growth and maturation which realizes the companion maturational
meant-to-be, youth is meant to be a time when, in assuming
responsibility for our life, we are meant to dis-sociate ourselves from the
assimilated social-meanings-- not divest ourselves of them, but only of
their dominance, their priority in our decision-making-- and to establish
ourselves in our decision-making on the native basis of our own nature.
Not that we always do, or that we are actually capable of doing this
effectively; for growth is not an automatic thing. Nonetheless, in this
dissociating meant as part of the work of youth, we find ourselves desiring-- and our human nature enabling (as part of our taking responsibility
for our own life)-- a connecting with other human beings which, given
the adult character of our being now, goes beyond the proximate (social)
connection and, taking shape fundamentally out of the initiative capacity
which forms the heart of the common human nature of the youthful
person in question, potentially embodies a mutuality which is rooted in
and expressive in self-aware fashion of our common humanity. Whereas
the social realizes the communal meant-to-be in us in proximate form, in
and through particular meanings that we have assimilated as a function
of circumstance (the society we happen to be born into, the associations
we have entered into in virtue of who happens to be part of our
circumstance), this essential connecting transcends those meanings and,
while even at its most effective it still retains social-meanings in some
form in subordinate functioning in the connecting, takes its root in the
essence of our humanity. It is with this venturing as an adult human
being that we begin our participation as responsible beings in the making
of history.
As an accompanying development to our maturation as initiators of
activity, we learn to employ the particular capacities of our initial endowment. This employment and this learning take place in activity which
functions as medium of our maturation and at the same time is
conditioned by the particularities of circumstance. Such particular
capacities are initially a potential which is able to be developed in a
variety of possible directions; but the particularities of circumstance,
especially in their inclusion of shared social meanings formative of
institutions and effective in the individuals with whom we associate,
make for an employment of them in this-way rather than in that-way, so
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that we learn to employ them according as our immediate society and its
defining social-meanings allow and invite. This employment and learning continues as, in adulthood, we enter the adult world of our society
and learn to take part in it in an adequately responsible fashion, and that
means, to operate in acknowledgment of its terms while doing so out of- and in heedfulness to-- a basis in ourselves which goes deeper than the
social. Finally, and more fundamentally, it continues if-and-as we
mature into the fullest responsibility of ourselves as human beings, and
within the vocational nature of that responsibility, come to employ our
developed capacities in activity which serves the consummation of
creation and realizes that vocation con-cretely. Supposing that we have
grown in this fashion and are able eventually to employ our particular
capacities in this manner, we then are embodying the fullest realization
of the human-nature meant-to-be’s and are participating in the fullest
fashion-- that which embodies the human in its fulness con-cretely-- in
the making of history.
The intended fullest realization in a human agent of both the humannature meant-to-be’s is found, then, in initiative and activity which,
entering the individual in each case as a fully mature (vocationally
responsible) human being into effort that seeks to help secure the at-stake
of creation (so far as this depends on human activity), con-cretely enters
each of a diversity of such human beings as they interact with each other
in the course of their responsible efforts into a distinctively-human selfaware connecting that is mutual. The pointing of the creational-andhuman-nature meant-to-be’s internal to this (adult, self-responsible)
individual venturing which carries the advance of the race introduces
into the overall adventure an internal-and-integral element of a meantto-be directionality-and-issue and an element of drama which first and
foremost concern the individual carriers of the advance of history. As a
result, the actual course of history as an ongoing issue of multiple individual venturing significantly depends on how, and how effectively, the
human beings in question are able, in their history-making and their
enacting and living this drama, con-cretely to enact in the circumstances
of their existence this meant-to-be directionality. History-making comes
into its own fulness, then, when-- and to the extent that-- the participants
in it, in their individual venturing, take part out of the fulness of human
capacity for vocational responsibility and for the responsible
employment of their own particular capacities in con-crete vocational
work and are able to find the way(s) to enable themselves and the circumstances of their existence to form a more-or-less adequate con-crete
realization of these meanings.
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This fulness in an individual’s participation in history-making,
supposing that it is realized in the interaction of a few individuals with
each other in a society, can foster a transformation with larger
ramifications, reaching even into the functioning of the institutions in
that society. In that measure, there is realized not only a civilized-livingtogether of certain individuals but, on the broader plane, a civilizing of
society for a while, one which infuses it with a common life and a spirit
which so far forth transform it and make of it something worthy of being
called a civilized society or civilization. The achievement at any time of
such a civilized mode of existence and such fulness of human community
is always an ongoing affair, dependent on the agents involved and likely
to be transient, not the least for the transiency of the agents and the
dependence for continuity on new agents working in the same fulness of
spirit. In any case, it does not signify an ‘end state arrived at and that’s
that’ but signifies rather an ongoing fulness being realized in the onwardmovement of time and interactive-activity, and one which, as depending
for its continuing existence on the ‘how’ of the ongoing, can well be lost
in the course of events.
The heart of such civilized-life-with is a moral one, that of the
morality of responsibility, and it is most fully realized when selfresponsibility becomes the fulness of vocational responsibility. In the
measure in which this heart is accepting in self-aware fashion of the
creational nisus as claiming its activity, the activity itself becomes an
affair of spirit. Because the responsibility in question includes selfresponsibility for a life which holds potential for creativity, the activity
in which such creativity comes responsibly into play is spiritual in its
inward character. Now such creativity, mobilizing various particular
capacities and skills, can take numerous forms, and the variety is what
gives its full con-crete character to the civilized-life-with/together as a
whole. But in a number of persons there is, as part of their native
endowment, the potential for creativity which is self-aware and
responsive to the spiritual life being lived in this responsible fashion-- a
potential for bringing the reflexive sensitivity of such a life to expression
in artistic creativity, or reflective creativity, or ... . When this is present
in a society and realized in some persons, the creativity with its reflexive
sensitivity brings the civilized to a particular and intense form of selfconsciousness; thus arises the temptation to confuse the civilized with
the simple presence of these particular forms of creativity-- the creative
application of artistic powers, or reflective powers, or ...-- or with these
spiritually-infused forms. The civilized, however, is centered in the
humanly essential (the moral/responsible), and these matters of
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particular creativity, which in and of themselves need not be grounded in
the moral and spirituality, have a place in the civilized only as they are
infused with the spiritual.
If a civilized-life-with/together is a moral/spiritual affair, and if a society becomes civilized to the extent that enough of its (adult) members
realize in themselves a moral/responsible-and-spiritual life so that this
impacts the functioning of the institutions of the society, it is also the
case that such a life-together is not confined to connections with other
members of the same society. For even within a society, in the very
nature of the civilized-life-together there is a transcendence of the socialmeanings definitive for the society in question, thus of the social
standing and roles of the human beings involved; and this transcendence
is made possible by, and is self-awarely grounded in, our common human
nature, so that the ‘together’ being achieved con-cretely has an
effectively trans-social basis and dimension, not being without
facilitating-social-meanings (language, say) but in each participating
person being rooted in and grounding itself in the common human nature
which they share as prior to the social-and-societal-differences, so that
the reaching is self-awarely toward each other simply as fellow human
beings. Given this root and ground, such reaching transcends the social
as it is embodied in members of other societies as well as of one’s own,
so that it is not a reaching toward ‘members of another society as
members of that society (rather than one’s own)’, making the societal
difference the reference point for the connecting, but toward ‘other
human beings who indeed happen to be members of another society but
toward them simply as human beings’. However, such a connecting,
when consummated con-cretely, needs a mediating social element of
some sort, but it is nonetheless in principle able to unite human beings
who belong to diverse societies in a moral-and-spiritual life together.
In this trans-social-yet-social-meaning-mediated connecting between
members of different societies, there is a limited and centered realization,
self-aware and con-crete, of the communal meant-to-be of human nature
in its full reach, and one which points to another potential that is intrinsic
to the human. The commonality of human nature provides a basis for-a fitness for-- the mutual connecting of any two human beings, and
provided there is some basis in particularity and some opportunity of
actually interacting this potential can be con-cretely realized and, at its
fullest, be realized in self-aware fashion on all sides. But because of the
spatio-temporal conditions of our existence there is in actuality no concrete connecting on this basis-- no connecting which actually realizes
this fitness-- with all as contemporaries. For as temporally finite in our
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individual being we are not-- and can not be-- actually contemporaneous
with all other human beings. Thus while it has grounds in the communal
meant-to-be and to that extent could be universal, we can actually realize
this potential connecting in immediate, mutual, and self-aware, fashion
only with (at most) those few human beings who are concurrent to us
and with whom we are actually interacting. Nonetheless, while no
immediate (let alone mutual and self-aware) connecting is even possible
with past and future human beings, given the commonality of the nature
of all human beings our limited con-crete connecting in mutual and selfaware fashion with contemporaries with whom we are interacting carries
with it in some form an element of connecting with all internal to this
con-creteness. This ‘with all’ has an initial foundation in the con-crete
in the societal inheritance entering into such connecting-withcontemporaries. Each human being carries this inheritance as having
incorporated it somehow and as, in the connecting in question,
something still functioning within the transcendence; and in the measure
in which the connecting with contemporaries transcends the social and
roots itself in the commonality of human nature, so this immanent
connection with predecessors (already gone) and posterity (yet to come)
via the social is thereby (at least in principle) also being transcended.
That is, because of its basis the con-crete connecting with
contemporaries simply as human beings extends into the recollectiveand-integrative connection with predecessors-gone-by and into the
anticipatory reaching out toward posterity-to-come, to make for a concomitant reaching out in the futural and preterite directions to human
beings simply as human. However, the society-based recollection and
anticipation involved in such a case does not establish any immediate-let alone mutual-- connecting with the previous and posterior human
beings one reaches out to, and the transcendence does not alter that but
only transposes the root of the connecting, such as it is in these references,
to the commonality of human nature from the realm of the ongoing of
society. Nonetheless, this is an extension of sorts that belongs in
principle to the limited con-crete realization of the communal meant-tobe, which of itself means a connecting with any and all human beings as
integral to the development and fulness of our human being. Because
the basis for the original connecting and this initial extending is a
common human nature which is found in all humans, past, present, and
future, an even further reaching out and fuller realization of the interpersonal meant-to-be could be part of the con-crete history-making being
achieved in this limited fashion, an all-inclusive one achieved as well in
what is in its basic character the self-aware participation of ourselves in
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our limited con-crete connecting with a few contemporaries. In the
element of self-awareness involved, this further reaching out, which
would match the farthest reach of the communal meant-to-be and the
essential connection of all humans with each other, would bring the
participation in history-making in the limited con-crete localized form it
is taking to include an awareness of what we are doing that is commensurate with the sense of history that we have been sketching out, that
in all that we are doing we are, as human beings acting through the initiative whereby we are human beings, carrying forward the adventure of
the race, not simply that of ourselves as individuals or as members of a
society, and we are now doing so self-aware to this side of our activity.
With this, history-making becomes self-conscious to itself in its full
human reference.
Finally, the activity which is undertaken by us out of the fulness of
responsibility and spirituality in ourselves engages us with circumstance
which includes other human beings, indeed, but is not exhausted by such
beings. In virtue of the fulness of responsibility involved and the fact
that such activity is dedicated to a task related to the at-stake, there is in
the activity embodying such civilized-life-with a reaching out beyond
the human, to the circumstantial as holding human-and-non-human alike,
and an effort in which the agent is taking responsibility to exercise
his/her capacity for helping to secure the consummation of creation in
regard to all beings with whom he/she is interacting. The civilizedbeing-with other human beings, while itself grounded in the conjunction
of the maturational and the inter-personal meant-to-be’s of human nature,
is thus ultimately itself an element in a responsibility which is claimed
most fundamentally by the creational-meant-to-be and is called to effort
concerned with all beings and the completion of their being-- and thus,
of being as a uni-verse-- in an inter-acting of all out of themselves and
their own natures. Thus while there is, in the civilized-life-with, a
distinctive connection with other human beings involved, this is element
in activity whose inclusive task is meant to be that of helping to secure
the at-stake in an engaging with circumstance and all the beings that are
participants in the interacting involved; and if this activity includes a
distinctive communal/inter-personal component, a joining as mature and
responsible human beings with other such humans in helping to secure
the consummation of creation, the responsibility assumed in that task is
nonetheless concerned with all, human and non-human, and not simply
to the human. Ultimately, then, and in principle, not only does the
civilized mode of taking up with other human beings remain in-complete
if it is not mutual, and remain fragmentary/fractional if the interacting
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parties involved are limited, but likewise, responsible effort that includes
such being-civilized in relation to other human beings remains incomplete if it does not engage with circumstance whole and be
concerned with a connecting with the non-human as well as the human.
Given that the dominant feature of circumstance is the earth itself, the
common support and habitat for all the living beings (including the human) with whom we interact, history-making finds its fulness in activity
embodying a responsibility dedicated to a connecting and living with the
earth and all its living beings (including especially the human) which
secures in con-crete fashion the ultimate at-stake of creation.
In sum so far: History is the adventure of the human race on earth,
carried forward in the interactive-activity of contemporaneously existing
individual human beings with their circumstance and gaining its
character from that and the ‘how’ of their engagement. That ‘how’, given
the fundamental meant-to-be’s of creation and human-nature, is one
directed by these meant-to-be’s to become responsive in a way that the
advance of history gains a con-crete realization of those meant-to-be’s,
so that the most-fully-human history-making is a participating in a
circumstance-engaging interactively-active effort formed out of the
fulness of responsibility and, in a way that is civilized both in the
interacting with human beings that is involved and with the interacting
with all beings, takes up with circumstance to assist in the coming to be
of beings in which creation gains its consummation.
The earliest appearance of the human among living beings on earth
happened so long ago that we have not yet discovered assured traces of
such a thing. But while we do not know where, when, or how, the first
humans arose and history-making actually began, it seems reasonable to
see human existence from the beginning on as having involved divergence-- initially and increasingly as our numbers increased-- into distinct
socially-constituted groups and different lines of inheritance, genetic and
social/cultural. In such groupings, we would find the realization of the
inter-personal-meant-to-be of our nature in the proximate form of the
social; but as to how the members of such groups functioned, we know
nothing, and can only conjecture. When we find traces of our earlier
fellow human beings sufficient to enable us to form some sense of what
has been happening since the beginning, inference from the evidence we
have suggests that the adventure of history has advanced on numerous
fronts concurrently, taking divergent paths, sometimes separate ones,
sometimes connected and intersecting with each other, sometimes
opposed and conflicting, but in any case relating to each other in
numerous modes. As far as that same evidence attests to the inward
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humanity of the human beings who are then on the leading edge of the
movement of history-- humans who lived not so many thousands of years
ago--, it indicates that historical human existence had achieved complex
social groupings, and humans were venturing, individually and
collectively, in a considerable variety of ways of living and acting and
con-cretely realizing their humanity. So far as we can tell, this venturing
was marked by much in the way of developed and accumulated skills
and knowledge, but also by much ignorance and error. In each social
group, we find a determinate complexity to its internal structure which
reflects public-and-accepted social meanings that represent agreed-on
interpretations expressive of a reading of (most fundamentally) the
problematic of existence; embodied crucially in their religious institutions, such interpretations set the group apart from other groups,
offering to the members of the group-- mainly by way of participation in
those religious institutions-- a distinctive conception of what is at stake
in and gives meaning to life, a distinctive sense of the constitution of the
universe, and in general, usually expressing the sense that ‘ours’ (that of
our society and tradition) is a ‘better’ way than that of others. From the
written records that provide us our closest sense of the more inward life
in the diverse ways in question, whatever the kinship (greater/lesser)
between such conceptions from society to society there was almost
uniformly a sense of the various strands of ongoing human life, of the
various societies and traditions, as separate affairs. That reflects not so
much the dispersed manner in which the human race has lived and developed on earth as the absence of the development of any sense within any
tradition of a recognized essential connectedness of all humans despite
the separateness. Until recently, humans have been (so far as we can tell)
wholly oblivious of their venturing as carrying the adventure of the race
itself and of the potential in their nature for a self-aware participation in
history-making that enters all humans into that making on the same
footing, namely, their common human nature.
It is with the Chinese of the 11th-10th centuries BC that we come
upon our first discernible expression by some human beings of the sense
of human venturing as something that involves the coming together and
joint adventuring of all humans on earth; that comes out in the idea of
the mandate of Heaven, formulated (so far as our records indicate) in the
transition from the Shang dynasty to the Zhou dynasty as the latter’s way
of understanding the continuity and discontinuity involved in the shift of
Heaven’s favor toward the Zhou, and in particular, toward the Zhou ruler
as now the proper representative of Heaven on earth. The sense of the
mandate was that of a commission by the ultimate divine power to rule
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in such way as brought human life world-wide into a civilized mode;
with that mandate to make political leadership the vehicle for the
achievement of a civilized life for all humans on earth went limiting
conditions on the way rule was to be conducted, and in particular, an
enjoining of a sense of “virtuous-power” upon the ruler as the force by
which such an issue was reachable and was to be reached. But
characteristically, this early sketch of a sense of the universal community
of the human meant a political order centered in the “central kingdom”
(that of the Zhou), and involved a notion of “civilized” which included
much that was particular to the Zhou life of the time. Others are to be
brought to the heights which we Chinese-- and now, we Zhou-led
Chinese-- have reached, or that inspire us and represent for us humanity
at its finest. Given the sense of a single political center, and of possible
shifts in the con-crete locus of that center over time, and of the continuity
of the mandate and the retention of previous ways within a new spirit
and ways, a sense of the human race as involved in an encompassing
venture which had a direction, an eventual issue, and which gave to
history a structure and meaning, was being affirmed in this specific form.
A somewhat comparable sense emerged beginning with the Jewish
sense of an ongoing dialogue with Yahweh, their sense of being a chosen
people, and the larger meaning for the peoples on earth of this interplay
and this chosen status; but it was with the Christian modification of this
thought, and in particular, with the detachment of the heart of the matter
from a people and with a spiritualization which opened “the true way”
for all, that the sense of history as having a meaning for all gained its
most analogous reach to the Chinese sense. Here it was the ongoing “city
of God” that was at the core of the vision, and the “good news” included
a missionary task of spreading the truth and (at least for a significant
number of Christian believers) preparing for a second coming of the
Christ, and after the apocalypse and the return of the Messiah, the
transformation of life on earth for those who survived and were faithful.
In contrast with these two interpretative glimpses of human life as
found at certain times and places as part of-- indeed, the leading part of- an overall human venturing that was in process and would continue on
into the future, the other peoples of the centuries between the start of the
Zhou dynasty and the lifetime of Jesus operated within horizons that left
unrecognized the race-wide nature of the human venture. In particular,
a different sense of the temporality of the human venture had emerged in
this time-period among the ancient Greeks and Indians. The early Indian
vision-- the Upanishadic, and even more forcefully, that in the
Bhagavad-gītā-- focused on individual human beings as of ultimate
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concern, and with notions of karman (action) as binding the agent and
involving one in endless re-birth until one became able to be released
from its binding force, saw individual life unable to make ultimate sense
except as such release was from ongoing in those cycles. And at their
best (in Herodotus and Thucydides) the Greeks, despite the rise of a
notion of ἱστορία, focused (historical) “inquiry” on major large-scale
events of their time or recent times (in both cases, wars), with a regard
for their unfolding over time, their impact on participants and those
affected, and their holding matters of significance for kindred events of
subsequent times. But the range of vision, while relatively broad in
Herodotus, was not race-wide. And neither in India nor in Greece did a
notion of history as the venture of the human race on earth, and the
question of a significant movement within this race-wide adventure
being in process at the time, itself arise.
It was in modern Europe, upon the background of the Christian message, that another version of history arose, framed most forcefully by
Hegel. Human history had the meaning of the progressive selfrealization of spirit, and according to Hegel, that realization had come to
its culmination in his time (late 18th-early 19th centuries). Later in the
19th century, after Darwin’s interpretation of life in evolutionary terms,
Nietzsche offered an analysis of his times as one in which a fundamental
revolutionary happening is taking place in human affairs, but one of
which his contemporaries were unaware in its true character and
meaning. Yet it was such as to concern the meaning of human life on
earth, and was a turning point in human history in which human beings
were finally to take responsibility, self-aware and understanding what
they were doing, for the existence of humanity as a meaningful affair.
In Hegel and Nietzsche, as in the early Chinese and the Judaeo-Christian, there are glimpses on the part of some human beings of a race-wide
involvement in a venture, but the formulation of these glimpses was in
each case ethnocentric, such as to claim for one group-- and in the cases
of Hegel and Nietzsche, for one individual whose views were
ethnocentric in their core-- a grasp that meant, in effect, that that vision,
in that formulation, was the truth to which others must somehow be
persuaded. But does that do justice to the truth?
b. Historical inquiry
The study of history is-- or should regard itself and be regarded as-the culminating form of anthropic studies. For while anthropic
psychology and sociology address the human with a focus on
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complementary facets of its operation, what the study of history
addresses is the human in its inclusive reach, beyond the divisions into
societies and limited groups, and at the same time, the human at its very
heart, as involving all of us in an adventuring which, entered into by us
simply as humans, relates to what is most ultimate in the nature of things.
More specifically, the study of history addresses the human race in its
temporally-extended existence on earth, with the idea of ascertaining so
far as possible the course of that existence, its structure, its significant
events and phases, and its overall meaning.
Historical inquiry is truth-seeking inquiry, and is an effort responsibly undertaken from the same standpoint as that assumed in the other
anthropic studies. It also has the same three-sidedness as anthropic
psychology and anthropic sociology. One side involves the provisional
conceptualization of the nature and structure of its field, namely, history;
a second concerns the grasp of the relevant standard(s) for understanding
and assessing what is taking place in its field; and the third involves
exploration and description of the extended ad-venture which is history.
(1) First side of historical inquiry: the field,
and the manner of inquiry into it
There is this distinctiveness about the field of history, that it is
basically constituted as a single (because all-inclusive) affair which is
an as-yet-unfinished ad-venture. The first side of historical inquiry
grasps this field in initial and tentative fashion, just as in the other forms
of disciplined inquiry; and in this case, as in anthropic studies generally,
it does so by abs-traction of history-- of the ad-venturing existence of the
human race on earth-- from the full con-creteness of existence, in an abstraction made for inquiry that is to be conducted from the standpoint of
human agency. But this field is temporal and exists at any time only in
an ongoing and unfinished way, in such way that part of its actuality has
already come to pass, while the actuality of its future (if there is to be
such a thing) is not yet existent. Thus the field is (so to speak) continually extant in an unfinished state of itself as field. How is it possible to
investigate such a field, and more fundamentally, to define it in its nature
and conceptualize it in its essential features and dimensions?
Thought undertaken from the standpoint of agency can take many
forms and can pursue inquiry in rather different directions. As we have
seen, the primordial thought undertaken there is that of the individual’s
practical re-flection, where the standpoint is that of a human agent,
indeed, but of an individual human agent concerned with his/her activity
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as something to be undertaken as part of assuming responsibility for
his/her own life. We have considered such re-flection briefly in Chapter
3, and have considered more at length the philosophical re-flection
which, while also that of the individual human agent, is undertaken from
the standpoint of that individual agent as human, not simply as individual;
and philosophical re-flection is concerned with the problematic of
existence that bears on the human agent, and with the truth of that and of
reality (including human beings and their agency) as harboring that
problematic. viii The philosophical and practical forms of re-flection
further differ in this way, that the former is disciplined inquiry seeking
truth simply and for its own sake, whereas the latter seeks resolution of
the problem facing decision-making in a concrete situation and concentrates thought on this practical task and issue. What connects the two
here, however, is this matter of re-flection on human life by a living
human being, thus by a human agent who, in the middle of the life he/she
is living, is engaged in seeking to understand (among other things) that
life (in its individual or its universally-human nature) before it is finished.
We have considered in what sense, and how, this is possible, and for our
purposes here need only to refer the reader back to earlier discussions
and to the discussion in The Well of Eternity just referred to in Note 8 of
this chapter.
The character of the thinking involved in such (practical and philosophical) re-flection-- that it itself is taking place in the middle of the
matter to be thought through-- is not unlike that of inquiry into history.
And yet, there are also significant differences.
In the case of life as the inquirer’s own, the temporal-and-spatial
enabling conditions make of that life an inherently finite affair, always
being lived by the active being in a temporal convergence of beginning
and end in the ongoing middle, a convergence which harbors and makes
available both potential and developed resource in-and-for the forming
of activity that is taking place in that ongoing. Inherent in the active
being’s being are meant-to-be’s as well, so that the life to be understood- whether as an individual affair or as human-- must be understood in its
inner tensions between the meant-to-be, the actual (currently and
already), and the potential, as well as in its con-crete unfolding in the
ongoing movement wherein it is being lived and wherein those tensions
are continually being integrated and resolved somehow in the encounter
with circumstance. At nowhere along the way is life ever sheer fact, let
alone wholly-actualized-and-finished fact, yet as an affair of movement
it does have a multi-tensioned structure which makes possible its
continuing con-crete actualization as a temporal-whole all along the way;
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and depending on the ‘how’ of that actualization at any time, the latter
gives life its current character at that time.
In contrast, history is an ongoing trans-individual affair, not (like life)
an inherently finite whole which, as belonging to a single individual, is
ever being actualized in-and-by his/her activity. History is ever being
actualized in-and-as the ongoing interactively-active engagement-withcircumstance of contemporaneously-existing human beings.
Its
continuing actualization in this plural fashion is the ongoing work of no
single individual but of all contemporaries in-and-as their own venturing
as human beings. Each individual’s share in the making of history takes
its shape responsively to that person’s circumstance and to the various
meant-to-be’s inward to him/her. We-- and in particular, we as inquirers
into history-- find ourselves participants in this history-making somewhere along the way of this encompassing movement; indeed, our
inquiring is a way of participating in the making of history. If this
movement is to be finite as having had a beginning (with the emergence
of living human beings on earth) and having an end (with the
disappearance of such beings here), that end remains in the future at
present. Thus if history is eventually to cease in its movement and to
have been then a finite actual whole, its finitude will be a secondary and
dependent one, a function ultimately of the finitude (their limited number,
their mortal being) of the adventurers who have been, are, and will be its
bearers.
If history moves forward on the strength of the active venturing of
plural venturers, to the extent that the venturing of the different
individual human beings is individually different that movement is a very
complex and diverse affair. But to the extent that the venturers are all
human, to that extent the venturing of each individual is formed by, and
manifests the essential element in, our common human nature-- the
responsive initiative capacity whereby decision-making-and-executing
take shape; it also manifests the creational and human-nature meant-tobe’s, factors responsiveness to which enters into the taking up with the
particularity-- circumstantial and inward-- that is to be entered (or not)
into the venturing in each case. Now included in the variety whose living
and acting are advancing history are individuals who are pursuing
historical inquiry. In every case, these persons in their inquiring are
participating in the making of history, and beyond the individual
differences in person involved, their making-history is effectuated in
their living-and-acting making the effort to think on and understand
history. For individuals to pursue such inquiry, there is need for them
not simply to take part in the making of history but to do so in such way
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as is able to raise expressly into view-- fully, sensitively, and unbiasedly- the very field the inquirer is participating in the making of and thereby
to open the way to a conceptualization of what the inquirer has become
aware of and, specifically, of what he/she regards as entering into the
constitution of that field. For such awareness and conceptualization to
be at their best, and for the address to the field disclosed and enclosed by
them, such inquirers need to be able to stand at the standpoint of agency
in the fulness-of-maturity-as-human-beings, and to become reflexively
cognizant there of the factors at work that make of human activity-- evidenced first-and-foremost in the very activity of inquiry he/she is
engaged in-- a history-making and that make of the field (history) what
it is (the adventure of the human race on earth).
If this self-aware and humanly mature participation in historymaking gives the historian access to the field of history in the only way
that is open for a human being on earth, namely, as field in which an
active individual finds him-/herself already entered as participant in
history-making, and if that access is sufficient to enable his/her inquiry,
it remains that the field that has come into view is necessarily an
unfinished affair for any participant and thus an affair that can not be
brought into concept as a finished fact. How then can that field be
conceptualized? And how can that field be investigated, and the truth
which the historian seeks be arrived at?
If the conceptualization of the field is to grasp it truly, and that means,
as the incompletely-actual affair which it is, it must attend to the factors
which enter into the history-making whereby history becomes actual in
the con-crete. In whatever present is involved, a considerable variety of
things enter into that making, some of which (the responsive initiative
power of human beings, the meant-to-be’s of creation and human nature,
for example) are central and (in some fashion) constant (found wherever
there are human beings and history-making), while others, particular and
quite variable, are more or less contingently central to the actualizing and
the actuality that arises. In conceptualizing the field, then, the historian
needs to notice and assess this difference in the standing and functioning
of the variables that enter into the history-making, to sort through the
complexities of the con-crete to identify all the elements integral to the
making, and above all to grasp those factors in their significance in-- and
for-- the happening’s taking shape as it does and why they have this
significance. ix
Now history as something which the inquirer could directly explore
so as to make such conceptualizations is history as actual and ongoing in
the present in which the inquirer is taking part. As such, it has a futural
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dimension, not simply because it moves forward into the future but more
fundamentally because inherent in its current actuality-and-ongoing are
factors which have a reference to the future and a practical functioning
and bearing within the present on how the future will emerge, so far as it
emerges in-and-through the venturing of individuals. If history as an
embracing affair has, say, a direction other than that of simple advance,
if it is going somewhere, then the basis for that would be found in the
individual history-makers currently composing the field as the inquirer
has access to it, him-/herself personally being one of those. Grasping
that basis and what it implies would be essential for an accurate
conceptualization of the field, since it would not be simply field of movement but one of purposive movement due to the factors involving in the
making.
As for the already-actual phase of the adventure, there is nothing
directly accessible of the history-making involved in it: that is part of
what is gone. But there are traces-- records, relics, and a whole variety
of starting-points in the present for inference back to that past. x The
historian’s task here is the indirect one of, starting from these, re-creating
the history-making and the actuality of the history that took place previously as best he/she can. Having explored and conceptualized the factors
in the history-making taking place in the present, he/she has some idea
of what the traces could represent and could tell us, what and how strong
their evidential value might be for such re-creation, and in general, some
idea how to weigh the extant traces so as to recreate, in as accurate a way
as the evidence allows, the venturing of an earlier time in its historymaking and its contribution to history. In this re-creating, there is a dual
approach required: there is need to regain the character of the historymaking as it took place (with its futural orientation), but also to discern
the actual issue of the making and grasp the character of that issue, the
course of the movement being brought to pass, its relation to the
venturings of other concurrent participants in history-making, and so on.
Seeing the plural venturings as all making their own contribution to
history as the adventure of the race, questions arise about the place of
each in its contemporary set and its contemporary setting, and if there is
a directionality to the venturings taken singly or in their connection with
each other to form something together-- and especially, a directionality
that is grounded in the constant factors of the creational-and-humannature-meant-to-be’s--, questions arise also about the importance of such
con-crete realizations of that directionality in the advance of the race as
a whole. xi
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In such re-creating of the past, operating within the conceptual framework that delineates the field and employing in particular some idea of
the directionality inherent in the venturings of the individuals who are
making history, the historical inquirer seeks to use to the fullest his/her
own participation in history-making to enter into that of others. But in
doing so, does this not invite-- indeed, inevitably introduce-- a bias?
Here a distinction needs to be made: if “bias” means “preconception,
prejudice, partiality, partisanship”, then the answer would be no,
provided that the inquirer does indeed embody the fullest responsibility
of human agency and that the morality of that responsibility together
with the morality of intellectual conscience governs the inquiring. But
if “bias” means “emphasis reflecting the inquirer’s own particular nature
and experience and limitations in capacity to enter into the past
happenings being recalled”, then indeed the historian can only illuminate
what he/she is enabled by his/her capacities to see and discern, and that
will indeed reflect the individual historian’s particular nature, development, and experience. No account is possible in which the weighingand-assessing of evidence, the interpreting of significance and
importance, and the other essential elements in inquiry, are lacking such
limitations. That, together with changing limitations in the availability
of relevant evidence and the ambivalent effect of increasing distance in
time from the persons and events being recalled, mean that any historical
reconstruction is very tentative.
(2) Second side of historical inquiry: standards
belonging to the nature of the field
If history is the adventuring of the human race which, carried forward
in the venturing of plural individual human beings seeking to help secure
the at-stake in existence, is being realized by individuals responsive in
some fashion to the meant-to-be’s of human nature, those individual
human beings are, as human, involved in an affair of growth and maturation so as to come into their full humanity only gradually. Thus the
human beings whose venturing primarily carries the advance of history
are the adults who have passed through the transition time for assuming
self-responsibility and whose venturing continues now as their own and
that of grown-up human beings; the same meant-to-be’s press upon it as
before, but they do so differently now. There is, then, not only an intelligibility to history provided most fundamentally by the immanence, in
the actual interacting of individuals with their circumstance, of the atstake claiming the human responsive-initiative in each individual, and of
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these meant-to-be’s appellatively at work exerting directional pressure
on that same initiative capacity; but there is also, in virtue of its being
meant-to-be’s (creational and human nature) which provide that
intelligibility, a framework of standards, of measures of success in
meeting something that is being called for, introduced by the factors
which provide the basic intelligibility to the field. Those standards
include the standards we have met before, of psychological health (in
anthropic psychology) and of social health (in anthropic sociology); but
in history, these are embraced under measures appropriate to the nature
and meaning of history itself. History being the adventuring movement
of the human race, its ‘healthy’ realization is found in the actualization
of the onward movement of human existence so far as it successfully
advances the human race toward-- and maintains it in-- a civilized-lifewith (with human and non-human beings both) that is commensurate
with the adequate realization of the meant-to-be’s at its basis; that
condition is realized in a responsible history-making that is self-consciously both race-wide and earth-wide in its contemporary reach as well
as in its reach-back and reach-forward, and is of sufficient impact on the
functioning of the institutions of societies to make of them civilized
societies, civilizations. The measures involved in history, beside those
of psychological health (based in the creational and maturational meantto-be’s) and social health (based in the meaning of the social as the
proximate realization of the communal meant-to-be), include measures
regarding the particularity side of human activity, and taking all the
matters so measured, regarding them from the distinctive perspective of
their contribution to-- and to an understanding of-- a certain inclusive
purposive movement to be realized in the advance of the race.
The distinctive feature of history is that it is an affair of movement
achieved by plural agents and gaining its direction and meaning in the
venturing of those agents so far as that venturing institutes a con-crete
answering to the basic meant-to-be’s involved. Now as we have noted
earlier, it seems plausible to think of it having initially taken shape in a
venturing of individuals interacting with each other in a group, and
thereafter, in the forming of diverse groups and thus diverging directions
of venturing and consequently divergent traditions. About the movement
being achieved in this way, four things are of primary importance in
shaping its con-crete character. First is the character and degree of the
maturation of the adult human beings whose venturing has primacy in
giving shape to the con-crete movement of history. Second is the character of the interpretative social meanings that form the shared social
reference for the group and, by assimilation into the individuals in
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question, for the individuals in their individual venturing as well as for
group effort. Third is the character and degree to which, while the
venturing is formed by the common human initiative capacity, the particularities of individual capacity-and-powers become not simply engaged
and thus significant for the character of the venturing but, in the measure
in which their development involves learning, are able to develop and be
employed in a way benefitted by a socially-retained-and-transmitted
accumulation of things learned, so that the native endowment, by
assimilation (via teaching and learning, say) of that heritage, can be the
basis in them for venturing which expands the reach of the venturers byand-amidst particularity beyond that open to their ancestors and predecessors. Fourth, human venturing is formed in a being whose existence
is conditioned by circumstance and formed with a responsiveness which
registers circumstance somehow, and circumstance, beyond including
other human beings, includes the aspects of the earth and the place on
her which functions as the immediate matrix for venturing; such aspects
invite, and enable, and prevent, and in general, help to shape ventureefforts of this-sort rather than that-sort, but in ways which often significantly depend on how the venturers take up with such aspects and
interpret their meaning for their venturing.
It is these four facets of the human situation and condition which primarily account for the con-crete character of the actual advance of
history. With regard to the standards and measures distinctive to history,
three things call for notice.
First: While we may speak of the ad-venture which is history being a
venturing toward-and-to (“ad-”), it would be a mistake to turn this
without further thought into the notion of historical progress, and
especially one which has an eventuation at which the movement of
history terminates, having arrived at a static place at which the condition
of fulness and adequacy is finally achieved. For one thing, beingcivilized pertains first and foremost to individual human beings and to a
kind of culminating fulness to their being in their interacting with
circumstance; presupposing responsibility and the adequate realization
of the morality of responsibility, and with the former, being susceptible
of the differentiation between initial and full, it obtains as actual
civilized-living-with only in-and-as a quality of a being who is actually
interacting with ... , and as such is fragile in its actuality, ceasing with the
cessation of the person (as its ultimate bound) and, even before that, with
changes in the manner of the individual’s engaging in the interacting.
For a second thing, being-civilized as it impacts the functioning of a
society does so through individuals who know a civilized-living-together
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and has such transformational impact on that functioning only so long as
a civilized-living-with is being realized in the participant individuals and
is radiating beyond them to others. For a third thing, while in both cases
being-civilized, and thence a civilized-living with and a civilized-livingtogether, are culminating affairs, they are not for that reason reached, say,
late in history or in dependence on any specific state of particularity; they
are culminations reachable by individuals and sets of individuals in some
fashion along the way of the actual course of history, and as such, while
involving the successful growth and maturation of the participants, at
different times presuppose and integrate quite different things as far as
matters of particularity that enter into them are concerned. In sum: If
history-making is always pointed by its foundational meant-to-be’s to
take shape as an ongoing civilized-living-with, its actual entry into the
achieving of such does not signify an end to history-making but rather
its coming into its own, into achieving an ongoing finality that is ultimate
indeed but is no cessation of itself and no stopping-place. Quite to the
contrary, as long as there is human life the responsible venturing which
accords with the meant-to-be’s must be an ongoing affair, a more-or-less
adequate realization in its civilized-living-with of those meant-to-be’s,
but one which has no assurance of being more than temporary in its
actualization in the individuals in question. Even in the case of a set of
interacting individuals, the participants are finite, and as new participants
enter, even they are self-aware participants in such history-making at
most only for the while of their individual ‘coming into his/her own’, for
the time between initial maturity and death. There is no reason to think
that endless continuation of such an inter-active set with changing
participants would be possible, given the dependent (earthly) nature of
human existence and the challenge-and-change nature of the circumstantial context of human activity.
Second: While the heart of the matter of being-civilized lies in the
human initiative capacity and depends on the development of that
capacity to the point of a capacity for responsibility (initially, selfresponsibility, eventually, full and vocational responsibility), that
initiative capacity has by nature the function of employing a variety of
particular capacities-and-powers (both those of one’s initial-endowment
and those arising in virtue of development), and doing so under a
responsiveness to the particularity-side of self-and-circumstance. That
particularity-side is composed of multiple factors, some inward to our
being and some marking other (non-human) beings who form, for us,
components of the circumstance in which we live-and-act but who, from
their own perspective, live-and-act out of themselves in a circumstantial
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setting that includes human beings. Because we human beings incorporate the circumstantial in some fashion into our being and respond to
it in the forming of our activity, and because we interact with it as well,
the particular contributes in multiple ways to the forming and carrying
out of human activity, and thus enters integrally into the activity which
embodies and expresses the culminating realization of the three meantto-be’s in the responsible and moral interactive-engagement with
circumstance whose connecting with other human beings is a mutual and
civilized affair. It is integral to being-civilized, then, but not of the
essence. Are there standards entering into human activity and deriving
from the nature of things that relate to the role of particularity in human
effort, and specifically, to the role of particularity in reference to the
advancing of history? Let us consider this question in four steps.
1. First step: Human activity ever is responsive to the at-stake of
creation, which is an interactive affair in which a con-crete center-tocenter connecting brings creation to its consummation in a completeness
of the being of the beings involved. Given that human initiative is
formed under the further pressure of the two human-nature-meant-tobe’s, and granting that the history-decisive history-making is that taking
place in the venturing of adult human beings, there is implicated in the
creational issue (so far as human beings are involved) a connecting
effected in effort that enacts responsibility (and if adequately,
responsibility in some stage of its development between the initial youthborn form and its fulness in mid-life). In virtue of the responsibility
involved, such effort employs our particular capacities-and-powers in
such way as seeks to help in the securing of the consummation of
creation and to contribute to this in the vein of ‘giving our most, our best’
to that effort. Because that securing itself is interactive and something
in which we only participate and do not-- can not-- by ourselves
determine, that ‘most’ or ‘best’ relates to our participation, and that
means, to an initiative capacity which utilizes the person’s ‘best judgment’ (relative to his/her native capacity for judgment) and which
mobilizes those particularity-elements in the person’s native endowment
in capacities and power that would aid the ‘most’ in securing the ‘highest
quality’ in the con-crete consummation possible in the situation. The
‘most’ and ‘best’ here set the measures for effort and relate to our
participation in the actualization of the connection of interactive beings;
this is part of the final issue, but only part. The ‘highest quality’ relates
to the connection and outcome itself, and thus includes that part (our side)
but as element in an interacting and connecting which does not simply
involve one party. Primordial among the complex set of standards
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involved in all human history-making effort, then, is that of a quality
consummation to which we contribute but which is not issue simply of
our own effort. At its highest, that issue includes a fulness to the
realization of the natures of the participants-- of their distinctive
initiative capacities, human and non-human--, but also a rich-andprofound-as-possible inclusion of the particularity available for
inclusion and constructively contributory to the realization of the being
of the beings involved.
2. Second step: When considered in a structural perspective, human
life is actualized in activity which is a venturing, a risking, and it takes
place in circumstances which, while they allow and may even be
favorable to human life, are not, in their own constitution, formed for the
purpose of supporting human life. Indeed, as far as other living beings
are a part of our circumstance, they are occupied in living-and-acting out
of themselves and in a seeking to maintain their own life in
circumstances which, just as in the human case, are not constituted as
they are for the purpose of supporting life in the form they know in
themselves. As a result, we humans know a primordial level of acting
on which our tentative exploratory reaching-out early learns to be
aggressive and defensive as regards the circumstances with which we are
interacting, and this, so as to maintain our existence and to adapt-circumstance to ourselves, and ourselves to circumstance-- in a way that
seems to us more conducive to our desired way of living in our
interaction with circumstance than if we left ourselves and things as they
were. It is in the course of an interacting which involves this primordial
level of concern and functioning that we grow and develop humanly and
reach, more or less successfully if we live long enough, into the selfresponsibility and the elements of morality it involves, that is, into an
adult human existence. But unless we are fortunate, the responsible
employment and further development of our capacities in creative
fashion during adulthood at best serves a mainly survival-threatened
living-with and at worst is dedicated to enhancing the aggressive-anddefensive to provide greater security. It is when the social ordering of a
group’s life-together is sufficiently secure, stable, and workable (in
internal interactions, and in providing the necessities for its members),
and there is a match of favorable circumstance with effective
responsiveness, that as we mature into the fullest responsibility we can
find present the setting and opportunity which allow our particularcapacities to receive development and have a function which is not
aggressive/defensive in nature. There are limits, then, set by numerous
facets of the situation but (here) by the risk-and-security-need factor of
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human venturing, to the particularity that can be included in responsible
effort in various circumstances by the various agents, so that not only is
the ‘highest quality’ rarely realizable in its initiative-capacity-heart but
the ‘as rich-and-profound as possible’ character of the attendant
particularity in it is also rarely ‘rich and profound’, even if we do our
utmost to contribute in such way that would make such an issue possible.
3. Third step: Seen temporally, human development begins at a place
which makes a small supporting group needed if the infant is to survive
and begin the appropriation of its own human potential. Given this
dependence and need, with the development of the child goes his/her
assimilation of social meanings, interpretative of the facets and
conditions of human existence. In different groups, the association
would involve different renderings and, with that, different ordering of
roles and the like. Not simply that: in different societies, the complexity
of the social order is also different, and with it therefore the character of
the development of individuals within that order. As our native endowment in capacities and powers becomes developed with exercise and
learning and in the course of this becomes inflected by social meanings
assimilated into ourselves and at work somehow in the forming-andcarrying-out of the activity that employs this developing endowment, so
the native in us ramifies and complexifies and thereby provides for us a
greater and more complex resource to bring into play and with the help
of which to make our effort and make our history-making contribution.
In this, the nature of the society-- the institutions and practices that
embody the defining social meanings for the society, and the way the
social meanings operate in the activity of other members of society-provides a dominant feature of circumstance that conditions and (via
socialization) inflects the evolution of our native endowment, both in the
essential and in the particular side of it. Now a historian, like the
anthropic sociologist, would take note of this variety of the societies of
which we have some idea sufficient for at least a minimal insight into
their structure and functioning, and would note this difference in
complexity and the way in which that complexity would impact the
development of individuals within the society. But the historian would
be looking at this affair with the notion of civilized-living-with in mind,
and while he/she would sort out the variety in ways not so different from
that of the sociologist-- one way might involve (say) levels of complexity,
another, the presence or absence of various complex institutions or of the
arts or scientific knowledge, another, the chronological order of the
flourishing of the societies involved--, his/her question would not be the
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sociological one, of the exact constitution of the society and its functioning. It would rather be that of the presence or absence of persons in it
who knew a civilized-living-with, of a set of persons who knew a
civilized-living together, and of the civilizing impact of such persons on
the functioning of the society in question. Was the society able to allow,
even foster, the emergence of such persons and to function under their
civilizing influence? The civilized character of a society is not dependent on a complex social structure, nor on the presence or absence of
certain institutions; it depends instead on the much more difficult matter
of how persons within the society are operating in-and-through its
institutions, and whether there are those whose operating is of a
civilized-and-civilizing nature. And yet because societies-- and (crudely
put) individuals developing within them under the meanings involved
and with access to the traditional heritage a society carries-- are different
and (the point here) different in regard to the way they foster the
development and employment of particular capacities in the activities of
its members, the civilized-living-with, since it transcends the social
while maintaining it in some form, will be rather different in different
societies for the way the particularity integrated into it is characterized
and for the character which that particularity imparts to the civilizedliving-with which harbors it. Are there measures, then, for comparison
of (so to speak) different levels of civilized-living-with, reflecting not
the latter directly but indirectly, by way of the social?
4. Fourth step: There is another side to the situation that we have just
considered, relating to the satisfactoriness of the social-meanings to
serve their ultimate function. Such meanings-- further particularizing
expressions of an interpretation of the three directional meant-to-be’s
(creational, maturational, and communal)-- have a facilitating function
in their proximate role, but they are creations meant to foster a con-crete
connecting-with in which the society-members involved transcend them,
having been able to breathe their own life into them and to find the
release of their ownmost nature into (by natural standards) successfuland-apt functioning supported by them. But as interpretative creations,
not all social meanings are able, when assimilated and operated under, to
serve well this function of fostering their own transcendence. And that
reflects not so much that they are mis-readings of the meant-to-be’s:
fictions and falsities are not only unavoidable but have a conditionallyconstructive role in human life; it reflects rather that the readings, as
assimilated, encourage-- even more, dictate-- an engaging which, so far
as it accords with the social-meaning, is indifferent to, lesser than, or
contrary to, what is needed if the human being is (by natural standards)
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to mature humanly. This includes the very reading of what it is to be a
human being and to mature humanly; as read in different social settings,
it is somewhat different, and not all such readings are equally capable of
fostering the maturing that human nature calls for. Thus not all societies
have concatenations of social meanings at their heart which, when
assimilated and when embodied in the institutions of the society and to
that extent working to reinforce the assimilated meanings, are equally
capable of fostering the con-crete connecting-with that civilized-livingwith/together involves. Civilized-living-with/together is a culminating
condition, something possible only as fruit of maturation in which socialmeanings have become transcended as the horizon of decision-makingand-executing; if such meanings, when assimilated and reinforced in
social institutions, are so formed as to facilitate (say) a connecting with
other members of the society but not to enable and foster the individual’s
maturing, and if rather they encourage practices which do not contribute
constructively to maturation, then the potential for civilized-livingwith/together becomes left unrealized, thwarted by the malformation of
the vehicles which are meant to help it eventually to arise. xii
In short: Viewing the course of history with such ideas in mind, the
historian would be attentive not simply to the society-and-social-differences that are being transformed in a civilized-living-with that takes
place within a society, and to the varying particularity side-andpossibilities that enter into such living-with in those different contexts
and make for differences in the character of the civilized-living-with,
including the nature and direction of the creativity that comes into play
when mature reflective and artistic powers and creative expressions
become part of a society; but he/she would also be attentive to those
situations where one society has intercourse with others (trade, say, or
any form of interacting, and the forming of connections which can exert
influence and reflect adaptation between societies), and to how civilized
life can take on an inter-national flavor, and perhaps even eventually, can
find a substructure of interactivity and particularity such that it could
gain a global flavor. [More on that later.] But all of this attention would
be in service of understanding how-- and to what extent, in what way-the potential for a civilized-living-with was being realized in this or that
place and time, and how those places and times both relate to each other
and, more fundamentally, have a role in the advance of the human race
in its existence on earth.
Third: While civilized-living-with is something which only human
beings (among the beings we are acquainted with) know as a possibility- indeed, a consummating possibility-- in-and-of their nature, the “with”
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is not simply with other human beings, but with the beings which humans
encounter as entering into the circumstance of their existence. That includes earth and other (non-human) living beings. There is no way in
which human beings can maintain their existence without some degree
of aggressive activity toward the earth and non-human living beings (to
say nothing of other human beings); born into circumstance which, while
indifferent out of itself to the human, can be supportive of human existence, being aggressive in active fashion is something required where
mere survival depends at the very least on appropriating food and water
from circumstance, and where survival is the foundation on which the
variety of particularity-capacities with which human beings are endowed
(to say nothing of those further capacities developed out of these in the
course of the development of the endowment) can be brought into play
and developed. But if we are to make that home habitable by us as
human beings, as beings that be-come ourselves only over time and
whose fulness of self includes a concern in which our interacting with
other beings out of the fulness and dignity of our own being includes a
respecting of any and all beings who likewise have the earth for their
home, then what is at-stake in our existence and activity is an
interactivity in keeping with such respect-- and more broadly, with
respect for ourselves as well. Here, likewise, there is a standard, a
measure, from out of the very nature of things and our own nature,
calling for a fitting integration of ourselves-as-human with the earth and
all earthly beings. That standard requires more of us than, humanly,
simply to have a regard for our own survival, and to seek to restrain our
aggressive address to earth and other living beings only by a selfcentered concern not to undermine the conditions of our own existence.
Our existence as human beings is not affirmed in such a self-regarding
form of restraint, a form of prudent self-interest in which we are failing
to live up to the humanity in ourselves. What the fitting-together is in
which we, as civilized-human-beings, affirm ourselves-and-otherstogether and make ourselves at home without unnecessarily disrupting
the lives of other beings, will differ in particulars from society to society,
from situation to situation. But the ‘highest quality’ of consummation of
creation that is to issue in interaction that includes human beings as
participants does not include the ‘greatest aggrandizement of the human
ego’.
(3) Third side of historical inquiry: discerning and
recounting the actual historical advance
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(a) Discerning the actual course of history

History as an ad-venturing of the race has taken an actual course
which, as the inquirer is him-/herself contributing to its advancing movement, becomes the primary focus-- a retrospective one-- of his/her
historical inquiry and historiographic recall. Because as an inclusive
affair of plurally-achieved movement it is extensive and mostly gone
without record, the diversified character of the total advance is incapable
of being traced. It is only the humans of fairly recent times-- at best, of
the last six thousand years, in scattered areas of the earth-- that, by way
of archaeologically discovered traces (artifacts, camp-sites, and the like)
and then in written records, relict structures, burial-cemeteries, and the
like, have left evidence of their lives, some of which are sufficient to
embolden us to think we can discern major features of those lives and do
something to re-construct at least aspects of the history of their times.
But put more cautiously, it is only in regard to the humans of even more
recent times-- the last three thousand years, in certain areas of the earth- that the evidential bases we have access to are abundant enough and of
sufficient quality and detail to give us reasonable grounds for thinking
we might understand in principle the major con-crete forces and
components of the main threads of the movement of history in recent
times. Now these point us to the actual course of those times as an
exceedingly complex affair, so that inquiry into it can take many forms,
with many different emphases or points of focus for investigation,
interpretation, reconstruction, and understanding. And yet, as an adventuring history has an intelligible structural basis and what gives it
structure points to a telos, a meant-to-be which history-making is
implicitly reaching for and which could recurrently be reached as an
ongoing (but not necessarily lasting) affair. The actual course has its
historical significance in terms of this structure and end. If, then, that
course in its totality is beyond any recall based on evidence, yet the
structure and end which give historical movement an intelligibility is discernible, then such reconstruction of the actual course as is possible can
take up with the complexity guided by an understanding of the
movement in its overall intelligibility and can explore, formulate its interpretations, and venture its understanding of at least facets and
segments of the actual course, utilizing what evidence is accessible and
the features of history’s overall intelligibility to underpin its account.
The peculiarity of this enterprise is considerable. For one thing, it is
undertaken from a place later in the movement of history, and by
inquirers who are themselves history-makers emerging at the leading
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edge of a certain thread of the fabric of history and offered an access to
and perspective on the whole from that place. Their effort, with all that
it involves of intellectual conscience and responsible procedure, is to
look back on the past from where they take their stand and to seek to
understand it with such resources as are at their disposal at that place,
including those which are theirs in virtue of their own experience of life.
Later in the movement, and in the person of other inquirers, the past may
appear rather differently to inquirers, without this at all detracting from
the effort of the first inquirers. Any effort is only tentative in the account
it can render, and subject to revision in virtue of further evidence, deeper
and wider experience on the part of the inquirer, greater sensitivity and
thoughtfulness in the taking up with evidence, and the like. For a second
thing, history-making is a futural affair. But when we inquire into the
past beyond the range of our own immediate experience (and especially
beyond the memory of anyone involved who is still alive and could be
consulted), we encounter at best only traces and records of what
happened, among which are occasionally some that remind us that what
actually happened came out of a making-something-happen which at the
time involved, for one thing, an unknown future, for a second,
anticipations that may well have envisioned something different (as
desirable, as likely) from what actually came to pass, and for a third,
efforts which worked (consciously or unconsciously) in other directions
than what emerged. The history-making involved, the ever futureoriented attempting of this-or-that which may or may not be turning out
as intended, has not only gone by, but when we seek to reconstruct it the
not-gone-traces of what did come to pass tend to dominate our attention
in such way as to invite us to seek too narrowly in our reconstruction of
the history-making, as if understanding of that could ignore what does
not seem directly required for making sense of what seems, based on our
limited current evidence, to have taken place. When we inquire and seek
to understand the actual course of history in its truth, however, we need
to discover the happening in the fulness of its making, of its ongoingand-not-yet-done, as well as in the fulness of what actually happened,
and to separate both from what is also part of history, but of later history,
namely, what came in time as occasioned by what happened-- we often
mis-speak of it as a ‘consequence’ of what happened--, as well as of how
what happened seemed to subsequent observers, and what they made of
it in turn and how they acted on what they made of it (most historymaking lives on in a series of interpretations which are not those of
historians committed to truth-seeking). If our own retrospective
approach together with the character and paucity of the evidence invites
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an investigation which stresses ‘facts’ (the ‘over and done with’, the
‘made’, the ‘done’: from facio, Latin, “to make, do”) rather than eliciting
‘actuality’ (the activity whose decision-making and -executing is giving
rise to the facts, is itself continually ‘in process’, ‘proceeding’, ‘in the
making’, as the ‘facts’ are arising from it), nonetheless both would seem
called for if we are to grasp the full truth of history. And the distance we
are in time from what we are recalling, as well as the character of the
resources we bring to bear from out of our own life as well as from other
sources, can make even greater difficulty in focusing on the happening
itself instead of on its ‘meaning’ for later events and times; at the same
time it can enable more of what later comes of what was happening-- but
comes through the response of others that may well be a mistaking of
what was going on in that happening-- to come into view and at least to
raise questions for us about what had really been going on that otherwise
we might not be prone to raise. Historical inquiry is addressing, in that
sense, an ongoing which (at least initially) seems different to later
inquirers into it than it did to the participants, and can seem ever more
different to even later inquirers than to the earlier, especially if we read
back into the happening things which we are aware of as having come
later.
In any attempt to investigate and understand different segments of
the advance of history that we have evidence for and to elicit the truth of
what was going on, three things would seem to be of especial importance
to recognize about the course, its making and the issue of that making.
1. History-making and self-awareness
In principle, the course of history is made determinate in plural
venturings that are experimental in nature, a trying and testing out
individually and socially; in each case these proceed in this direction
rather than in that, so that given the multiplicity of agents involved the
overall venture of the race is internally quite varied. Not only that, but
in the course of time and the passing of generations, individual and social
venturing become inflected with a plethora of handed-down heritages
that are entered into the ongoing experimenting and enable it to take
shape in some continuation-- or at least, reflection-- of parts of the past.
All along the way, the diverse human beings involved in making history
are themselves, and in their conditions, marked by particularities. But
the heart of history-making lies in the initiative-capacity of the diverse
humans who are involved, which responsively registers such
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particularity amidst register of the at-stake-in-existence and the meantto-be’s of human nature and shares in history-making by responsively
realizing these meant-to-be’s con-cretely as part of its giving shape to
activity in dependence on the judgment of the active-agent. Now about
this heart, how the human beings involved not simply enact in their
history-making the inter-dependence which their essential initiative
capacity entails but also realize the communal meant-to-be in their activity differs considerably, not simply in terms of the particularity
gathered up into the activity and entered into the connecting being
achieved but, more fundamentally, in virtue of the way this realization
takes place. Basically, the inter-personal meant-to-be is realized
primordially by way of a responsive register of it and of the instinctive
gregarious inclination toward other human beings subtending its
presence (somewhat as in the case of aspiration and the maturational
meant-to-be); that inclination initially and naturally draws humans to
connect with the others in their proximity and with the help of social
meanings to associate and form societies, and that is indispensable for
continuing human existence and for human development. In such socially-inflected realization of the inter-personal meant-to-be, the historymaking side of the realization can be only latent in the sense of being
enacted in the mode of obliviousness, with no recognition of the
universal implications harbored in the meant-to-be. And in fact, that
seems likely to have been the mode of realization for history-making-- it
is happening, but without recognition of what is taking place-- for most
of human history so far. Even in times when individual maturation
brings something one would recognize as closer to this fullest (the
historical) realization of the meant-to-be, namely, an enacting of assimilated social meanings which one has transformed so as to make them
alive as part of one’s own authentic self and vitality, the hint here-- in
this transmutation of the social which fulfills its meaning-- of a still fuller
realization of the meant-to-be, involving its universal reference (say) and
a connecting based self-aware in this, is only that. As we noted earlier,
we find our first clear indication of express recognition of the fullest
implication of this meant-to-be in China of the 11th-10th centuries BC ,
but even in later Indo-Aryan and then early Hindu times in India (9th8th centuries BC), with recognition of a spirituality that was open to all
but that required withdrawal from society to pursue it, this
acknowledgment of something more to the realization of the interpersonal meant-to-be than the social-and-association did not seem to
involve any self-awareness to its fullest implication. Except sporadically
and here and there, history has till lately remained something being

Commented [56]: [[NOTE 34]]

Commented [57]: [[NOTE 60]]

229

Chapter 4. The human, in the communal dimension

realized without clear self-awareness to the universality it involves. In
our own times, however, the provocation of the ‘crisis’ of ‘identity’ by
the global-integration-movement, by bringing to the fore in pressing
fashion the question of ‘what is it to be a human being?’, has opened the
way to a clear recognition of the ad-venture of history as the fullest
realization of the inter-personal meant-to-be, beyond the connecting of
particular-individual-human to particular-individual-human which depends on a mesh of particularities, beyond the connecting of member-ofsociety to member-of-society which depends on shared social-meanings,
in short, beyond other forms of realization of this meant-to-be. To that
extent, we find ourselves in the midst of a fundamental turning-point in
human history, one fraught with the possibility of a history-making
which can self-consciously acknowledge and align itself with the fulness
that the meant-to-be points us to (that of a civilized life-together) and
which can take up the particularity of present circumstance, including
the ongoing integration-movement, and infuse it with spirit. (For more
on this, cf. the discussion in Chapter 5 below.)
The first thing of fundamental importance to keep in mind in any
account of the actual course of history, then, is this element of self-awareness to the history-making as history-making. What is the difference
between history-making accomplished in obliviousness to itself as such
and that which is self-aware to itself as such? And whatever the awareness, what difference does the accompanying interpretation of such
awareness make, what possibilities of history-making open up or are
closed off by such interpretation, and by different forms of such
interpretation?
2. History-making and the non-human
If the heart of history-making (whether self-oblivious or self-aware
or in some mode in between) lies in the decision-making of individual
participants taking responsibility for their own lives, the judging that is
central to that decision-making and crucial for the con-crete venturing of
their living-- and with that, for their contribution to history-making-takes shape in a responsive register of whatever factors of diverse
particularity (including social meanings) are involved. While these
factors (both inward and outward) do not determine or pre-determine
such decision-making in its issue, they do condition it, and in the
decision that ensues the participant integrates particularity in a way that
reflects his/her response to-- and reading of-- the meant-to-be’s.
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According as how this decision-making takes shape, particularity is integrated into it somehow, but what is crucial is the greater-or-lesser
adequacy of the con-crete venturing as measured by the measures
harbored in all the meant-to-be’s.
Even so, among the particularities that are a constant element in the
conditioning of human venturing are the factors that compose the natural
environment in which human beings find themselves and in interaction
with which they make their ventures. In that interplay with earth and her
other living creatures, the human is set variable conditions by the
environment, given its variety in different places on the earth and its
changes over time; the very effort of humans to sustain themselves as
they adventure and make themselves at home on the earth involves
interplay that includes some efforts on their part to adapt the environment
they encounter to their needs and desires, to modify it as a conditioning
factor in their living-and-acting. But this is only one way in which the
non-human is entered into human activity and eventually integrated into
civilized-living-with, and only a subordinate way.
The most
fundamental way is as composing those non-human beings which enter
in their own way into the interactive-interplay in which human beings
have their existence; where that interplay is taken part in by responsible
human beings, there is the need--out of the meant-to-be’s of creation and
human nature together-- for an engaging which recognizes earth and her
other living beings as co-participants in the issue. They are not, indeed,
history-makers, but their standing is nonetheless as partners in existence
and being and contributors to the history we are making. It is not one of
subordination to the human. When this partnership-standing is
recognized as such, however, how it is acknowledged-- and under what
interpretations-- can differ considerably and fairly significantly.
This interplay-- of the human and the non-human-- and how in it the
human relates to the non-human and defines itself in connection with it,
forms an ever present side of the field of history that inquiry can focus
on and recall can describe, although for much of the time we have little
evidence available on the basis of which to understand what came of the
interplay, let alone to know the impact (say) of the environment in truth.
But at least we know that eventually, over the last six thousand years
quite clearly, humans have taken up with very different environments as
forming their life-setting and rather than being simply subjected to the
vagaries of those environments have in each case significantly adapted
their environment to their wants and needs and have wrought many
changes, intended and unintended. What this has meant, for humans and
non-humans alike, and what place such differences have in the story of
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human history, are important features of any account of the actual course
of history. The story of this thread is reaching a kind of climax in our
current times, as we shall take note in Part II.
3. History making and the complexity of particularity
We know nothing of the actuality of early human history, let alone of
the possibility that it realized with any sufficiency the standard of civilized-life-together. But it seems plausible, as a hypothesis to test out, that
at the beginning of the adventure the movement of history got underway
among human beings whose conditions of life are unlikely to have given
much opportunity and support for the development of any but the most
limited particular capacities; and yet, we are here, these many thousands
of years later, the offspring of a continuous line of human life from that
beginning. Somehow, that happened, and how it happened is unlikely
ever to be uncovered in any detail. But obviously, in a way fitted to and
commensurate with the conditions at the time, human life-- individually,
a developing affair eventually taken on as the person’s own responsibility,
but one whose development involved other human beings and took place
in supportive association with at least some of them-- was possible then,
and managed to reproduce itself and its potentiality and to cope (at least),
perhaps even tp flourish. But how life was interpreted, how it was lived,
we do not know, having no evidence for-- or determinate idea of-- the
earliest human life and conditions, only some imaginative conjecture.
And as we saw in considering biological studies, it is in that conjecturing
that we are most vulnerable to mistaking matters, out of a misreading of
the human as we have access to it in our own lives now and a projecting
backward in time of our ill-founded ideas as part of a conjecture as to
‘what it must have been like to be a human being then’. Nonetheless, in
regard to the movement from then to now, we have the basic terms in
which its meaning, and the assessment of the measure of its living up to
the creational-and-human-nature-meant-to-be’s along the way of its
advance, may be fittingly regarded.
When we inquire into history as a venturing/experimenting in which
human beings are ultimately ever seeking (whether consciously or not,
under whatever interpretation-misinterpretation of the communalmeant-to-be) a civilized-living-with/together, we know that the
distinctively-human-initiative involves employing particular capacities
in a striving which, on a primordial level, needs to maintain existence in
order to be able to reach upward-- although not always, for there are
circumstances and times when death is unavoidable if we are to maintain
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what is essential in human life, or when upholding something is
important despite the risk of death or injury. There are times, however,
when in the advance of history something like such a civilized lifetogether seems to be being realized, and even if these embodiments of
civilization are fragmentary and partial and not fully self-aware in their
historical realization of the communal meant-to-be, such times stand out
from other times for any sensitive human inquirer who catches a glimpse
of them. What lies at their heart is responsibility and the morality of
responsibility, and the connecting of human beings with their
circumstance, and in particular, with each other, in expression of such
responsibility. Inquiry and recall can select out such a time, and seek to
understand how it came about, what conditions fostered it, how creative
taking-to-oneself of challenges and opportunities opened the way into it,
what came to constitute the factors of particularity which became
elements of it and give it distinctive color, and what contributed to the
flourishing of the human-together-with-... in such a time. These are the
times-- times of fruition-- which hint at what history is meant to be, the
rare high-points in the course of history which in the movement-onward
sufficiently embody the meant-to-be that we recognize them. They are
times which stand in contrast to many times (ages, epochs) which are
significant not for such realization but for falling short of it.
Even so, given the wealth of subordinate aspects of life-together
which are realized in the course of history, there is a tendency to focus
attention on these subordinate factors and even to mis-take them for
something essential to civilization, or more precisely, to mistake the way
in which they have an integral role in civilization even though they are
not themselves of its essence. I have in mind here (for example) a variety
of factors of particularity, and especially the particular capacities and
aptitudes and particular skills and competences that are subject not
simply to development in individuals and within social orders but to
transmission by learning and further development in other social
contexts (as a result of borrowing, modifying to operate in a different
social context, say), bringing them quite beyond their earlier degree and
form. Within a social context there are numerous such accumulative
features, ways and techniques, forms of knowledge and know-how,
traditions, as well as potentialities in new members which, beginning
roughly where older generations and other persons left off, can
themselves develop in such way as to elaborate those forms, ways, and
techniques, to an even greater degree. These, and the things which can
be produced by such capacities and aptitudes, skills and competences
(more accurate knowledge, say), introduce complications and changes
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into social life which, if the latter becomes transformed into a realization
of civilized-life-with, become integrated into the latter. They thereby
enter into civilization a richness and a complexity of structure and understructure, social, institutional, and technological, including arts and
crafts and forms of knowledge, and the like; but while they form a richer
and more complex medium for life, they do not of themselves constitute
the civilized character of life-together nor bring to it its finality and
meaning.
Nonetheless, it is one of the important tasks of historical inquiry to
grasp, in such detail as is possible, the interplay of the particular and the
essential as the former builds up and provokes and occasions a
strengthening of the latter (clarifying of awareness of differences, say);
and that would include understanding the creativity which is involved in
the responsible integration of the particular and the transformation of the
social-meanings, such that a civilized-living-with arises for a while. In
what way is civilized-living-with different at different levels of
complexity of the particular, and in integration of different socialmeaning interpretations?
On the largest scale, then, historical inquiry would be inquiry into,
and recall of, the whole movement of history, with its various epochs and
ages, its times of ‘progress’ and ‘regress’ and ‘reaction’, its moments of
approximation to-- or realization of-- a civilized mode of life-together,
but with enormous gaps in the course history took for which we have no
direct evidence and little basis even for conjecture. In that large-scale
recall, the movement shows a break when history-making becomes selfconscious to itself as such, and major variables in the character of the
civilized-living-with in which it becomes consummated for a while are
to be found in the human response to the non-human environment and in
the complexity of inward particularity (as developed and employed in
ways reflecting social-meanings). The aim of inquiry that explored this
advance and these variables would be simply knowledge, understanding,
of what actually took place, and through this, a re-gaining of the past in
the form of knowledge of it. And with that there arises as well the entry
of that past-- through our knowledge of it-- into the ongoing present as
possible resource to be drawn on and to contribute to the venture onward
into the future.
c. Historiography
Because there is something at-stake in human activity, and because
history is an adventuring of human beings in and through their activity,
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it would seem that history is a dramatic affair, indeed, an unfinished
drama. But that raises a final question: How does one tell its story
truthfully? xiii That is the task of historiography.
(1) Recounting the course of past history
Earlier we likened history to our own life: we find ourselves in the
middle of both, participants in their movement, and desirous of understanding both, even though we can not place either over against ourselves
as we can the matters which form the field of the natural sciences. In all
the forms of inquiry which belong to the anthropic studies, and in philosophical inquiry as well, we are addressing the human, and ourselves
being human, we are seeking to understand the human ‘from within’, so
to speak. But not simply that: in the case of our own life, and now in the
case of history, it is ‘from within’ an ongoing affair that we are
participants in and that has not yet ended. If the understanding of such
an unfinished affair gains access to the matter to be understood by our
participation in it, the utilization of that access by the participant-asinquirer needs two things not furnished simply by that access itself: one,
is a grounding of the inquirer in the agential standpoint that is able to
free inquiry from bias, partisanship, and the like; and two, is a
complementary recourse by the inquirer to the participation of others in
the history-making, since unlike in the case of one’s own life, this
unfinished affair is a joint one, not a singular one which the inquirer
alone lives and alone has direct access to. No one has exclusive direct
access in his/her own person to the movement of history in its current
constitution.
Now in the case of an individual life, inquiry which would lead to an
autobiographical account of one’s own life-- even if only of life up to the
time of the retrospective inquiry in question-- needs to center itself upon
what lies at the heart of the living of the life, namely, the at-stake in
existence, on the one hand, and on the other, the initiative-capacity, its
responsiveness to the at-stake, its evolution, and its (perhaps changing)
reading of the variety of meanings and meant-to-be’s that enter into the
constitution-and-forming of activity and life and that enable these to take
shape not simply under conditions but also-- and (since life is an evolving
affair) more importantly-- out of itself. Now our life, as lived, is a dramatic affair, and as long as we are alive, an unfinished drama. Because
of the developing character of our capacity, much that is important is
hidden at any time to us, and that, as part of the very nature of life-- the
need for attention, for focus, for concentration, thus the dis-regarding,
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the dis-missing, the ignoring, to say nothing of the need for repression,
the unconscious functioning, and the variety of constructive (but also
injurious) modes of maintaining the sort of integration of factors that
enables ‘the best possible effort’ to be made; in retrospect, some at least
of this can become visible, but even then visible to someone for whom
much is still hidden. And what was visible before, can become seen later
differently, as registered with different eyes and capacities for
apprehension and comprehension. Prior to death there is no time when
all that is-or-was involved, even all that is-or-was important, is openly
and clearly visible, and ‘dead men tell no tales’. So how can any autobiographical attempt capture the truth? xiv But even more fundamentally:
Suppose that it was possible for us to reach a place in our own maturation
such that the nature of the drama of our own life can become visible. If
we could render an account of this “nature”, would that be the same as
narrating our life in an autobiographical way? In any case, it is clear that
in the autobiographical mode, we are unable to tell the story of the rest
of our life, what is still futural at the time of our telling. An
autobiographical recounting of our life must ever be incomplete, and
truth as the truth of our life as we lived it-- truth in that sense-- would
ever be incomplete, beyond our reach. Yet even as regards that part of
our life that we could bring to speech, how can we tell our life as we have
so far lived it through except in dramatic form? Is the living something
that can be recounted except in dramatic form? Can a conceptual account
catch that life, or must we tell it in story form?
Similar questions and conditions hold in the case of history, but with
some significant differences.
For one, there is a kindred need for centering any understanding of
history on the meant-to-be’s that obtain as reference-point for making
intelligible the ad-venturing which is history, and the inquirer-as-agent is
participant in history-making and has access to-- is responsively taking
up with-- those meant-to-be’s first-hand. But the ‘agent’ of history is not
singular but plural human beings making concrete some connectedness
among themselves as human in the dispersed activities which carry
history forward. If the inquirer is among the participants in the joint
work of carrying forward history, there are others whose participatory
perspective is their own but significant for the ‘carrying’. As a result
there is a somewhat different and additional element of hiddenness,
supposing that the inquiry is addressed to the joint work in its concrete
character and must therefore seek out the contributing of others which,
while first-hand in their case, is nonetheless not directly accessible to the
inquirer.
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For a second, more commonly the inquirer, while a participant in history-making, in his/her inquiry is concerned retrospectively with a phase
or phenomenon in which he/she was not participant. Into inquiry
concerning this, the inquirer may nonetheless carry elements of his/her
own participatory perspective and unwittingly obscure what is to be
found by reading the meaning of discoverable evidence through that
filter as a set of unexamined and pre-judicial preconceptions. Such
elements range potentially from a particular reading of the basic
directionality of history that is founded in its constitutive meant-to-be’s,
to specific meanings forming categories for organizing inquiry and
facilitating understanding but being brought to bear uncritically and ab
extra on the subject being studied.
For a third, the inquirer is concerned with what is a drama in which
something is at stake, but it is not the drama of a singular being and life,
but rather that of the human race, and in any specific segment of history,
that of an aspect of the interconnecting of a variety of singular human
beings in their own dramatic venturing. Since it is impossible for historical (or psychological, or sociological) inquiry to arrive at an exhaustive
characterization of the participants in-- and the connecting achieved in-a con-crete realization which is dramatic in nature, what would be needed
for an inquirer to characterize-- truthfully, but not exhaustively-- what
was taking place, what actually was going on, what actually happened?
No situation involving human beings can be grasped exhaustively, and
even if it could, much of such characterization would concern details
which are not essential for understanding the dramatic movement
involved. And yet, how would one recognize what is relevant or
essential, and what is not? What determines relevance and the essential?
And even if one could recognize the heart of the matter, how would that
be formulated in order to convey the drama of the movement? Would a
descriptive re-production of that heart in a narrative of some sort suffice
to convey it as a happening? Not only will description inescapably
represent a simplification, either because of lack of pertinent evidence
for facets of it or because of a judgment concerning relevance and the
dismissal of what is ‘irrelevant’, but such simplification can hardly fail
implicitly to fill in the gaps at times where evidence is lacking and to
convey a sense which completes something which one knows only
incompletely. How is this not fiction rather than the communication of
historical truth?
(2) Historiographic presentation of the truth of history
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If historical inquiry seeks the truth of history (as an unfinished
venture), and if that truth is the truth of an ad-venturing whose ‘end’ is
‘civilized life’, how does such truth relate to truth in the other anthropic
disciplines, indeed, in all the disciplined forms of inquiry which bring
the human into their purview? Or more broadly, how does it relate to
truth in the variety of forms of human effort which claim to formulate
and convey truth as it relates to the human?
If truth in general is what-is in its undistorted self-disclosure to the
human mind, then anthropic studies are truth-seeking inquiries
concerned with the truth of the human in one aspect or another. But their
concern-- at least, that of psychology and sociology-- is specific, with
the conceptual apprehension of that truth. Is that so with history? In
contrast with a conceptual truth, one may think of art-- a novel, for
example, and thus fiction-- as concerned to convey the truth of the human,
but this is not truth as an issue of inquiry nor is it truth brought to
conceptual rendering. Not only that, but myth as sacred story, epic
poetry (such as Homer), and even legend, make claims to truth, to
bringing forth truth in their story accounts; but in none of those story
accounts is that truth being brought into a conceptual rendering.
Is it, then, that what is sought in anthropic studies is not simply truth,
not even the truth of the human, but a conceptual grasp of the truth of the
human? Or is historical inquiry different? Does it seek more than such
a grasp? To the extent that it sought a conceptual grasp, such inquiry
would provide an account of the course, the factors involved, and so on,
in a conceptual rendering; and it would be seeking such a grasp for no
further end, simply to bring the truth of history into the light of
understanding, into the open for a being whose being is centered in
responsiveness, including awareness. And there are certainly significant
aspects of history which can indeed be rendered in such a truthful
account. But the drama: what of that? Can a conceptual rendering
actually catch the truth of the drama, in particular, of an unfinished drama?
As drama, history has an interest for us of varied sorts, which leads
us (say) to take an interest in any-and-all of our fellow human beings,
even those gone-by, or (say) to enjoy a good story or a well-told story of
human striving, or (say) to desire to learn from the past (as inspiration or
warning, as lesson with a moral, as ...). Indeed, in The Utility and
Harmfulness of History for Life Nietzsche treats historiography as a kind
of recall whose life-serving function leads to its recall under a variety of
selective and revisionary filters, the better to make the past serve life’s
aspiration toward a higher future. Historiography becomes a kind of lifeserving fiction then. But need that be the case necessarily? Can the
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drama not be recounted truthfully despite simplification, and at the same
time serve a life-enhancing function? xv
However that may be, historical inquiry is different from the other
two anthropic studies, as including an effort to discern and recall the
actual course of history’s advance as well as to lay out the structure, the
crucial facets and variables, involved in the advance. And the
appropriate written account of what is discovered through inquiry-- the
history-writing of the historiographer-- would presumably also be
different.
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NOTES

i
A relatively simple but significant example of this: As infants our
‘instinctive’ (natural and meant-to-be) active outreach, which is initially
trusting, invites a reassurance which, as received, reinforces the willingness to reach out trustingly; eventually, as activity takes shape in the form
of ‘doing’, this reinforced trusting outreach augments, again with the
help of encouragement, into a self-confidence that invites further
supportive reinforcement through the time of learning to ‘do’, with
(among other things) its primordial-aggressive mode that tests what
difference one can make. Eventually, self-confidence grows to the place
of steady poise and strength where, much of the time, any outer
reinforcement is not needed, even in circumstances which would thwart
and frustrate or in other ways test and call into question our capacity as
agents. This dialectical interplay between self and others, in which the
inter-personal meant-to-be (calling for realization in a connecting) works
together with the maturational-meant-to-be (calling for realization in an
evolving by exercise and learning), is part of our being-human as a
nature-based be-coming.
ii
Keep in mind that this interplay, involving as it does the particularities of the individuals, is something that is more than “association”. The
latter is an aspect of the richer reality, defined by reference to social
meanings; the actual interplay always involves much more than such
meanings, even as it is inflected by the latter and may even be looked at and

considered by reference simply to those meanings and the way they are at work
in the richer con-crete reality in question.
iii
The Bhagavad Gītā, in the figure of Arjuna and the thought of Ka in the
dialogue between the two which is this ‘song’, urges such a status to dharma.
See my translation and commentary of the work, especially pages 82-83.
iv
It is the thrust of the critique in the Gītā of the Upanishadic notion
that withdrawal from society is eventually called for if the needed spiritual life
is to be realized.
v
Cf. Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Philosophy, Chapters 3 and 6, for
a sense of ‘truth’ of this sort (symbolic truth, as in religion).
vi
The use of the current forms of primitive society, while potentially
helpful in some respects, is readily misleading. There are reasons why
some societies persist but do not evolve or progress, while others
advance; the factors involved in the latter are likely to be missing in
current forms of primitive society, so that the latter would not give us an
adequate access to the primitive forms of the societies which advanced.
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vii

There are further complications terminologically when “history” is used
to stand for the temporal course of “all life on earth”, even of our “solar
system”, and when “historical” is used to characterize times that are
marked by the presence of writing and written records, in contrast with
“pre-historical” times.
viii
The Well of Eternity holds an extended consideration of philosophical
re-flection, that can amplify what we have already said earlier in this
work and what is not being said. See Chapter 3 especially.
ix
For further on “significance” and “importance”, see the following
sub-section.
x
The importance of written records for reconstruction has led to the
differentiation of the ‘historical’ and the ‘prehistorical’ precisely on this
matter of the availability of such records.
xi
Numerous questions are raised by this notion of “importance”, with
its implication that some threads more important than others-- but
according to what standard, in what reference, and how does one
determine that?
xii
Put differently: Not every interpretation of the fundamental meantto-be’s, and not all that develops as part of the social-meanings of a
society, is consonant with the maturity of civilized-living-with, is able to
be transformed and to be given a place in such living-with. This is not a
matter of the difference between spirit and convention; it is a matter of a
conflict between some meanings embodied in social institutions and
practises, some conventions, on the one hand, and on the other, the lifebreath, the spirituality, that radiates in a civilized person’s participation
in affairs. If elements of such inconsonant meanings can nonetheless
remain resident in someone who, with the help of others, has been able
to mature, it remains that such things mar the civilized-living-with,
distort it, although they were not able to prevent its arising.
xiii
For a discussion of ‘telling the story of one’s own life’, see my The
Well of Eternity, 59-68.
xiv

For a case in which this question is explored with a particular life as
reference point, see the first three chapters of my The Well of Eternity. The
case is Friedrich Nietzsche.
xv
For my discussion of this early work of Nietzsche’s, see The Well of

Eternity, Chapter 5. Note that his focus is on historiography, thus on
different kinds of telling, for different purposes or for the same purpose
but in adaptation to different current conditions of the listener-- what he/
she needs to support life’s-reaching-upward. For that end, he treats
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twisting the ‘truth’ as acceptable. But so far as historical-inquiry itself is
concerned, while he discounts ‘objectivity’, he seems not to face the
question of genuine truth in this early work.

PART II
TODAY’S TOMORROW
Chapter 5
What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?
In Part I we sketched out the fundamental structure of being: first
(Chapter 1), the creational nature of being as the con-crete universe of
beings (the-all), and then (Chapter 2), the space-and-time which, in the
act of creation, enable the con-crete interactive-existence of beings,
bringing the distinct and unique beings integral to being to exist as
individual active-beings ever interacting with others, each active out of
its own here-and-now and by way of its own initiative. In Chapters 3
and 4, we turned to those active-beings which are human, and in reflection of the two intertwining meant-to-be’s which relate to the responsive initiative capacity which distinguishes the human mode of being, we
considered, first (Chapter 3), the human in its individual realization. In
particular, we pointed to the heart of the human in that realization-- our
responsive initiative capacity-- as meant to evolve with exercise and
learning, so that we are meant to mature into our full humanity over time,
to come into a fulness of our being as human by the exercise and development of this capacity toward the capacity for responsibility. And second
(Chapter 4), we considered the human in the communal meant-to-be
which pertains to its essential common nature (its initiative capacity) and
which intends for each individual-human a con-crete connecting with
other individual-humans in activity initiated from out of each in the employment of our common human nature and meant by that nature to issue
eventually in an inter-connecting of human beings out of the fulness of
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mature responsibility. In virtue of the nature of our responsive initiative
capacity under the two intertwining meant-to-be’s, we human beings are
dependent for this development of our essential capacity and our own
individual maturation humanly not only on our own exercise of that
capacity and our own self-learning as regards it, but also on emotional
and other support from other human beings, on learning with their help,
and on joining with others in co-operative activity impossible without
others but an inherent potential of our nature. We can not come into the
fulness of the development of our own essential capacity as a human
being without this support and aid from other human beings and this joint
activity with them.
As we have seen in Part I, this coming-into-fulness is complex. For
as born-beings we initially are physically dependent in the extreme on
other beings (those forming the supportive circumstance of our existing),
and in particular, we are essentially dependent on other human beings.
In our interacting with the other human beings on whom we happen to
depend for support and protection we become involved in an associating
with them by way of factors (social-meanings) which represent
facilitating factors for that associating. As we are assimilating these and
becoming members in a social group in which those meanings have a
complex functional role at once integrating (within the group) and
segregating (setting the group off from others), we are developing our
own natures out of ourselves but under the conditioning of such
meanings and of the individuals of our circumstance; it is in such a social
group that we realize, in proximal fashion, the communal meant-to-be of
our human nature, doing so differently in accord with the differences in
the concatenations of meanings that mark different social groups and in
accord with the particularities of ourselves and of those with whom we
interact. In its own nature, however, that meant-to-be intends something
more than an associating in group terms as what is (eventually) to be ours.
Ours is to be a growing and maturing in our humanity which, while
facilitated by social-meanings, structures, and institutions, comes to its
fulness (if and when it does) in a transformation of our initiative capacity
that takes us beyond the social as the limiting horizon for living the lives
we are becoming responsible for; indispensable though it is, then, the
social facilitates an associating which, as such, is-- and is meant to be-only a limiting and limited realization of the human, whereas we are to
become fully human with its help. Specifically, as we mature we are
eventually to gain a capacity for taking responsibility for our own individual lives and for a connecting with each other in which, reaching beyond the social, we can con-cretely realize the communal meant-to-be in
a relating of humans to one another as naturally self-responsible beings.
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Then in time, growing further and into our fullest capacity for responsibility-- a vocational one--, we can participate in a fulfilling con-crete
interacting with any-and-all circumstantial beings, human and nonhuman, one which answers to the problematic posed in the act of creation,
namely, that of the consummation of creation by way of the interacting
of active-beings, and which does so in the fullest measure open to us as
human beings. In the self-conscious civilizing mode of responsible history-making which brings to its meant-to-be fulness our participation in
helping secure the consummation of being-as-the-con-crete-universe-ofbeings, we know that responsible living-and-acting-- realized in concrete, ongoing and limited fashion-- which, in its answering as we were
meant finally to answer to the problematic of existence, makes of that
living-and-acting an affair infused with finality and ultimate meaning.
What the above summarizes is a discernment of the features and the
structured dynamic of the problematic of the con-crete existence in
which each of us finds him-/herself. If those features and that dynamic
enter into the constitution of our ‘today’ as accounting for the basic
character and structure of the emergence of existent beings and as making their present be a spatial-and-temporal affair of interactivity in which
something is at stake that concerns the participants, they also entered into
the ‘today’ of our ancestors, and in a universal reference, the most fundamental of them (Chapters 1-2) enter into the here-and-now participation in existence of every active-being there ever was, is, or will be,
while the narrower (Chapters 3-4) enter into the here-and-now participation in existence of every human being there ever was, is, or will be
on earth. Thus we have so far considered certain fundaments and a basic
structure which enter into the con-creteness of our ‘today’, but we have
not yet considered that ‘today’ in its own full con-crete character, in the
distinctive and variable determinateness internal to it. For while our ‘today’ is, in primordial terms, unique in the beings and the interacting that
are involved, it is determinate in a considerable variety of ways that
introduce into con-crete being, beginning with space-and-time, an intelligibility which we must now attend to and explore in its more specific
reaches.
What is the ‘today’ of us who, in our living-and-acting, are writingand-reading this work? The term ‘today’, like the term ‘tomorrow’, can
be used with various meanings. The initial sense, rooted in the daily
character of life on earth for us human beings and meaning ‘this daylight
time’ from dawn to dusk, then extended to mean the period from one
dawn to the next, is (in its primordial reference) anchored in some human
being who in his/her here-and-now is experiencing the daylight period
as one during which his/her existence is currently working itself out. So
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far as that daylight period, however, is experienced by con-current
human beings as a public affair and as the locus of the interactive-existence of themselves and a variety of other existing beings, we can begin i
to free the meaning of ‘today’ from express anchorage in any particular
human being or beings, by (say) dating the day (February 19, 2008) by
publicly discernible and locatable outward features (events, deeds)
occurring within it. Further expansion, which is commonly achieved by
making the term metaphorical, makes it signify not simply a more or less
extended period of time but more importantly an indeterminate but
limited period which, while including a day in the first sense as its
ultimate anchor-and-reference-point, refers rather to a period of time
marked by a series of events (‘today, the American taste for political
partisanship is souring’), or by a set of ideas (‘today, our idea of ‘liberty’
is rather different from what it was in the days of ancient Greece’), or by
a distinctive, delimited, but relatively pervasive to public life,
concatenation of social meanings (‘today is different from the times of
colonial America’), or by ... . It is in this broader and metaphorical
meaning that I speak of our ‘today’ and ask what defines it for us who
are living-and-acting in it. What series of events, what sets of ideas, what
somewhat indefinitely bounded time-period, what concatenation of
social meanings, constitutes our ‘today’?

A. Our ‘today’ harbors an unprecedented ‘crisis’
Each of us who are communicating through this book is an individual
human being existing in unique con-crete circumstances and interacting
with other beings who form part of such circumstance. In that interactive
engaging there is something at stake, and as human beings we are engaging through an initiative capacity which is responsive to that at-stake as
claiming us. We are also, in our engaging, actualizing the potential of
our initiative capacity under-- and responsively to-- its meant-to-be’s,
carrying the past actualizing of our human nature and the resources
actualized in it into an ongoing current actualizing in which, with an
initiative-capacity that is meant to be evolving, we are reaching for
whatever we are reaching for futurally; and we are entered upon such
activity and such actualizing within the possibilities for participation
which our situation holds, so that we are finding the current circumstance
holding favoring/disfavoring conditions and opportunities for further
activity and the further actualization of our nature, including the entry of
ourselves into our capacity for responsibility in its fulness. Now because
the individual and unique nature of our being and circumstance are as we
have seen in Part I, as we are engaging in this interacting and connecting
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we are involved with a con-crete diversity, the particular factors in which
in some greater or lesser measure con-cretely connect us with many
others in this-or-that regard, so that we share a variety of things in our
con-crete conditions, without this contravening the individuality and
uniqueness in question. We live on the one earth, although in different
places, thus with a different immediate involvement with this one place
of our habitation; we live within the same global climate system,
although again, in virtue of our different places on earth, with different
immediate involvement in the more limited weather systems that form
part of that climate system. There are different levels of such sharing, of
overlap and difference in our personal situations.
In speaking of the con-crete character of our ‘today’, we are going to
focus on different factors which, if they do not connect all humans currently on earth in direct fashion, are significant directly for some of us
now but are likely to become significant more widely in time, given the
forces and initiative at work in our current situations. The different factors will come to our attention as facets of our situation as active-beings- as human beings living-and-acting with something at stake in that
living-and-acting-- and in particular, facets important to take into
account not simply as marking our ‘today’ but as having import for our
‘tomorrow’, and that includes, for our engagement with our
circumstances today in a witting effort to reach for this-‘tomorrow’ rather
than that-‘tomorrow’.
Let us begin with our situation simply as individual human beings
who exist ‘today’. We all share this, that individually each of us is
somewhere in the middle-reach of the ongoing of our lives, and we all
find ourselves there (wherever that is more specifically) in the midst of
a decision-making that is central to our living-and-acting as the
individual human beings which we are. There, too, we find ourselves-having already come to take responsibility (in some manner and measure)
for our own lives and selves-- encountering our immediate circumstance,
with some venturing already decided upon or in the process of being
decided upon under our interpretation of something at stake and
mattering to us. And to the extent that we are on the way toward a fulness
in our responsibility, we find our decision-making as not simply relating
to the enacting of our own life whole but (under some interpretation) also
to something basically at-stake in existence as it involves and concerns
others as well as ourselves. That immediate circumstance in the face of
which we are undertaking and enacting our decision-making will be
different for each of us, but not wholly so. In that regard, where are we
as responsible adults who are making decisions? What do we find
ourselves in the midst of in that decision-making? What most decisively
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marks our ‘today’?
If I would begin to sort out the factors that, while currently forming
part of that circumstance for me today (in the narrow and immediate
sense), nonetheless connect me con-cretely with other beings and human
beings within our ‘today’ (in the broad sense), I would find, say, out my
window a landscape, overall that of a mountain valley with a small
stream running through it, and various mountain ranges visible in the
distance, placed at each end of the valley as if completing the enclosure
of this valley on all sides. In the last century and a half, the valley has
become settled by migrating human beings and, in virtue of the ranching
operations that took shape on the valley floor, it has become fenced off,
roaded, with clusters of houses and attendant buildings scattered here
and there, and some of the land has become cultivated using irrigation.
Otherwise the valley-floor vegetation is dominated by sagebrush, with
increasing intrusion of greasewood: it is arid country, and over the last
ten years or so, country that has also been undergoing a drought. The
Barnoskys, who live in sight across the valley floor at the foot of the
Ruby Mountains that form the valley’s southwest side and who own
much of the lowland in my immediate view, have recently done some
wetland restoration work on the lowland through which the small stream
(the Ruby River) runs, seeking to enhance a portion of it for ducks and
geese and other wetland species; they have also placed a conservation
easement on the pastureland and hay-crop land up here on the benchland,
on the other side of our house from the lowland. Last fall Neal, whose
father Jay graciously made a point of helping us settle into the area when
we moved here a dozen years or so ago, brought over a book for me to
look at, a philosophic book as he characterized it; actually, it was a theological work, articulating in a relatively forceful reasoned way a fundamentalist reading of the Christian message. Now all of this landscape,
including the ranchland that another neighbor of ours, Steve Woods,
owns and that completes the land-area immediately surrounding our
house with more pastureland and hay-crop land, is populated seasonally
by wildlife, especially deer and, in the late autumn months, a number of
moose which come down from the mountains to get together close to the
willows along the stream, apparently as part of a mating ritual and as in
that way also gaining access to wintertime food. Hunting is a significant
autumn activity in these parts, and a way in which ranchers, by charging
fees, can supplement their agricultural income. Despite that, and use (for
a fee) of nearby public land for summertime grazing, ranchers like Neal
and Steve operate under the strain of making a living in a landscape that
is not well suited to their endeavors.
All of this which I have been describing as the landscape, land-use,
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and people, that represent the immediate context of my everyday life is
also the context for the writing I am doing, its mountain-and-valley
character and its agricultural use even helping me enter into my thinking
both directly and by recalling me to the outdoor world I knew as a
youngster on the farm and my many-sided (especially, hiking and fishing)
engagement with the region around Rock Creek in the 1960s-1970s.
Such recall is instrumental to a thinking and writing which, undertaken
with death fast approaching-- something also helping to bring back with
some strength my life whole to me--, make extensive use of my life
experience; it also lies at the heart of a larger recollection based in a lifelong study of languages and books that give access to life and times longago and in distant lands. My study, and the basement, are filled with
such books, and notes, photocopies, and other materials, that make up
somewhat for my distance from any library that could provide access to
such things. When I am not writing, and am not walking out in this
environment (in part from a love of being outdoors, in part as exercise,
in part as element in a rhythm of contrasting modes of participation that
I seem to need for mental and physical health), I am often at the
television set watching the latest news on the unfolding of the political
campaign currently underway for the country’s next president, the
ultimate decision in which (late this year) promises to have a decisive
impact on the future of our country and on the affairs in which we
become directly and indirectly involved in the near future.
What is made apparent in this review of determinate facets of the
immediate circumstance of my current existence today, and in this notice
of something of how I am engaged with it, is a variety of factors which
are parts of larger systems and are connected with-- and affected by-conditions and sets and series of events quite beyond the immediately
circumstantial. Thus as the immediate elements register in me, their
presence and determinate character reflect matters that are not
themselves directly evident here but that nonetheless have local impacts
and ramifications and are important for understanding what is here, and
why it is what it is and not otherwise. Indeed, the local, in its present
immediate constituents, opens out into the global and the whole of
human history, and becomes more fully intelligible when seen in that
larger context. For in the ranching, we know an economic enterprise
within the American economic system, which is more and more an
integral part of a global system-- the price of beef, questions of labeling
of country of origin, the repercussions of mad-cow disease, are
reflections of this standing. The pressures currently being exerted on this
enterprise also reflect a growing food problem in this country and the
world, as population increases and as (in our country and our part of the
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global economic system) expanding urban settlement takes productive
food-growing land out of that use, competition with energy-productive
uses of food-crops decreases the availability of food, and increasingly
unsettled weather conditions threaten the dependability of foodproduction from year to year. Then again, in the settlement of this valley
that gave ranching its place here, we know a historical venture westward,
not simply by individuals and in displacement of the native American
population, but sponsored by the Federal government and fueled by a
variety of private dreams and public incentives. In that same settlement,
we know expansion of a way of relating to the earth as a habitation and
home that displaced a different way of the native populations, and that
even now has not yet taken a shape fully adapted to the nature of this
place but requires much modification and manipulation of the place-especially as concerns water availability-- to provide a relatively meager
living. Then further, in the book Neal (Barnosky) brought over we are
reminded of the role of religion in this settlement, the work of missionaries, and the book itself expresses that missionary zeal, and serves as a
reminder in turn of the recent awakening to political activity by religious
conservatives in our own political system, and on an even larger scale,
of the world-wide turmoil involving religion, as exemplified in the
Middle East. Again further, in the wildlife, the drought, and the arid land,
we know a larger system of life than the human, and conditions of
climate that are beginning to alter the support-elements for life in this
particular landscape and to make tenuous-- if the alterations continue as
they seem likely to-- much life in many places on earth. Finally, in the
thinking and writing of this book, we see a concern for a future that
reaches beyond the author’s own life and life-time, that relates to the
manner of living into the future on the part of the human race as a whole;
and in the watching of a political campaign, we see concern not simply
with the future of this country but with this country’s role in the
international scene and in the determination of the conditions of human
life (perhaps of all life on earth) into the indefinite future.
As we trace out some of the ways in which the local is connected
with the larger human and natural world and manifests forms of historymaking that continue a past, what eventually comes to our attention are
factors in something still larger than what has so far been noticed,
something encompassing and central to the definition of the character of
our ‘today’ (in the broad sense). As a first approximation, we could say:
As the current leading edge of human history, we-- all individual human
beings in the full particularity of our being and circumstance, and thus
all members of all societies in some different-for-different-societies way- are ‘today’ in some fashion caught up in and (in our ways of living-and-

acting) are more-or-less wittingly and willingly furthering (or resisting,
or opposing, or ...) an unprecedented history-making venturing, that of
‘modernity’. In virtue of the way it is taking shape, our venturing is
placing us not simply in the midst of changes (to the different societies
themselves, not simply to their present-members) but more fundamentally into the midst of changes that (a) have plunged us into a
unique ‘crisis’ (‘time of decision’) relating to what it is to be a human
being and to live as a human being here on earth, and (b) have made
necessary on our part a thoughtful practical answer to the question of
how (as we move on into the future) we are con-cretely to enact our life
as a human affair, such that within the determinate context of our present
life we are both acknowledging in effective con-crete fashion our interdependence and inter-connection humanly via our common nature and
are making this a significant part of our helping, in a global-scale lifetogether on our shared habitat, this earth, to secure the ultimate at-stake
in existence.
Spelled out a little more fully: Looking at the world-scene in its
present state, we find our earthly existence appearing to us on different
levels.
At first sight, our 'today' exhibits a variety of conditions which seem
to form an uncoordinated, even coincidental and unrelated, multitude of
changes taking place within-- and in the intercourse of-- different
societies with their different complexes of social meanings. Among the
most obvious and consequential changes which directly link together
some clusters-- but not all-- of human beings are, first, a variety of
separate conflicts, wars and political struggles, currently localized most
intensively in various parts of Africa (Sudan and Chad, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Somalia) and a loosely connected set in the Middle East (Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel and the occupied territories), but
in some cases (by way, say, of terrorism, and threats to the supply of oil
in Europe and the United States) drawing in a much larger segment of
the world. Some of these have distinct and lengthy historical
backgrounds, and represent tribal rivalries, sectarian and religious
conflicts, ethnic clashes, directly involving relatively few peoples; but in
numbers of cases these have become gathered up into more recentlydeveloping tensions arising from recently-developing venturings that
have broader and rather different bases. (More of that in a moment.)
Second, and connected with the first, is the recent development and
spreading use of a variety of means of massive modification of our
earthly environment, only one of which (weapons of war, missiles and
bombs, chemical and biological weapons) is directly related to the first
set of changes. Thus numerous forms of earth-reshaping equipment have
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been developed (for mining and drilling, for dam and road building, for
expanding the built-up land-area [structures-- residential and commercial-- and roads]), the separate and dispersed use of which on the scale
involved has large-scale consequences for the character of the surface
and immediate sub-surface of much of the earth and for the natural
systems which are being displaced and disrupted, to say nothing of the
impacts on water (underground and surface). Third, the development of
a variety of changes transforming agriculture into an industrial enterprise,
using pesticides and insecticides, artificial fertilizers, increasingly
hybridized and genetically-engineered seed-supply and plant species,
and in expression of the second point, using mechanical equipment that
increases the scale of work that can be accomplished and that leads
(together with other factors) to extensive clearing of previously not
arable land (tropical rain-forests, say) for agricultural production.
Companion to this is the transformation of the human use of trees, industrializing and agriculturalizing the ‘harvest’ of trees as a ‘timber-crop’,
again with expanded machinery but short-sighted focus, leading to the
elimination of many old-growth forest areas, and much pollution of
streams, disruption of natural systems and wildlife habitat. Fourth,
underlying such a push in agriculture is (among other things) an
expanding population of human beings, and increasing needs for food,
increasing vulnerability of larger and more densely settled populations
to malnutrition, but also to disease and epidemics, ravages representing
the other side to the physical health which agriculture fosters by
providing the food-stuff for life. Fifth, connected with agriculture and
medicine, but also having other roots, is the increasingly intensive effort
in a variety of countries to discover the knowledge which makes possible
biological engineering, both of the non-human (mainly for food, but also
for medical purposes-- drugs, say) and of the human (cloning not simply
of animal species but also of humans, stem-cell research for medical purposes, genetic knowledge to counter hereditary defects but also to ‘engineer’ ‘better’ human specimens). Finally, a broad development-- the industrialization, then the communications-technology transformation-- of
an economic system that reaches now throughout much of the globe, and
the consequent utilization of energy sources (especially, coal and oil) that
has been quite heedless of long-term consequences and is beginning to
show signs of the unintended but genuine change in the global climate
which such utilization is at least partially responsible for, with increasingly disruptive outcomes on the way even if a concerted effort were to
be made to prevent a worsening of the world-wide (but uneven, and not
completely negative) impacts we can now begin to anticipate.
Of the various enumerated changes and types of change that mark

our world at present, the relatively limited and isolated as well as the
broader and more encompassing all are human-instigated, the issue of
efforts under this-or-that reading of the at-stake in human life to achieve
something worthwhile. This sense, that the changes are rooted in the
human response to the problematic of existence, and in particular, to such
response guided by diverse ways of understanding what is at stake and
of answering to its claim in efforts to help secure it, points us to the possibility that, if we look more penetratingly at what is going on, we might
be able to discern a connecting thread for a good many of these changes,
and could discover a historically-extended dynamic which, as it
increasingly spreads through the world, is in process of engulfing our
globe as a whole.
Seen in historical perspective, all of the six types of change enumerated above do in fact appear within, and seem localized or specialized
ramifications of, a wide-reaching and expansive movement which, in the
course of fashioning and guiding itself by a distinctive-- but not
altogether uniform or self-consistent-- vision of the human, has reached
out to effect an increasing interactive integration of current humanity
globally; but it has been doing this in such way that, in virtue of a manysided and complex surface of conflicts and impacts that have been (and
are continuing to be) generated by and within the dynamic of the
movement, it is bringing on a crisis which is deeper than-- but being
occasioned in virtue of-- this surface. The wide-reaching happening in
virtue of which the crisis is arising is a collective movement which is
serving as catalyst for a first-time close and self-aware integration of all
humanity on earth into a global community. The happening in question,
we shall call “modernity”.

1. Modernity, its historical course and formation
In Part I we understood being to be creational in nature, and such as
to involve beings as active participants in the act of creation, with the
role of bringing it to completion under the directional meant-to-be which
sets such completion as what is at-stake in existence and that means in
their interacting. Such participant beings are individuals, and are finite
not simply in the inclusive spatial and temporal sense implicated in space
and time as we considered these enabling conditions in Chapter 2, but
also in the sense that their agency is always determinate in its character
and limited in the potentiality and possibility relating to any agent. In
our own case, our being is marked by a human nature present in each
individual and making of our active participation in existence something
determinate and limited in characteristic (human) fashion. Thus as we
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saw in Chapter 3, in our activity the initiative-capacity with which we
humans take part is a meant-to-evolve-out-of-itself affair, and that
evolving is meant to take place in virtue of our exercise of such actual
capacity as we have at the time together with such learning as we are also
capable of at the time. In that evolving we are to become capable of a
responsibility which, in virtue of our responsive register of the at-stake
and of our own limits (spatial, temporal, capacity), is to make of our
participation in existence an as-effective-as-possible assisting in the concrete securing of that at-stake.
In Chapter 4 we noted that our human nature is also such that in our
activity we are meant to connect with other human beings in a distinctive
human way, and in particular, to learn how to take part in affairs as human beings with the help and support of other human beings. We are
thus social and history-making beings fitted distinctively to connect with
each other by virtue of social meanings and a common human nature,
and eventually to grow into a maturity out of which we are to enter upon
responsible effort (individual and/or joint) to secure the at-stake in concrete fashion. Our temporality as individual human beings is such that
our personal past not only remains with us as a reservoir of memory but
is continually available in the ongoing decision-making whereby we are
taking part. In virtue of the social meanings we have assimilated in the
course of that past and thus of our membership in society, our temporality
also involves us in a social (traditional, historical, trans-personal) past
extending quite beyond ourselves individually, and we relate to this past
via social meanings and interpretatively, so that even with contemporary
members of the same society the common social past is recalled
selectively and under quite different readings in different persons and
thus bears differently on different of us. But whatever the character of
the interpretation and the bearing, our engagement with things present,
and our reaching for the future, are inflected at the decision-making crux
of our being by the social ‘past’, at the very least in and via the
interpretation of it we carry with us inwardly. Now the course of our
personal living and of the historical happenings that we bear with us interpretatively may well have had an actuality whose determinateness
eludes our interpretations in greater or lesser measure: our cognizance of
them may be mediated by distorting readings, say. But as we saw in
Chapter 4, it is the task of historiography to sort out what actually happened and was going on, and to do so impartially and accurately.
I am not a historiographer, but because our ‘today’ seems centrally
constituted as a continuing of a historical movement which began long
ago, I would sketch out here, in a form sufficient for our purposes, my
sense of that movement as it took shape, and point to the main formative
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factors that entered into it along the way. In our continuing of the movement in current circumstance, we are maintaining, rejecting, modifying,
augmenting, the ongoing issue of those formative factors, and this, in
ways that are keeping the movement alive. Since all attempts to
understand human activity involve the attempter’s own reading of the atstake in existence, and draw on his/her own capacities and experience, I
refer the reader to the first four chapters of this book for indications of
the fundamental framework implicit in the following attempt; but to
provide more focused help, let me preface my recall of the past by calling
back into mind, in a form that is limited but slightly expands the opening
paragraphs of this chapter and of this sub-section, the directly relevant
ideas first expressed in those chapters, ideas which represent the factors
and variables which help make history-making intelligible and will help
us makes sense of the particular history-making movement to be recalled.
According to the way I have been conceiving things, existence is an
affair of the interactivity of active beings, such that the course taken by
any individual being takes the shape it does in virtue of the engaging
from out of themselves and the interplay of agents. Entering into that
interplay and into the defining of that course is the outward side of the
constitution of each agent, itself marked by distinct processes and factors
that make up the determinate outwardness within being and that have
their own impacts which, as conditioning the agential interacting of the
beings carrying such outwardness and registering in their engaging,
contribute to the character of the interactive interplay. Where human
beings are concerned, given the spatial-temporal enabling which makes
activity the issue of an initiating begun in the inward side of the agent
but carrying the whole being into active effort as a unity of inward and
outward, the fundamental factors determinative of the basic shape of the
being’s history-making engaging are these:
(a) First: The maturational, communal, and creational, meant-to-be’s
that concern-- and are registered as they bear upon-- the inward decisionmaking powers operating at the initiative-center of the current (but pastinflected) actuality of the human beings involved.
(1) The creational intends the creationally-culminating as the atstake in interactive-existence, namely, a con-crete interplay which brings
being to an up-to-standard measure-meeting completion; in his/her (initiation of) activity each agent is claimed (out of the act of creation itself)
to participation in the securing of the con-creteness with the called-for
character. The register of the creational nisus in its claiming of the
agent’s activity to such participation pervades the global register of
immediacy and is for a long while indistinct and unclear to the agent in
its specific import; that something is at stake and our activity a venturing
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to help secure it is apparent enough, but what is actually at stake, is not,
given our initial powers of receiving, registering, and interpreting.
(2) The maturational intends an evolution in our decision-making
capacity toward a fulness of decision-making capacity and responsibility,
and in the course of that evolution, at the time of youth, brings
a. the emergence, by nature, of aspiration-toward-the-higherand-better as to be registered by the youthful agent and its
appeal be responded upon;
b. discovery, in immediacy, of the life one is to assume responsibility for as a mortal one, to be lived from now on
to the end under the tensioned-union of the recognized impending of death and the appeal of aspiration;
c. discovery of oneself, in assuming that responsibility, as
summoned to a practically re-flective thinking commensurate with that life-whole, that the assumed mortal and
aspirationally-dedicated life be lived in the con-crete as a
thoughtful affair.
The responsibility begun in such assumption in youth and to be realized
in an ambition-marked enactment of aspiration in activity ahead, is
eventually to develop maturationally into a fulness of responsibility
which is vocational, in which one’s life has become devoted, self-aware
and with attentive concentration, to seeking to help secure con-cretely,
in a way that employs the developed-and-further-developing resources
and capacities of oneself as a living human being, the ongoing interactive
culmination of creation possible in the changing situation in which that
life is being lived.
(3) The communal intends a mutual linking of ourselves out of
our decision-making capacity with other beings who share our nature and
the capacity for developing and employing this same capacity. That
linking is facilitated by social meanings which represent the mediating
factors for our proximal associating out of our common human nature.
Assimilated by the agents in question in a process of socialization, they
function as intelligible connecting bridges for their interacting.
a. The con-crete character of this linking changes over time
as the decision-making capacity at the heart of the human
being’s humanity evolves and enables a different centerto-center connecting. In that evolving we learn to be
human beings with the help of others, we learn how to
interact with others so as jointly to undertake things, we
learn much in the way of skills from others and/or in the
course of interacting with them, and we find our
confidence as agents strengthened or undermined by the

way others receive and connect with us in our interacting
with them.
b. Youth brings to light a fundamental difference in the way
such meanings can function, for up to then they operated
(both as assimilated and as inflecting our social context,
both as dictates and as providing intelligibility) as the
interpretative horizon for our activity. With youth, the
aspirational element in its immediacy frees us (in principle)
from confinement by such assimilated interpretative readings and opens us into the animating ground belonging to
the ‘beginning’ of our own life as our own, with the need
there
for
re-flective
assessment
of
the
worthiness/unworthiness of such meanings to be
reaffirmed by us and regarded as acceptable/unacceptable
inward elements in the new life ahead. We discover in this
way that social meanings can operate in us in two
fundamentally different ways. For
1. they are interpretative factors which can become
surrogates substituting for what they are interpreting, so that we experience them as horizons
whose dictate-and-intelligibility dispositioningand-filtering character delimits for us our world
and our selves;
2. or they can be maintained as tentative implementative readings of matters which we register in immediacy, first-hand, and can keep touch with beyond any interpretation, so that the readings are always capable of being tested by us and revised as
to their adequacy as interpretations, given the
immediate availability of what they are meant to
render.
Especially as regards the fundamental directional powers
in the nature of things-- the three meant-to-be’s, say, and
aspiration-- such interpretative meanings are able to be
fulfilled in their mediating function only when they are
maintained as implementative, and not allowed to become
surrogates. Activity in which such meanings function in
this surrogate fashion is humanly incomplete, defective
and
inadequate in the responsiveness-henceresponsibility with which it is undertaken and carried on.
Only as a responsive undertaking is rooted in the
directional-immediacy can it hold the social in its
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naturally-intended tentatively-implementative status and
can the agent live-and-act ‘beyond’ convention and
participate in existence in the spiritual way which marks
the fully mature and responsible human way.
c. Finally, the fulness of our connecting with others is found
in a mutuality and sharing which marks the interacting of
ourselves as fully responsible human beings. This is still
mediated by the social meanings which are the proximal
facilitating factors for our associating out of our common
human nature, even as we meet and unite on a basis
‘beyond’ those meanings.
(b) Second: The presence of what currently confronts the agent there
(other beings, which register through the outward senses) and the current
functioning of factors inwardly (as these register in inner sense). While
our activity is a venturing in which something is at stake, it is a venturing
amidst circumstance, which in its own nature confronts us as lacking an
inherent purposive adaptation specially to support our existence and
active participation in it; indeed, even the involvement of other human
beings in their interaction with us holds no automatically supportive fit
with ourselves as agents and with our own efforts. And yet ...
(1) given the natures of space-and-time, of existence as
interactive, of life, and of the human, we who are venturing amidst such
circumstance are inherently involved in different levels of reference of
ourselves to-- and dependence of ourselves on-- what is other than and
independent of ourselves in its existence and functioning out of itself;
(2) and we also know an essential dependence on our own
learning and capacity to learn for becoming capable humanly and skilled
in engaging with circumstance.
All of these forms of dependence by which our existence amidst-- and
active relation to-- circumstance that is independent of us in its being is
inflected make us vulnerable as we venture and seek to help secure what
is at stake. And the tension of that vulnerability intensifies the risk inherent in our activity as a venturing in which something is at stake .
(c) Third: The potentiality of the agent and the reservoir of retainedpast, temporally convergent upon-and-in the ongoing register of
presence inward and outward and available to be drawn on in the ongoing
decision-making in the current-now.
Our decision-making capacity, operating within the responsive
register of these three (of the claim by the at-stake, of presence [outward
and inward], and of future and past in the potentiality and retainedhappening of the agent), gives particular shape to our venturing in a
particular situation (deciding upon venturing-in-this-manner-and-

direction in it rather than venturing-in-that-manner-and-direction) and
does so in virtue of
(d) the way that capacity is currently constituted and is currently
functioning amidst these available and present factors and their
immediate register in the decision-making, and in particular,
(e) the way that current functioning is constituted, involving
(1) an attentional bringing-into-focus of various facets of what is
registering within the global responsively-receptive immediacy,
(2) an interpreting and assessing of the practical bearing of what
thus comes to attention and is taken up into the deciding, and
(3) the determining out of oneself of the direction of the venturing
that such register-attentiveness-interpretation-assessment leads one to
take.
And because all (human) agents and their activity are determinate, thus
involve particularity,
(f) this decision-making-and-executing is that of individual human
beings possessed of particular capacities and situated in particular
circumstances, so that given the current-constitution of the (humanly
essential) decision-making capacity (i.e. (d) above), the register of the
three meant-to-be’s as meanings along with future and past (thus, (a) and
(c) above) is joined in the actual decision-making with that of the various
particularities (of self-and-circumstance: particular desires that reflect
the particular needs of a particular active being, the particular
interpretative-social-meanings which function as assimilated in the agent
and as embodied in a variety of ways in his/her particular circumstance,
the actuality and potentiality of circumstantial agents, the threats and
enticements that stem from the particularities of circumstance, etc.) (that
is, (b) above and (f)). And the decision emerges with the help of such
attention, interpretation, and practical assessment (thus, (e) above).
Finally, central to the venturing decided upon is
(g) an element in the constitution of our decision-making-andexecuting capacity, namely, the dialectically-primordial trusting-butwary outreach fundamental from the start to our address to circumstantial
presence and by nature correlating in its two-sided character with the
ambivalence of circumstance as regards its favorability/unfavorability to
our continued being. This primordial character to the outreach internal
to our venturing is meant by nature to function as subordinate-butsupportive facet of all active-effort up to and including that in which,
when we have developed our capacity to take part in existence to the
place (that of youth) where we are (by nature) to take responsibility for
our own life and enter upon activity-as-life-bearing, we are meant (by
nature) to be able to act animated wholeheartedly by the dialectically-
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ultimate aspiration-toward-the-higher-and-better. It is our response to
aspiration that is crucial to the beginning and carrying on of our own life
as our own and our responsibility.
(1) Along the way between infancy and youth, however, our
nature means for us, in the course of our actual encounters with actual
circumstance, the development of trust (the trustful reaching out to
welcome and explore what is being encountered in our interacting) into
confidence-in-venturing as agent;
(2) but these encounters in turn invite us by their ambivalence to
learn and develop a self-protective element in our manner of address (as
extension of a primordial wariness, of a being-on-the-lookout for
anything threatening, into a readiness to react self-protectively at the sign
of a threat relating to our vulnerabilities and to the possibility of our
venturing failing what it is attempting), in reflection of our need to guard
ourselves against facets of circumstance that threaten and/or actually
bring injury to us.
(3) Finally, given the nature of activity as the medium whereby
we initiate an interacting with others in such way as (at the very least)
enables us to share in the securing of the at-stake, we learn-- again, in
the face of the in-dependence and ambivalence of circumstance-- to exert
ourselves with some measure of assertiveness, even aggression, in order
to maintain our continued being in the face of circumstance and while
doing this, to effectuate such securing and to strengthen our capacity to
take part in the affairs of existence as we grow toward maturity.
Because the evolution of trust into confidence, of wariness into self-protection, and of active outreach in an assertive or aggressive mode,
involve us in learning amidst actual circumstance upon which we know
a complex dependence (see (b) above) but which may be quite varied in
its mesh with our efforts and its favorability to our continued being, and
because our learning (such as it is) takes place in a time of life when we
are by nature developing in ourselves a still-immature sense of ourselves
(as ‘ego’) and a way of engaging in activity that is ‘ego-centered’
(seeking gratification of our ‘ego’), we can readily learn to develop the
dialectically-primordial trusting-but-wary outreach in such way as to
live-and-act in an aggressive-and-defensive manner that is also ‘ego’centered. Some measure of this, and of its resultant learning of activity
as a form of ‘ego-gratifying’ ‘doing and accomplishing’, is intended by
nature and is part of the self-becoming (a phase in it) by which we are
gradually gaining a sufficiently self-confident address to things that we
arrive at youth ready for the task which the transitional time of youth
requires of us, namely, the assumption-- on ourselves and in our own
decision-making-and-executing-- of responsibility for our own living as

this is to be effectuated in our acting. In that life of responsibility ahead,
we need that original primordial trusting-but-wary outreaching to
become entered (whether as re-gained, or as maintained from our early
life) into our aspirationally-animated venturing-and-risking, and to
function there in subordination to aspiration and in support of effective
participation in the securing of the at-stake as aspiration points us to it.
In particular, the wariness of that dialectically-primordial heart reflects
the enduring need for the dependent-and-vulnerable venturer to continue
to be (= continue his/her being as an active being) as he/she ventures
amidst independent circumstance and as, aspiring to the higher-andbetter, he/she seeks to participate in the con-crete securing of the at-stake.
Likewise with the trusting outreach by which we would advance into
action open to whatever we encounter. We may, of course, arrive at youth
unprepared, unready to unlearn the ‘ego’-assertive/aggressive-andcompetitive disposition and manner of acting which the in-dependence
of circumstance and our dependence on it seems to require of us, for
growing humanly is no automatic and automatically successful affair.
But so long as we do not unlearn that disposition and relearn the
dialectically-primordial trusting-but-wary manner of engaging, so that in
this new life of ours it may operate in us in a way that is supportive of a
being active that is animated wholeheartedly by the dialecticallyultimate aspiration-toward-the-higher-and-better, we become arrested in
the further maturing of ourselves as responsible human beings and live
as ‘adolescent’, even ‘childish’, adults. For adulthood is not the same
thing as maturity.
In short: history-making is the issue of individual (adult) human venturing which, taken in the limited perspective of its being a con-crete
advancing of human existence on earth achieved in a way that involves
all of these operative factors, is always being undertaken in-and-from
this in-the-middle spatio-temporal locus. The above-cited factors in, and
structure of, existence as a human affair provide the fundamental
framework for making intelligible all human history-making.
a. Italian Renaissance and its humanism
To retrieve the ‘beginning’ of ‘modernity’, ii we must recall stirrings
in western Europe a number of centuries ago, and in particular, the signs
of gathering energy and con-crete venturing apparent as early as the 12th
century in northern Italy, with the rise of the republican city-state; but it
is only after an early start, manifest in literary figures such as Petrarch
(1304-74) and Boccaccio (1313-75), was interrupted by the Black Death
plague in the middle and last half of the 14th century (1347-51 for the
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first onset, with several-year recurrences in 1361-63, 1369-71, 1374-75),
that we see in the 15th century and the early part of the 16th century the
flowering of what constitutes the most apparent beginning of modernity,
namely, the Italian Renaissance and, in particular, its humanistic or
intellectual side, together with the significant spread of the latter (aided
by Gutenberg’s mid-15th century invention of the movable-type printing
press) by the end of the 15th century into a cluster of north European
societies. This several-sided revival and flowering was only one of the
springs (but the first main one, it seems) whose flow initiated that
expanding stream of ‘modernity’ in which we are caught up today. The
flow from this spring became augmented by that from other springs, and
by way of a mutual stimulating and catalyzing of factors carried in these
streams, a dynamic developed in time, and there soon arose, out of the
variety of the initial and subsequent springs and their transforming and
coalescing, a large and complex stream that in virtue of its recent and
current manner of advancing has come to provoke ever more pressingly
the crisis of our time.
This particular 14th-16th century ‘beginning’ in the middle of history
was two-sided. At any time human life is a venturing which, taking
shape with the help of some sort of ongoing responsive
acceptance/resistance to its concurrent ongoing conditions, is animated
by a sense of something at-stake and embodies energies which, as they
enter into the effort to help secure that, may or may not be well served
by what extends the past. Indeed, those energies and that venturing may
find other ways into the future that modify, even reject, the directional
impetus of that (personal, social, historical) past. In the case we are considering, one side of the ‘beginning’ was the growing dissatisfaction in
numbers of persons with a medieval order centered in a (Roman)
Catholic Church which, falling away from the height of its effectiveness
as a coherent organizing power for life in much of Europe, was losing its
power to command assent for various reasons mainly internal to the
conduct of the religion. The Christianity which had ascended to this
height of authority and power had as one of its distinctive original
characteristics a detachment from roots in a particular society; in contrast
with the Judaic matrix of its birth, it aspired to a spirituality which was
not rooted in the particularity of a people and did not embody a particular
society’s shared interpretative representation of the ultimate horizon of
intelligibility. It claimed rather to represent a universal and spiritual truth,
and was able to spread from its Middle Eastern place of origin to acquire
standing and power in diverse societies and a large area. As a religion,
it had (by the 12th and 13th centuries) developed in that side of it manifest
in western Europe a hierarchical institutional organization, centralized in
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Rome and headed by a Pope, and had become deeply involved in matters
political as well-- indeed, the Pope was becoming a monarch himself
both within the Church and in relation to the kings and rulers within
Christendom; and in the course of these times, the political and bureaucratic side of the evolution of the Church was paralleled by scholastic
(theological) developments fostered within the Church, which came to
produce (among other things) an account of the created world that did
not derive wholly from the Bible (revelation, faith) but (as in St. Thomas
Aquinas [1224-74]) derived importantly from Greek philosophy
(Aristotle in particular, was taken as exemplifying truth as natural human
reason could attain to it). But already in the late 13th century, and increasingly in the 14th when the Papacy was temporarily relocated to Avignon
(1309-77) and when its return to Rome led to a schism (1378-1417) and
more than one Pope, the prestige and respect for the papal institution was
declining for various reasons and calls for reform were being sounded
but resisted. The 15th century brought some actual attempts at reform,
but nothing sufficient to recapture the energies of those who were
seeking life and realization in ways that the medieval and ecclesiastical
was increasingly unable to attract and hold.
The other side was a constructive con-crete venturing which was animated by energy embodied in venturing in ways and directions not
emphasized within the Catholic framework. The 14th-16th century Italycentered ‘beginning’ of the dynamic we are concerned with was itself
diverse and several-sided in such energetic venturing, though those venturings shared in this, that in each something was being sought independently of-- and at best in some limited alignment with, although at times
despite-- the prescriptions of the Pope and the (Roman) Catholic Church.
Those prescriptions, among other things, oriented life on earth toward an
after-life, and operated to give validity and reinforcement to a social and
political order on earth in keeping with the Christian faith as it was being
interpreted by the Church. In contrast, earthly life and the variety of its
goods, while affirmed prescriptively in a limited and subordinate position, had become a magnet of concern and energy in diverse ways,
especially in northern Italy. Thus we find a life, its energies significantly
unsatisfied by the then-current normative framework, not simply
reviving in a growing trade with the Middle East, and in the emergence
of political and social, as well as economic, alternatives to the feudal
system-- especially republics, and the rise of leading families and
powerful individuals in the political and economic spheres--; but above
all, with the mid-century fall of Constantinople (1453) and the resultant
influx of scholars and manuscripts, we also find the enhancement of an
already extant interest on the part of secular men of letters in the cultural
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achievements of the ancient Greeks and Romans and a flourishing of
various forms of (visual and literary) art inflected by this study of the
ancients. Already, a recent influx of the classical Greek through Arabian
sources was being integrated into the medieval and Christian, and
subordinated there to faith and revelation (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas). But
for those looking to something other than the medieval ecclesiastical
framework for how life could be lived, the ancient Greek and Roman
civilizations spoke as attesting the viability of another and non-Christian
perspective, and did so in a way that not only appealed in its own
character but that offered support and inspiration for a new ‘today’ and
‘tomorrow’ that could come to birth-- indeed, was already doing so-- in
the present-day. The ‘new’ was not a reiteration, or even an imitation, of
the ancient (Greek and Roman), yet its novelty incorporated a manifold
of things learned from or with the help of the ancients and took shape in
reachings into the future which were kindred in spirit with the ancient
but were divergent in determinate outworking. The height in the
expression of this perspective which represented something like a rebirth of the Greek and Roman as vital powers in 15th century Italian mode
is probably found in the Florence of the Medicis, with their lavish patronage of art and learning; and the epitome of the Renaissance idea of the
many-sided human being is probably Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519),
painter and sculptor, engineer (mechanical and hydraulic), student and
close observer of nature and things in their immediate appearance, and
author of treatises on painting, architecture, mechanics, and anatomy.
Overall, the Renaissance, in its humanistic dimension in the 14th-16th
centuries, was two-sided in nature. On the one side it was an affirmation
of the human, of human dignity and virtue, of that virtue as to be developed to its fullest extent and of its fullest realization as to take shape in
an activism of civic responsibility, one promoted originally by statesmen
as well as men of letters and one whose aim was a widespread civic and
cultural renewal. On the other side it was a study of (mainly) the Greek
and Roman world that (for the most part) preceded the Christian, with a
scholarly and educational intent and an aim at enabling the first side of
the humanistic emphasis to become informed and enriched by the
ancients in a way that assisted its own formation. One strand of such
study was the study of texts, of the Greek and Latin languages of those
texts, and the development of critical techniques of classical philology;
the inclusive aim of such study was the grasp of the mentality and culture
embodied in the writings in question. A second strand of such study took
up with the forms and themes of the ancients and under their inspiration
not only developed an artistic creativity-- creating poetry and literature,
say, using Italian as well as Latin--, but also and more broadly, looked at
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things, first, with the help of ancient eyes, but stimulated by that, then
sought to release reality in its visual and sensuous immediacy from what
had become the traditional and inherited filter (medieval Christianity), to
recover and see it without such preconceptions and, having attentively
registered and noted things in this way, to savor and take up with and
rejoice in the positive values of things in their immediate presence and
character. A third-- and inclusive-- strand of such studious attention to
the Greek and Roman and to the immediate world around was the educational fostering of a practical life in which human virtue would find its
fullest outworking. That fostering involved an educational effort concerned with ‘arts’ that were ‘liberal’ both as liberating the student from
the mental framework by religious orthodoxy and as liberating the
student’s own capacities for free inquiry and criticism. But not simply
that: such effort was to prepare participants in the current revival of civic
life by a study of history and moral philosophy, with a stress on the moral
benefits of poetry and rhetoric, and an emphasis on eloquence, worldly
achievement, and fame. It is in free and artful participation in civic
affairs, both skillful and up-to-high-standards and thus realizing virtue in
that larger communal domain, that such humanistic education was meant
to issue. And success in achieving this aim brought support for their
work from readers and patrons among princes and merchants, as well as
employment in government positions and in the tutoring and education
of the youth of important families. The humanists thereby influenced the
developing conceptions of citizenship and civic patriotism.
The humanism of this time, and more broadly, the Renaissance spirit
as it reached into various facets of contemporary life (the political and
the artistic, in particular), was not anti-Christian, nor even antiecclesiastical, at least overtly; but the orientation toward earthly life that
it embodied and fostered was in tension with aspects of Christian
teaching (its other-worldly stress). And yet, while it was itself above all
a paying close attention to the this-worldly or secular sphere of earthly
life which, while certainly not ignored in Christianity, was recognized as
acceptable to a Christian only so long as it was something subordinated
to the other-worldly, because the humanists copied and translated works
of ancient authors in Latin and Greek that focused on the this-worldly as
seen and valued without that constraining subordination, this humanistic
address not only revived various Greek scientists and philosophers (and
thus views alternative to what were embodied in Christianity and
promoted by the Church), but also brought Christian (Patristic) writings
in those languages into its concern and raised questions concerning
traditional interpretations even of important writings of that character.
Thereby it opened a threatening avenue of study for any orthodoxy of
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Christian belief based on a simple uncritical-- and that includes, innocent
of a studious grasp of the language and implicit cultural framework
embodied in such writings-- acceptance of certain readings of such
works.
In sum: the Italian Renaissance embodies a variety of new ventures
in earthly life which, while taking up with such life somewhat differently
from before and from each other, attest an affinity which includes a lack
of concern to subordinate themselves to ecclesiastical structures-andinterpretative-teachings, even if at the same time they generally show
also an absence of intent to expressly negate the Christian teaching which
the Church would promote, indeed even lay claim in some cases to filling
it out. The various ventures, with a family resemblance in their intellectual and spiritual outlook but by no means consistent or expressly connected with each other in their determinate outworking, shared a focus
on the positive values of earthly life and the nature and capacity of the
human beings whose life would embody the enjoyment of such values.
For the humanists Greece and Rome functioned (in their different ways)
to encourage a reaching-for-new-life and a revival of the human spirit
that affirmed the dignity of the human, for in ways of life and thought
actually realized in antiquity and untouched by the Christian they attested what the human could be, and more specifically, made evident
what an earthly life would be that was more attuned to the values
accessible in-- and expressive of-- the earthly in its own nature than what
the Christian teaching (if not always Church practice) promoted. To a
burgeoning vitality whose novel venturing and outworking in the contemporary world did not yet have a settled framework of its own within
which its reaching was intelligible and seen as humanly satisfying, study
of Greek and Roman antiquity provided some indications of directions
for its own expansion and self-definition, for a fulfilling of life in the
present-day world that, while novel and with considerable appeal and
suitableness in the context of contemporary life, was kindred to what
study disclosed as having been realized of old.
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b. The Protestant Reformation
That initiating contribution to the stream of modernity which arose
in the Italian Renaissance and which was expressed in particular in the
humanist spirit endured for a while as it found diverse body and voice;
its animating vision of the human-- of its dignity, of its many-sided
nature-- was rehearsed in numbers of diverse ways before it gained its
early 16th century culmination. Well before that, however, it had spread
beyond Italy and had reached into northern Europe. While coming to
flourish there in a setting which was rather different from the Italian, it
encountered what were to be the sources of a second initiating spring of
‘modernity’, a spring with a different character from the first and one
whose own nourishment-sources were already present and at work in this
northern setting. This second spring itself found its decisive form in the
Protestant Reformation as initiated by Luther in the early 16th century.
The northern and southern parts of Western Europe have rather
different histories, not the least in virtue of the climates, topographies,
and physical conditions, under which those histories took shape. It was
the Netherlands and the German principalities into which the humanistic
side of the Italian Renaissance principally spread at first. Already in the
middle of the 14th century the same Black Death plague that decimated
northern Italy struck in northern Europe, and while the recovery in the
north took much of the 15th century, the loss of population meant a restructuring of the economic basis for sustaining life. Based on that
altered economy (see below for more on this), the remainder of the 15th
and the early 16th centuries knew an economic growth, an increase in
population, and the revival of life generally, but now in a somewhat
different mode. Politically, the German-speaking areas of northern
Europe were at that time still a mixture of principalities, free cities, and
a loosely organized empire (the Holy Roman Empire), which
principalities and cities, unlike in France and Spain where a nationbuilding and centralizing monarchy was uniting a large territory,
jealously maintained their relative independence. In this loosely connected plurality, the decline in prestige and authority of the (Roman)
Catholic Church that also lay behind the Italian Renaissance had long
been going on, and religiously orthodox as the Germanic peoples were
generally, there had nonetheless long been-- from the end of the 13th
century, at least-- a strain of Christianity, pietistic and/or mystic, which
was different in emphasis and practice from the Church as the Papacy in
Rome would promote it. In figures like Meister Eckhart (1260-1327),
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Johann Tauler (1300-1361), Heinrich Suso (1295-1366), all in the
Rhineland area, and in the lay group known collectively as the Friends
of God (originating in Basel apparently, spreading through the Germanic
world and into the Netherlands), a more inward, more personal, more
meditative (even mystical), religiosity developed within Christianity as
the embodiment of the meaning of Christ. [Parenthetically: An anonymous work (Germanica Theologia) arising in the late 14th century from
this circle was later said by Luther to be the book from which, except for
the Bible and for the writings of St. Augustine, he learned more about
man and God than any other book.] Moreover, in the Netherlands, there
was not only the influential Flemish mystic Jan van Ruysbroeck (12931381) but Gerhard Groote (1340-1384), a layman mystic whose teaching
affirmed the need to combine spiritual communion with moral action.
Before his own spiritual conversion, Groote had helped found a center
for impoverished scholars who wished to earn income by copying manuscripts; out of this eventually emerged the Brethren of the Common Life,
an order that spread through the Netherlands and the Germanic world
and operated as a teaching order which placed a strong emphasis upon
Bible study but eventually integrated humanistic studies into its
schooling. After his conversion, Groote also began attacking clerical
excesses and abuses.
Thus what lies in the background of Luther was not simply mystical
religiosity and lay devotional groups embodying a simpler, more
personal and spirit-centered individual and communal realization devoid
of the sacramental and the Rome-centered eccleciastical structure; it was
also a wide variety of reform cries, arising out of such sources but also
from places within the orthodox centers of the German Church, indeed
in places quite beyond the territory of the Germanic peoples. One of
these brings together in his own person the confluence of this
background and the influx of humanism from Italy, namely, Desiderius
Erasmus (1469-1536). Schooled when young by the Brethren of the
Common Life, then entering a monastery and becoming an ordained
priest, he eventually found himself drawn to classical studies at the
University of Paris and to concern with Scripture as to be approached
and expounded in the non-scholastic fashion of the early Church Fathers.
Responding to Origen, the early Christian writer who promoted an
allegorical, spiritualizing, mode of scriptural interpretation, he began
thinking and writing in that vein, and at the same time made manifest his
humanistic faith in the power of education to draw out the worthy and
discourage the unworthy sides of human nature. Thus he advocated and
practiced a humanistic incorporation of both classical and Christian
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antiquity, contrasting the beneficent impact of such an approach with the
disputatious temper fostered by scholastic logic-chopping. In his years
in England, then back in the Netherlands, he used the philological
methods pioneered by the Italian humanists to lay the groundwork for
the critical study of the past, especially in his studies of the Greek New
Testament and of the Church Fathers. But it was through his criticizing
of clerical/ecclesiastical abuses that he was drawn into the events of his
day in which Luther was the center, and it was through his attempt to
maintain an independent stance, unsympathetic with any fracturing of
the unity of the Church but also with the powers claimed for the papacy,
that he was drawn to appeal to the Pope (privately) for a reconciliation
between the Church and Luther. For to his mind there was no justifiable
reason for division so far as theology was concerned, but there was a
justified anticlericalism and considerable lay resentment over Church
practises which needed (and were capable of) remedying without
breaking up the unity of the Church. His appeal went unheeded, and in
time he became drawn into public disagreement with Luther over the
latter’s stress on predestination. A life filled with polemics ensued, Erasmus being attacked by both sides while maintaining a progressive middle
ground; in it all, he was advocate for a Christianity purified by deeper
knowledge of its historic roots.
It was Martin Luther (1483-1564) who was the crucial and decisive
figure for this initiating spring whose stream came to enter constitutively
into the composition of modernity. If the humanists of the Italian Renaissance felt the Papacy and the ecclesiastical structure of the Church failed
to provide a sufficient outlet for the life-energies of human beings active
in present-day life and themselves focused on the pre-Christian times of
Greek and Roman antiquity as inspirational support for a fuller earthly
life, Luther’s address to that same structure was focused in two directions.
For one, his upbringing, his education through the MA at the University
of Erfurt, his entry into an eremitical Augustinian order, his pursuit of
advanced theological studies at the University of Wittenberg, his career
as a teacher, together with some resolution to his personal distress of
conscience concerning being a Christian and his eventual discovery of
the meaning of the Biblical “the just man shall live by faith”, led him to
inaugurate a program of teaching-and-learning within the Church which
replaced Aristotle and the scholastic theologians by a biblical humanism
which centered on direct study of the Bible, drawing on the revived study
of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, and taking as its interpretative guide the
early Church Fathers and in particular St. Augustine. iii For the second,
in the course of his career as preacher and teacher he had assumed duties
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as district vicar and had entered the world of practical administration and
pastoral care. In this role, as in that of preacher and teacher, he found
himself at odds with the Church on a variety of points, but the
provocation that began the reaction by Luther that started him off on the
path that brought his break with the Catholic Church concerned the sale
of indulgences. These were ways the Church had developed to provide,
in regard to sins whose eternal punishment had been remitted and guilt
forgiven sacramentally but whose temporal (and especially, purgatorial)
punishment remained, a remission of this punishment, provided a certain
payment of money were forthcoming. The practice had been long
established, but when the Church needed funds in times of difficulty, it
was resorted to often. Luther’s posting of Ninety Five Theses on the
Castle Church door in Wittenberg (October 31, 1517) stressing the
inward spiritual character of Christianity and implicitly criticizing Papal
policy started a confrontation which grew in scope, in public notoriety
(abetted by the Gutenberg’s mid-15th century invention of the movabletype printing press, and the relative rapidity thus of dissemination of
documents and books), and in the involvement of other parties entering
into the dispute as it unfolded. The upshot was eventually a conflict
centering on papal authority, and Luther’s defiance, his condemnation
and his excommunication. As the confrontation had proceeded, it
became apparent that other considerations were entering significantly
into the dispute, in particular political and nationalistic attitudes that
were invoked (for one thing) by an appeal by Luther to the ‘Christian
nobility of the German nation’ to help bring about the reforms that the
Church was resisting. These attitudes became crucial to the final
outcome in that, when Luther was condemned, and this condemnation
was joined by a ban voted by the imperial Edict of Worms (1521), many
of the Germanic principalities and their leaders refused to accept the
Papal action or the Diet’s action following it, and supported and
protected Luther. This support for Luther, building on the basis of longstanding social and cultural differences between the Germanic north and
Italian south and on the decline in respect for the Papacy and ‘Rome’ that
had been increasing over the last century, was given intensity by a host
of political and economic factors. In particular, on top of resentments
over Papal claims relating to the authority of the Pope to confirm or
depose emperors and kings, of conflicts between secular and
ecclesiastical authorities over the appointments to benefices, and of
resentment at the immunity of the clergy from nearly all civil legislation,
in a Germanic north that was gaining strength economically through the
latter half of the 15th century and early part of the 16th there was
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increasing bitterness at the draining of resources from the north by the
Papacy, even though the Church was already rich in possessions, monasteries were competing with businessmen while being exempt from taxation, etc. This bitterness was especially strong in the face of the luxury
and the corruption which seemed rife in the Church hierarchy, to say nothing of the morals and worldliness of recent Popes. The growing alienation of Germanic states and leaders from this institution down in Rome,
together with the anticlericalism of the masses, meant a strong basis of
support for a German who would stand up to the Pope and an ecclesiastical institution that seemed increasingly corrupt and resistant to reform.
Luther’s defiance was on behalf of a reform that sought a return to
the Bible as the sole authority and to the simpler Christianity existing
before the Church became the sort of hierarchically organized and
centralized institution with structural complexities intervening between
worshiper and God that it had become and before it claimed the sort of
status which it had come to claim. His reform was conservative
compared to some of the more radical proponents of reform who became
active in the course of this whole affair. Urging that the rule of God was
exercised in two realms, the spiritual and the temporal, he urged the duty
of civil obedience and the sinfulness of rebellion against lawful authority.
And in 1524 and 1525, when peasant revolts surfaced, he was an
ambivalent voice, with some sympathy for the peasant cause but a rather
strident voice on the side of order in the face of imminent political chaos.
Unlike the Italian Renaissance which reached back to the antiquity of
Greece and Rome and thus to a pre-Christian time in its own history, the
Reformation honored no such earlier (pre-Christian Germanic) history
of its own but sought simply a purification of the Christian and a return
(historically seen) only to the earliest Christianity and to the Bible. In
the contrast of Luther with Erasmus, we see this difference embodied,
and in their eventual conflict with each other, the divergence of the two
streams. Thus Luther, in stressing faith, discounted reason, and in
exalting predetermination, discounted freedom of will; thereby he
pointed into a very different future from Erasmus, who stressed reason
(but not as undermining faith). Both emphasized education, but again,
in somewhat different veins. In any case, the Reformation was not
exhausted by Luther but soon became augmented far beyond what
Luther and his followers themselves sought and directly instigated, and
knew independent springs in Switzerland (Zwingli:1484-1531) and
France (Calvin [1509-1564], whose center of activity also became
Switzerland), and subsequently, further splits and new springs eventually
gathering in the Netherlands (the Anabaptists, then the Mennonites,
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Hutterites, etc.) and then England (Anglican Church: 1534) and Scotland
(Knox and the Reformed Church of Scotland: 1561), and so on
throughout Europe and America in the centuries to come. Indeed, the
proliferation of forms of Protestant Christianity continues into the 21st
century, but they all share certain fundamentals visible in Luther: the
affirmations of justification by grace through faith, of the priesthood of
all believers, and of the authority of the Word of God and the Bible as
that Word.
Regardless of the proliferation and the many variations on these
fundamental themes incorporated in its different forms, the Protestant
movement embodied-- and the conflict with the Catholic and the differentiation of forms of Protestant Christianity strengthened-- a penchant,
present in the Roman Catholic and institutionally made quite manifest
therein with the establishment at Rome of the Inquisition (1542), for
treating faith as belief and for conceiving belief in a literalistic (and even
absolutistic) vein: not only is the Word inerrant, but so is (at least some)
believer’s interpretation of the Word. The possibility of moving beyond
this approach of orthodoxy-- right belief, embodied in practical commitment-- is, indeed, retained in the Protestant strains so far as they incarnate
recognition of the need for further (indeed, continual) reformation of the
Church. But the religious history of Christianity now becomes mostly a
tale of warring fanatical parties, each claiming its own way of grasping
and enacting the meaning of Christian revelation and of holding to it as
orthodox, as accurately representing the one true way, in relation to
which all other ways are ultimately heretical. One offshoot of this: the
conflicts gradually weakened the plausibility of any and all dogmatic
claims, at least for those who became infused with a third stream which
comes to form ‘modernity’, that of philosophy and science in their new
(post-medieval) forms, and which invites re-flection that would reach
deeper and raise questions on one basis or another about the connection
of religion (in this case, Christianity) with ‘belief’, ‘faith’, ‘dogma’, ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘conformity’.
c. Initial confluence of Renaissance and Reformation,
context of new springs, momentum-building:
mid-15th to mid-17th centuries
‘Modernity’ took shape with the help of three further significant independent springs and the streams that flowed from them. These springs
arose and developed in that interactive field of Europe in which the bearers of the Renaissance and Reformation came to encounter and respond
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to each other, and while the latter currents were interacting these three
gave their own and further impetus and character to an augmenting and
embracing movement. In particular, they imparted further directional
energy to it in the spheres of the political, the intellectual, and the
economic, and did so in such way that as all five streams interacted,
connected with each other, and complexified the form of the overall
movement, the latter gained significant new features. We may see both
of the formative streams that we have already considered (Renaissance,
Reformation) on the backdrop of the Black Death plague which,
recurring for several-year periods between 1347 and 1375, and again in
1390 and 1400, decimated the population of Europe. Recovery from the
low-point of this drastic mid-and-late-14th century alteration in lifeconditions took considerable adjustment to difficult circumstances, and
the European community was a while in regaining its vigor and vitality.
But during the whole of the 15th century it took to reach the pre-1347
population level in Europe, and especially in the last half of the century,
adaptation and recovery were taking place, and not as a return to status
quo ante, but as the formation of something different. The new
development is outwardly manifest in the fact that the growing numbers
of people were to be found in a rather different locational-distribution
from before, both locally and continentally. And that distribution reflected that (on the economic level) they were developing the initial
forms of a wealth-focused and capital-centered economic mode that, in
time, would evolve into an enterprising capitalistic (free-market and
industrial) order for the providing of goods and services. At the same
time, Europeans found themselves underway (on the political level) on
divergent paths of political re-organization, bringing the beginnings of
nation-states to various stages of development, and as ambition for
greater power and effective self-assertion issued at first in a Europe
which was dominated by French and Spanish monarchies that had consolidated their land area and had themselves entered into rivalry as dominant powers in Europe, the members of the European community were
at the same time entering upon a course of overseas expansion that has
led to the global reach of the European. Finally, in the midst of the
confluence and mutual-adjustment of the first two spring-fed streams
(Renaissance and Reformation) and of the attendant rise of the ventures
on the economic and political level just alluded to, there was emerging
from a spring of intellectual venturing the first manifestations of the most
powerful and hopeful current that composes ‘modernity’, namely, postmedieval philosophy and science. It is in the interplay of these five basic

269

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

streams as they themselves evolve and, in their creative conflict and cooperation, engender further forces, institutions, and a global network beyond anything which was yet present in this early phase of ‘modernity’,
that we arrive at our present state of affairs.
Let us then, first, briefly recall the general character of each of the
three further streams at work bringing ‘modernity’ to birth in the mid15th through the mid-17th centuries, and then, consider the directional
outworking of all five in the mid-17th through the 20th centuries.
(1) Political evolution
(a) Nation-state and centralized monarchy
By the middle of the 15th century, Europe was composed of numerous
relatively small political units of rather different character, the current
forms of the historically diverging and converging development of
diverse peoples with (at the time) various modes of social and political
organization and diverse (social) visions of themselves and others.
Embraced within Christendom, these variously sized political units were
entered into a long-standing tension between the Papacy-and-Church,
heading Christendom spiritually, and their own rulers, especially in the
case of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. That tension concerned
whose was the ultimate status and authority in the temporal sphere. At
this mid-century time there were numbers of places where the spiritual
authority of the Papacy and of the ecclesiastical order of the Church was
fading, and in the presence of human energy seeking an outlet, this
authority was being felt as inadequately supporting the reaching for life
animating that energy. In some of those places life-affirming activity
was venturing in a ‘beyond’ to what presently was the case (both present
actuality and the ideality being proclaimed in it), and in those who were
on the move responsively to that energy and leading the way to
something ‘other’, that ‘beyond’ was tentatively being filled out with the
help of an adaptive revision of the presently-accepted horizon of life so
as to make of it a more acceptable horizon worth venturing within. In
the sphere of the political, the various paths which activity actually took,
given circumstance, opportunity, and available inward resources, did not
bring all the venturers to the same issue, but the one initial issue that did
arise in some places and that would make a significant contribution to
the forming of ‘modernity’ was that of a large territorially-delimited nation-state governed by a centralized monarchy.
In the Italy of the Renaissance, the political development did not
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reach that issue. After the famines and Black Death of the mid-and-late14th century, the Renaissance in northern Italy knew as its underpinning
an economic and political resurgence in the numerous independent citystates which, whether as republics or as ruled by signori (lords), knew a
strong sense of local patriotism, an expansionist territorial reaching, and
almost incessant conflict, leading to the mid-15th century formation of
an ‘Italian League’ (Milan, Florence, and Venice, then joined by Naples
and the Papacy). This league bound these independent powers together
against any power, foreign or Italian, that would disturb the existing
‘balance of power’. However, a ‘national’ sense, sufficient to lead to its
political realization in a nation-state whose territory would be the whole
peninsula, did not evolve from this. Indeed, not only did the
fragmentation remain, but it was made even more complex due to the
presence of the Papacy and the Papal states in Italy’s central region. For
while Rome was religiously the center of a Christendom which included
Europe whole, the connection of Italy with the rest of Europe also had a
political dimension, involving not only the long-standing tension
between Pope-and-Church and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire
but also the dynastic connections of rulers via marriage and inheritance
with different powers in Italy. Thus no sooner had the league been
formed than powers from the rest of Europe intervened in Italy. The
rulers of France and Spain both had dynastic claims there, and the late
15th century saw an invasion by France (motivated by such
considerations), the first in a series of such intrusions; then the mid-16th
century saw the subjugation of much of the country by the Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V, whose country (he was king of Spain) had claims on
various parts of Italy and, given the dynastic rivalry between the rulers
of Spain and of France, had been-- and continued to be-- involved in
struggles with France in Italy. Thus Italy’s various republics and principalities became recurrently entered into war from numerous sides, and
fragmentation remained the condition of the peninsula throughout the
times we are considering. The writings of the Florentine, Niccolò
Machiavelli (1464-1527), reflect the centrality of war in this period; his
account of the political placed war, the discipline and organization
needed for it, at the heart of the aims and the study of a prince, for
security was ever threatened. Even if one does not accept Machiavelli’s
reading of humanity, that men are bad and that a ruler can not be anything
but realistic in that regard and therefore must develop the power
symbolized by the lion (to ward off the wolves) and the intelligence
symbolized by the fox (to recognize and avoid traps), we can see a basis
in human nature for such a state of affairs as marked this period in Italy’s
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history and for Machiavelli’s reading-- but in truth, misreading-- of the
human. For in our sketch of the human in Chapter 4, iv we have spoken
of our condition as active beings, and have seen that our involvement in
existence as individual human beings includes, on a primordial level, an
aggressive/self-protective element in our venturing amidst circumstance,
that we may assure our continuing an existence in which we are responding to the at-stake as it registers in our responsive capacity and claims
our effort. Given the independence of the circumstantial matrix that our
venturing engages us with, and given the primordial uncertainty of its
being supportive, this aggressive/ self-protective element is a persistent
one, and needfully so. But it is persistent as a dialectically subordinate
one. However, as we grow and our growth as human beings brings the
at-stake to register in the mode of aspiration, if we interpret the at-stake
in such way as intensifies our exposure as vulnerable in the activity in
which we are seeking to secure it-- something which we do when see it
in terms of wealth, power, standing, so that these become imperative to
us--, then the imperative of securing these can make us captive to an
aggressiveness and a wariness that elevate the ever present
aggressive/defensive element of our involvement in activity into an
encapsulating aggressive/defensive posture that dominates our involvement in circumstance. If this becomes the modality in which those who
are enacting political leadership carry out their endeavors, then it is quite
understandable how such a state of affairs in Italy, and such a reading of
the human by Machiavelli, could arise. Whatever particularity is needed
to understand the ‘balance of power’ issue in Italy in its con-crete form
there, such an issue of a situation of a multiplicity of diverse states interacting with each other is a plausible one-- at least, as a temporary affair- if such a posture dominates in the activity of the states involved.
France and Spain, the two disruptive foreign powers in Italy, knew a
contrasting political evolution in this period, but one which led them on
a larger scale to participation in a comparable (this time, Europe-wide)
‘balance of power’ issue.
Spain saw, in the union of the two royal houses of Aragon and Castile
after the marriage of Ferdinand (of Aragon) and Isabella (of Castile), a
confederation of a large part of the territory on the Iberian peninsula. But
while that unifying development was followed up slowly by centralizing
moves that would enhance the political power of the crown as against
the nobility, what was made central to unification in the forming of the
Spanish nation was religion. The Spain that was emerging turned its
back on both Renaissance and Reformation; it would be a Catholic nation,
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banning all other religions than Roman Catholicism, instituting an Inquisition to enforce the ban, and effecting a religious purification by the
expulsion or forced conversion of Jews (1492) and by a gradual centurylong forced conversion of Muslims (beginning with the conquest of the
independent Muslim kingdom of Granada [1482-92]) and finally the
expulsion of even the converted Muslims or their descendants (Moriscos)
(1609-14). When Charles I came to reign (1516) and then was elected
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1519), he aspired to a universal
monarchy by acting as champion of Christianity against the Ottoman
Turks and of the Catholic Church against the German heretics led by
Luther and other Protestant leaders. His effort to re-establish the supremacy of Roman Catholicism, Spanish style, throughout Europe-- indeed,
throughout the New World which Spain was opening up abroad-- was
continued by his son, Philip II, whose rule (1556-98) was likewise
marked by the aim of maintaining his subjects in the true Catholic
religion and seeking to defend and advance the faith in Spain’s
interaction with the larger world. But while Philip was able to rule over
a wide-reaching empire which had, outwardly, a greatness in power,
extent, and influence, that made it supreme among the nations of the time,
internally the functioning of the economy suffered from the treatment of
the Jews and Moriscos, who had, in distinction from a nobility that disdained productive work and those who engaged in it, formed a good portion of the economically sophisticated and capable class in Spain. And
politically, the achievement masked the failure of Charles and Philip both
to develop a system of royal government that did not depend almost
wholly on the ability of the king to lead and make decisions. Thus under
the less capable rulers that followed, Spain was outwitted and outmaneuvered by (most of all) France, and before long, Spanish mastery of the
seas, the key to her overseas empire, was severely diminished when the
English defeated the Armada (1588) and was further undermined by the
Dutch in another sea-battle (1639). In addition, her power on land was
hedged in by France (1642-43), and her control of the United Provinces
of the Netherlands was finally renounced as part of the peace ending the
Thirty Years War (1618-48). France had displaced Spain and become
ascendant on the continent, the Dutch Republic and the English now
dominated the seas, and while the Spanish nobility and the Church may
have remained rich from the gold and silver that had flowed in from the
overseas empire Spain had achieved, the nation was not simply in decline
now but on the path to collapse. The Spanish experiment in nation-state
building lost steam, and Spain’s future role in the emergence of
‘modernity’ in its political side was to be quite negligible.
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In contrast, during this same period France was making an aggressive
move on the path toward being a territorially-large nation-state with a
centralized and autocratic monarchy that was more effective and longerlasting in its capacity to exert governance-power internally than was the
case with its rival, Spain. With the Hundred Years’ War with England
drawing to its close, Charles VII (r. 1422-61) began the structuring-- both
a regionalizing and a centralizing-- of government; when carried on in
future, this would make France a nation-state under an autocratic
monarchy exerting its power from a center in Paris. With the end of that
war, France concentrated on its own unification. That meant lessening
the sense of independence which the nobility had developed during the
war and rallying the people’s loyalty to himself as legitimate king
(something aided by the actions of Joan of Arc), and within this
redirecting of attitudes, introducing the financial and military reforms
which strengthened the power of the monarchy in the larger territory
which governance must now attend to.
Louis XI (r. 1461-83) continued the work of his father, extending the
kingdom’s territory from the Atlantic and English Channel to the
Pyrenees and the Rhine, and further limiting the power of the princes.
While maintaining the standing army which Charles VII had instituted,
he augmented the resources available to the king by reforming the
revenue system and (as part of this) enabling himself to raise taxes on his
own authority, without the customarily required approval by the EstatesGeneral or provincial Estates. At the same time, he fostered commerce
and industry within the expanded national boundaries, encouraging
guilds and promulgating ordinances for industry, encouraging mining
and the silk industry, and so on, regarding wealth as an important element
of power. Finally, forming a circle of loyal followers from the lower
nobility and the middle class, and expanding the role of administrative
departments, he imposed his authority everywhere; the subordination of
subject to sovereign definitely replaced the feudal ties of personal loyalty.
Unfortunately, he was a tyrant, brutal and vindictive, incessantly
intriguing; and while he had initiated the development of a professional
machinery of state, he did not achieve anything like complete centralization. In 1472, he concluded a concordat with the Pope that allowed
him to control the appointment of bishops, and it was in regard to this
matter of religion that, after Francis I (r. 1515-47) came to power, the
first major test of the direction of political development in France arose.
There were two intertwining sides to this test: one, the rivalry of Spain
and France as major powers on the continent, and two, the differing
manner in which the Protestant revolution was addressed by these two
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powers. After an invasion and victorious campaign (1515) to recover the
Duchy of Milan in Italy, and an agreement with the Pope that returned
the benefices of the Church of France to the Pope but gave Francis the
right to nominate prelates to that Church and strengthened his authority
over the clergy, the king returned to France and enjoyed the standing of
the most powerful sovereign in Christendom. But when the Holy Roman
Emperor died (Maximilian, 1519) and was replaced with the young King
of Spain, Charles I, this meant that France was now surrounded by lands
in the control of Spain. There ensued a struggle, initiated by Charles
(now Charles V, as Emperor), and twenty-seven years of warfare interrupted by truces which were regularly violated. After hostilities with
Spain broke out (1521) in the Pyrenees and in the Netherlands, the fortunes of Francis went downhill rapidly, with defeats, capture and
imprisonment, decline in his health, his sons made hostage for his release,
and so on. Even before the Spanish conflict had arisen, Lutheran
writings had begun appearing in France (1519), and Francis, on the point
of war with Emperor Charles and King Henry VIII of England, forbade
their publication, despite his own sympathy with the need for reform and
for the orthodox reform movement. As the Protestant and anti-Catholic
presence in France grew and became a threat, his policy became hostile
and repressive.
At his death (1547), his son Henry II (r. 1547-59) took over, and despite having had strong personal differences and conflicts with his father,
he continued many of his father’s policies. He continued his father’s
expansion of the creation and sale of offices and titles of nobility as a
way to gain resources without imposing taxes, and indirectly that
furthered the growth of a professional class as participants in state affairs.
He continued both his father’s repression of the Huguenots v and his war
against Emperor Charles V, but in 1559 he made peace with Charles in
order to concentrate on his anti-Protestant campaign within France. An
Edict of his in that year laid the basis for systematic persecution of
Protestants. Upon his death in an accident later that year, he was
succeeded by a series of short-lived or inept rulers (Francis II [r. 155960], Charles IX [r. 1560-74], and Henry III [r. 1574-89]), under whom a
series of Religious Wars arose (starting in 1562), vi to end only with
Henry IV (r. 1589-1610). By the time of Charles IX, the Huguenots had
become a disquieting religious and social force, and particularly
important economically as a significant (although still small) part of the
growing proletariat; bearers of the Calvinistic strain of Protestantism,
resentful of the disdain of bishop and baron for commerce and of the
ecclesiastical and aristocratic wealth that had nonetheless been built up
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without entrepreneurial effort, and receptive to the example among the
Germanic peoples, the English, and the Swiss, of a successful alliance of
merchant with Protestant rulers and ideas, the Huguenot represented a
revolutionary force, especially as they formed tight-knit communities
organized along republican lines. What that force represented was all
the more threatening because, as organized rallying point for others (for
example, members of the nobility who were unreconciled to the
centralization of power in a unified state headed by the king), it could
give to any revolutionary action a greater strength than otherwise.
In the middle of Charles IX’s reign, a massacre of Protestants on St.
Bartholomew’s Day, 1572 not only gave rise to another period of war
but provoked Huguenot intellectuals, who had previously professed
loyalty to the King, to turn in horror from Charles IX. A Huguenot jurist,
François Hotman, from his retreat in Switzerland, argued (1573) that
historically the Gallo-French monarchy had been elective, the king had
been (till Louis XI) subject to a national assembly of one kind or another,
and the current parlements and the long neglected States-General were
the weakened remnants of that elective power; that power had been
delegated to these bodies by the people, to whom alone belongs the right
to elect and depose kings. Urging the periodic assembly of the StatesGeneral as a body that should alone have the authority to issue laws and
make war or peace, to appoint to major offices, to regulate the succession
and to depose bad kings, he sounded a century ahead of time the voice
of 1789. But then in 1576 Jean Bodin (in Six Livres de la République)
argued within a religious framework, to the effect that, within the natural
order as one ordained by the divine, the state is a political integration of
families under a sovereign power with authority to govern by law (the
commands of that power) and meant to do so in keeping with the absolute
morality of divine and natural law; governance in a community
integrated in this way (a rightly-ordered community), being a divinelyintended affair whose issue is to be the well-being of human beings living
morally, is the work of a sovereign power whose claim on community
members does not depend on their consent but expresses the natural or
divinely-intended order of things which the sinfulness of man has
disturbed. Such governance, in the rightly-ordered state exercised in
keeping with and fostering morality, respects certain fundamental rights
of the governed (of liberty and property); but if the power meant to be
exercised in this way is exercised in a way that violates divine and natural
law, the sovereign nonetheless commands and may not properly be
resisted by force by his subjects, whose whole duty and obligation as
subject is to obey the ruler. Then again, in 1579 after Henry III had come
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to the throne and had settled the sixth Religious War (1577), an
anonymous pamphlet sent out from Basel (Vindiciae contra tyrannos [A
Vindication against Tyrants]) was used by the Huguenots in France (but
also in time by the Dutch against Philip of Spain, by the Puritans against
Charles I in England, and by the Whigs to justify dethroning James II in
England). It urged: (a) government involves first of all a covenant between God and king-and-people, the king and people promising to keep
the laws and ordinances of God (to be pious), and any king failing to do
this may be deposed; (b) government involves, secondly, a pact between
king and people, the one to rule justly, the other to obey peaceably; the
function of the king is to maintain the law in all three forms, divine, natural (a law of reason expressing a natural justice to which king and
people alike are subject, a law conformable to the divine moral code and
superior to all ‘positive’ law), and positive. Thus subjects (not as private
individuals, but as the people) had a right to rebel using force if the king
disobeyed the laws of God or refused to govern the people justly. Finally,
in 1588 Pierre de Belloy (in De l’autorité du roi) claimed that monarchy
was created by God, that the king was responsible only to God, and that
any rebellion against the king was a rebellion against God. The right to
command obedience is nothing that could be bestowed by man, only by
God; God therefore chooses the king, and there can be no contractual
relation between king and people. To rebel against an unjust ruler is to
challenge God’s choice. If the king breaks his contract with God, he is
answerable to God alone.
Now while the Wars of Religion provoked such diverse thoughts on
the nature of government and the standing and power of the king, the
most that initially came of the Wars and of those thoughts was achieved
when Henry IV, having come to the throne, converted to Catholicism
(1593) and a few years later issued the Edict of Nantes (1598), which
confirmed Roman Catholicism as the state church, but granted a large
measure of religious freedom to Protestants, gave them a right to hold
public office, and allowed them to retain their fortresses in certain cities.
Given the state of relative disorder and the weariness of all after a long
period of strife, the end to the Religious Wars provided Henry an opportunity to exercise his power, with the acquiescence of all, as something
close to an absolute power, and to focus on bringing prosperity back to
France in a period of peace. This he did, with the help of the Duke of
Sully as leader in the task of economic and monetary recovery. Thus
marshes were drained to develop agriculture, the silk industry was introduced and manufacture of various luxury items that had previously been
imported from Holland or Italy was encouraged, new highways and
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canals were constructed, and treaties were concluded that furthered trade
with England, Holland, and Spain. In the course of this, Henry and his
Huguenot minister, the Duke of Sully, began envisioning a future in
which, having overcome the Hapsburgs and bringing about a Europe of
several great states of approximately equal power, something like a
league of European nations could be brought into existence, one in which
the small states would have their place as well-- a sort of Christian
Federated Republic. But in 1610, Henry was assassinated by a fanatical
Roman Catholic, and the crown passed to Louis XIII (r. 1610-43), although for a while the latter’s mother served as regent, then as dominant
policy figure until he came of age and eventually exiled her. In time,
after an advisor of hers (Richelieu) became cardinal (1622), Louis came
to rely on Richelieu’s political judgment, and the latter helped resolve
the disorder left at the death of Henry IV.
Richelieu, one of the most ruthless statesmen in French history,
sought to consolidate royal authority, to make the king absolute in his
kingdom, and also to break the hegemony of the Spanish and Austrian
Hapsburgs. He succeeded in both regards. Internally, with Catholicism
reforming itself and knowing a rebirth, the clash of Catholic and
Huguenot continued, with neither being disposed toward tolerance;
Richelieu, while accepting the doctrines of the Church, not only
preserved the ‘Gallican liberties’ of the French Church as against Rome
but in things temporal he subordinated the Church to the state. And while
overcoming the Huguenots in La Rochelle (1628), he confirmed the
Edict of Nantes, recognizing the immense economic value of the Huguenots to France; and they abandoned revolt, gave themselves peacefully
to commerce and industry, and prospered as never before. More broadly,
in internal affairs he proceeded against the nobles who still held France
to be many and not one; for France was dismembered not simply
religiously but also in virtue of not having fully grown beyond the feudal
order into being a single unified nation. vii Thus in the face of an
assemblage of proud and still semi-independent nobles capable of disrupting the peace and the economy of the state at any time, he sought to
centralize authority and power in the king, and found support in the
middle classes, artisans, and peasants, who approved the absolutism as
protection against the lords. His main concern, however, was foreign
policy and, to make France the strongest power in Christendom, he used
taxes to build up armies and a navy and in the process neglected the
economy and brought France toward destitution. Externally, his aim was
to liberate France from the surrounding cordon of Hapsburg power in the
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Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and Spain. But in his placing this goal uppermost, while he did indeed create unity and strength, it was at the cost of
a dictatorship and a royal absolutism that in time generated the
Revolution. Richelieu died in 1642, and the king also shortly thereafter
(1643). The French political experiment had brought this initial form of
‘modern’ political organization to a realization that seemed definitely
more stable, effective, and progressive than in the case of Spain. But the
French was not the only successful experimental first step.
In contrast with the continental powers of Italy, Spain, and France,
England is an island, all intercourse with which-- aggression, trade, exchange of ideas-- required crossing water and thus ships, a navy. This
had an important role to play in the rather different political experiment
carried out in England. The story here begins after the end of the
Hundred Years’ War with France (1453) when, as the conclusion of the
War of the Roses (1455-85), Henry Tudor seized the throne and was
acknowledged as king by Parliament. Under Henry VII (r. 1485-1509)
England knew a period of unprecedented economic growth aided by his
management of the government in the realms of finance and law. His reestablishment of the financial credit of the crown by finding income that
did not depend on Parliamentary approval, his re-assertion of the
authority of royal law by eliminating privilege and provincialism in its
enforcement and making it work effectively in this impartial fashion,
together with his development of organs of administration under his
direct control and the restraint on the old nobility that this enabled, meant
a sense of loyalty to the king and the king’s decrees could arise and
provide a feeling of unity to a kingdom that was prosperous and knew a
solvent government. But one vestige of medievalism remained for his
successor, Henry VIII (r. 1509-47), to deal with, namely, the
independence of the Catholic Church which gave to Rome and the Pope
control of a significant institution in the realm, making for a kind of state
within a state. Aided by Thomas Wolsey as head of the English Church
and Chancellor as well, Henry VIII was able to sustain the sense of king
and loyal subjects which his predecessor had achieved; his was the work
of redefining the relation of the English king to the Church in Rome, and
of doing this as the Reformation and its impacts were unfolding. This
task became intertwined with two other matters: his effort (a failure) to
sway the balance of power on the continent as the rivalry of Spain and
France was working itself out, and his desire for a male heir (thus his
mistresses, wives, divorce from the sister of the Spanish king, and his
failure in various attempts to have the Church bless the actions he desired
to take). The events here-- his alienation of and from Luther viii as well
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as from the Pope, his assertion of himself (1534) as “Supreme Head of
the Church of England”-- meant that the (Roman) Catholic Church now
knew not simply the Protestant separation from it effected first by Luther
and followed up by Calvin and others but an Anglican separation in
which the Church was clearly subordinated to the state. With the influx
of new religious ideas flowing into England and finding a receptive
audience not only in those who could find no spiritual satisfaction in the
old religious forms but also in those in the religious subculture which
had already in previous centuries challenged the Church (Wycliffe
[1330-84] and the Lollard movement, beginning in the late 14th century,
persisting underground and surfacing again in the early 16th century),
there was support for Henry’s actions under the sense that his were steps
on the way toward thorough reformation of the church. ix But while
Henry did seek to re-build and re-shape the Church of England, making
it in effect an arm of the Tudor state, his religious orientation was still
Catholic in every respect except in the acknowledgment of the papal
power, so that, as the influx of religious ideas and forms persisted and
various forms of Protestantism took hold and sought tolerance, he ended
up persecuting both Protestant critics of Catholic dogma and ritual and
Catholic critics of his own ecclesiastical supremacy. Thus his action
signified the onset of a troubled future of religious conflict within the
realm. Consequent on his rejection of Rome, he dissolved the
monasteries and the incorporated their lands into the royal estate; some
of the properties involved in this dissolution were given or sold to
supporters of the king’s policies, and this, while creating a new upper
class that was loyal to the king, also provided a bulwark of economic
interest against any Catholic restoration. x By 1840, Henry had become
the most absolute monarchy that England had ever known, and his
version of the Reformation, not doctrinal in the way the German was,
nonetheless had one result in common, that the state gained primacy over
the church. xi
The accession of Mary Tudor (r. 1553-58) after the brief reign of
Edward VI (r. 1547-53) brought an attempt on her part, being Catholic,
to undo the English departure from that faith. She succeeded in many
regards, getting Parliament to repeal the Supremacy Act, to reinstate
Catholic worship and heresy laws, to make Protestantism and other
‘heresies’ illegal, and to prohibit all Protestant preaching or publication.
Putting down a revolution sparked by her plans to marry Philip, son of
the Spanish King Charles, she provoked the revulsion of many by her
turn to persecution and her insistence on religious orthodoxy; but a plot
to depose her and enthrone Elizabeth was foiled and she died, in 1558,
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having lost an unpopular and unsuccessful war with France (losing
Calais, England’s last toehold on the continent), and not having produced
a son.
With Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) we reach the definitive establishment
of the Church of England as Protestant in character. She severed the ties
with Rome again (1559), but in Church reform, she proceeded less boldly
than some Protestants-- to be known as Puritans later-- desired. Nonetheless, she moved to have the laws against heresy redefined and
enforced, outlawed Unitarians and Anabaptists, forbade Catholics to
hold Catholic services or possess Catholic literature, and maintained the
sense that theological dissent was a form of political revolt. Yet in this
she focused on actions, not thoughts: any man could think and believe as
he pleased, it was external conformity and obedience to the laws that was
needed. Hers was a government of benevolent paternalism, in which the
ruling body-- the ‘king in Parliament’-- involved Parliament, but without
a hint of anything like popular or parliamentary sovereignty (she held to
the divine right of kings); in that involvement, it was the crown that was
to provide leadership and to be the controlling mind, and Parliament was
to be supportive. The aim of governance was an ordered and stable
society in which competition and conflict were curbed and life regulated
in such way that all could know at least a minimum standard of living
and share in the benefits of the order according to status, while achieving
the spiritual salvation which was the aim of life. For that to come to pass,
all must honor the divinely ordered social distinctions and the
hierarchical structure of the whole, and whatever their status, each and
all must honor the obligations that went with that status: the possession
of land, for example, carried with it duties of leadership and service to
the throne, or again, membership in the inferior part of society entailed
the obligation to accept the decisions of the higher and better part. Not
only was the structure of the whole to be maintained, but the mobility of
persons within that social structure was restricted: what was important in
life was something else. In the workings of this orderly system, her
strong hand as leader was usually masked, the order maintained indirectly (by the shaping of public opinion, say).
As regards the functioning of this orderly social system, Elizabeth
was fortunate in that, as part of the realization of the structure in the
activities of its members, the historical context provided opportunities
for much occupation of the energies and minds of those members that
was initially consonant with the structure. For one thing, the spread of
literacy-- augmented significantly by the mid-15th century invention of
the movable printing-press, fostered as well by its importance in the

281

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

emerging capitalistic economic system, and now, in amplification of a
focus on education that was part both of the humanist current from the
Renaissance and the Protestant (especially Lutheran) appeal to the Bible
and individual judgment, also stressed in the Elizabethan system-- meant
the presence of a capacity among the wealthier and the economically and
politically active levels of the society for sharing in-- and contributing
to-- an intellectual life whereby ideas could readily have a practical
(political, religious) impact and attract attention to new possibilities,
hopefully without challenge to the governance aims. For a second thing,
there was the reality of a cognate venturing, this time over the seas, and
the attraction of adventure and first-hand participation in a larger world
that was opening up in the 16th century: participation that was
economically motivated (the slave trade, gold) or religiously motivated
(missionary conversion of natives of the lands being discovered) or that
involved settlement and life in a New World. For a third thing, the influx
of Protestantism had brought something more than support for the
English break with Rome that Elizabeth was consolidating; it brought
forms of the thrust of protest which sought something more radical than
Elizabeth could accept, a radical purification of the forms of faith and
worship which were not expressly or solidly anchored in the New
Testament. Such Protestants-- called Puritans for their stress on such
purification-- were different from other Protestants, for not only did they
hold to the literalness of their creed, but they also were very disciplined
in their oversight of the soul’s health, militant in their faith, and felt
themselves to be apart from the rest of corrupt mankind. As the Protestant
presence in England became more Puritan in outlook, this strengthened
the Protestant support for a way of life in which the middle classes could
flourish; but the Puritan dogmatism-- in what it asserted, and in the
manner of that assertion-- threatened the religious settlement she had
made. xii The Puritan might outwardly accept both her placing of religion
under the control of the state and the particular form of that religion, but
not inwardly: indeed, the control of the state by religion, and by the Puritan form of religion in particular, was their inner desire. This disciplined
spiritual elite eventually clashed with the queen, the crisis coming to a
head in 1586, when the queen was criticized in Parliament for her refusal
to let Parliament debate religious issues. In the course of events, Parliament decreed that anyone who questioned the Queen’s religious supremacy should be imprisoned and (unless he gave a pledge of future conformity) should leave England and never return, on pain of death. This
led to an exodus of Puritans, many to Holland and eventually to America.
In the larger (international, European) political situation, England
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became drawn into the continental balance of power struggles, first
encouraging the Huguenot revolt against the French monarchy, and then
opposing Spain, first, over King Philip II’s claim to a monopoly of trade
where the Spanish flag flew throughout the world, and second, over
English aid to the Netherlands in the revolt of the Dutch Protestants
against Spanish rule. The conflict built toward an all-out war of Spain
on England, which eventuated in the English destruction of the Spanish
Armada (1588). This destruction had considerable larger and long-range
impacts, as it helped the Dutch to win their independence, it opened
North America to English colonies, and it strengthened Protestantism
and brought Catholicism to wane in England.
As it happened, however, something else that would affect the future
was going on: the 1590s were years of economic depression-- bad harvests, soaring prices, peasant unrest, high taxes-- and increasing Parliamentary criticism of the queen’s economic policies and political leadership. Imperceptibly, the House of Commons was becoming something
other than an obliging organ of royal control, namely, an instrument by
which the will of the landed classes could be heard. Because of the government’s financial dependence on it, because the Parliament had been
summoned to action so many times on so many important issues that it
began to think it ought to be consulted on all things, and because of the
growth (and greater representation in Parliament) of a vocal, politically
conscious, and economically dominant gentry, the Commons was replacing the Lords in importance because the social element it represented had
become economically and politically more important than the nobility.
A change in the political order of things was being unwittingly prepared.
When Elizabeth died (1603), she had never married and was childless;
she was succeeded by James I (r. 1603-25: he had been James VI of
Scotland, from 1567 on), who while experienced as king in Scotland was
not well suited to the English way of doing things. Financial problems
hanging over from Elizabeth’s reign (due to the war with Spain, which
he ended in 1604) required summoning Parliament into session, and the
latter, claiming ever wider rights to criticize and shape public policy, was
faced by the king, a strong advocate of the divine right of kings and the
right of their rule to be absolute, with the claim that the privileges of the
Commons had been granted by the grace of the monarch. This revived
the Elizabethan disputes about those privileges, and while this conflict
was resolved by a compromise, it did not bode well for the future. Indeed,
an increasingly self-assertive House of Commons, many of whose
members represented (on the one hand) the rising mercantile classes who
resisted limitless royal power over their money and (on the other)
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Puritans who repudiated the claim of a king to rule their religion, and a
stubborn and assertive king, brought the nation toward the rebellion
which occurred in fact against his successor, Charles I. In 1621, when
James had called Parliament seeking money to support the Protestant
cause in the Thirty Years’ War that had started on the continent,
Parliament decided to debate foreign policy; the king, hearing of this
trespass on royal prerogative, rebuked Parliament. And that brought
Parliament to issue the “Great Protestation” (1621) which affirmed that
“the liberties, franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions of Parliament are
the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of
England”, and added that “the arduous and urgent affairs concerning the
king, state, and defense of the realm ... are proper subjects and matter of
council and debate in Parliament”.
When King James I died (1625) he was succeeded by his son, Charles
I (r. 1625-49), who inherited from his father a domestic economic crisis
(bad harvests, trade dislocation, plague deaths) and a war with Spain.
Both required dealing with Parliament, and in the course of that, much
conflict, with Parliament seeking to manage the course of action by the
purse-strings and the king seeking to avoid such constraint and yet obtain
the resources needed. In the course of the back and forth, Parliament
proposed granting the king subsidies provided he signed the Petition of
Right (1628), which asserted four liberties (freedom from arbitrary arrest;
freedom from nonparliamentary taxation; freedom from the billeting of
troops; freedom from martial law). He accepted it, but then, when the
minister in charge of his military and domestic policy was assassinated,
Charles sought to manage the Parliamentary session himself, and the
conflict escalating, the session ended in disarray. Charles sought to govern without Parliament, and after putting an end to involvement in the
war on the continent, he sought to pacify his subjects by undertaking
administrative and financial reform to make it possible for the crown to
live within its own resources. But at this time, a different sort of
challenge arose, relating to Church reform; in 1633, just at a time when
the Protestants everywhere (not just in England) were fearful of the
survival of their religion, the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud,
introduced practices which reminded of the Roman Catholic Church.
When this reform was exported to Scotland, it met with riot and rebellion;
Charles met this with force, and again, having to go to Parliament for
money, he found Parliament discussing instead his inadequacies, and he
cut short the session. But without the money, he was defeated by the
Scots, and had to agree to a peace arrangement that required him to return
to Parliament for funds, this time for the upkeep for the Scottish army.
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This time (1640), Parliament (the “Long Parliament”, it came to be called:
it lasted until 1653) sought to limit the king’s constitutional authority in
order to protect the existence of Parliament and the liberties of subjects,
and also to reconstitute the Church. Acts mandating the summoning of
Parliament every three years, and removing the king’s power to dissolve
the ‘Long Parliament’, were passed and were accepted by the king; and
he also accepted revisions of the laws under which he had been collecting
income, which made some of the things he had been doing under the old
form illegal under their new form. As for Church reform, Parliament
itself was split on how to change the reforms that the Archbishop had
introduced, and as the more radical party introduced alternatives that
made the king seem a defender of the Church and gave a rise to his
popularity, he concluded a peace with the Scots and the reason for the
current session of Parliament was removed. Another crisis immediately
arose in Ireland, and the ‘Long Parliament’ debated a catalogue of their
own grievances against the king (the Grand Remonstrance [1641]); it
divided the Commons, and soon two groups of members, one royalist,
one parlementarian, began to coalesce-- the beginning of ‘political
parties’. The bill passed, and when the king (contrary to parliamentary
privilege) rode to Westminster intending to impeach five members of
Commons and one in the Lords on charges of treason, this effort failed:
they had fled in advance, and his action lost him the confidence of many
moderates still left in Parliament. When (1642) Parliament presented to
the king a series of proposals for a treaty, Charles rejected them outright
and, determined to settle matters by force, the king launched the country
on a civil war. The next years brought indecisive fighting, and when the
king widened the war (bringing troops back from Ireland after
negotiating a cease-fire with the Catholic rebels there), Parliament negotiated with the Scots and brought them into the war on its side.
Eventually (1645) Parliament recast its military establishment and
formed the New Model Army. When that army defeated the king’s forces,
he surrendered to the Scots, thinking to be better treated by them. The
response of Parliament to the king’s defeat split, particularly on the
matter of disbanding the army before an agreement was reached with the
king; and when the king was returned into English hands, and the army
resisted the first steps in disbandment, the civil war had been transformed
into a revolution. There were three main players now, the king,
Parliament, and the (previous Parliamentary) army. Charles sought to
negotiate his restoration with the army, offering a tolerant church
settlement; but as this and the reform of Parliament were being discussed,
turmoil in the army led its leaders (including Oliver Cromwell) to

285

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

reassert military discipline. And in the meantime, the king brought on a
second Civil War (1648) when he joined his followers with Scots
opposed to the army’s intervention in politics. The fighting was brief, the
army prevailed, and a future without the king was contemplated for the
first time. While the army was making plans to put the king on trial,
Parliament sought to achieve a treaty with the king; the king grew
stubborn, and the army was infuriated, thinking Parliament would sell
out its sacrifices and compromise its ideals. The army acted to purge
Parliament of all but 75 members who would do the army’s bidding, and
the trial (by the ‘Rump Parliament’, early in 1649) found him guilty and
beheaded him.
Internationally, this regicide was not well received, and Charles II
was urged to reclaim his father’s kingdom. Nonetheless, a
Commonwealth was declared (1649) after the monarchy and House of
Lords were abolished, and the Rump Parliament, together with the army
and a Council of State, held political power. Oliver Cromwell’s defeat
of royalist and Catholic forces in Ireland brought his reputation to soar;
so when Charles II landed in Scotland (1650) and was declared king,
Cromwell was the logical choice to head the forces that opposed the
king’s army. In 1653, after the Rump Parliament had created something
of a mess, Cromwell marched to Westminster, dissolved it, and replaced
it with a Parliament whose nominated members came mainly from the
military. After its futile efforts at overcoming internal divisions and
creating reform, it dissolved itself and returned power to Cromwell and
the army. The problems in all this floundering were due to the considerable number of diversely minded groups involved. Later in 1653,
the first British constitution was created (Instrument of Government),
creating a lord protector, a Council of State, and a Parliament that was to
be elected at least once every three years. Cromwell was named
protector, and he chose a council mainly of civilians. The Protectorate
attacked many of the reform-issues head-on, but the protector was no
better able to manage Parliament than the king had been. In a period of
the emergence of royalist opposition and attempts to put it down, it was
clear that all that held things together was Cromwell. But he contained
within himself the contradictions of the revolution: desire for a fixed and
stable constitution, but a millenarian vision of a more glorious world to
come. When he died in 1658, all hope of reform died with him. In the
relative power vacuum that followed, no solution seemed acceptable to
the various parties until, the members of the Long Parliament who had
been purged being invited back, the Long Parliament came back together
and dissolved itself, making way for the return of the king (1660). Thus
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while the continental experiments in political evolution had led by midcentury to a balance of power among nation-states the most dominant of
which were centralized monarchies, civil war, regicide, and restoration,
were placing England on the threshold of a significant step forward on
the way to constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.
Two other political evolutions significant for the initial phase in the
development of ‘modernity’ in Europe need notice. One is that in the
Netherlands; the other is that in the Holy Roman Empire.
As for the Netherlands: In the mid-15th century, the Netherlands was
a group of secular and ecclesiastical territorial principalities, each jealously guarding its own freedom and institutions. With the end of the
Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), efforts by Burgundy, which had earlier
penetrated the group via marriage, wars, and inheritance, to unify the
principalities was generating resistance, and, the duchy of Burgundy
having been taken over by the French crown, the first written constitution
for the whole of the principalities in the Netherlands came into existence
as part of a defense against France. By virtue of the marriage of Mary
of Burgundy with Maximilian I of the Hapsburgs, the latter-- and with
them, the Holy Roman Empire-- was brought into the action, and tied the
future of the Netherlands to Austria and the Holy Roman Empire. When,
in 1504, Philip I, who had succeeded to the Netherlands dominions at the
death of his mother Mary, also inherited the Spanish crown, the
Netherlands became part of the struggle of the Hapsburg (Spanish and
Austrian) empire for hegemony in Europe. As the Hapsburgs clashed
with France, particularly under Emperor Charles V (= King Charles I of
Spain, 1516-56: he became Emperor in 1519), the Netherlands were
being governed by governor generals appointed by the Emperor. xiii By
1548 the number of provinces being governed reached seventeen after
the addition of some neighboring provinces. In 1555-56, Charles’s son,
Philip II, succeeded his father as prince of Netherlands (1555) and king
of Spain (1556). Already, the Protestant movement, and especially its
Calvinist form, had spread into the Netherlands, and its discipline and its
organization into communities presented a threat to the government’s
plans for unity and centralization. Included in those plans was the
introduction of a new ecclesiastical hierarchy, making the Netherlands a
directly governed region of the Church with 3 archbishops and 15
bishops (1559). Criticism of the Church structure and of the worldly way
of life of its prelates had long been a part of life in the Netherlands, and
with it, desire for reform. But especially because of the increasing
Protestant presence in the Netherlands, there was fierce resistance to this
institution of a new Church hierarchy as vehicle for imperial control, and
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the Netherlands became a major battleground between the old (Catholic)
and the new forms of Christianity (first the Lutheran and the Anabaptist,
then the Calvinistic). Given repressive measures directed at this
resistance, then further resistance (including an iconoclastic movement
of Calvinist origin, to desecrate churches and destroy church images:
1566), and then increased repression, the regime being instituted finally
precipitated a revolt (1567) that eventually led (1579) to a partition of
the Netherlands. xiv
If religious matters were important in it, the revolt was also fueled by
difficult economic conditions, and as well by a sense of distance from a
king living in far-away Spain and with his absolutist policies
undermining the long-standing independence and privileges of towns
and nobility as well as provinces. Not only were the factors motivating
the revolt diverse, but what was seen as desirable by those revolting was
not uniform or united. Initially it succeeded only in Holland, mainly on
the strength of Calvinist resistance; but while William, Prince of Orange,
had become the leader and voice of the revolt, his own aim was a United
Netherlands in which Catholic and Protestant both had a place. But when
the Protestant and Catholic desires and voices proved to be irreconcilable,
provinces in the north joined in a union (1579) of the provinces and cities
committed to carrying on resistance to Spanish rule until the revolution
succeeded, and this union in turn became the basis for an independent
state (the United Provinces of the Netherlands, or the Dutch Republic).
The agreement to unite allowed each member of the union to retain
sovereignty in its own internal affairs, but they joined together to share
a common foreign policy; and the chief executive officer of each
province represented it in the States-General that formed the organ for
their unity. Decision-making in the States-General was to be unanimous
in the matter of foreign and military affairs. A correlative sort of Union
(of Arras) relating to the southern principalities-and-cities began the
reconciliation of the southerners with King Philip II of Spain. Initially
the two unions were meant to be consistent with retaining the Spanishgovernor structure relating to the whole, but in time (1581) the StatesGeneral declared Philip had forfeited his sovereignty over the provinces
by his persistent tyranny, and the whole of the Low Countries was
declared independent, although events to come (an attempted coup, the
assassination of William of Orange) eventually limited the force of this
declaration to the northern union, which alone remained represented in
the States-General. That union was of seven provinces, with Holland
being the major one.
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The collaboration of Holland and the house of Orange that had rebuffed the Spanish attempt to regain the Netherlands as a whole was soon
replaced by rivalry that allowed varied tensions in Dutch life to surface
in its political dimension, and prevented the discussion of concluding
peace with Spain from reaching a conclusion; and when Spain reduced
its proposal to a truce rather than permanent peace, and included
treatment of the United Provinces as independent and sovereign (but
short of outright recognition) and put aside its seeking for guarantees for
Dutch Catholics, a truce (Twelve Years’ Truce: 1609-1621) was agreed
to. This did not end the internal controversy, especially conflict between
the more extreme Reformed Church with its demands for strict orthodoxy and for status as the state church with rights to interpret what
church views were vs. the more tolerant Arminians who would have the
church under state control and a church that was inclusive and tolerant
of those outside it (Catholics, Jews, and other Protestants). The house of
Orange took the side of the more strict, the leaders of Holland that of the
more tolerant; the leader of the house of Orange acted under the authority
of the Estates-General to enforce the more strict side which the majority
of provinces favored, and the result was a beheading of Holland’s leader.
Hugo Grotius was also arrested, imprisoned, and later escaped, being on
the more tolerant side. With this victory of the house of Orange and the
strictly orthodox, war with Spain was a virtual certainty when the Truce
expired, and indeed it resumed in 1621. By 1625 Spain seemed on the
verge of winning the war that had started again, at the same time as the
Austrian Hapsburgs, allying with their Spanish cousins, were winning in
the first stages of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). But with the death
in 1625 of the leader of the house of Orange (Maurice) and his replacement, the military achieved victories and the naval forces as well (off
Cuba in 1628, and off the English coast in 1639). The new leader of the
house of Orange (Frederick Henry) ended the internal religious
oppression by the more strict-orthodox side, and formed an alliance with
France aimed at the joint conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. But
gradually Holland turned against him, especially when he arranged the
marriage of his son William with Princess Mary Stuart (daughter of
Charles I of England) on the eve of the English Civil War (1642-51).
This elevation of the house of Orange in royal circles highlighted
something involved in the more tolerant religious party’s opposition to
him and to the house of Orange, namely, the fear that the political
leadership of the house of Orange would be turned into an explicit monarchy and away from the republican form of government. During the
1640s, however, Frederick Henry lost his physical and intellectual
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powers and was unable to prevent Holland from reasserting its predominance over the republic’s policies. Finally, peace negotiations with Spain
were concluded (1648) just after his death (1647), and now at the end of
this Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648), Spain formally recognized the independence of the United Provinces which formed the Dutch republic. By
mid-century, then, what had emerged in this evolutionary political path
was, above all, a Dutch republic that was (and continued to be for a while)
one of the major homes and havens of the modern mind. Yet as a politically-organized state, it was small, internally diverse, and resistant to
centralized monarchy, contrasting thus with Spain, France, and England
alike.
As for the Holy Roman Empire: By the middle of the 15th century,
the Holy Roman Empire was simply a confederation of Germanic
principalities, of which the Emperor was one of the kings of one or more
of those principalities elected by a college of electors to be the head of
the confederation. There was still unsettled the question of the relation
of this Emperor to the Pope and Papacy, a question going back at least to
the time of Charlemagne and taking different forms over the course of
time. But by the time of Frederick V (German king, 1440, crowned Holy
Roman Emperor in 1452, served until 1493 as Frederick III) the emperor
was scarcely more than the elected German king, with a limited claim on
the various German principalities and a limited responsibility as king.
His son, Maximilian (1459-1519), archduke of Austria, married Mary,
daughter of Charles the Bold and heiress of Burgundy, in 1477, and they
in turn had a son, Philip (1478-1506), who (when Mary died in 1482)
inherited the greater part of Charles the Bold’s widespread dominions,
including the Netherlands. Maximilian functioned as regent till Philip
came of age. When Maximilian’s father (Frederick) died in 1493, he
himself became head of the house of Hapsburg, and in 1494 he handed
over rule of the Netherlands to his son Philip. After Mary’s death, Maximilian had procured for Philip marriage (1496) to Joan, prospective
heiress of Castile and Aragon, thus securing for his family not only Spain
but the immense dominions which would be conquered in the Americas.
When Philip died (1506), his son, Charles I of Spain (1500-1558)
became king of Aragon and Castile on Ferdinand’s death in1516, thus
firmly establishing the dynasty that was to govern Spain for nearly two
centuries. Then in 1519 he was elected king of the Germans and became
Holy Roman Emperor as Charles V (thus his ascendance to being
Emperor coincided with the outbreak of the Protestant Reformation), and
he remained both until 1556, when he transferred a number of his
possessions to his son Philip II and his functions as emperor to his
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brother Ferdinand, who (as Ferdinand I) succeeded him formally as such
(by election) on his death (r. 1558-1564). Thus the Hapsburgs, mainly by
marriage and inheritance, had gained an extensive imperial domain; but
this division by Charles V, creating imperial and Spanish lines of the
Hapsburgs, created a basis whereby the hegemony in Europe that the
dynasty had enjoyed in the 16th century would fail, in good part because
of lack of cooperation of the two lines in the 17th century. We have
already seen how Charles V aspired to universal monarchy; he treated
his role as that of emperor of Christendom, with the duty to defend it
against Islam and against Christian heretics as well. So when Luther was
drawn into the conflict with the Pope, Charles called the imperial Diet at
Worms and, rejecting Luther’s doctrines in the Edict of Worms, declared
war on the Protestant heretics. But his ‘war’ was basically ineffectual,
as were his gestures toward warding off the Turks on land and in the
Mediterranean. When he abdicated his imperial position, his younger
brother replaced him as Ferdinand I (r. 1558-1564); he not only
succeeded in centralizing his administration, but with the peace of Augsburg (1555) concluded the era of religious strife within the imperial domain by recognizing the right of the various princes to determine the
religion of their subjects. But he was followed by Maximilian II (r. 156476), who largely failed to achieve his political goals (at home and abroad);
his liberal religious policies, however,-- he was sympathetic to Lutheranism, basically a humanist Christian who paid lip service to Roman
Catholicism but favored compromise between the rival confessions-permitted an interval of peace between Roman Catholics and Protestants
in Germany after the first struggles of the Reformation. He was followed
by Rudolf II (r. 1576-1612), whose ill-health, mental instability, retreat
from imperial responsibility, and unpopularity, prevented him restraining
the religious dissensions between Catholic and Protestant that eventually
led to the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War. He was followed by his
brother Matthias (r. 1612-19), who sponsored a Catholic revival in the
Hapsburg domains, one that led to the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War.
It was Ferdinand II (r. 1619-1637), the leading champion of the Roman
Catholic Counter-Reformation and of absolutist rule by the emperor,
who reigned during most of the Thirty Years’ War. It was his provocative
actions which altered what was originally an internal-to-the-empire
conflict into one that drew in Swedish, then French, intervention and
eventually involved most of the powers of Europe; and that, in turn, made
its eventual resolution, in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), of such
significance for the whole of Europe. As we have already seen, that
Peace abolished Spanish sovereignty over the northern Netherlands; in
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regard to the Holy Roman Empire, it severely restricted the emperor’s
authority over the other German princes, and left the various independent
principalities in question more self-determining that ever before. In
contrast with Spain, France, and England, the Germanic peoples
included in the Empire were not drawn toward a closer political unity,
but rather, given the diversity of Catholic and Protestant principalities
involved and the pressure of the Emperors toward Catholicism, content
with resisting such a direction at this time. Thus the experimental path
on which these powers that composed the Germanic nation were moving
at this mid-century time was one on which, feeling bound through a
common language, customs, and linked histories, they remained politically independent entities valuing that independence, thereby remaining
(somewhat as the Dutch Republic did) at the opposite pole from Spain
and its autocratic monarchical rule centered in upholding the Catholic
religion. France, England, and the Netherlands represented the nationsin-the-making that moved on the progressive forefront of ‘modernity’ at
this mid-17th century time, and France and England it was who,
politically, were pregnant with the next decisive steps taken in the
evolution of the ‘modern’ state.
Seen overall: Politically, this mid-15th to mid-17th century period
marks the first phase of the emergence of ‘modern’ Europe as a political
arena. The starting-point of the venturing which brought this emergence
was a Christendom that included the diverse political units of most of
Europe but held them in an uncertain reference to how church (the
Papacy in particular) and state (the Holy Roman Empire in particular)
were properly to be related within that embrace. The venturing involved,
and the energies being released and seeking a sufficient realization in
that venturing, brought different changes to the political organization of
different European powers. Seen in regard to the formation of
‘modernity’ as a distinctive embracing development, the political
evolution was not simply diverse but also uneven, more or less
significant in different countries as regards its embodying ‘modernity’.
At the time of the Italian Renaissance, with its stress on the human
and its many-sided potential in some contrast with its constrained
acknowledgment within Christianity, we find emerging, politically, a
form of city-state amidst city-state and an aggressive settling-forbalance-of-power-among-a-variety that provides the political
manifestation that is counterpart to the underpinning economic
development and is political context within which the cultural-andintellectual re-birth were taking shape. But not only does the emphasis
of the latter re-birth avoid direct challenge to the Christian framework,
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although generally making quite different stress on the human and
human potential from that in that framework; the political evolution also
stops short of generating a nation-state, and leaves Italy (by the end of
this period) a variety of powers prone to conflict in their interacting with
each other but operating within the same religious horizon.
With the beginning of the Reformation and its calling into question
the role of the institution of the Church in Christianity, the broader
European community knows a recurrence of this balance-of-power
pattern but with the significant difference that the political development
now shapes itself in responsiveness of some sort to both streams. The
starting-point for the formation of ‘modern’ political structure was still
numerous and diverse principalities with an internal social-and-political
structuring which, in reflection of a decaying feudal arrangement, still
placed prince, king, or emperor, at its head. But there is an intertwining
of two factors involved in the political development in Europe at large.
One factor is that found also in Renaissance Italy but arrested there
before a monarchical nation-state was reached. Because the prince, king,
or emperor, usually attained his position dynastically (by birth and inheritance, by marriage) or by election, the arrangement often meant
heads of state who had no close connection with the people(s) or land(s)
they ruled and/or who, depending on the character and interest of the
king, the happenstance of inheritance and arrangements of regency, and
the current institutional relation of kingship with the land-holding
nobility, were differently inclined and differently fitted to exercise their
power and authority in ways that took good advantage of the changing
situation for themselves and for their people. At its best, ruling to good
advantage was not easy, for the situation was changing significantly; the
demographic and economic underpinning of these times (see discussion
below) was a recovery-in-process from the population decimation of
mid-and-late-14th century Black Death plague and various epidemics,
and because that recovery required enterprise that was willing and able
to venture in novel ways under novel and difficult circumstances, there
was economic recovery in various places and of various form that gave
an assurance of at least subsistence to many in novel ways. Such
coming-to-life in one place and form or another within any political unit
meant an opportunity and a challenge to the ruler, different according as
(for one thing) the nobility that formed the upper class differed in its
attitude toward the changes. But if a ruler’s ambition was for greater
power and effective self-assertion-- in the name of whatever--, an
expansionist effort was readily provoked, one seeking expansion by
marriage and inheritance or by way of aggressive action, one seeking an
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expansion not simply of territory but also power to influence beyond that.
And given this ambition, with elements of rivalry with other rulers, there
was need for a re-shaped and more complex governance structure to achieve and sustain royal ambition. In the measure in which the economic
underpinning was sufficient, there was not only the possibility of royalty
financing its ambition (in part, at least) by encouraging and feeding off
of the economic evolution, but also the need for support of royal
endeavors and royalty itself from the larger community, and thus some
accommodation with nobility would be called for, some acknowledgment and support for and from new classes that were emerging, and
royal support was needed among the populace. Where the ruler was successful in adapting the governance structure, a unified nation-state would
be forming, one engaged in internal building-and-integrating (establishing a political leadership with an internal foundation of some resourceful sort) and entered into an external rivalry-situation which for each
ruler-and-country meant, as in Italy in microcosm, so in the rest of
Europe in macrocosm, concern also (at the least) for an external balanceof-power, with each participant able to find and maintain the internalresources-and-cohesiveness to assert-and-sustain itself in the interplay in
question.
The second factor complicated the first, for unlike the early political
development that is part of the Renaissance, that which is part of the
development of the larger European community (including the Italian
city-states, eventually) took its shape in some responsiveness to the
Reformation. As a result, it was entered unavoidably into the question
regarding the appropriate role of religion (the institution, in particular)
in relation to the political, and the venturing in which the political was
involved represented (among other things, also) a con-crete working out
of some tentative answers to that question. Thus as in this remainder of
Europe the limited expansionist reaching of the Italian city-state took on
a more expansive form, and certain larger states took shape and
consolidated into nation-states (Spain and France, in particular), this
growing-and-consolidating meant a similar balance-of-powers condition
along the way, and especially, a time of wars: indeed, the period between
the beginning of the Reformation (1517) and the end of the Thirty Years’
War (1618-48) was dominated by war, not only between powers but also
within powers (the Religious Wars in France, for example,1562-94). But
because the warring parties were often struggling with this question of
the place of religion in the functioning of the political organization of a
people, the warring had a strong religious coloring. If the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War and the struggle of the Dutch
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Republic for independence from Spain, it did not simply leave Europe a
continent of diverse powers, some larger, some smaller, entering into
shifting alliances, willing to assist each other (openly and covertly) to
make sure that no winner of any conflict could parlay that into future
dominance of all the others, and continually seeking (at the very least) to
maintain a balance amongst each other that for each would be supportive
of its interests. It left a Europe whose ‘balance’ involved parties entered
differently into the division of the Christian religion into two
incompatible forms. Marking the end not only of any realistic possibility
of (say) a Catholic unity under a Pope but of what might have been the
feudal unity of Europe in a Holy Roman Empire, the Peace of Westphalia
ushered in a time when, within the Holy Roman Empire, each politicallyorganized unit, while being disposed to insist internally on an orthodoxy
or politically-imposed religious conformity (either Catholic or Protestant,
with only the Lutheran and Calvinist forms of the latter being
acknowledged), agreed (among other things) not to make war for religious reasons on any other power within the Empire, and internally, to
allow at least private worship, liberty of conscience, and right of
emigration, to all religious minorities or dissidents within their domains.
Given the accompanying recognition of the sovereignty of each such
power in relation to the Emperor, this in particular precluded the latter
from the intolerant imposition of the Catholic orthodoxy as the ‘true form’
of Christianity on the various members of the empire. xv
Because of this intertwining of religion in some orthodox Christian
form with the political, Jews, Muslims, and adherents to other forms of
Christianity not that of the ruler of a state were in constant jeopardy
within that state. But if the establishment of a diversity and balance of
opposed aggressive powers prone to enforce internally an orthodoxy or
religious conformity and to carry this orthodoxy-and-insistence into its
interacting with other powers marked ‘modern’ Europe in its initial establishment of itself politically as a community of nations, this tie of
religion with the political had more than religious meaning; for in some
nation-states, religion-as-an-affair-of-orthodoxy was becoming
subordinated to the state, and even where this was not so, it was being
made to serve not only a social-order-and-coherence-within-a-nation
function politically but also to provide the evident forefront and
rationalizing cover for much aggression and conflict that more or less
covertly (and with significant if not dominant force) served dynastic,
political, economic, and in general, diverse secular values and interests,
both internally to each power and externally in the relation of each power
to other powers.
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Seen in this perspective, the political in its ‘modern’ European shapetaking is to be found in the movement in two directions. One,
exemplified by France and England but arrested for a while in Italy, was
toward a centralized (bureaucratic) autocracy in a territorially
consolidated and relatively large state that was striving for supreme
political and economic power and, so far as it succeeded in achieving
such a shape, was manifesting its internally-established power in a
seeking dominance amid the nation-states/powers of Europe; different
European societies moved greater or lesser distances in this direction
(Spain moved farther than Italy, but nonetheless failed to embody much
that marked the ‘modern’ in this way), and gave to the issue being
achieved in each case diverse forms (more or less implementing a mature
and effective and stable form). The second, exemplified by the Dutch
Republic, was toward a governance tolerant of religious differences and
of freedom of thought if not also of speech. For as the religious in its
‘modern’ shape was splitting into ever more Christian orthodoxies, and
in its involvement in the political appeared at times in some interplay of
intolerance between orthodoxies-- and intolerance toward non-Christian
religions--, it was reaching toward a condition in which the state, having
primacy over the church, allowed something called “religious freedom”.
If this was as yet only a half-way step on the way to acknowledging the
meaning of religious life, which is spiritual and non-assertive in the
realization of its nature, it at least opened an avenue which will be
followed out more fully in subsequent times.
In both political and religious spheres, the experimentation in which
‘modernity’ was beginning to take shape manifested a shared and
constant feature, namely, a dominant aggressive-defensiveness at its
heart, a central concern with power and control. xvi What had happened
in Renaissance Italy, the reaching-upward that brought the emergence
and flourishing of a higher life beyond-- even if confined by-- such
power and control, and this, as part of the fuller vitality of human life
which is meant to be being realized in the interplay of human beings, has
not yet happened here with any effectiveness, except in small measure in
Elizabethan England.
(b) State and global outreach
In the mid-15th century Europe was a largely self-contained world
lying on the western fringe of the inhabited area known to Europeans.
To its west was nothing but Iceland and small islands in the Atlantic
beyond the continental mass. The larger known world lay mainly in the

Commented [34]: [[CM-51]]

Commented [35]: Keep in mind, in the balance-of-power,
how “power” can be more than “force”, and involve “the
ability to influence” in all sorts of ways other than coercion
and the threat of coercion by force-- there is the economic,
but also the religious, the ethnic and nationalist, ideas of all
sorts ... so that inter-national power and balance of power
among nations has a complex meaning ...

296

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

easterly direction, and while it included the distant Orient, what was
known most directly was a Middle Eastern world familiar first-hand
mainly to those who lived in southeastern and Mediterranean Europe. At
this 15th century time Europeans and the peoples of this Middle Eastern
region were caught up in the current continuation of an extended backand-forth, often aggressive in nature, which goes back before the Roman
Empire but which (for our story here) has taken a number of significant
turns since then. Already we have taken note (as involved in the
conditions making for the Renaissance and its humanism) of the trade of
north Italian cities with the eastern Mediterranean, and of the fall of
Constantinople to the OttomanTurks (1453). These mid-15th century
affairs reflect certain facets of that back-and-forth. The fall of Constantinople recalls two ancient beginnings. One is the Roman then
Byzantine empires, and in particular, Constantine (r. 306-337) and the
Christianization of the Roman empire. The other is the birth of Islam
(Muhammad lived 570-632), the expansion of an Islamic state first in
Arabia, then into Syria and Iraq, then eventually (by 870) the attainment
of a vast empire which extended from the Iberian peninsula to central
Asia. This expansion expressed an aggressive dynamic, an expansive
activism (jihad) on behalf of the Islamic community, in keeping with its
original Arab context in which military prowess needed to be and was
readily exhibited and in keeping with its own division of the world into
the Muslim zone and that zone into which Muslims could and should
expand (the abode of war). The first of the turns significant for our
understanding of the mid-15th century arose as a manifestation of this
dynamic: the threatening presence of Muslims (Seljuq Turks in this case)
around Constantinople in the late 11th century provoked a call for help
by the Byzantine Emperor and occasioned the first (1096-99) of a series
of Crusades which, over a period of two centuries (the Eight Crusade
took place in 1291), manifested a Christian counter-aggressiveness. One
consequence of the First Crusade was the opening of new political and
commercial relations with the Muslims of the Middle East. The European end of the trade fell mainly into the hands of Italian cities: initially,
Venice and Genoa, but after 1380, Venice prevailed, with the Oriental
trade-- particularly, spices-- coming via the Indian Ocean and the Red
Sea to Alexandria, from which it was distributed via Venetian ships
throughout the Mediterranean and into northern Europe via the Rhone
valley. A second turn in the interplay to which we are referring began
slightly before the First Crusade, in the building of momentum in another
and different (but kindred) expression of Christian aggression, namely,
in the Christian re-conquest of the Iberian peninsula. Ever since the 8th
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century when Muslims, invited from North Africa to help one side in a
conflict among Christians within the peninsula area, decided to conquer
the land for themselves and soon gained dominance in most of the peninsula, there had been Christian states looking forward to taking it back;
but not until the 11th century, and in particular, a victory at Toledo (1085),
did this push get much momentum. The re-conquest effort only came to
completion, however, with the fall (in 1492) of Granada, the last
independent Muslim kingdom in the Spanish part of the Iberian
peninsula. The third and final turn, already underway before this
Christian Spanish re-conquest was completed, was the aggressive
expansion of one of the three large centralized empires in the 15th century
Islamic world, namely, the Ottoman. This aggression, besides leading to
the mid-century fall of Constantinople, was exerting pressure on the
European trade with the Orient, especially that via the Mediterranean,
then overland and through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
This was the larger background and context for what began as
another facet of this interplay of Christian and Islamic but, in virtue of
other factors emerging and operating in this time, evolved into something
far broader and rather different from that. That is the western European
reaching outward and overseas in the Atlantic-- first around South Africa
to India, then to the Americas and to India via the passage south of South
America and across the Pacific. In its initial phase, this outreach, beginning in Portugal, soon followed by Spain, and in time, joined by France,
the Dutch Republic, and England, brought a basic alteration of the nature
of Europe and European civilization: Europe no longer was centered on
the Mediterranean and knew its own southern lands (Greece and Italy)
as the creative center of its civilization, but shifting its center to the
Atlantic and initially to these five emerging nation-states, this European
outreach contributed in numbers of important ways to the
determinateness of an emerging new phase of Western civilization, what
we are calling ‘modernity’. Bringing further change to states that were
already changing, internally and in relation to each other, this overseas
venturing led to widespread exploration of the larger world and spread
of the newly-developing European institutions and culture into lands and
amidst peoples foreign to the venturers; in that spreading, Europeans had
to take some stance regarding these indigenous peoples they were
meeting and in regard to themselves as they appeared to themselves in
that meeting, a stance that expressed their reading of what it is to be a
human being.
That part of the Iberian peninsula which eventually was to be
Portugal had been conquered by Muslims in the 8th century and its re-
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conquest had been basically completed by the middle of the 13th century.
But that history remained alive as, after an extended struggle with Spain
(or, at the time, Castile) and a truce (1387) finally concluded (1411) with
peace and Portuguese independence, John of Aviz initiated Portuguese
expansion by the conquest of Ceuta, a Moorish town in Morocco on the
North African coast (1415). This aggressive extension of the animus of
the reconquest of the homeland to conquest of Muslims on the African
continent was led by his sons, one of whom, Prince Henry, became
governor of the conquered city for a while, and then, returning to Portugal and retiring from court (1419), became governor of the southernmost province of Portugal. It was there that he concentrated on putting
into effect a personal interest of his. Having become grand master of the
Order of Christ (a Papal-sponsored order which had replaced the crusading order of the Templars in Portugal) and using funds available through
the order, he drew together geographers and navigators in 1420 and, with
the help of improvements made in navigation and the sailing capacity of
ships, began more concerted and longer-distanced exploration efforts
along the African coast. His interest seems to have been complex:
already there was Muslim (Ottoman Turk) pressure and disruption of
trade on the overland portion of the spice-trade route to India as well as
in the Mediterranean Sea itself, and he envisioned the possibility of
circumventing such troubles by finding a sea-passage around Africa
(supposing that there was one: that was not yet known); then he had
heard from the Moors at Ceuta of a gold supply in Africa, control of
which could help the Portuguese economy; and more generally, he was
interested in fostering commerce, including joining in the African slave
trade, another help to the Portuguese economy; but most fundamentally
in his own personal case, there was a missionary and conversion interest,
as announced by the red cross which his vessels always displayed on
their sails. It was realization of this religious interest that seems to have
been most important to the discovery-voyages he sponsored, and the
hope of bringing Christianity to India at the same time as the spice-trade
was being made safer and more profitable. This vision of a sea-route to
India around southern Africa was nothing realized in his lifetime (he died
in 1460), but it was taken up and made national policy by John II (r.
1481-95); the first rounding of the Cape of Good Hope and the
exploration of the East Africa coast took place in 1488 (by Bartolomeu
Dias), and the report that Columbus had discovered the “Indies” (yet
there was no mention of spices in the report) led quickly to a Portuguese
expedition to India (1497, Vasco da Gama). Portugal soon secured
control of the trade routes in the Indian Ocean and its approaches, and
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made Prince Henry’s vision a reality. With the discovery (by Cabral,
1500) of the land that was eventually to be Brazil, Portugal was launched
on a complex two-directional outreach which, importantly religious, was
effected at the same time as an affair of trade and something important
economically for Portugal. Except for in Brazil, there was no significant
territorial conquest and colonization, although fortifications and posts
strategically located to enable protection of the sea-route and to provide
secure places for the exchange of goods were established. But the
original intention, to make Oriental trade a royal monopoly, was
thwarted when private Portuguese merchants joined in the trade and
prevented the government from charging the prices in Europe that it
would have been able to otherwise.
Portugal’s neighbor and rival, Spain, was closing its own re-conquest
frontier domestically under Ferdinand and Isabella, with the conquest of
the independent Muslim kingdom of Granada (1482-92). In 1476
Columbus, a Genoese sailor who had settled in Lisbon, Portugal, had
been refused when he sought financial support from the Portuguese
throne for a voyage of discovery; approaching the Spanish royalty, he
appealed to them as Catholic Christians to support a westward voyage to
India and Cathay. They would be sending him to India, he urged, to see
the princes, the peoples and lands, there, and to see how they could be
converted to Catholic Christianity. In so acting, the king and queen
would gain status among the monarchs of Europe and, joining with the
Pope, could take the lead in the Christian defense against the infidel, i.e.
the Ottomans and other Islamic nations of the Eastern Mediterranean
whose alarming growth and increasing threat to Western monarchies was
effectively closing off the land routes to the East and was making the
sea-portions of the route (in the Mediterranean, and in the Indian Ocean)
dangerous. Then too, he himself desired in this way to rise from humble
beginnings and to secure riches for himself and his family, and even to
join the ranks of the nobility in Spain. This appeal-- to Christian
missionary fervor, to the power and standing of Aragon-and-Castile, to
rivalry with and fear of Portugal-- and its framing of more earthy factors
(such as the desire for gold and the need for a reliable supply of herbs
and spices) within the religious, makes clear at least what he thought
Ferdinand and Isabella would be persuaded by. xvii After the initial
voyage and discovery, the Spanish enlisted the Pope in support of a
specific line of demarcation from pole to pole which would give Spain
exclusive rights to regions west of the line, Portugal those to the east,
and this division, with a shift of the demarcation line, was agreed to in
the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). There followed not simply the further
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exploratory ventures of Amerigo Vespucci (1499, north coast of South
America) and Magellan (1519-22, circumnavigation of the globe going
westward), but conquest and colonization efforts: an expedition against
Mexico by Cortés (1519-21), another against Peru by Pizarro (1530-33),
and disappointing explorations northward (Coronado, 1540-42, in
southwestern United States and as far north as the Oregon coast; de Soto,
1539-42, in southeastern United States), these last two discovering
nothing of the gold and silver rumored to be found in these places. It
was that-- precious metals-- that seems to have caught royal attention,
and while the policy for its procurement, verbally, may have been
humane (after all, Dominican and Franciscan friars were sent with the
conquerors to convert and educate the natives who were to do the work),
the reality on the ground was quite different. Exploitation of the earth’s
resources involved slavery for the native populations, who were treated
as inferior beings destined to be subdued and made slaves as well as
forcibly converted to Christianity. When that was accompanied by a
colonization that, by the middle of the 16th century, also involved pastoral
and plantation economies using imported African slaves, the Spanish
outreach not only secured a significant influx of bullion into Europe,
enough to produce by mid-century a profound effect on the economy of
the Old World, but also initiated in arrogant and inhumane fashion a
social development in this New World setting that gave to the Spanish
achievement a considerable dark side.
France, the third Catholic nation to become involved in this overseas
outreach, was intensely preoccupied with European affairs in the 15th16th centuries, and made only a spasmodic overseas gesture. The gesture
began with exploratory voyages: Verrazano reconnoitered the North
American coast for France in 1524, and in the next decade Jaques Cartier
explored the St. Lawrence river (1534: his plans for a colony came to
nothing, but out of his explorations a fur trade with the native Americans
developed). But with the decline of Spanish power at the beginning of
the 17th century, and with domestic religious peace restored (Edict of
Nantes, King Henry, 1598), the French king chartered a Western
Company and further exploration and then settlement took place: first
(1603) Champlain went to Canada (New France) and founded a
settlement on Nova Scotia (1604), then founded Quebec (1608). He also
introduced Franciscan friars to convert the natives, then Jesuits, who
soon became the main missionary body. When the Quebec settlement
languished and Richelieu founded the Company of New France (1627)
to revive this French area of North America, conflict with England
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disrupted settlement activity, and even when that was resolved, colonization was slow. Thus what marked French presence up to the mid-17th
century in North America was little more than the fur trade and some
missionary work, with a modest colonial area of no great vigor or vitality.
Elsewhere, in the Caribbean, several places (Martinique, Guadeloupe)
saw French settlement activity by 1635, and black slaves as early as 1642.
But in all, French outreach was rather limited in the time period we are
considering.
Of the two Protestant nations to become involved in this overseas
venturing, England had the most long-range impact on the formation of
‘modernity’. Yet it was only late in the 15th century that John Cabot
made the first significant exploratory voyage (from Bristol, 1497,
discovering Newfoundland); and England lost interest in discovery after
the death of Henry VII (1509) until, in 1553, some ventures to find a
Northeast passage and others to find a Northwest passage were
undertaken. Even then, it was not until Sir Francis Drake, first with his
circumnavigation of the globe (1577-80) and then with his defeat of the
Spanish Armada (1588), opened the way that the prospect of English
colonization in America had any effective appeal. But the lure of the
Orient initially proved stronger: the East India Company was formed
(1600), and after finding itself unable to compete with the Dutch in the
area of major profits (Indonesia), shifted its focus to India (Madras in
1639, Bombay in 1661). Meanwhile, settlements and colonies on the
mainland of North America were beginning to establish themselves,
starting with Jamestown, founded by the Virginia Company in 1607 and
becoming a royal colony in 1624. In 1620, (New) Plymouth was
founded by Puritans who had emigrated first to Holland and then came
to America in search of religious freedom. Massachusetts Bay Colony
was also founded (1630) by Puritan refugees under a royal charter to
trade and colonize in a certain area of New England. And so it went,
settlement after settlement, with colony after colony, along the eastern
seaboard from what is now New England to (by the end of the period we
are considering) Virginia. The social, political, and religious diversity of
the early populations (although most were English), the conditions of
settlement and colonization, and the diversity of landscapes and possibilities of survival (all were agricultural in some form, but quite differently
so, and some were importantly involved in trade), made for quite
different histories and characters. Generally, there was a significant
economic purpose for the emigration of the settlers, and since they had
learned enterprise and initiative from participation in the English
economy they tended to be prepared and motivated to rapidly develop
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their colonies economically. Eventually, as the settlements developed
and formed connections with each other, the colonists also established
traditions of local self-government for themselves. But while they
included persons of many religious affiliations, and religion was another
important reason for their emigration, this was rarely the case in the sense
of providing a missionary religious purpose for the settlement, but more
because they were seeking to escape from an intolerable situation for the
practice of their religious affiliation in England and to find freedom for
that practice in the New World. Even though the English West Indies
exceeded the North American colonies in economic importance for
England in the first half of the 17th century, it was in these initial and
subsequent North American settlements and colonies that England was
unwittingly preparing a nation that, as an independent power, would one
day make contributions to the formation of ‘modernity’ as significant as
any country would make.
In the 17th century (1639) the Dutch Republic followed up the
English destruction of the Spanish Armada (1588) with a victory of its
own, and became for a while the world’s foremost naval and commercial
nation. Long known for their fishing fleet and their operation as carrying
agent for the goods of others, the English Armada-destruction and their
own subsequent victory enabled the Dutch to penetrate all the known
oceans and to wage unrelenting war against the Iberian nations in
particular. Coveting the Portuguese commercial empire, they founded
the Dutch East India company (1602) and took much of the trade away
from the Portuguese in the East, and indeed, from the English as well.
Ruthless in their actions, they sought and gained local monopolies (in
the trade of cloves and pepper) in Indonesia, but their undertaking was
only for trade purposes; there was no colonization in the East, the Dutch
there were only company officials, seamen and soldiers, overseers of
plantations and commerce, and a few scientists and Calvinist clergymen.
Unlike the Catholic nations (Portugal and Spain, especially), the Dutch
possessed no missionary interest in religious conversion, in extending
Protestantism: their venture was commercial, pure and simple, and not
colonial either, although they established one station on the voyage
between home and the East (Cape Town, South Africa:1652) that later
became a colony. As regards venturing in the direction of the Americas,
their attempt to take control of Portuguese Brazil worked in one part for
a while but eventually failed. A West India company, founded in 1621,
was active in the South Atlantic and in the Caribbean, but the only colony
they established in North America, namely, New Netherland (1624),
lasted only until 1664, when it fell to the English fleet and was renamed
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New York. On the whole, then, the Dutch participation in the European
outreach was trade oriented, and eventually, given its small size and the
difficulty of sustaining a large fleet, the Dutch venture was short-lived,
giving way to the English and her rule of the seas soon after the end of
the period we are considering.
Overall, the initial outreaching by Western Europeans during the
period we are considering had a range of different motivations in the five
cases (indeed, internal to each case). These emerged in their particular
form within the ongoing determinateness of diverse countries in evolution economically and politically, in persons with the position and an
ability to mobilize resources, and in both cases, under the pressure of the
current interplay of rivalry and conflict internally and externally; in the
persons in question, the various motivations gave to the notion of an
adventurous venturing beyond Europe itself such an appellative force as
encouraged its undertaking. That venturing had a kinship in every case:
outwardly it was a sailing over open seas in uncharted waters, on voyages
of discovery, and inwardly, this sailing-venture was envisioned as worthwhile because (part of) meeting a challenge of such significance that,
undeterred by the risk to life and the uncertainty to success, it was
important to undertake the venture. There were significant differences
in actual motivation and in envisioned (short-run and long-run) aims as
well as notions of what was important; but despite that, there was a
kinship in the way of carrying through the venturing and of following up
on the discoveries being made, and that kinship was strong and central
enough to enter as a significant feature into the constitution of
‘modernity’ in this formative time. That kinship can be expressed,
roughly, by speaking of an imperialistic venturing in which the ‘emperor’
in question is the ‘ego’-self in and for whom the venturing is undertaken.
This ‘ego’ is not that of any individual, and not that of the ‘we’ of a
people or nation or group; it is the ‘I’/‘we’ of the ‘human’ held latently
in a pre-reflective interpretative rendering. And what the ‘emperor’
aspires to is a ‘grandeur’ which ‘aggrandizes’ himself.
There is a mixture of facets to this sense of the human self rendered
as ‘ego’-self as I mean it in speaking of the ‘emperor’. One is an aspirational openness to the unknown, belonging to us as human beings and
meant by nature to be entered upon in our youth. A second is the anticipatory projection of a responsive venture into this unknown made
intelligible and plausible under an interpretative framework which gives
some anticipated determinateness to the unknown in its correlation with
the self of ourselves as human beings; that means, a framework which
includes a dual anticipation, of how what at the start is hidden by
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darkness is likely to appear to us when it does, and of how, under a
reading of the direction of our own venturing as human beings in this
aspirational vein, we are committing ourselves in advance to responding
to it. A third-- and this is the distinctive facet-- is a cleaving to this
interpretative framework in such way as leads us not only to impose it
on what appears and to take up with that accordingly, but also to enact
our own being in accord with it, at the same time granting to our ‘ego’self a ‘we are superior’ and allowing to what-is-other (‘it-and-they’) only
an inferiority that authorizes ‘us’ (within this contrast of superior with
inferior) to subjugate, take control over, exploit, and use, it-and-them as
resource for ‘our’ purposes. What is involved in the ‘imperial’, then, is
not the framework by itself alone but how, given that that framework is
a functional element within aspiration, it is brought actually to function.
What is involved in the global outreaching of this period and its
underlying ‘imperialistic’ character is, in truth, an expansion of the
aggressive and impositional mode and manner of the activity whereby
the Europeans are engaged in nation-building and relating to each other
on the continent as they are evolving-- an expansion of this mode and
manner to an outreach into the larger world, where it discloses more
openly than in the intra-continental context the ‘imperialistic’ nature of
the interacting of the evolving nations with each other in that context.
What appears as common to both, if more apparent in this outreach than
in the wholly intra-European context, is venturing in which the becoming
of oneself involves (a) a reducing of nature to resource to be exploited to
provide for ‘ego’-self, and (b) a reducing of the other (and especially
non-European) human-beings being encountered to lesser beings in
relation to the ‘ego’-self, those others being envisioned and responded to
as such in virtue of the pre-formed and rigidly and insistently held to
attitudes/purposes/visions carried by Europeans with them and imposed
on what they met (those others are infidels, non-Christians, savages, etc.,
not ‘fellow human beings’); and to that extent, the coloration of the
outreach with these ways of reading and taking up with the-other and
other-human-beings, matching the coloration of the having-to-do-with
each other in their evolving as members of the European community, (c)
shares (whatever its particular form in reflection of the different nations)
in a betrayal of the meaning of aspirational adventuring as a human
affair, that is, of the openness of the aspiring venturer to the new as other
and as challenging in a way that calls for self-transformation, that calls
into question one’s pre-paratory pre-conceptions and that summons one
to-- and re-calls one into-- the unknown-and-unpossessable inward to
oneself and thereby challenges the beliefs and convictions that are basic
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in-and-to the framework of one’s orientation in undertaking such
outreach and in engaging with what we encounter as the undertaking
proceeds. If, both at the start, and in the face of what one encounters,
those beliefs and convictions are held to absolutely rather than provisionally, the adventuring and becoming of the adventurer becomes truncated. In short, the venturing of Europeans in which a new (‘modern’)
sense of the human is becoming defined is one that, here in this early
formative period, is taking shape in responsiveness to the at-stake in
existence but, due to a way of interpreting matters and of holding to that
interpretation, is doing this in a way that is closing off some aspects of
the human concomitantly with opening up and realizing other aspects.
In other words, it is ambivalent.
Even so, the facet of ‘modernity’ which is taking shape in this
overseas outreach of these European powers enables them themselves-the venturers who continue to remain involved first-hand, at least-- to
gain a con-crete character in the encounter and having-to-do with theother which, regardless of how the venturers are taking that other to
themselves, indicates the entry of the-other into that interplay and its
imparting of something of its own character to (and its exerting some
measure of impact on) what the European was doing and becoming. That
shape of this facet of the European becoming-- this outreaching and
becoming modified both by how the inward is being developed in that
outreaching and by what is being encountered and taken into itself in it- fits together (if not always readily and harmoniously) with the shape
being given to that becoming in the intra-state and intra-European
political development that is bringing the political units (some further,
some not as far) toward being nation-states with a centralized monarchical governance structure and entering them into an interacting with
each other that seeks to maintain a balance of power among them, all the
while some are seeking the subordination of all under their own
governance. xviii
All of this, in turn, is only part of an early phase in the self-becoming
of ‘modernity’ in the European segment of humanity, the full flowering
of which is yet to be reached and the full meaning of which is yet to be
discerned even by those involved, those whose own becoming is at issue.
It is that phase of the self-becoming seen in its political side, a phase and
self-becoming which involve the other facets of the self-becoming which
we have noted (the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation). In this
mid-15th to mid-17th century time, these latter two are coming to confluence and joining with-- and giving some of its character to-- this complex
political stream. There is more that is essential in the self-becoming,
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however, and in particular, two further significant springs and streams
that enter into the constitution of this early period of the forming of
‘modernity’.
(2) Philosophy and science
If the stream of ‘modernity’ took initial shape out of the springs of
the Renaissance and the Reformation together with the amplification of
the flow from these two by streams arising from three further and
independent springs, one of these three latter (springs) was what we have
come to call “modern science”. Born with what is called the Copernican
revolution, thus with the work-- and the impact of that work-- of
Copernicus (1473-1543), the mid-16th century start of this spring had the
Italian Renaissance as its preliminary nourishing environment and
supportive matrix. In particular, the scientific starts as itself a re-born
transformation of something Greek, namely, philosophia, and knows as
its birth-name “natural philosophy”. Only in time did it become
recognized in its own different character and separate itself off as
“modern science” from “philosophy”.
In the Renaissance awakening to a richness of the past that was felt
as reinforcing to an aspirational vitality that could not be satisfied by the
ecclesiastically-fostered framework for the understanding and living of
life, that reinforcing power of the Greek and Roman was responded to
selectively. The elements of ancient Greek philosophy that were already
incorporated into the extension of the medieval, as Aristotle was in St.
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), reflected an honoring of native human
capacity in the form of “reason”, as did also the scholastic critique of
Aquinas in Scotus (1265-1303) and Ockham (1285-1347/49). But this
honoring, while addressed to a human capacity stressed as essential to
the human in Greek philosophers, xix pointed to something which was not
central to what was revived in the Renaissance as the human. Man could
indeed be ‘rational’ in that scholastic sense, and could subordinate that
‘rationality’ to ‘faith’; but what was felt most strongly, what from the
past resonated in this aspirational vitality that was reaching for the new
as most akin to itself, was something political-and-civic, something
artistic-and-literary, something giving a new and fuller sense of what it
is to be a human being. To the extent that what resonated included
something philosophical, that ‘something’ was three-sided.
One side was the Platonic centering of life in aspiration and in a sense
of connectedness with a larger world out of the human self and the aspirational love central to human life. As testimony to the power of this side
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of Plato, we have the mid-15th century Platonic Academy, founded by
Cosimo de’ Medici in Florence and headed by Marsilio Ficino (14331499). Ficino made the first complete translation of Plato into Latin, and
also translated writings of many Neoplatonists, including Plotinus; but
more to the point here, he authored a commentary on Plato’s Symposium,
and in his own thinking and writing adapted the Platonic to the Christian
by (for example) conceiving the highest form of human love and friendship to be a communion based ultimately on soul’s love for God (substituting God for “the Good” which the Platonic Socrates proposed in the
Symposium). Ficino’s creative appropriation of the Platonic is extensive,
but centers in this matter of the soul-- what is most essential to the human-- and such things as its place in the universe and its unifying function.
A second side to what resonated was insight discovered as present in
all directions and gathered together in a syncretist appropriation that
reached quite beyond Plato, and in the case of Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola (1463-1494), beyond the Greeks, into the Arabic and Jewish
traditions. As manifest in his De hominis dignitate oratio (Discourse on
the Dignity of Man) (1486), this discovery of truth in a variety of places
and the desire to seek it out widely is grounded also in an affirmation of
the human, but in this case, the human as marked by a God-given nature
that has no fixed character or limit but is centered in a freedom whereby
we are able to create our own future and to reach the level to which we
aspire. Given this freedom, given that our life is determined not by some
antecedently fixed nature but by our freedom, we are to use that freedom
well and to elevate ourselves toward the highest form of life. But using
it well means availing ourselves of the light of philosophy and perfecting
our knowledge of divine things, learning from the wise of all traditions.
And if that requires a moral character, then restraint of the bodily is a
precondition for that higher life, just as is a wide-ranging search for truth.
A third side to what resonated was various features of a wide range
of early Greek ‘scientific works’ now becoming available in translation,
works offering Greek alternatives to those Greek figures-- Aristotle and
Ptolemy-- whose thought and vision have been made part of the
traditional ecclesiastical version of the world as human beings could
grasp it with their natural reason. In the variety being recalled, there was
Plato but also figures like Pythagoras and Archimedes, there was a role
of the mathematical (including the geometrical) and of experimentation
in any understanding of the basic character of the universe and any way
of reaching that understanding, there were accounts which involved
alternatives to the placement of an unmoving earth at the center of the
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visible world. But above all, there was the clear and intriguing presence
of a wider horizon of possibility for understanding which, in time, could
spark venturing in thought which was at odds with the by now traditional
theological account, itself presumed to be the refined and systematic
statement of what is presented as truth in Biblical revelation, although
this theological elaboration was itself achieved by human reason.
None of the ways of taking up responsively with this resonating
philosophical material themselves amounted to a start in a way of
engaging in inquiry that would mark the emergence of something
‘modern’. At best there were here facets of a matrix for thinking and
inquiry, whose stress-- say, on aspirational love, freedom and the variety
of outworkings of thought-- might operate to encourage a new mode of
inquiry and whose suggestions-- say, concerning the structure of the
visible world and of the way mathematics could help make it intelligible- could in time become fruitfully incorporated into a ‘new’ mode of
‘natural philosophy.’
Another side of this matrix favorable to the eventual birth of ‘modern
science’ and ‘modern philosophy’ is found in the social needs and
political demands of the times, related in particular to war and to
construction projects, and raising in importance the profession of civil
and military engineer. Effectiveness in warfare was enhanced by the
development of guns and metallurgy, improvements in calculation of the
motion of bodies (cannon-balls, say) in space; construction of waterways,
buildings, and infrastructure, required imagination and calculation in
service of practical effort that needed to solve new problems, and thus
required a development of mind and skill that could look at things
differently, inventively. Such a focus had its reinforcement in the
intellectual world, with (say) the translation by Ficino of manuscripts
(really, forgeries) of Hermes Trismegistos, a legendary priest and prophet
and the alleged contemporary of Moses; these told (among other things)
an alternative story of creation which, because it saw man as made in the
image of God as creator and not as rational being, gave inventive and
productive effort the role of manifesting man’s being as made in the
image of God and thus as acting in god-like fashion when creating. For
man to enact this image well, he must learn nature’s secrets, and thus (for
one thing) learn how to address nature so as to discern them and learn
how to manipulate nature with the help of such knowledge.
One figure who brings to reality-- but still in only an embryonic and
incomplete way-- the cluster of possibilities harbored in this matrix as
womb for the birth of the ‘modern’ is Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).
He unites in himself, as architect, hydraulic and mechanical engineer,
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sculptor, and painter, a variety of ways of being productive, but above
all, he epitomizes a way of taking up with things which readily (although
not yet in him) leads into ‘natural philosophy’ in its ‘modern’ form. For
he maintains that true knowledge begins with first-hand observation of
nature and with experiment, and with the formation of ideas directly out
of such experience rather than out of books. More precisely, he urges
that the eyes are the main avenue of knowledge, that sight gives us access
to the facts of experience with immediacy and assurance, but that we
must learn to see. For seeing is not just the simple register of what is
presented to our eyes but involves attention, notice, that can free itself
from preconceptions and take in attentively what is there as it presents
itself; we need, then, to learn to use that capacity rightly and discover
nature with its help. Because of this access to knowledge, the painter is
the prime person qualified to achieve knowledge, for he starts by observing and he accurately reproduces what he sees in a pictorial manner.
Leonardo became fascinated with this possibility of knowledge, and set
himself the project of observing all the objects in the visible world, of
recognizing their form and structure, and of pictorially portraying them
as they actually are. He contrasts such knowledge with book knowledge,
which is epitomized in knowledge maintained by tradition (for example,
that knowledge claimed by the citation of authorities like Aristotle and
others, whose truth-claiming words are retained in writing). What books
hold can not be simply accepted but must be tested out against immediate
presence accurately observed and not allowed to override what seeing
opens us to. What Leonardo represents is not yet natural philosophy, not
yet ‘modern science’ nor ‘modern philosophy’, for (for one thing) his
reaching to be inclusive and comprehensive in knowledge is minimally
re-flective and limited to the visible. And yet, there is this which lies at
the heart of the Renaissance and of the ‘natural philosophy’ which arises
eventually out of that heart, that taking things in in their immediacy and
registering them, regarding them anew beyond the terms and
preconceptions we are prone by custom and habit, tradition and language,
to filter their presence through, is essential to getting at truth.
(a) ‘Modern science’
It was in the matrix of life and thought which Leonardo’s late 15thearly 16th century Italy provided that a Polish student, Copernicus (14731543), studied the Greek language and the writings of Plato, mathematics
and the astronomical thought of his day, at the University of Bologna,
then law and medicine at the University of Padua. While carrying out
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his tasks as a cathedral functionary back in Poland, he seems to have
planned out a systematic program of astronomical observation, and by
1514 he was well enough thought of as regards his grasp of the
astronomy of his day that he was asked by the Lateran Council for his
opinion on calendar reform. He declined to give an opinion, claiming
that the positions of the sun and moon were not known sufficiently well
for him to do so. Whatever may have been involved in his refusal, he
was engaged in efforts at the time to recalculate the supposed orbits of
the sun, moon, and various planets, around the earth, and was becoming
dissatisfied with the Ptolemaic geocentric system. Eventually he
developed a heliocentric theory which was a challenge to the way things
seem to common sense and, more importantly, to the traditional Churchadopted cosmology of Ptolemy. In his studies at the University of
Bologna (1497-1500), he had been introduced to ancient Greek astronomers who had questioned the immobility and central position of the earth
(for example, Aristarchus of Samos: 310-230 BC); but the thought of
Ptolemy (2nd century AD) had triumphed, despite being exceedingly
complex. Could a simpler account of the relation of the various planets,
earth, and the sun, be found? Nicole Oresme (1330-82) and Nicholas of
Cusa (1401-64) had renewed the proposal of terrestrial motion, and Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) had claimed that the sun does not move, the
earth is not the center of the circle of the sun or in the center of the
universe. Copernicus felt that a heliocentric theory might explain what
we see-- not just everyday appearances, but appearance to intensive
observation of the heavens over long periods of time-- better than the
Ptolemaic view. In 1514 he summarized his conclusions in a small work
that was not printed during his lifetime but circulated among a few persons. The response was not encouraging, but in 1539 a young mathematician, Georg Rheticus, became attracted by the views presented in it and
urged publication of the work. Copernicus refused, yet allowed him to
publish a simplified analysis of its first four books (1540). Again the
reception was not favorable, but finally he agreed to the publication and
Rheticus delegated to a friend (Andreas Osiander, a Lutheran minister at
Nuremberg) the task of seeing the book through the press. Osiander did
so, but on his own prefaced the book in a way that would make it more
acceptable to Church authorities, claiming that its arrangement of the
various bodies was only a convenient way of making predictions
possible, not an account of the truth; he published it in 1543, just before
Copernicus’ death. The theory carried with it many remnants of the
Ptolemaic theory which it displaced; and not until Kepler, Galileo, and
Newton, could work out the mechanism of the new theory to greater
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simplicity and accuracy would it appear clearly superior to the old. In
the meantime, the Catholic Church initially raised no objection to the
new theory so long as it represented itself as an hypothesis, but once it
was claimed as a truthful account of the real world and its implications
grasped, it was attacked by Church authorities, and not simply Catholic
but Protestant as well.
The Copernican view ran counter to Aristotle’s view of earth as the
unmoving center of a finite universe bounded by the heavens of the fixed
stars, and Ptolemy’s view of the motion of the sun and planets around
that fixed point. Both had become integrated into the vision of life on
earth that was part of Christian revelation and thus was held to be true as
a matter of faith as well as of common-sense. The Copernican account
challenged the previously-accepted view of the quite limited size of the
universe, and opened the way to a sense of the universe as infinite (as
Giordano Bruno [1548-1600] would soon hold); it also challenged
Aristotle’s account of motion, which utilized the notions of natural
places for natural elements and the natural place of earth at the center of
the universe in order to explain the motions of bodies which later, in this
heliocentric view, would be grasped as the work of the force of
gravitation. But if earth is not the center in a universe bounded by the
not very distant eternal and unmoving heavens, and if humanity finds
itself on a planet which is itself moving (both revolving around the sun,
and rotating on its own axis) in a universe all components of which are
also involved in motion, what then?
The Reformation challenge to Catholic Christianity was not so much
dogmatic as institutional, accepting within the revelatory framework of
the Bible and directed more at the nature and place of the institutional
structure than at the understanding of revealed truth. The Copernican
reconception of the universe formed a deeper challenge, one to the Reformation churches as well as to the Catholic, for it concerned something
integral to their shared sense of the nature and meaning of Christian
revelation and their sense of the way this revelation addresses the nature
of the real world as we know it in everyday life. Even so, it took a while
for this challenge to be felt as a shock, muted as it was so long as what
Copernicus offered could be regarded simply as a fiction convenient for
limited predictive and calendric purposes. But even when this muting
wore off, the challenge of this new view was conveyed in its full force
only with Galileo, when the basis on which he founded its claims to truth
became itself affirmed by him in an express fashion.
The Copernican account was flawed in a number of respects and incomplete in all sorts of ways. One major step in refining it and removing
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those flaws was undertaken by Kepler (1571-1630). A German who ardently advocated the Copernican system, in a series of works between
1609 and 1621 he developed the notion that the planets moved in an
elliptical orbit in which one focus was the sun, in contrast with the
circular form of the orbits Copernicus had presumed; and he developed
added principles of planetary motion and mathematically-formulated
laws based on those principles that further amended the Copernican view
but at the same time strengthened the support for it. Because he urged
that the Copernican theory was not simply a useful fiction but had been
proven as truth, his work was placed on the Church’s Index of Prohibited
Books. Nonetheless, through him the heliocentric view not only won
widening acceptance but was refined in a way that opened an avenue for
the even more far-reaching and profounder account of motion which
Newton (1642-1727) was to provide in the time closely following on this
period we are currently considering.
If the work of Copernicus, refined by Kepler, conceived the universe
as a lawful and orderly structure more expansive than previously thought,
and if Kepler’s refinements were assisted by a wealth of observational
material (mainly observations by Tycho Brahe, a Danish astronomer) as
well as by his own Platonic and Pythagorean predisposition to look for a
mathematical harmony as marking the orderliness of the Creator’s universe, it was not until Galileo (1564-1643), an overlapping contemporary
with Kepler, that we find ‘modern science’ taking shape in a way that
was importantly self-conscious to its fundamental novel side, that of
method and methodical inquiry. An Italian living in the lingering glow
of the Renaissance, a student of medicine and philosophy, Galileo was
early drawn to mathematics and in particular to geometry, and as a teenager had discovered that the swings of a pendulum, regardless of their
width, take equal times. It was this combination-- of mathematics and
mechanics-- that remained his passion. Of the things in his life-work that
had enduring significance, two need notice for our purposes, both
concerned with the nature of what we call “modern science”.
The first is intelligible on the background of Aristotle, who had
understood “first philosophy” to be the study of being qua being, and
had considered “nature” to be a type of being which was the focus of a
subordinate philosophical study. That type of being is one that has a
“nature” in the sense of an inherent and internal archē of kinēsis: the
translation of the two Greek terms here is difficult because in English we
have given connotations to the most often used translation-terms that
quite readily distort what Aristotle had in mind. But if we recognize that
each term, in Aristotle’s usage, has a variety of meanings, and seek to
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point to the fundamental sense which gives coherence to that variety, we
would speak in colloquial English of a natural being’s nature as that
inherent starting-point (archē) which harbors the capacity, an impetus,
and a directional factor (a meant-to-be), for the agential developmentand-functioning (kinēsis) of the being and which thereby constitutes its
essence and defines it in its distinctive temporal being. Human nature is
such a starting-point, such that we human beings develop and grow out
of our selves to be (for Aristotle) rational beings: rationality is the term,
the end, of our natural growth-and-development as human agents. This
gives to the term “nature” a sense which means that a being’s growth,
development, and agential functioning, have not only a starting-point and
an impetus native to them but, from the start, an inwardly-based direction
with an ending-point (telos: the fulfillment of nature, the completion of
growth, development, and functioning, as a natural affair); thus the “nature” gives to the being’s actual evolution a native directionality which
is meant in-and-by the starting-point to be actualized, although whether
or not this actually occurs depends not simply on the native impetus and
functioning of the natural being in keeping with it but on supportive circumstance.
Galileo’s was a rather different approach to nature-- to that same reality which we human beings (Aristotle included) encounter by way of our
senses and are indeed part of--, and to that reality as prominently marked
by observable growth and development, change and motion. His was the
address to understanding nature which saw the grand book of the
universe written in the language of mathematics. That is, approaching
the observable world within an attention to space and time so far as they
are measurable quantities and disregarding as subjective all those
observable features of the spatial-temporal things we encounter that do
not mark them as quantifiable matter, he sought such grasp of this
material reality in its mensurable features as observation (both normal
and experimentally-produced) could disclose and such connection of
those features and such implications from them as rational demonstration
could prove based on the evidence observation provides. It was not
purpose, the why, which he sought to grasp, but how things happen, any
lawfulness to that happening, any discernible or deducible pattern or
structure to it. In inquiry, then, he focused on the observable within a
certain framework of attention, sought rational discernment of a certain
sort of lawfulness in what is observable, and through experimentation,
calculation, and rational deduction, sought to grasp the lawfulness in a
mathematically-determinate conceptual form. His mode of inquiry,
defined by such a focus and seeking aimed at eliciting the truth of the
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observable world, drew on our distinctive (adult) human capacities and
thus was in principle open to all who would apply those capacities in the
requisite fashion. In this form, his was the first (and as yet, by him, imperfectly realized and self-understood) methodologically self-conscious
realization of inquiry as it is to be central to ‘modern natural science’ that
we know of. Such a method is not a specific technique which, when
utilized, automatically produces satisfactory results; it is a mode of
investigational address which requires imagination, creativity, to say
nothing of (as inquiry advances) instruments, a laboratory setting, and a
variety of other supporting factors which become useful as aids to inquiry.
Galileo realized certain of the essentials in his embodiment of this mode
of inquiry, but only that, and did so imperfectly, yet with sufficient clarity
and strength that he is often recognized as the first genuine scientist in
the ‘modern’ vein.
The second factor of enduring significance in his life-work and relevant to our purpose was both internal to this, and at the same time, such
as had external repercussions of a profound sort. The mode of inquiry
he exemplified is such that the inquirer is willing to accept as authoritative for any conclusions he/she would draw only the observations of
our senses and the deductions of reason from sensible evidence. This
excludes, for one thing, his/her own feelings, emotions, desires,
convictions, and the like; but it also excludes opinions and truth-claims
(a) that are not based on the evidence available to observation operating
within the conceptual determination that what is real in the observable
world is limited to what has mathematical features, and those (b) that do
not stem from reason drawing cogent conclusions based on such
evidence. While a significant amount of his work was connected with
various features of the local motion of bodies here on earth, Galileo’s
basic concern was with matter and motion as it was to be found throughout the universe, and thus, in the heavens as well as on earth; and
eventually he gave more and more of his time to astronomy and motions
in the heavens. In this regard the Copernican proposal concerning the
centering of the planets on the sun made sense to him, and his own
improvements of the telescope and his use of it to discover a new world
of stars, a new surface to the moon, satellites moving around Jupiter,
together with his observation of sun-spots and the explanation of them
that made most sense to him (that their periodicity indicated the rotation
of the sun), strengthened his belief that the Copernican proposal was not
simply a useful hypothesis for prediction but formulated the true state of
things. But the Copernican view seemed clearly incompatible with the
Bible in its literal meaning, and when Galileo’s talk of the truth of the
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Copernican view was challenged by Church authorities, he replied by
pointing to passages in the Bible which call for a non-literal reading
(those referring to God’s hands and feet, his anger and hatred, and the
like) and at the same time sought to separate the authority of the Bible in
religious matters from any authority claimed for it (and mistakenly so)
in regard to natural processes which we either perceive by careful observation or deduce by cogent demonstration. Truth about such natural processes is one and not self-contradictory; where the Bible seems to make
claims about those matters that contradict what reason and observation
see clearly to be such-and-such, Biblical interpreters need to keep in
mind that, while inspired, the Bible was composed for ordinary people
in a certain historical context and written so as to make sense to them
and to strengthen true religion in them. Thus one should interpret
passages which seem to contradict what reason and observation establish
with this in mind, and preserve the claims of the latter. After all, he urged,
the God who endowed us with sense and reason did not intend us to forgo
their use. The dispute that arose regarding his espousal and defense of
the Copernican heliocentrism led eventually to his being charged and
found guilty of heresy and disobedience by the Church, and to his
spending the remaining years of his life under house arrest, a prisoner in
his villa but able to pursue his studies, receive visitors and teach students,
and even write books-- although publication was another matter.
In his insistence on the ultimate and exclusive authority of sense and
reason in the sphere of inquiry he took it to address (the visible universe
as a mathematically determinable field), Galileo was an advocate for responsible inquiry freely seeking truth through the appropriate use of
human capacities; whether his own application of himself to that very
endeavor always adequately measured up to the standards and norms implicit in the endeavor as he understood it, is another question. But nonetheless, this question was raised most importantly by his clash with the
Church, namely, what is truth? Not, what is true in this or that case, but
what is the nature of truth itself, and under what conditions can it be
disclosed to the human being? This is a question which becomes increasingly pressing in times to come.
It is as truth-seeking inquiry attentive to reality in its mathematizable
features, disciplined to accept as evidence for truth-claims about it only
what is based on observation (experimentally mediated or not), and committed to claiming truth as conclusion derived from rational deduction
grounded in the directly observed, that we find ‘modern science’ being
practised self-consciously here in its early manifestation in the person of
Galileo. Despite the flaws and limitations in his embodiment of that

316

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

mode of inquiry, he began ‘modern man’ on a self-conscious endeavor
that has brought enormous advances in knowledge of the physical side
of reality on its most primordial level; but how this embodiment was
continued and the discipline brought more fully into itself by being
refined and revised in others as time goes on belongs just as importantly- and perhaps even more so-- to the historical constituting of ‘modernity’.
Especially important in that regard is the story of how, and to what extent,
the pursuit of truth which seeks to found itself independently of religion
and tradition becomes more effectively self-critical and responds to
reshape itself as the question of how life is to be inquired into in a
responsible and experience-grounded fashion becomes central to it. If
the Reformation brought the Catholic Church into question as an
institution, this development of the enterprise of ‘modern science’
brought into question both the Catholic and the Protestant, indeed any
religion’s, claim to reveal truth concerning the nature of this universe we
find ourselves in and to disclose the truth of ourselves as active
participants in it. But since Galileo, has this inquiry-vehicle itself been
adequately brought into question as to its own claims, has it been brought
to a sufficient self-critique on this matter of truth? And yet, is that not
essential, as much so here as in the case of revelation, if the clash of
‘science’ and religion is to be a fruitful one?
Beyond this self-conscious start by Galileo of the discipline of
‘modern science’, there was much during this mid-15th to mid-17th
century time, undertaken by others and regarding other fields than those
of physics and astronomy, that belongs to our recall of the beginnings of
‘modern science’. What was taking place in those cases stressed another
side to this undertaking, the empirical widening of acquaintance with
this-or-that without an express and self-conscious thinking upon the
nature of the inclusive field holding the phenomenon or upon science as
an endeavor addressed to a field of inquiry. The venturing in these cases
did indeed revive or initiate a number of disciplines of knowledge, and
often did so with significant advances: there were Vesalius and Harvey
in anatomy, Paracelsus at the alchemical edge of the application of
chemistry to medicine, Gilbert on magnetism, and so on. Such venturing
was often aided by the stimulus deriving from the overseas exploration
taking place during this period, the adventure of sailing bringing with it
an adventuring intellectually: expanded acquaintance with the earth’s
surface, new seas and new lands, brought the challenge of mapping and
relating geographically what was being discovered; the discovery of new
fauna and flora, gems and minerals, foods and drugs, in these new lands
brought an enlarged acquaintance with the variety of the earth’s
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components and her living offspring, her variety of life-environments,
together with the challenge of comparing and relating this variety,
classifying and analyzing the given data on living species. It would be a
while, however, before assimilating the mass of empirical data being
gathered, critically revising traditional ways of conceiving the particular
phenomena involved, and opening up this-or-that path of inquiry into
this-or-that set of reconceived phenomena, would lead to something like
the development of a self-conscious methodological component which,
become part of inquiry in various other fields, is visible in Galileo as
regards inquiry into the field of physics. In the meantime, it would be
mainly philosophers-- Descartes, Francis Bacon-- who thought on such
matters, and one of the eventual impacts of Galileo, seconded by these
philosophers, was to place a paradigm of ‘scientific’ inquiry in front of
students in these various other fields that was in fact relatively inappropriate for many of them but for a long while was held up uncontested as
a standard, without a well-thought-through alternative.
All of this, both the Copernican, Keplerian, and Galilean venture and
the manifold empirical widening of acquaintance and preliminary
analysis of phenomena within an implicit presumed understanding of the
fields involved and by way of a self-critical seeing and noticing of what
is visible, was challenging and adventuresome for the practitioners and
generally for the formally educated among the population; the breakthrough of the confines of antecedent tradition, religious, philosophical,
scientific, was not threatening but inviting, exhilarating even, and
reinforced a sense of pride in human capacity that had already been
called to mind in the Italian Renaissance and that was now given a
particular boost with the new venturings and discoveries (physical and
intellectual) being made and with the expansion of acquaintance and
knowledge of the universe in which we human beings find ourselves. At
the same time, this was not the perspective of the Catholic Church or
indeed of the Protestant churches, nor for the most part of the less
educated, whose familiar world seemed to be being undermined in
fundamental ways by the various undertakings.
There is another side to the growing tension between ‘modern
science’ and its social matrix, beyond that being generated by the
challenge of the thought-results of certain exceptional individuals to the
horizon of intelligibility within which whole societies and peoples were
operating. For in this case, what these individuals-- Copernicus, Kepler,
and Galileo, for example-- were accomplishing is, seen in its most
fundamental feature, the initial realization of a discipline of inquiry
which by its nature is collective and collaborative, and this, in the
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specific way that allows progress in the advance of knowledge. It is not
just the challenge of the ideas of a few, then, but the potential challenge
of a growing community, that is becoming born here. We have remarked
on how Galileo expressly noted that the capacities required for such
inquiry as he was involved in were shared human powers, and that the
framework and field of the discipline he brought those powers into play
within was likewise a shared one. The observational and experimental
elements in inquiry, the public character of the evidence and the
reasoning involved, and the character of the employment of human
capacity under the constraint of standards-- in short, the methodical
nature of the type of inquiry involved-- make for the possibility of a
working of diverse individual human beings which is collaborative in the
sense that it inherently enables the labor of one inquirer to contribute to
the labor of others in the form of refinement, criticism and correction,
amplification, extension, pointing to new evidence, and the like, all
within the sense that “we” are seeking “truth” in the same disciplined
way and can advance the discovery of what we are seeking with help
from each other, by subjecting our own efforts and results to criticism
and to confirmation-or-refutation-or-challenge by others who may
initially think differently but who accept the same norms and standards
of inquiry. We have seen how in the Renaissance the recovery of manuscripts and their translation into more accessible (even vernacular) languages was important to the humanistic effort, and how the invention by
Gutenberg of the movable-type printing press in the mid-15th century
enhanced the speed and breadth of the availability of the written word to
the literate and furthered the sharing of old and new ideas, even to the
point of strengthening the Reformation movement. In the context of the
inquiring in this emerging discipline, the furtherance of ready and timely
communication by way of writing augments the potential for progress
and for expansion of the cohort of inquirers, and it underlines that in
‘modern science’ we have a potentially universal community in the
making, one of scientific inquirers who, however they may contest each
other’s work within the framework and field they attend to, know not
only a community of endeavor and intellectual conscience, but know
these as a medium for a cooperative advance of knowledge by way of
self-criticism and peer critique, one that can bear fruit beyond what any
individual could achieve on his/her own. As literacy expands, as word
of what is being discovered and thought in this community spreads
beyond it to society-members who are not (yet) inquirers but (say) whose
life-horizon is being challenged by what is being ventured within that
community, numerous problems of communication and education will
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be spawned by the distance that is growing between inquirer and others.
But potential sharing is possible also.
(b) ‘Modern philosophy’
As we noted above, the Renaissance that formed the background for
what we have just been considering, the first steps in the “natural philosophy” which we now call ‘modern science’, also held a revival of philosophy in the fashion which Ficino and Pico exemplify. In the last half of
the 16th century, another figure bringing that revival to a striking realization was Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). A controversial Italian, his
hostility to Aristotle and the Scholastic mode of thought was accompanied by an outspoken and provocative manner of engaging with others
and of presenting his thought in lectures and in writing. Although he
became a priest, he early on found himself in trouble with Church
authorities and found a trial for heresy being prepared for him. Fleeing
to Rome, getting in further trouble there which led to a second
excommunication process being started against him, he entered on a
extended life of wandering, punctuated by brief residences in
Switzerland, France, England, and Germany; eventually he returned to
Italy, to arrest and the Inquisition (he had early on been declared an
outlaw), and in virtue of his refusal to retract the heresies he was charged
with, to death by being burned at the stake. His was a transitional
thinking, versed in Scholastic ways of considering things but himself
committed strongly to the Renaissance ‘think for yourself’ spirit; finding
some inspiration in diverse sources, ancient and contemporary
(Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic; magic and the occult; and
Copernicus), he worked his way beyond these to his own thoughts. In
them, he forcefully, even dismissively and sarcastically, rejected the
Scholastic and Aristotelean, even as the language he uses often draws on
terms from the tradition being rejected and sometimes gives them the
same meanings, sometimes his own sense. The directions in which his
thinking moved as it evolved were basically two. One was toward understanding the universe as both infinite and a unity; as infinite, it was
without a center or circumference, without an up or a down, and as a
unity, with a oneness that unites the infinite individual centers of being
which act each according to its own inherent law and character but which
are what they are relative to each other, in a coinciding of the contraries
and contrary forces involved in their interplay. The other direction was
toward understanding the human as finding its center and fulfillment in
‘heroic frenzy’, in particular, in the sort of aspirational love which the
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Platonic Socrates sketched out in the Symposium, in a heroic reaching
for participation in the supreme good and primary truth, in the willing
inward reaching to God within and the light of truth and the place of
contemplation. Although his thought would incorporate the Copernican
challenge to the geocentric and to that extent was in tune with the
beginning of ‘modern’ thought, he would go far beyond Copernicus in
the direction of breaking down the fixity and finitude which was intrinsic
to the traditional Christian view; thus he pointed to infinity as (for
examples) holding innumerable world-systems such as our own solar
system, as marked inwardly by life in all of its beings, and as eluding all
our attempts to think it limited in the various ways we are prone to do.
Bruno made little immediate impact on his contemporary world,
except for the example of his death and what led to it, namely, the
strength of his rejection of the authority of the Church and tradition in
the matter of truth and his affirmation of the importance of freedom of
thought. But he does sound in Renaissance form some things which are
sounded again in some later modern thought (Spinoza and Leibniz, for
example). The re-birth of philosophy in a ‘modern’ form, however, is to
be found in René Descartes (1596-1650), whose thought was centered
importantly on understanding the nature and promise of the ‘new
knowledge’. But his reflections warrant a contrast with those of Francis
Bacon (1561-1626), whose view of the nature of that undertaking
emphasized rather different sides to it than what Descartes emphasized.
Bacon concerned himself with this form of inquiry within a
framework already settled for him in its fundaments by his religious
commitment. According to that framework, human beings have access
to knowledge in two rather different ways, one supernaturally (revelation)
and the other naturally (using human capacities alone). While
revelation-- and it alone-- discloses to us the fundamental truths in
theology, ethics, and psychology, our nature-acquired knowledge can
discern, in the teleology of nature, grounds for affirming the existence
and some attributes of God (thus providing a natural theology to go with
the revealed), and by the light of nature can partially discern right and
wrong (thus provide a natural ethics to go with the revealed), and can
know the animal form of soul (a material entity, shared with animals) but
not the rational soul as immaterial and directly created by God (disclosed
only in revelation). But Bacon devotes most of his attention to the
naturally acquired knowledge of nature (and especially, of non-human
nature), and he does so basically as a merely human affair that has
considerable promise. His account of the inquiry which seeks out such
knowledge is only an incomplete sketch, accompanied by promises to
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fill it out on other occasions; but in it he treats such inquiry as having a
theoretical or knowledge-gaining side, yet one that is most important
because of its practical-application potential. For the ultimate end of the
knowledge gained in natural philosophy (‘modern science’) is, in
broadest terms, to help man redeem his fall from grace in Adam and to
re-establish his dominion over the earth and its life. Such a re-establishment is possible with the help of the development and application of
such knowledge, provided of course that that application is for the
benefit of all mankind and the relief of the human condition, that is, that
it is animated and governed by (Christian) charity. xx
How does Bacon understand the inquiry which has such promise? In
his characterization of it, he puts emphasis on the empirical as the heart
of this promising new ‘method’ of inquiry. As he saw it, experience, and
in particular, sense experience, and even more specifically, such
experience engendered experimentally, provides a starting-point which,
when taken up in inquiry in an orderly way, enables us to reach a useful
understanding of nature. But first, a problem: the mind with which we
reach for such understanding from that starting-point needs to be selfaware and self-critical to succeed. For in our ordinary approach to what
is given to us in our experience, our mind is cluttered with ideas that
distort our reception of things and dispose us to take up with them in
ways that do not allow us to arrive at a truthful grasp of them. We need
to deal with this distorting factor as the first step in our inquiry. This
factor is complex, and while we cannot rid ourselves of it in all respects,
we can become aware of it and counter the distorting force of what we
can not eliminate.
Bacon speaks of this complex factor by enumerating four types of
idol: (1) “idols of the tribe” are inherent weaknesses and tendencies of
human nature itself, which cannot be completely eliminated in any
person but can be recognized and compensated for: for example, the
tendency to take the perceptions of our mind and our senses as
undistorted disclosures of reality when in truth our senses are quite
limited in what they can disclose, and disclose only crudely at best, and
even then do not disclose reality simply; in addition, our minds are prone
to impose order and simplicity far beyond what is actually present and
being discerned, and to jump to hasty conclusions while ignoring
counter-examples or matters that are in conflict with the conclusion we
draw, often doing this at the prompting of emotion and will, because we
want something to be so; (2) “idols of the cave” are distortions,
prejudices, biases, peculiar to an individual in virtue of our individual
experience and education, religion and social class, training and
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distinctive temperament and responsive proclivities; (3) “idols of the
market place” are impediments to clear thinking arising in our
intercourse and association with each other, and especially, those
embedded in the language we use: words in their current meaning invite
us to think of things according to that meaning, but their meanings are
formed by and for the popular mind, not reason, and in any case, names
do not always stand for things which exist and may name existent things
in ways which are vague or misleading, based on bad observation or
faulty ways of thinking; and (4) “idols of the theatre” are impediments
to understanding stemming from various systems of philosophy which
are inadequately founded but can readily dispose us to think along their
lines.
Supposing we are alert to these factors in ourselves and not
dominated by them, how do we gain a knowledge of reality? That begins
with properly carried through observation and recording of what is
observed, but is arrived at from this beginning-point in data by the
mind’s use of an inductive procedure which enables us, if it is properly
conducted, to arrive eventually at laws or general principles. Crucial to
the proper observation and recording are, for one thing, use of instruments and various devices to overcome the limits of disclosure inherent
in our senses and, for a second, comparison of the perceptions of
different observers, to counteract any bias in each; but the sensible foundation of knowledge being gained and expanded by the use of
experiments must be recorded and classified, and our initial classifications must be corrected or replaced as more data is disclosed and
recorded. Crucial to the next step-- the proper inductive application of
reason to this material from experience-- is two things: one is the
cautious rise from the particulars first to axioms of moderate reach,
relating to similarities, differences, variations, and patterns of connection,
and before moving on to more wide-reaching laws, return to more
particulars to confirm or correct the moderate-reaching axioms in
question; the other is, in the induction from particulars to axioms and
eventually to laws, the use of negative instances so as to highlight and
eliminate false alternatives, merely limited associations and similarities
that are readily mistaken for something they are not, and so on.
Implicit in this vision of an inductive experience-and-experimentbased method are various presuppositions, including this, that the
method is the appropriate and relevant one because nature is a
hierarchically ordered structure at the apex of which are a limited number
of forms underlying the variety of simple natures which we can discern
directly in experience. While these forms do not come into direct view
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for us, our procedure can elicit them as the explanatory factors for the
way nature is and operates if we come to them on the properly conducted
inductive path.
In some contrast, Descartes sought to establish philosophy itself-- not
simply natural philosophy-- on a new and solid basis, and as part of this,
addressed natural philosophy as a field for inquiry and for knowledge
grounded in that basis. His emphasis both in his philosophical procedure
and in his account of the method of natural philosophy is on the rational
element, not the empirical. Shortly after he had heard of the Church’s
condemnation of Galileo (1633), Descartes withdrew a work he was
about to publish (The World), but soon thereafter (1637) published his
Discourse on Method. Then several years later (1641) he published
another work, Meditations, elaborating further on this method. Like
Bacon, Descartes was impressed by the dubiousness of the many human
claims to know which he encountered in others and found in himself, and
he challenged himself to see if he could find a solid and assured
foundation on which he could build the edifice of knowledge open to a
human being. His way was to reject as false everything for which he
could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if there remained
anything that seemed to him entirely certain. Now our senses sometimes
deceive us, thus it is possible that nothing is just as they cause us to
imagine it to be; and because we deceive ourselves at times in our
reasoning, he rejects as false all the reasonings he had formerly accepted
as demonstrations. And finally, because what enters his mind when
awake can do so when he is asleep without such things being at that time
true, he resolves to assume that everything that ever entered into his
mind was no more true than the illusions of his dreams. But at that point
he comes upon something which he can not make dubious, namely, that
while he is striving to think all things false, it is necessary that the ‘I’
who is doing this thinking should ‘be’; that is, the truth ‘I think therefore
I am’ is unable to be undermined by the ‘I’ who is doubting everything,
and can be taken as the first principle and foundation of the knowledgeedifice he is seeking to build.
But this ‘I’: what is it? Simply a substance-- that is, a soul or immaterial substance-- whose whole essence and being is to think; and in this
activity, it is a center of cognizance whose nature and existence is
entirely separate from body. How proceed from this clearly and
distinctly grasped truth to further truths? The first step is for this ‘I’ to
recognize what there is in this true and certain truth that makes it true
and certain, namely, the clarity and distinctness with which the necessity
of his having to be in order to be thinking is apprehended. Thus “clarity
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and distinctness” forms a criterion of truth, such that all things that we
clearly and distinctly conceive are true. The second step is for this
singular existing thinking being to discover what exists beyond itself,
and this takes place in a variety of ways that lead to the same place,
namely, the existence of God as source of this self-aware thinking being
who recognizes, among other things, his own imperfection (in his very
doubting: for to know is a greater perfection than to doubt). And once
this existence of the perfect being which is God is acknowledged-Descartes offers various proofs for such existence--, and the criterion of
truth which he had developed is seen as founded in this source (God
would be a deceiver if that criterion was itself dubitable), the third step
is for this ‘I’ to reach out beyond this source of himself to everything else
that also has its source in this perfect being, and to do so via the variety
of ‘ideas’ which this ‘I’ finds in itself. And he argues from the differences
in this variety, including the presence of some clear and distinct ideas,
together with the thought that God is no deceiver, to the existence of
other things, the nearest of which is his own body.
Our experience seems to disclose to us our own bodies, and other
bodies that are made manifest to us through our senses. With regard to
all such material entities, however, we know (again, unless God is a
deceiver) that while these powers-- the senses with which we register the
existence and character of such beings, and the power of affirming-ordenying by which we judge concerning (say) this register-- are capable
of deceiving us, we have been given capacities (reason and freedom of
will, say) with which, if we use them aright (restrain our freely-exercised
judgment to affirmations-and-denials in keeping with our clear and
distinct apprehension), enable us to discern them in their true nature and
to sort it out from what is deceptive. With this, we have arrived at the
Cartesian version of the Galilean rendering of the field of responsible
scientific inquiry. xxi Descartes speaks of it as extension (extended
substance), or quantity in length, breadth, and depth; such substance is
capable of many different parts of many sorts of size, figure, situation,
and local movement, as well as degrees of duration.
The Cartesian method of doubt is a philosophical one addressed to
the discovery of the first principles of things, but once such principles
have been discovered there is the task of understanding the variety of
things on the basis of them. The disparity between the multiplicity of
bodily things (possible and actual) and the few principles (in this case,
the clear and distinct ideas of ‘matter and motion’) creates many
possibilities of understanding any particular thing as exemplifying those
principles, and sorting out the actuality in the real world requires the
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introduction of experiment to enable the arrival at a grasp of how the
principles are explanatory in particular situations. But the general idea
of the method of inquiry within this field of natural philosophy is the
reverse of that of Bacon, to work from the principles down through the
complexifying introduced by combinations of simple elements
eventually to the concrete level, rather than in the inductive movement
upward. Thus it is the power of reason which dominates in Descartes,
but reason understood in a certain way, a quite different way from that
of any of the ancient Greeks or any medieval thinker, or perhaps from
that of other modern philosophers and inquirers into nature or (for that
matter) students of ethics.
However different the views of how this new enterprise of ‘scientific
inquiry’ operates when it is operating to its best effect, Descartes shared
with Bacon the sense that the knowledge which can be gained, even with
finite human capacities, can be considerable and (more to the point)
sufficient to enter a progressive improvement into common human life,
not simply in the form of an advance in knowledge but also in that of a
proliferation of arts and crafts. If Bacon puts this point in terms of restoring to man the dominion over nature that was his original position in
creation, Descartes speaks of such knowledge as enabling human beings
to employ natural things for such uses as they are by nature adapted and
thus to make ourselves “the masters and possessors of nature”
(Discourse on Method, Part VI).
The intellectual venturing which arose within the Renaissance matrix
and took ‘modern’ shape with the Copernican and Galilean realizations
of ‘science’ in modern form preceded the kindred transformation of
philosophy which we find in Descartes. And not merely that, but the
latter took shape in important ways by focusing on the former, an
unsurprising development since the problematic of existence is always
raised con-cretely and the emergence of ‘modern science’ was
provocative enough (cf. the Copernican revolution, the clash of Galileo
with Church authorities, to say nothing of the burning of Bruno at the
stake) to raise that fundamental problematic. With Descartes, the
‘methodological’ reflexivity visible in Galileo’s pursuit of ‘scientific’
inquiry was amplified into a philosophical re-flection, and in his pursuit
of that re-flection ‘modern’ philosophy was entered upon a path that
emphasized epistemological matters. So far as philosophy showed other
signs of re-birth in the times we are considering, there is the thoughtfulness concerning governance which a 16th century figure like Bodin exhibits in the French context, but in connection with political
developments of these times, it is the 17th century figure of Hobbes in
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the English context in whom a different form of the re-birth of
philosophizing in ‘modern’ form than the Cartesian takes place. xxii
Hobbes (1588-1679) approached the political from what he claimed
to be the perspective of philosophy, that is, of natural human reason,
whose work is the reasoned apprehension of effects based on knowledge
of causes, and the reverse, the knowledge of causes from the knowledge
of their effects. Early on impressed by the force of reasoning as exemplified in Euclid, and by the newly emerging thought which saw in nature
basically matter in motion, he was drawn to work out a comprehensive
scheme of understanding, which regarded physical phenomena as understandable by reference to motion, human beings as understandable by
reference to the motions involved in their cognition and appetition, and
human society as an intelligible structural offshoot of human nature.
Central for understanding human society and in particular the political
community are two connected but different factors implicated in our
nature. One is that it authorizes each to use his own power as he wants
for the preservation of his nature (that is, his life) and thus to do whatever
in his own judgment seems aptest for securing that preservation; the
other is that the reason in us forbids us to do what is destructive to our
life or do what takes away the means for preserving it, and forbids us as
well to omit doing that by which we think it may best be preserved. If
we naturally seek our own (individual) preservation and do so relying on
our own capacities and doing whatever we think would best enable that
preservation, there is no security for others, nor for ourselves in the face
of others naturally seeking their own individual preservation. We are
each and all perpetually driven to seek more and more power and control
over our situation and that means especially, over each other, that we may
assure ourselves of an enduring and contented life; and we are each and
all inherently vulnerable and can not avoid being apprehensive of danger
and threats to our preservation as we live and act, including threats from
other human beings (we are naturally wary thus of each other,
mistrustful).
In this situation, the reason in us provides two precepts: (a) that we
ought to seek peace where it is realistically possible to obtain it, but seek
and use the help and advantage of war otherwise; (b) that we ought (for
peace and the defense of ourselves, and if others are likewise willing) to
be willing to renounce our unconditional right and liberty to govern ourselves and to control and possess everything, and ought to be contented
with so much liberty against others as we would allow them against ourselves. Now it would not be enough that everyone agrees to renounce
his unconditional or unlimited right and liberty, unless there were a way
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of enforcing this renunciation in each and all, so that the good sought by
each and all (the peaceful condition of restrained liberty) could be
assured. That way which Hobbes points to is the establishing of a
common power beyond the renouncing parties themselves but one which
they set over themselves with (a) a right and force sufficient to compel
their keeping their word to each other, and with the right to command-and the sufficient power to enforce-- the laws which define the restrained
liberty which is to be allowed, and (b) with a commitment on the part of
each to submit his will and judgment to that power’s will and judgment
(as regards the common peace and safety). It is in the establishing of
such a power, and with it, the renunciation of the right to oppose it in its
governance function (its commanding as regards allowed and prohibited
actions, say), that Hobbes sees the sole condition under which we can
make possible for ourselves an existence in which we each, by our own
efforts and by our appropriation of the fruits of the earth, are able to
nourish ourselves and live our lives out contentedly and in peace.
Human beings who have entered into such an agreement and such a
conferring have instituted a political order, a “commonwealth” or unitary
political community or civil society, whose heart and center is the
sovereign whom community members have each agreed with each other
to obey and to allow to determine the civil laws and to decide judicially
any controversies, so long as that power is able to defend and protect
them.
It is in this materialistic and egoistic clothing that the political evolution toward autocratical monarchical nation-states becomes dressed
when it is brought into early re-flective articulation in ‘modern philosophy’. But the mid-17th century political substratum which is matrix
within which Hobbes achieves this is itself about to evolve in crucial
ways, and with that will arise other ways, and a somewhat different
framework, in which philosophy takes up and brings the political into
thoughtful re-flection.
(3) Economic evolution
By the end of the 15th century, Europe had recovered population-wise
from its decimation by the Black Death plague and subsequent epidemics
(mid- and late-14th century), and had moved beyond the general period
of depression that had overtaken much of it. That recovery featured responses to the huge losses of human beings which altered the previous
system of providing for need(s) and brought the growing population to
provide for itself in a different manner from before. Amidst crises that
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invited retreat into a desperate clinging to the old, into the irrational and
the superstitious, it included in various places a response on the level of
‘self-preservation’ kindred to the Renaissance ‘looking at things anew’:
an ingathering and courageous taking responsibility and venturing which,
drawing on perception-and-thought released in some measure from the
traditional filter and required to envision opportunity in novel adaptation
to altered circumstance, sought to serve life by at least assuring
subsistence amidst difficult conditions. This meant trying various new
alternatives that seemed plausible for achieving that persistence amidst
the con-crete conditions of the time. In virtue of sufficiently widespread
success in such venturing when it took certain forms, a shift and
evolution took place-- over time, at an uneven pace, with varying success
in different parts of Europe, and via a variety of transitional arrangements.
That shift was (put generally) from what had been a feudal economic
arrangement based in landholding and involving a hierarchical system of
lords, vassals, and peasants (free or serf/slave), of dues and obligations,
of merchant and craft guilds, of ‘just price’ and a ban on ‘usury’, to a
system dominated by merchants and artisans and operating within a
social framework which, while still marked by the contrast of nobility
and peasants, held also emerging commercial and land-owning classes
as well as changing political systems that (in these early times of experimentation) in numbers of places were moving toward a centralized
absolute monarchy. The times we are considering here (mid-15th to mid17th centuries) are marked by the initial maturation of capitalist
economic systems in which eventually ‘ownership of the means of
production and distribution’, ‘money’ as ‘investment capital’ and
‘wages’/‘income’ and ‘profit’, and the workings of the market in reflection of supply and demand, costs and prices, dominate. The adaptations
to circumstances made in these times will eventually bear fruit in the
form of a complex mixed regulated-and-free market system, one which
is only beginning to take shape and gather momentum here and to do so
unevenly in the various parts of Europe.
(a) Adaptations and their direction
One adaptation to the presence of fewer people in the countryside
and thus fewer workers in agriculture together with more abundant (and
cheaper) land was a shift in ownership and use of land. Land-owners
with sufficient capital accompanied by inventiveness and enterprise
could acquire and consolidate greater land-holdings and convert (say)
arable land into pastures (requiring fewer laborers) and raise sheep or
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cattle for commercial markets (wool, food). In western Europe, where
sufficient capital was present and the political system was supportive to
such a development, this shift was fairly widespread; and after the
beginning of the Reformation, when various states adopted Protestantism
(the north German states, Netherlands, England, and the Scandinavian
countries) and former Church lands were confiscated and sold (in whole
or in part), such adaptive use of large areas of the countryside was
augmented in those countries. But in eastern Europe, where sufficient
capital was not present and compliant governments were operating,
adaptation moved in a different direction, toward the formation of even
larger estates and the increase of serfdom, with formerly free peasants
becoming serfs bound to the soil, and toward increasing production of
grain for market. In this way eastern Europe became the breadbasket for
much of Europe.
A second adaptation took place in towns to start with, but its effects
reached out into the countryside. In town, two forms of inventiveness
and enterprise developed. One concerned investment of capital in
technology that would enable the fewer workers initially available in the
circumstances to do more, and that meant, in part, for machines to do
work instead of humans. Thus we find changes in shipbuilding and the
development of navigational aids allowing bigger ships to sail with
smaller crews over longer distances; and given the prevalence of wars,
we also find gunpowder and firearms giving smaller armies greater
fighting power. In general, manufacturing boomed, especially of those
goods used in the outfitting of armies and fleets-- cloth, armor, weapons,
ships--, and (as support for this) new mining and metalworking
technology that made possible the profitable exploitation of the rich iron,
copper, gold, and silver deposits of central Germany, Hungary, and Austria, and in turn afforded the opportunity for profitable large-scale investment of capital. We also find the printing press replacing human copyists,
and the multiplication and spread of printing shops and of books. The
second concerned the coordinating organization of a number of workers
to play a cooperative role in a larger system of enterprise. Thus in the
16th century, we find cottage industries in the countryside, diffused over
much larger areas of Europe than in Middle Ages, but now with towns
functioning as centres from which the raw materials were distributed into
the countryside and with the work of rural workers being coordinated
and marketed by urban entrepreneurs. The key to this integration of city
and countryside in regional economies was the entrepreneur, who purchased the raw materials, distributed them among the working families,
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passed the semifinished products from one artisan to another, and marketed the finished products. The size of the trading networks and the
volume of merchandise moving within them made the services of the
entrepreneur (typically, a great merchant resident in town) indispensable
and made numerous workers dependent on his capabilities and resources.
A third adaptation emerged in support of the activity being fostered
in the first two adaptations, both of which depended on the availability
of capital. As the investments (to aggregate land, to develop technology,
to coordinate various facets of a complex commercial undertaking) grew,
and with them, the markets that were able to be developed, the banking
and finance system which could supply the needed capital evolved as
well. In the 16th century, we find the full development of an international
money market with its supporting institutions. There had been medieval
bankers in the 14th and 15th centuries (in Florence, say), who financed
(among other things) trade with India via the Mediterranean. But with
the formation of joint-stock companies operating on a large scale, and
the growing needs of centralized governments for financing other than
taxes, the financial and banking system adapted in such way as to take
advantage of opportunities that were opening up. The earliest architects
of this were South German banking houses. With the mobilization of
capital in fabulous amounts, however, money began shaping the politics
of Europe in a multitude of ways, including bribery.
In earlier discussion, we have already noted how population, its numbers recovering from the low-point of the Black Plague times, continued
to increase in most places during this mid-15th to mid-17th century period;
while the Thirty Years’ War brought decline in some cases (the Germanic
states, but also Italy and Spain), the distribution of population was in any
case also changing, not simply the numbers. Political changes added to
purely economic changes in affecting the concentration of population in
certain towns and urban areas. The centralized state of the early modern
age came to exert a decisive influence on the development of financial
institutions and in other economic sectors as well. To maintain its power
both within its borders and within the international system, the state supported a large royal or princely court, a bureaucracy, and an army. It was
the major purchaser of weapons and war material. Over the course of
the 16th century, the prince/king expanded his authority not only to make
appointments and grant pensions but to direct and control the economy
in the interest of enhancing state power. Although mercantilism as a
coherent economic theory had not yet arisen (the true age of
mercantilism postdates 1650), the political direction-and-control efforts
were already expressing mercantilist-like policies. With such a presence,
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capital towns or cities became all the more magnets for economic activity
and increasing population, with the double attraction of providing
proximity to political power and enhanced economic opportunities of a
variety of types. Then too the beginnings of exploratory outreach into the
larger world, starting with the Portuguese establishment of a sea-route to
India via the Cape of Good Hope and continuing with the discovery and
opening of the Americas, meant the redirection of competitive traderoutes in a way that was to the advantage of the nations, and port cities,
on the Atlantic seaboard. Such cities as Antwerp grew rapidly, and others
grew as well: seaports such as Lisbon and Seville, Amsterdam, London,
Bremen and Hamburg, and a financial center such as Augsburg, and
politically important centers such as Madrid, Paris, and Vienna.
The changes taking place in the ways just sketched proved a turning
point for the guild organization, both merchant and craft, that had served
the medieval economy that was being replaced. Guilds were fitted for
the more localized economy of feudal times. The emergence of regulated
companies and other associations of wealthy merchant-capitalists fitted
for this more expansive market left the merchant guilds increasingly
isolated from the main currents of economic power. And craft guilds
broke down as the pace of technological innovation spread and new
opportunities for trade disrupted their hold over a particular industry.
Masters tended to become foremen or entrepreneurs, while journeymen
and apprentices became laborers paid a wage by the day. In short,
modern industrial organization undermined guilds of both types. At the
same time as these consequences were being felt, the 16th century was
also a time of inflation, in part due to monetary debasements and/or
increasing volume of precious metals (from America as well as
Germany), in part due simply to the ‘more’ who had to be fed, clothed,
and housed, thus to demand outpacing supply. In the course of this
upward trend of prices, there was not a comparable rise in wages, so that
while the economy was being stimulated, more extensive markets were
becoming formed, and entrepreneurs were generally securing and
increasing profit, the number of the poor and destitute in society was also
increasing. Since entrepreneurial activity was a risking and failures were
not uncommon, while the advance in prosperity overall was noticeable it
was far from uniform.
Finally, after the Reformation got underway and with the change in
attitudes stemming from it as it spread, there was a widening presence of
ways of thinking of economic activity different from before and
supportive to all this. For the Protestant, both in its form in Luther and
in its form in Calvin, represented a shift from medieval Catholic
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Christianity with its teachings about usury and just price and its
condemnation of the profit motive. Luther emphasized that every
Christian had received a calling (Berufung) from God, and this gave new
dignity to all secular employments; Calvin went further, and stressed the
positive value of work, sobriety, diligence, frugality, and thrift, and to
that extent a Protestant businessman knew a religious reinforcement of
his industrious temper, even though Calvin’s vision was not focused on
the individual in the way Luther’s was, let alone the capitalist’s was. For
he urged that ‘no member of the Christian community holds his gifts to
himself, or for his private use, but shares them among his fellow
members, nor does he derive benefit save from those things which
proceed from the common profit of the body as a whole’. To that extent,
he had no sympathy with acquisitive speculation or ruthless
accumulation. Nonetheless, the Protestant re-evaluation of work called
forth in Roman Catholicism a theory of vocation that closely imitated
that of Luther’s “calling”, and the Protestant attitude evolved till by the
17th century commercial success could be deemed a sign of God’s favor.
Overall, then, but especially in Protestants there was from the mid-16th
century on this (if not unqualified) support in religion for something like
the entrepreneurial spirit that was blossoming at the time.
(b) Varying contribution to ‘modernity’
If, overall, the structures of European society-- the ways by which it
produced food and goods and distributed income, the ways in which it
organized itself politically, and the ways in which it looked at itself and
saw itself as part of the larger world-- were taking new shapes and
marked by new forces, what was emerging was by no means uniform but
diverged in different states, and was also still in process, as yet
unfinished and undisclosed in features that would evolve in time. In
particular, the economies varied considerably in different parts of Europe
and were at different stages in the evolution that would bring a ‘modern’
economy into being if the impetus and direction of change persisted.
Economically, the Spain of this period embodies one venture which,
so far as the more long-run future goes, basically dissipates the promise
which its outreach to the Americas held open. As we have noted before,
this had much to do with the way its nation-state building was conducted,
the centering of political effort on religious orthodoxy and the
consequent impact on the Jewish and Muslim populace who were the
most capable and active in the internal economy of the country. But it
was also because the ruling powers shared in the nobility’s disdain for
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commerce and productive work and squandered the wealth coming from
exploitation of the New World, its gold and silver, on wars and luxuries.
Not only did the Spanish fail to use it effectively in the development of
an internal economy which would be self-sustaining and supportive to
its masses, but the increase in bullion, used to acquire goods and pay for
wars, also contributed to the inflation which worsened the condition of
many Spaniards during this time.
France and England were more successful in the ‘modernization’ of
their economic venturing, and their paths will lead into even more significant realizations of ‘modernity’ in the times after the period we are now
considering.
Like Spain, France was forming itself as a nation-state and achieving
a steadily more effectively centralized and autocratic monarchy during
this same period. But internally, once the Hundred Years’ War was ended
and the territorial expansion and consolidation on the continent was
underway that would make France a nation-state of considerable size,
the kings sought to attend to the financial and economic condition of the
budding nation. At the same time during much of the 16th century, France
became caught up in internal religious conflict; for a significant
Protestant (Huguenot) minority had developed in this Catholic nation,
and it had become a disquieting religious and social force. But it was
also particularly important economically as a significant (although still
small) part of the growing proletariat; bearers of the Calvinistic strain of
Protestantism, resentful of the disdain of bishop and baron for commerce
and of the ecclesiastical and aristocratic wealth that had nonetheless been
built up without entrepreneurial effort, and receptive to the example
among Germanic people, the English, and the Swiss, of a successful
alliance of merchant with Protestant rulers and ideas, the Huguenot
represented a revolutionary force, especially as they formed tight-knit
communities organized along republican lines. It was not easy, but an
eventual resolution to the conflict was achieved, and with the Edict of
Nantes (1598) the Protestant presence was acknowledged and given
standing. With this, Henry turned to the task of economic and monetary
recovery. As we noted before, marshes were drained to develop
agriculture, the silk industry was introduced and manufacture of various
luxury items that had previously been imported from Holland or Italy
was encouraged, new highways and canals were constructed, and treaties
were concluded that furthered trade with England, Holland, and Spain.
But the Edict of Nantes did not end the differences between Catholic and
Huguenot nor the conflict, and the latter broke out again with the
assassination of Henry IV. Under Louis XIII, however, with Richelieu
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as the dominant advisor and statesman, the first half of the 17th century
saw not only the strengthening of the royal power throughout the nation,
but enactment of a policy which recognized the significance of the
Huguenots to the economic and financial well-being of the nation and
which represented an operation of the central government in ways favorable to achieving such well-being. Nonetheless, while Richelieu was
able to move France toward being the strongest power in Christendom
and, by his death in 1642, had used taxes to build up armies and a navy
that would-- at the end of the Thirty Years’ War (1648)-- make France
the foremost European power in displacement of Spain, this focus of his
at the same time overmastered the concern for economic well-being.
More significantly for the long run, it brought unity and strength at the
cost of a dictatorship and a royal absolutism that in time provoked a
revolution-- indeed, the Revolution. It also brought only limited outreach
across the seas, with some exploration and colonization (New France) in
North America, some missionary work and fur-trading extending
beyond that, but little that made much economic difference.
After the end of the Hundred Years’ War between France and England,
the latter ventured in a direction which, economically, was even more
important in the long-run formation of ‘modernity’ than France, and did
this within a political development that was kindred to that in France, at
least so far as governmental support for the economic was concerned.
But it was the distinctive situation of England as an island apart from the
continent and as willing and able eventually to take an active role in the
overseas outreach that underpinned its venture, and the somewhat
different nature and political handling of religion in England that made
for what is the most far-reaching development, so far as contribution to
the character of ‘modernity’ is concerned. Under Henry VII (r. 14851509) England began a time of significant political change but one that,
in virtue in part of the political effort, was also a time of unprecedented
economic growth and accompanying social change. We noted earlier the
political side of this; in terms of the economic itself, England was in the
midst of a shift in the ownership and use of land which brought a free
peasantry and, in the case of large landholders, turn to a leaseholding
system accompanied by the aggregation of rent-paying properties that
were agriculturally productive in ways that involved less need for labor.
In virtue of an accompanying appropriation and enclosure of previous
common areas, and attention in particular to raising sheep and the development of a wool market, this meant the disappearance of a good many
villages, but the emergence of a yeoman class. While London continued
to grow and dominate the southeast, central and northern England
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became dominated by the woolen industry, not simply the raising of
sheep and exporting raw wool but eventually the production of cloth for
an export market. A cottage form of industrialization emerged, and with
it the integration of town and countryside in regional economies; and in
turn such regional economies became connected with mainland markets,
and in all, a scale of production, a size of trading network, and a volume
of product moving within that network arose which reflected the energy
and adeptness of entrepreneurs with access to capital. The economy that
was emerging in this way was rooted thus in a different use of land and
made possible by money and the enterprise of those who knew how to
organize such a system. Henry VII was supportive of such a
development, chartering a monopoly for the London cloth exporters who
controlled the London-Antwerp market, and negotiating a favorable
commercial treaty between England and the Netherlands. Under Henry
VIII (r. 1509-47) such developments in land use continued, but being a
risky and competitive affair, economic venturing brought high rents and
profits for some, difficult competition and lower wages for others, and
overall, an inflation and an uncertainty that had the new classes that
prospered under the new way of producing goods and providing for
needs supporting a government that would abet their growing prosperity
and would assure the rule of law and a stability to life-conditions that
was favorable to enterprise. But while the facilitation of such economic
life by the central government continued under Henry VIII, attention
shifted to continental affairs, to matters of religion and Henry’s
transformation of the Church in England into the Church of England. An
influx of Protestant religious forms and ideas entered England from the
continent, and despite Henry’s opposition, introduced an energy that was
favorable also to economic activity. Moreover, in dissolving the monasteries seized by the state in the transformation of the Church and selling
or giving them to supporters of his policies, Henry brought lands with an
altered economic function into play, and prepared the way for what
succeeded him, namely, a steady economic condition amid the political
and religious turmoil that eventuated in the reign of Elizabeth I (r. 15581603) at the end of the century. Elizabeth’s was a reign of order, and
included in the order being fostered was the economy. The Elizabethan
state legislated in this regard, as in the Statute of Apprentices (1563), a
code of governmental supervision and compulsion which embodied a
vision of work as lying at the heart of a meaningful life. Thus ablebodied youngsters were required to learn work through an apprenticeship
program, and willfully unemployed men under thirty without an income
of a certain level could be forced to take employment as directed by local
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authorities; similarly other aspects of the work-life being fostered were
specified and responsibility for setting and enforcing terms (wages, say)
were laid out. But the work-vision was employer-centered, and its
impact on working classes was such as to foster impoverishment, especially as the enforcement of (say) wage-adjustments was left to magistrates
who belonged to the employing class. Thus as prices rose and the
inflation which afflicted the economy of Europe as a whole-- grounded
importantly in augmented presence of precious metals, and debasement
of currencies by governments-- made itself felt in England, wages also
rose, but far more slowly, so that during the last half of the 16th and first
half of the 17th century, during which the system was basically intact, the
conditions of artisans and laborers worsened. The government sought to
remedy some of the evils that resulted, with laws against mendicancy
and with Poor Laws that acknowledged the responsibility of the state for
keeping its people from starvation. For a while some monopolies were
permitted for the manufacture or sale of various goods, but complaints
brought suspension of some of these; but the effect of lack of competition
was that domestic trade developed more slowly than foreign commerce.
As regards the latter, England (like Spain and France) wished to export
goods and import gold and silver, for it was in precious metals that a
nation’s wealth was to be measured (a mercantilist concept before there
was any explicit mercantilist theory). Elizabeth’s minister (William
Cecil) declared as a policy aim an elimination of dependence on foreign
commodities (dependence represented a vulnerability in case of war) and
the protection of home industries, and employed tariffs and subsidies to
discourage imports and encourage exports. A sign of the direction which
the future was to take was the formation of the East India Company
(1600): overseas trade, the building of the fleet that would enable it and
the discovery of lands and peoples and the formation of colonies with
whom to conduct it, were beginning to open the way for England to
become a major European power, not by the exertion of military might
and intervention in the balance of power on the continent but, with the
defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588) and the opening of supremacy on
the seas to the British navy, by way of overseas trade and colonization
and with them the beginning of a world-wide British Empire. All of this
was facilitated by the development of the appropriate financial
institutions and devices: banks multiplied, joint-stock companies formed,
and as stock transactions mounted, stock-markets were formed for the
exchange and ownership in shares; in 1566, the Royal Exchange was
built to cover such mercantile and financial operations. In addition,
interest on loans was reinstated and distinguished from usury (1571),
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legitimizing a 10 per cent return. The commercial spirit grew as London
became one of the thriving trade and commerce centers of the world. It
was only in post-Elizabethan times, however, that the overseas reaching
which would bear the imperial fruit began in earnest, even as those were
also times of growing crisis concerning governance under the Stuarts
(James I, 1603-25 and Charles I, 1625-49). In that outreach, the reach
toward the East was soon followed by a reach westward, with colonial
settlements in America and growing trade between colonies and the
mother-country. But at the same time, there was a domestic economic
crisis brewing: increasing population, together with disruption of trade
with continent in course of Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), a year of bad
harvests (1629-30), rising taxes in relation to participation in the war, a
couple of economic depressions (1629-32, 1638), brought growing
tension between classes and regions.
One issue of the economic changes in England in the period we are
now considering was a regional tension reflecting different religious persuasions and different economic interests.
The north was
overwhelmingly agricultural and (if only clandestinely) overwhelmingly
Catholic, while London and the south were increasingly industrial and
Protestant. The new business class, while cherishing its monopolies and
protective tariffs, demanded a free economy otherwise, one in which
wages and prices would be determined by the supply of labor and goods,
in which there would be no feudal or governmental control of production,
distribution, profit, or property, and in which no stigma would be
attached to commercial occupations, the charging of interest, or the
manipulation of wealth. The barons and their peasants, however, clung
to the feudal concept of mutual obligation and group responsibility, of
state regulation of wages and prices, of limits by custom and law to
conditions of employment and profit. The barons protested that the new
mercantile economy, producing for a national or international market,
was disrupting class relations and social stability. They (and the gentry
and the government) felt their own solvency threatened by the effects of
inflation on the value of the traditional dues, rents, or taxes upon which
they depended. They looked with angry disdain upon the lawyers who
shared so prominently in administration, and the merchants who ruled
the cities. They dreaded the power of mercantile London. This
economic-based class-tension entered into the political system. For as
the gentry and yeomanry became more numerous, they also fretted under
the system and longed for a government submissive to a Parliament submissive in turn to themselves; and as the expanding wealth of the bourgeoisie--- bankers, merchants, manufacturers, lawyers, physicians--
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meant demand in this case as well for political representation
commensurate with its economic power, these two forces (bourgeoisie
and gentry/yeomanry), with no interest in common otherwise,
collaborated as a middle class in the attempt to check the noble landlords,
the court, and a king who considered a hereditary aristocracy the
necessary source of economic and political order and stability. The
House of Commons thus became increasingly a voice of such persons-the emerging middle class; and as that voice grew more assertive,
England moved toward a fundamental turning point internally. All these
factors collaborated with religious strife to drive many English families
to America, and in time, to plunge England into a civil war that changed
the face and destiny of the nation. The first half of the 17th century was
building in England toward a crisis involving religion, the government,
and the economy.
(c) The emerging economic system, as visible so far
Central to the new forms of economic organization and activity that
became parts and expressions of a ‘modern’ economy were several things
which, while they did not emerge all at once, and perfectly, but at first
only partially, gradually, and imperfectly, were becoming sorted out in
the times we are considering.
First was an emphasizing of enterprise, both by individuals and by
groups formed for economic purposes; that means a stress on taking responsibility for applying capacities in an economic vein. Second was a
sense of the ‘economic’ which, while rooted primordially in the
venturer’s providing the goods that enable his own survival, expanded
and transformed the reference back to the venturer and loosened the tie
to survival, so that, on the one hand, a communal reference to such
activity was made central in the form of a market for goods and services
provided to others than the venturer, and, on the other hand, the operation
of the enterprising provider of those goods and services for others was
conceived as requiring profit (earnings, income, beyond expense) to be
gained. Such profit was needed both to provide for the needs of the
owners-and-managers but to provide investment capital for further economic activity.
What is underway now, by the first half of the 17th century at least, is
a start on forming a system in which these factors are emphasized. But
that system is set in a larger context that is constituted by certain further
factors which, while not emphasized in the way the first two are within
the system that is emerging, are taken for granted in it and are absolutely
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essential for the existence and functioning of such a system. There are
three of these in particular.
As is evidenced in the difficult times and conditions of life which the
Black Death plague introduced and in the response to which this system
began to take shape, one thing taken for granted as a sometimes more,
sometimes less, hospitable-- but nonetheless, indispensable-- enabling
condition for it is, put crudely, the earth and, in each case, the particular
land, climate, location, and environment of living beings (human and
non-human), for the people in question. As entered into the economic
system itself, this has a many-sided role, but it is entered into it only
because it exists beyond the system itself and is something in its own
right; in regard to the system, it is an enabling condition for the living of
the human beings in whose interaction the system has its place and
function and its own way of regarding this circumstantial presence.
Also entering as enabling condition is a social order or society whose
interplay-facilitating meanings-- and thus whose socially based and enforced values, ways of relating to other human beings, roles for participation in intra-society (and extra-society) interplay, and so on-- offer a
supportive context for individual members to be enterprising and to seek
to provide the needed-and-desired goods for members of that social context to be able to live their lives out in interaction with each other. As
such meanings and values inflect the needs-and-wants, thus the desiresto-acquire, of society members, they give determinateness to the
impelling factors that are primordial functional rationale and directional
features for economic activity in the society. Because the meanings
which form the constitution of an economic system are social and part of
the inclusive meanings defining the social system as a whole, changes in
other parts of the inclusive set have impact on those that give its shape
to the economic system, and likewise in reverse.
Again, within the society there is a particular further enabling condition, namely, the governance-structure obtaining in it. For it is this which,
by law and law-enforcement, by regulation and oversight, is importantly
instrumental in ensuring the orderliness that makes the conduct of
economic activity possible in a fair and reliable fashion.
Beyond the two emphasized factors within the system, and the three
taken-for-granted enabling conditions for the operation of the system,
there are two further factors which are of considerable consequence for
the functioning of the system but also have a rationale for their being
which is not economic alone. Economic activity depends on some
form(s) of transportation for its distribution and exchange of goods and
services, and likewise, on various means of communication. As modes
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of transportation and communication change, for economic or other
reasons, so the functioning of the economy will change. In contrast,
money is a purely economic thing, with no reason for being except as
functional element in certain economic systems and certain types of
economic transaction.
In conclusion, although the economic system emerging is European
in its origins and initial realization and carries marks not only of its
original setting but of its cultural matrix, because of the European outreach into the larger world that was taking place in these times and that
involved in important ways an economic side and numerous impacts on
the evolving economic system, it was a global economic system that was
in the making internal to the connecting of distant peoples that was taking
place. Unlike the Mediterranean and overland trade that already existed
with the Middle East and Orient, this extension of the European reach
over the seas and directly into touch with the western, southern, and
eastern coasts of Africa, with India, southeast Asia, and China, and with
South and North America, carried with it the in-the-making evolution of
a novel ‘modernity’ that was political and intellectual as well as
economic, and was above all element in and testimony to a large-scale
in-process re-shaping of the human sense of humanity. It was not simply
the beginnings of a global economic system reflecting the new forms of
economic organization and activity that is appearing in this period, but
the start of a con-crete connecting of the diverse peoples of the globe-economically, but also politically, intellectually, and socially-- in a way
that, by our times today, is entering all human beings alive on earth today
into a ‘crisis’ and the question, what is it to be a human being? About
that, we will be asking, What role does the ‘modern’ economic system
have to play in that crisis-provocation?
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d. Early modernity, the initial formative coalescence
of the five springs: the dominant emphases
We have spoken of ‘modernity’ as having originated from five
springs and streams; while what emerged from each was only a facet in
the inclusive and complex situation of human beings (in this case,
Europeans), in the interacting of those beings the various streams flowed
together, diverted each other, generated new sub-currents, and in general
formed a whole which, while internally it continued to change in
numerous ways as the human beings whose energies carried it came and
went and the situations of their living changed, began to gain determinateness and a momentum as a dynamic whole with internally
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mutually-interacting elements.
Let us consider now the nature of what was happening in this
formative phase, and do so using the terms laid out above (250-256)
which slightly expand selected elements from our account in Chapters
1-4.
1. In its most distinctive side the Italian Renaissance began and took
shape in a time when, seen structurally, the aspirational reaching toward
the ‘higher and better’ in various individuals was being inadequately
satisfied by the terms of the then-current ‘past’-and-tradition together
with the then-‘current’-conditions in which this tradition was being
carried forward by the various other members of the society. In those
inadequately satisfied individuals, aspiration sought a con-crete direction
more adequate to its own native reaching and found this-- various
particular directions and the directional at-stake expressed in taking
them-- with the help of elements in ancient Greek-and-Roman life. As
those elements registered in such individuals, they reinforced focus on
the humanity-component in aspiration, the allure of a ‘higher and better’
human life in oneself-and-others, fuller and richer in its earthly character
than the ‘past’-extending’ ‘current’ would represent. Aspiration’s liberational working as the own-life-beginning directional-power for adult
human life thus opened up the future as in principle unconfined by the
horizon of the then-current-‘past’-and-tradition, and not yet captured by
a particular alternative horizon. Thereby it encouraged the risking of a
way into the future whose determinate shape(s), while formed
responsively to the actuality-and-possibility of the current situation,
would show a significant stimulation by selective elements from a distant
past that supported a different and not simply traditional way of taking
part in the present and following out the reaching of aspiration. As it
happened, current circumstance and the opportunity it offered did mesh
with and allow (even foster) the novel venturing sufficiently that ongoing
affairs became augmented and modified by the venturing of various
individuals and the contemporary response to it.
Given what is discernible at this distance, numerous and complex
facets of the Greek and Roman heritage functioned in this supportive
way in those whose uncaptured aspiration meant they were open to
something different and whose particular capacities enabled them both
to make something of the stimulation of that past and to do something
that fit with present circumstance. For the most part the stimulating
distant past gained its impact in a re-flective-- in this case, intellectual,
artistic, and civic-- participation in the present. Thus we find ventures in
these areas of then-contemporary life, and ventures which also roused
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further kindred responses and spread beyond Italy, mainly in the
intellectual realm, expressing the humanistic study (critical and selfcritical) of languages, the art of text-reading, and the use of vernacular
in writing, but spread also to some extent in the artistic realm. Beyond
the different particular venturings-and-realizations and any influence
those may have had, there was more fundamentally a common spirit and
basic directional aim being realized in most of the creative individuals,
one (a) that concerned what was central in life (the decision-making heart)
and that focused on realizing human potential and reaching in such way
as would give to human life on earth a many-sided fullness as this was
able to be envisioned in this particular Italian setting, and one (b) that
expressed the courage to respond in the realm of alluring possibility that
aspiration held open and to respond with this human focus independently
of-- even despite-- the circumscription of then-current-tradition and its
intellectual horizon.
The Renaissance part in the beginning of ‘modernity’ was not limited
to these more distinctive re-flective factors, but was visible in connection
with other facets of the life-and-activity situation. Yet there was some
tension between the reachings just spoken of and these others. Already
in the ongoing context of the re-flective side of the aspirational liberation
there was political change, the emergence of the city-state and a republican form in some cases, and an economic underpinning for this, particularly through trade. The latter took a shape which, while not inconsistent with a continuation of tradition, fitted closely with the changing
political horizon; the political change, however, while advancing slightly
in the direction which gave rise to ‘modernity’, was arrested at a very
early stage on that path. On the one hand, there was the humanistcolored civic involvement with its stress on morality and virtue as a
strength that showed itself in practical affairs as well as cultural
achievement. This leavened the operation of some city-states to some
degree. On the other hand, there was the dominant operation of the
political in terms of power, where the early arrest of the development of
‘modernity’ on this level was typified by the Italian League, the
attainment of a form of aggressive ‘ego’-aggrandizing expansionism that,
in its prudence, led eventually to a ‘balance of power’ commitment by
diverse political powers. The five parties to the agreement included citystates with such aggressive expansionist reachings who, seeking defense
against encroachments from outside upper Italy, were willing to join in a
restraint of aggression against each other. The roots of this in human
nature are somewhat different from the roots for the humanist version of
civic life, which were the element of aspiration and a sense of potential
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human fulness to life on earth. Instead, in correlation with the inherent
vulnerability of the human condition in its manifold dependence on a
(human and natural) environment that is in-dependent, the basic root was
the trustful-but-wary reaching out which is element in the dialecticallyprimordial facet of any human activity, and then, in the secondary development of this reaching-out within a maturationally-arrested ‘ego’-self
acting in recognition of human vulnerability, the liberation of active
energies in activity that seeks aggressively to incorporate from circumstance what is needed to maintain a threatened existence while at the
same time defensively protecting the agent by assuring continued access
to such needed resources. In the political world that subtended the
cultural and humanist activity of the city-states involved in the Italian
League, these roots in human nature evolved into a dominantly aggressive-defensive way of addressing the world by the political units and
their leaders. As animating the functioning of a politically-organized
unit, such ‘ego’-aggrandizing address led to a centering of political action on ‘mastery’ in the form of expansion of the area of dominance, both
internally and outwardly, and, faced with aggressive powers outwardly,
a self-protective settling for a ‘balance of power’ agreement which prudentially restrained aggression within the circle to achieve the strength
to deter aggression from greater distance.
As initial adumbration of a novel sense of the human as realizing a
certain grandeur as participant in earthly life, the Renaissance
contribution was two-sided, with a tension between the two sides that
reflected the dialectical tension within human nature, between the
primordial and the ultimate. Its most significant contribution was a reflective one. Its flourishing in the intellectual, artistic, and civic, spheres
of Italy lapsed after a while, but reverberated in later times and inspired
other developments. Especially important in its inspiration of later
developments were two things: one was the example of its aspirationbased freeing of the human being from the filter of current tradition and
the stress on learning in such freedom to see things directly rather than
guided by that filter; the second was its attestation to the possibility of
venturing in a way that represented a broad affirmation of human
potential and that provided a con-crete confirmation-by-actualrealization of that potential with the help of the suggestive recall of the
ancient past. Thus the excitement of learning and seeing anew, with an
accompanying sense of the promise of ‘tomorrow’, marked this startingpoint. But the flourishing which carried these elements of promise was
hedged in by its forming only part of a whole and, while being incorpor-
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ated into and modifying the life of the city-state and the public expressions of the religion that still dominated that life, by being unable to permeate that whole effectively with its spirit. Or put in reverse fashion, it
was hedged in by the inability to develop the aggressive-defensive mode
of the primordial trusting-but-wary outreaching in a way that
transcended the ‘ego’-aggrandizing and was more effectively subordinated to the dialectically ultimate. At best, the liberating and elevating
spirit at work in the latter was linked in uneasy tension with the loosing
of aggressive energies in the political and economic sides of life.
2. The Protestant Reformation and the Church against which it was
directed shared a Christian revelation conveyed in the Bible, and with it,
a reading of the existential context of-- and the nature of-- human aspiration by way of revealed truth. Both parties accepted the Biblical account
and took it as to be understood literally, thereby missing the symbolic
sense of myth, and thus constraining the power of the immediacy of
human aspiration to function as liberating and opening up for question
the meaning and truth of any-- here, of the Christian-- interpretationmediated disclosure. Instead with aspiration captured by a literalized
Christian vision, what was in dispute for the parties was the nature and
status of the institution that had responsibility for perpetuating such
revealed truth and for helping believers become confirmed in their
commitment to live in accord with it. The central critical and reforming
thrust of the Reformation, in Luther but also in others (Calvin, for one),
was directed against an institution whose functioning, seen as corrupted
by worldly considerations and as operating defectively in its inherent
religious purpose, was in need of-- but refusing-- significant reform.
Leaving aside the intricacies of the dispute-- the nature of the church, the
place of ceremonial and the emphasis to be given to the word (sermon),
the meaning of various rituals, the authority of the Pope, the place of
tradition, and the like--, Luther represented a voice calling for reform,
one of numerous voices but one whose challenge to the institution found
sufficiently widespread support (for a variety of reasons) that, when he
persisted and was outlawed and his writings proscribed, he was protected
by numbers of North German princes. Out of his effort to liberate the
religious life of believers from institutional obstructions and hindrances
and to enable it to realize itself more fully with the help of a self-purified
church eventually arose separate reformed churches, and a split within
the institutional form of Christianity, with the Catholic and the several
Protestant churches forming themselves differently as the proper vehicle
for conveying the truth and the continuing presence of Christ to the believer and for fostering a Christian life.
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In the course of the conflict, Luther’s early call for the direct access
of the believer to the Bible-- he made a translation into German himself
as a way of fostering this-- and for each individual to use his own
judgment in understanding made sense on the implicit background of the
aspirational element in life, with its directional pointing linked with the
call to take responsibility for life ahead and with a summons to reflection and thoughtful attention to and assessment of what one is
attending to. To that extent, he was attuned to the liberation of the
individual believer from human (the Church’s) authority. Yet his appeal
to a ‘book’ (the Bible) in its meaning quite apart from its place in
ceremonial occasions, was joined with his own penchant for a literal
reading of it (except in those limited places where a metaphorical or allegorical reading is clearly called for by the text itself); and when it came
to the reformed Church, the various forms of Protestant church generated
their own theologically-developed confessions and were as prone as the
Catholic to make of faith (the receptive cleaving to revelatory presence)
a kind of unreasoned belief and to insist on an orthodoxy of belief reflecting the truth of revelation as understood within the church in question. That the divergent forms of Christianity with their variant forms of
belief and practice did not acknowledge the symbolic character of the
revelation in the Bible but laid claim to having ‘the’ truth in literal form
had a number of significant consequences for the shape which
‘modernity’ took, showing initially in the political and then the economic
spheres.
3. As the streams from these two springs with somewhat different
manifestations of the working of aspiration came together, their confluence joined with a stirring in the political realm, where the leaders of
some of the political units of north and west Europe were expanding their
reaching for power and self-aggrandizement by securing increasinglycentralized control of larger areas that would come to form the territorial
base of nation-states. The initial culmination of this effort, in the first
stage of the formation of a ‘modern’ nation-state, was (internally) a centralized political order headed by an absolute monarch. As the Reformation came to intersect this development, significant complication arose.
Already there had been question concerning the relation of the state and
its leaders, with the Church, and this, in a number of areas, some relating
to temporal affairs (taxation of Church holdings, for example), others to
ecclesiastical affairs (appointment of functionaries representing the
Church in the territory of a political unit, for example). The growing
assertiveness of the political leaders brought changes, the character and
degree of which varied from place to place. Even in Spain, where there

Commented [57]: [[CM-106]]

346

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

was still religious alignment with the Pope, there was some
independence sought (as in the operation of the Inquisition). In the
Germanic principalities, while the Holy Roman emperor remained
generally aligned with the Catholic and Rome, the Reformation, starting
in the German area and gaining support from many German princes, led
not only to a multiplication of Christian churches, but also to the
assertion of each prince’s right to determine what church was to
represent orthodoxy within his realm. On a larger scale, this happened
as well in England; not only did the governing power (in the person of
Henry VIII) free the political from dominance by the Catholic Church in
Rome but it made the church an arm of the state and even insisted on
conformity within the realm to a Protestant form of the church. While
the notion of a genuine diversity within the Christian religion was
rejected by Catholic and Protestant churches alike, the notion of a toleration of the de facto increasing diversity of forms of that religion had begun, by degrees, and more so in some places than in others, to be
recognized by and incorporated into governance as it moved toward
absolute monarchy.
The political, as the accepted institution within a social group for its
decision-making and active exertion of authority concerning the good of
the group, was already marked by social distinctions hierarchical in character, which gave group self-governance to leaders at the apex of the
hierarchy. It was the aspirations of those leaders that counted, and their
effectiveness in providing protection and some justice to the led. Now
the political integration of larger territory, resources, and people, under
centralized governance put a premium on development of governance
capacities that were sufficiently masterful-- effective and fair enough to
elicit compliance and loyalty-- to be equal to the task of governing a
larger, more complex, and more diverse realm. Correlative with the
strengthening of central control that was enhanced within the state by
such mastery was the outward reach of royal power-seeking. In the immediate intra-European area this issued in a balance of powers on a larger
scale than the Italian League, but one nonetheless stressing the defensive
side linked with the aggressive as in that League; but in the imperial outward-reaching overseas, the aggressive was pursued without restraint
and its imperialistic character carried with it a sense of a ‘rightful’ dominance by the aggressors of the non-European inhabitants of the empiresin-the-making. At the same time this aggressive outreach overseas was
referred back to the aggressive interplay among the nations back in Europe, being a competitive extension overseas, superiority in which could
affect the rivalry at home. What ties together the inward-and-outward
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sides of the political in this phase of ‘modernity’, then, is what was found
in the Renaissance city-state as well, the focus of the political on the
aggrandizement of the dominant powers within the state and of the
dominant states, making ‘politics’ a sphere in which power-as-controlover prevailed as means for such aggrandizement. But mixed in now, as
Christianity split and the matter of the relation of state and church was
receiving different and shifting (more or less temporary) resolutions in
the different nations, was a religious element which, if it received some
restraint in the interplay of the Christian nations of Europe, was often in
the forefront in the imperialism abroad.
The intensification of the long-standing sense of governance as a topdown affair by the centralization of governing power in monarchies that
governed larger and more complex realms and that knew the instability
of a relatively capricious dynastic continuity, together with the religious
tensions and (as we will note again below) the changing economic
situation that brought new classes into economic (and at least indirectly,
political) power, set the stage for the next phase in the development of
‘modernity’ in political terms. Thus the arrest of the development of
‘modernity’ on this level, found in the Italy of the Renaissance, was
temporary in the larger European arena. The enduring work of political
activity in this period was the birth of a set of nation-states in selfassertive and self-defensive competition with each other, both on the
continent and in the imperialistic outreach into the larger world, an
accomplishment that persisted into the period to come even as the form
of political ordering and the manner of governance evolved beyond the
autocratic and centralized monarchy carrying the banner of some form
of Christianity.
4. As the Reformation was beginning and these first political reachings were joining with it and the two streams were beginning to inflect
and deflect each other, a fourth stream, begun in the late Renaissance
matrix, was entering an intellectual challenge into the mix. As the
uncaptured aspiration of the Renaissance had become inspired by the
Greeks and the re-flection aspiration calls for had moved beyond the
practical and found its inspiration in philosophy as various Greeks
pursued it, the Renaissance saw a revival of philosophical reflection
which at first showed nothing distinctively ‘modern’ in its nature or in
the direction it took. But in the course of the venture to affirm and
elevate the human capacity for understanding under the name of philosophy and to know anew and better via one’s own inquiry this earthly
context of human existence, one facet of that context drew novel
attention, namely, that of physical ‘nature’. As the venture which
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pursued the truth of nature and came to be spoken of (in some innocence
of its genuine novelty) by the traditional term “natural philosophy”, the
address to nature with a mathematical emphasis, and the development of
a method of inquiry adapted to that field and that emphasis, gave its first
shape to what we have come to call ‘modern science’, or more
specifically, physics. As the new venture developed, it involved freeing
human capacities for inquiry and judgment from the hold of faith and
tradition and freeing them for a self-determined and skillful exploration
of that determinate field in which experience and reason were the
decisive factors for determining truth. Soon such inquiry came to assert
truths about nature which stood in conflict with those asserted as true by
the Church, based on its reading of the Christian revelation in literal form
and the theological reaffirmation of the description of nature in revealed
literature. But what was most significant here was the assertion of a responsible basis for determining truth (at least in this field) by way of a
reasoned and methodical development and employment of man’s natural
capacities independent of faith and revelation. The challenge, initially
focused (in content) on the movements of heavenly bodies and the earth,
was confidently made on the basis of (and in defense of) the competence
of responsible human capacity to ascertain truth; but as the content-area
for inquiry widened and the confidence in the legitimating basis of this
type of well-conducted inquiry into the nature of things and of man increased with mastery of the method, the tension between science and
(Christian) religion (whether Catholic or Protestant) increased, not only
over the nature of truth but over its content and the legitimating basis of
claims to truth.
As this happened, a ‘modernizing’ of philosophical inquiry in the
sense of re-flection addressed to the problematic of existence took place,
and did so in focus initially around this venture of ‘natural philosophy’
and in an attempt to make clear its legitimate foundations in the nature
of things. This attempt to place ‘natural philosophy’ and its field in the
larger context of reality as a whole and to understand how human
capacity could find support in such reality for its inquiry expressed what
philosophy by its nature involves, the self-responsible re-flective
exploration of questions concerning human life and meaning. What
Descartes saw as the significance of this new form of inquiry lay in its
enabling us, through the power of reason and the knowledge it opens to
us, to become “masters and possessors of nature”. It was not knowledge
simply as such, expansion of our cognizance of the matrix and nature of
this ‘new life’ which ‘modern man’ was seeking, but knowledge that
gave control, gave such insight as enabled human beings to turn nature
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to human benefit, to exploit its components so as to provide for ourselves
what nature does not provide simply as such. No constraint on such use,
no restraint in such exploitation, was envisioned as called for or as
acceptable.
These two ways of bringing human cognitive capacity into a determinate direction when it has been liberated from the confining horizon
of the medieval world being left behind by the Renaissance-- namely,
‘modern science’ and ‘modern philosophy’-- were now forging ahead
slowly and proposing, and in degrees achieving, renewal of life in a
progressively-better vein, right amidst the changes being wrought in the
other streams forming modernity. This stream, by its advance of the
Renaissance spirit and its conflict with the Church (including the
reformed church, as regards the truth of nature accepted in both),
complicated the stream of modernity and added to its internal tensions
and its gathering momentum. At the same time, it had as yet made only
a limited start, and one involving much fumbling in the face of the
expanding discovery of the not-before-experienced (much of it from
distant parts of the world not previously known) which other sides of
‘modern life’ were bringing into view; it was mostly occupied with investigative exploration and preliminary sorting out of the variety and
with opening the way to promised eventual knowledge in fields other
than the mathematically-focused approach to ‘nature’ that was first to
successfully develop. In this ‘scientific’ vein, as well as in some re-flective effort to bring what was being discovered and thought in this
narrower focus into sight for a re-flective understanding of what such
venturing meant for human life on earth, ‘modern man’ was making good
initially on a Renaissance-inspired aspiration in which his judgment and
rational powers, freed fully from external constraints, sought to become
commensurate with the universe in a cognitive way and to use that
knowledge to aid in achieving fulness in life on earth through his own
efforts. The increasing fruits of this, both positive and negative, lie in
the period to come.
5. Finally, underlying the four springs and streams and their confluence was a more primordial spring and stream, that in which, as
human beings responded to the drastic population decline brought on by
the Black Death plague, they were challenged to learn new ways of
providing for life and meeting its needs in the unprecedented and
difficult circumstances of the last half of the 14th century. xxiii In human
beings, subsistence is not mere persistence in time but the persistence of
a living being who lives in his/her venturing, however restricted (and for
whatever reason) that venturing may be. The possibility of continued
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existence and recovery simply on the level of continuing organic
functioning, let alone of the continuing actualization of capacities for
engaging actively with circumstance, including following out the higher
reaching of aspiration, required a responsible engagement in providing
for oneself that was adapted to the new circumstances, that could not
simply continue old ways suited to old circumstances but that required
taking risk, venturing, and a perceiving and thinking that could transform
past ways in a way that enabled human beings to cope with the different
reality of the day. Thus the challenging circumstances represented a
summons to enterprise and initiative and to the use of capacities in new
and creative fashion, and rising to this challenge in time brought a development of skills for organizing and carrying on co-operative and
structured enterprises engaging many in helping each other out. With
this eventually came opportunity for a large-scale providing which
reached beyond (individual and local) self-subsistence: more distant
markets emerged, and invitation to economic activity that could sustain
and increase itself through profit and reinvestment and could serve others
at a distance as well as better subserve the individual and local
community. In this way what began as various ways of successfully
providing for oneself in new and changing circumstances developed into
a system of economic activity that stressed human initiative and
enterprise (individual and group), and in time, became drawn into not
only the political changes of this period, to take on a mercantilist cast as
rulers put economic activity to their own ends, but also (in increasing
numbers of cases) the living of lives, the potential richness (and not
simply wealth) of which the many-sidedness of concerted and intelligent
human effort could advance.
Because at the start difficult circumstances had challenged not only
the old economic ways but the feudal and religiously-grounded
organization and restraints that were an integral part of them, the new
system, slowly jettisoning the old restraints while submitting at times to
new restraints emerging within the changing political and social
dimensions of life, sought increasingly unrestrained ways of carrying on
economic activity. For the new ways meshed sufficiently with the ‘ego’enhancing mode of exercising responsibility that this latter, resisting
external restraints, came to find what seemed a socially constructive
outlet in economic activity. Internal to this system, however, was not
only competition of entrepreneurs, the ‘natural’ issue of which is monopoly by the eventual victor in the competition, but no principle of selfrestraint in the treatment of human beings, or for that matter, any beings.
The ‘natural’ issue of the system as it was evolving is complete
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domination of the-other (natural and human) and complete release of
inward capacity into the service of human desire. In this way its eventual
issue readily fit with the imperialistic political reaching, indeed became
an integral and even dominant factor in that reaching overseas.
Seen in its several-sided wholeness, the initial determinateness of
‘modernity’ reflected two things: one, that its earliest springs arose in
situations marked by a felt mis-match between aspiration and what the
traditional-framework of the times and the functioning of the institutions
which would prolong it into the future seemed to offer to some of the
persons for whom those were facets of their extant life-conditions, and
two, that its early development took shape via decision-making that
made something determinate of the uncaptured-aspiration, stressing the
importance of human fulness and this, in a way that saw avenues for its
furtherance in freedom of (philosophical and scientific) inquiry, in an
increasingly free mode of economic activity, and in a political expansion
and centralization that, if it reached autocracy within and an aggressionrestrained balance of power in the immediate circumstances of Europe,
was unrestrained in its address to the larger world beyond Europe, to the
peoples of that world, and to the natural setting of human life. The
ventures on these initial avenues sought not simply novelty and something different but much more, namely, ways of self-responsible human
effort that would help constitute-- and bring-- an improvement and
betterment of the human condition by way of human effort. They were
an engaging of the energies of human beings under kindred guiding
interpretations of the human and of what promised a full human life here
on earth, and that engaging embodied a vitality that communicated itself
to others and led to the withdrawal of further energies from the old and
expansion of this ‘something new’. Sounding through the interpretative
notions were certain characteristic emphases, certain recurrent themes or
variations on themes, that held a strong appeal. One was an emphasis on
liberation, both a liberation from what confines and blocks, a liberation
of energy and effort, and a liberation of these to a self-affirming
functioning which meshes (say) with human aspiration, or perhaps
instead with the desires of the ‘ego’-self. A second was mastery, relating
to the effective employment of capacity in human effort; it is found
embodying both sides of the ambiguity that is contained in the term
“mastery”, which signifies skillful, well-done, superior, effort and
achievement, but also signifies control over, dominance of. As with
liberation, it may be found in connection with such employment as is
animated by an aspirational longing (where skill enables an effective
realization of aspiration), or such as manifests the ‘ego’-self (here
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normally in the sense of domination, control). A third, often linked with
the second emphasis in its second meaning or the first emphasis in its
second sense (liberation of ...), is an aggressiveness that may range from
the simple assertiveness of any overt action to the forceful appropriation
to oneself of what is other; thus it may reflect a development of the
dialectically primordial trusting-but-wary character of the initiation of
human effort, or the assertiveness of the ‘ego’-self, or the simple act of
doing anything.
As the five streams came together and an evolving complexity issued
from their interacting, there were conflicts and tensions in the various
interpretative readings that gave rise to ‘modern man’, but what we have
recalled so far is only our beginning as ‘moderns’, and not our end.
‘Modern’ humanity in this initial form did not cease learning in this
matter of being human, and aided by that learning, continued to venture
further-and-otherwise amidst changing circumstance in order to establish
a more satisfactory realization of human aspiration. Let us then turn to
what has happened to the venture of ‘modernity’ since the mid-17th
century, and see how, in adaptation to changing circumstance as well as
further learning, ‘modern man’ has augmented this beginning and
enacted more effectively (but perhaps still deficiently) the directional
meant-to-be’s in ways that claim to measure up to the standards-andmeasures they harbor.
e. Mid-17th century through 20th century
In the preceding discussion of the origination and initial phase of the
movement I have been calling ‘modernity’, we have considered in rough
and elliptical fashion the complex beginning of a movement that
develops and lasts up until our own day. In what follows, we will recall
this second phase, and consider how the movement not simply continues
but comes to modify itself, and how some of its tensions diminish and
others intensify. As in the above, even more so in what follows: we will
take note only of the major directional factors and crucial events that
illuminate the matter under discussion, and seek to bring back to mind in
their most significant features the most important developments that lie
behind us in our current ‘today’ and still resound in ourselves even now.
After the Thirty Years’ War, Europe was constituted by a variety of
disparately-sized powers, some of which were involved in an outreach
which extended their presence globally; considered in their interacting
with each other, they were entered into the tension of a dynamic balance
on the continent, and considered internally, they contrasted in the degree
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of their development along the path of ‘modernity’. Indeed, a hinterland
was forming within the European community in which economic and
political change were not significantly advancing on that path (Russia,
say, and much of southeast and central Europe), and in contrast, a
vanguard was appearing, particularly on the northwestern seaboard, in
which the evolution of ‘modernity’ was advancing fairly rapidly in an
experimental venturing rooted in the distinctive character of the society
in each case. England, France, and the Dutch Republic, represent this
vanguard.
(1) Three revolutions
If politically the advance internally in ‘modern’ states has so far been
toward a centralized and autocratic regime, this is only as a dialecticallystructured first step, and the advance in Britain and France, having successfully achieved that step, is on the verge of moving beyond that, while
in an offspring of Britain, namely, America, that movement-beyond is
soon to take its own distinctive shape beyond the British starting-point.
In each of these three cases, a political revolution is required for this
advance, but in two of the three, the revolution successfully and directly
gives birth to some form of ‘democracy’ as a rebirth of the ancient Greek
polis in distinctively modern form.
In the mid-17th century, England was already in turmoil internally. It
was struggling politically: between 1640-1660, a civil war and
revolution, the Puritan Commonwealth, the Protectorate of Cromwell,
until finally the restoration of the king, Charles II; this struggle involved
religious reform as well as the powers of king and Parliament. But it
also involved an economic evolution in progress, and that economic
advance entered significantly into the political changes taking place,
indeed into encompassing social changes, into the variety of human
social connections, roles, and standings, that inflected life lived in that
society. By the time of Charles II (r. 1660-85), political supremacy had
effectively passed from the king to Parliament, and from the Lords to the
Commons. But it was not until the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 that
this supremacy was consolidated with the deposing of James II (r. 168588) and the acceptance of William of Orange as William III (r. 16891702) to jointly rule with Mary II (r. 1689-94; daughter of James II).
This consolidation was accomplished with a Declaration of Rights to
which William and Mary agreed; re-enacted by Parliament as the Bill of
Rights, it contained the explicit assertion of the legislative supremacy of
Parliament (something the preceding Stuart kings had contested); it also
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asserted protection for the citizen against arbitrary governmental power,
and it excluded Roman Catholics from holding or sharing the throne of
England.
Implicitly, however, something else was accomplished. Under the
series of Tudor rulers, but especially under Henry VII and Elizabeth I,
the English economy had made considerable strides, and as that
happened, there entered into the midst of political tensions which were
centered significantly in matters of religion an increasing pressure by
leaders of commerce, industry, and finance, not simply for political
management which supported economic venturing but for political
power for themselves in Parliament and for their determining governmental policy in that body. Even in the time of turmoil the middle classes
had prospered, and under William the monied classes, the providers and
managers of capital, came to dominate politically. One sign of this:
William’s own main interest as king was to align England with other
states and his original homeland against the French king, and needing
money to fight Louis XIV on the continent, he accepted the offer of a
group of bankers to lend the money, and in 1696, the Bank of England
came into being, with a monopoly on such loans to the government. In
continuation of the Tudor focus, then, the upper and middle classes
benefitted substantially under this new regime, while the artisans and
peasantry were basically ignored and dismissed. And politically, the
commerce-leading classes came to power with the firm establishment of
parliamentary supremacy and the dominant role of the House of
Commons in the Parliamentary setup. If monarchy remained in place, it
was no longer the autocratic governance power it had been: ‘modernity’
in England had advanced beyond that with the unfolding of the political
into a still embryonic ‘democratic’ form that was distinctively English.
This evolution politically was reflected in the realm of philosophy by
John Locke (1632-1704) whose writings, published late in life, include
Two Treatises of Government (1690). Having in the first of these
confuted the idea of absolute monarchy founded on divine right, in the
second he seeks to affirm a view of the political system in which
government is by consent of the governed. The basis for his
understanding lies in his grasp of human nature and being, seen however
in the larger context of nature (and in particular, nature as a creational
affair). The aspects of that larger context which concern us here are these:
God gave the earth and all its beings to mankind in common for the
support and comfort of their being, and gave to human beings reason to
make use of the world to the best advantage and for their convenience.
He also made us beings who by nature are not simply rational but also
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social, and that means, beings who are driven into society, under strong
obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination, and who are fitted
by understanding and language to continue our association. The first
society is man and wife, and more broadly, the family as the inclusive
society of parents and children, master and servants. But the society
most directly relevant to our concern is a political society, which he
addresses beginning from the state of nature as he understands it.
According to his account, each and every human being is born into this
larger earthly world with a title to perfect freedom and to an uncontrolled
enjoyment of the rights and privileges of the law of nature (that is, the
law of reason) equal to those of any other human being. If any particular
human being is to use the gift of the earth and its facets to all mankind
in common, he can do this only by appropriating a portion of it and, in
employing his freedom to make it his, excluding all others from it. Given
that his appropriating depends on his own body and on his own labor,
both of which are properly his own alone (thus ‘property’), whatever he
removes out of the state of nature and mixes his labor into becomes properly his also; that is, he annexes it as his own property and excludes the
common right of others from it. For this annexing, he does not have to
ask all others and gain their explicit consent to his appropriating it; there
are, however, proper limits to this appropriating, dictated by reason and
amounting to a limitation of his appropriation to what he can use for the
benefit of life. Now in this state of nature, each human being is entitled
not only to appropriate a share of the common gift and to preserve his
property (that is, his life, liberty, and what his labor appropriates and
makes his estate) against the injuries and attempts of others, but also to
judge of and punish the breaches of the law of nature in others.
While the natural state is one in which all human (social and rational)
beings have by nature perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose
of their possessions, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave of-- or depending on the will of-- any other human being, it
is at the same time one in which the law of nature in question is the law
of a reason which obliges all human beings, given the community of their
human nature, not to harm others in their life, health, liberty, or
possessions. xxiv The proper state of nature for human beings, then, is
one in which, even without a common superior on earth, all human
beings actually live in keeping with the law of reason in their interacting
with each other, keeping their own appropriating within proper limits and
having respect for the proper appropriating of others. But it is also part
of the state of nature, that in it the execution of that law is placed in the
hands of each human being, and when the law is transgressed by anyone

Commented [59]: [[CM-78]]

356

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

(and that means, when that person acts in such way as renounces reason
and rejects the principles that mark human nature), anyone perceiving
this has the obligation and right to enforce the law and punish the
transgression. In this state, there being no common superior to enforce
the law of reason, the various individuals must resort to individual efforts
at enforcing that law, which efforts may themselves be in violation of
that law, being animated by passion and revenge and ill-will, say. For
however clear the law of nature is to the reason of rational creatures, men
are biased by their interests and are ignorant for want of study of that law
and resist allowing it to be binding law in the application of it to their
own particular cases. This brings disturbance and uncertainty, danger
and insecurity, into the state of nature and the relations of human with
human.
There is a way of responding to such disturbance, namely, the formation of a political or civil society. A political society arises when society
members agree with each other to join and unite into a community and
to do so for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst
another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security
against any that are not of the community. In such a body politic, every
member of it has foresworn his natural power to enforce the law of
reason on his own and has resigned it to the community, and has agreed
that this single body has the right to act as the majority wills and
determines and that all will submit to the determination of the majority.
This means, for one thing, giving up the power to do whatever he thinks
fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the
law of nature, and submitting to the particular laws made by the society
(so far as the preservation of himself and the others may require) and
perhaps thereby confining the liberty he had by the law of nature; it
means, for a second thing, giving up wholly the power on his own to
punish crimes committed against the law of nature, and enlisting his
force in support of the executive power of the society. If the law of nature
is the same for all human beings and on its basis they form one allinclusive community, still men are not through and through rational but
are degenerate, vicious, corrupt, and the like; there is need, then, to join
together in lesser and separate communities and live together under
particular political laws. As regards the relation of such communities to
each other, it is that of humans in a state of nature, unless of course some
all-encompassing human community could come to be established. xxv
What constitutes any political society, then, is simply the consent of
any number of freemen uniting and incorporating into such a society.
This voluntary agreement alone can be the starting-point of any lawful
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government in the world. What becomes set up by the majority in the
unitary community on the basis of this starting-point can vary in
character (the form of the government or the location in it of the lawmaking power, and the rules developed by it), but whatever these are,
what becomes established with their help is not the natural liberty of man
but the liberty of man in society, i.e. the right to be under no legislative
power other than that established by consent in the commonwealth and
to be under no will or restraint of law but what the legislature shall enact
according to the trust put in it. xxvi That enacting can never extend farther
than the common good. As the freedom of nature is to be under no other
restraint but the law of nature, so the freedom of men under government
is to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society,
and made by the legislative power erected in it, together with the liberty
to follow my own will in all things where the legislative rule prescribes
not, and not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another man. If the
legislature makes laws for regulating and preserving property, and if the
men authorized by the community for the executing of these rules and
deciding disputes between members of the society concerning any matter
of right do as they are asked by the community to do, then all who are
united in this one body can have their disputes judged by law that applies
to all equally. In this way, Locke thinks his thought contrasts with that of
Hobbes (see 325-26 above), and he can in fact urge that absolute
monarchy (of the Hobbesian or any other sort) is inconsistent with civil
society, as it places the monarch above the law whereas the very meaning
of civil society includes the presence of an appeal to standing law to
which everyone is subject.
Locke’s thought makes property the center of the political, but “property” in a peculiar sense, to include what is not distinct from oneself
(one’s own body, that is, one’s most intimate possession, and one’s
activity as employing that bodily being in interaction with others) as well
as things which are distinct (what one has appropriated or taken
possession of in such employment, and claimed as one’s own). As he
develops his particular notion of it the evolution of the economic system
which he is presupposing introduces complications. For the initial
development of his ideas worked with property as the appropriated
common fruits of the earth in a fairly direct and straightforward sense-berries and nuts, say, and wild animals. Appropriation of such natural
fruits commonly meant appropriation of perishable things, whose
usefulness knew a limited time frame before they spoiled and became
useless. But with the appropriation of land and even more with the introduction of money, that is, of some lasting thing which could be kept
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without spoiling but which men by mutual agreement would take in
exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life, other
possibilities arise, including that of appropriating far more (of the
perishables, or of land) than could possibly be useful to or provide
convenience for the life of the individual in question. For so long as use
governs, and gathering more than one’s use and convenience can employ
means waste and a violation of the original meaning of the gift of nature
(it was for use, and convenience), there is little temptation to seek to
appropriate excessive amounts. With money, however, there is this
possibility and this temptation. And it is in that regard above all that a
political community focuses in its law-making on property. xxvii
Such focus on property brings to the fore the notion of taxation, since
government that would preserve the peaceable enjoyment of their
property by its subjects needs money to accomplish that. The taxation
which is to secure this so that the government can do its work must be
with the consent of the people, meaning of the majority; anyone claiming
a power to levy taxes on the people by his own authority and without
consent of the people thereby invades the fundamental law of property
and subverts the end of government. The trust which governs the lawmaking power a body-politic has put in place has bounds, whatever form
of government is involved. The basic constraining bounds upon that
power are these, that it is to govern by promulgated established laws, the
same for all; these laws are to be designed only for the good of the people;
this power must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the
people’s consent; and this law-making power can not be transferred to
any other body but must remain in that body in which the people
originally put it. In regard to the law-making power, if it should act
contrary to the trust in which its functioning is held the people have a
supreme power to remove or alter the current form of the law-making
power.
In the middle of the 17th century, the British experiment in
colonization in North America was well underway, with the variety of
colonies taking shape quite differently in different places along the coast,
in reflection both of the origin and aims of the colonists and of the
landscape in which they were making a new home for themselves.
Several widespread features of this colonization had a long-lasting
impact. One was the presence of native American tribes already
inhabiting the area, and the manner in which these diverse parties-natives and new settlers-- sought to accommodate to each other. Despite
occasional exceptions, the attitude of the settlers contained little in the
way of respect for Indian claims to the land or for Indian culture, so that
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as more settlers arrived and the area of colonization expanded by
aggression, the Indians were steadily being pushed further west. A
second was the limited character of the governance oversight from the
home-country in most of the colonies, which focused mainly on the
economic side of matters as development and trade with the mothercountry took shape; there was only one royal governor present in the
colonies in 1650, and while there were eight a century later, this gave the
settlers, regardless of their original aims and reasons, considerable freedom and responsibility for their own future, and regardless of anything
else, that had to include providing for their own continued existence and
the operation of their own communities at a considerable distance from
the mother country. Given the distance separating England and America,
together with bureaucratic inefficiency and pressures from the colonists,
the power of provincial officials was strengthened at the expense of
crown control, so that by the mid-18th century most political power lay
in the hands of provincial officials, not royal officials. This meant local
control, but by the well-to-do, the economically powerful, so that with
the noticeable exception of Pennsylvania the colonies were governed in
a way that gave most settlers little say in governance. Third was the
widespread introduction of slaves, mainly from Africa, particularly in the
southernmost colonies where plantation agriculture was feasible and
profitable with the help of such labor. As the variety of colonies
developed as units independent of each other and connected mainly
through their common reference back to the one original authorizing
source, political and economic institutions within them took shape in
adaptation to this new setting and circumstance, with its opportunities
and problems, so that there was at once a historical background and
ongoing tradition behind the venturing that was taking shape but one that
was itself undergoing change and in any case needed to be adapted to the
New World situation. And that would be done to a great extent by the
settlers themselves.
Early on in this period, the mid-century (1660) Navigation Act set a
certain tone by providing that goods bound to England or to English colonies (regardless of origin) must be shipped only in English vessels, that
three-fourths of the personnel of those ships must be Englishmen, and
that certain ‘enumerated articles’ (including sugar, cotton, and tobacco)
must be shipped only to England, with trade in those items with other
nations being prohibited. The mercantilism expressed in the Act was
refined in further Acts governing trade (1663, 1673, 1696) and brought
the economic activities of the colonies under closer crown control. If by
the mid-18th century, the British had succeeded in imposing a (from their
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perspective) desirable commercial order on the colonies, that was not
quite what many of the colonists felt. The colonies knew a large growth
in population between the mid-17th and the mid-18th centuries, a
significant amount of it slave and southern, but beginning in the early
18th century, also non-English: German, say, and Scotch and Irish as well.
Most were drawn to the economic opportunity offered by (among other
things) available and relatively cheap arable land, and this meant landbased cultivation and manufacture of products for market, especially
back to Europe. The first half of the 18th century meant increasing
commercial importance of the colonies in the world, the fruit of an
attitude that saw in the unruly and wild land the opportunity for subduing
it and harnessing its forces and resources to economic advantage. Such
an attitude-- not simply entrepreneurial, but nature-conquering in the
name of gain through enterprise-- meant a receptivity to science and
technology as these were developing and could be given practical
application in these times. It was supported in the religious horizon,
mainly Protestant but with quite a variety of different forms, from
Calvinist to Quaker, and yet in the frontier areas, a secularization was
also taking place as the pioneers moved farther away from ‘civilization’,
indeed moved to escape ‘civilization’ and to establish themselves in their
own ways in some freedom from its restrictions.
While this development in North America took place far from the
European continent, there were emanations from there, recurrent signs
of pressure from Spain and France, for example, and their designs on the
North American mainland. In particular, toward the end of the 17th and
into the first half of the 18th centuries, a recurrent conflict of France and
England impinged on the colonies, taking shape for the most part as extension to this continent of conflict between the two powers in Europe
and fighting into which the colonies were drawn by their mother-country.
The French and Indian War (1754-1763) over land to the north and west
of the colonies, and over Indians and trade, culminated these conflicts
and ended in English victory in the St. Lawrence, Quebec and Montreal,
areas; when that victory was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris (1763),
England had gained control of Canada and the continent east of the
Mississippi River, including Florida. It was as the colonies were
becoming freed from Spanish and French designs and entered upon
expansion from the coast into the wilds to their immediate west, that the
needs and interests of the growing British Empire began to diverge
noticeably from those of the colonists. Become economically significant
powers in their own right, steadily more independent politically, and
culturally distinct in virtue of their way of entering into this new
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homeland and making themselves its as they made it theirs, the colonies
were moving, without intending this, toward fundamental separation of
themselves from their mother-country, and that meant revolution when
the appropriate provocation emerged.
The provocation arose in the further course of the 18th century.
The Crown had claimed authority to veto laws passed by the colonial
assemblies; it did not often use that power but when the Assembly of
South Carolina, “sensible of the great social and political danger arising
from the enormous multiplication of Negroes in the colony,” passed a
law imposing a heavy duty upon the importing of slaves, the law was
rescinded by the Crown, for the slave trade was one of the most lucrative
branches of English commerce. Concomitantly, Parliament assumed the
right to legislate for all the British Empire in economic matters, and
usually its acts favored the motherland at the expense of the colonies. Its
aim was to make America a source of articles not readily produced in
England, and a market for British manufactured goods. It discouraged
the growth of colonial industries that would compete with England’s: the
manufacture of cloth, hats, leather wares, iron products; the colonies
were forbidden to set up steel furnaces or rolling mills. Many checks
were put upon American merchants as well. The colonists evaded some
of these regulations by smuggling, and by secret selling of American
products to foreign nations, even to the French during the Seven Years’
War. The British justified the restrictions, pointing to other European
nations laying similar restraints upon their colonies, to the virtual
monopoly that many American products enjoyed in the English market
through their exemption from import dues, and to England’s deserving
some economic return for the cost of the protection which her navy gave
to colonial shipping. But when French power had been expelled from
Canada, Britain felt warranted in asking America to help her pay off the
enormous debt she had incurred in the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763).
At the same time the colonists, relieved of the possibility of attack by the
French from the north, were coming to feel more secure and less dependent on the mother-country. In 1765, England passed the Stamp Act
placing a fee on (for example) all colonial legal documents, and Patrick
Henry (Virginia) and Samuel Adams (Massachusetts) advised rejection
of the tax, appealing to the Magna Carta, and claiming taxation was
proper only with consent of the colonials or their authorized
representatives. The Act was the first attempt of Parliament to levy a tax
directly on the colonies regarding their internal affairs (as contrasted with
external trade). Popular resentment arose, boycotts were undertaken of
British goods, and when William Pitt (the elder) returned to Parliament
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(1766) he declared the kingdom had no right to lay a tax upon the colonies. The Stamp Act was repealed, but at the same time the Declaratory
Act was passed, affirming that Parliament had the power to bind the
colonies by legislation but intensifying the discussion in the succeeding
years about the constitutional authority of Parliament as regards the
colonies. When in 1767 an attempt was made to lay new duties on
imports into America, the Americans resisted the new duties as disguised
taxation, and a boycott of British goods was again undertaken. A
compromise (canceling all the duties but those on tea) led the colonies to
resolve to drink only such tea as had been smuggled in. And when, in
1773 and as part of an effort to rescue the East India Company from
financial difficulties, the British passed the Tea Act giving the company
a monopoly for distribution of its India-produced tea in the colonies, this
led to the Boston harbor tea incident (1773). Step by step in this gradual
fashion, Parliamentary interference in colonial government led to the
calling of a Continental Congress (1774), to which every colony but
Georgia sent a delegation. The meeting led to a phased plan of economic
pressure, and while a Second Continental Congress was meeting (1775)
news of clashes between Massachusetts militia and British troops at
Concord and Lexington stirred the delegates to move toward war, to raise
an army and to appoint committees to deal with domestic supply and
foreign affairs. In August 1775 the king declared a state of rebellion, and
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense put independence, not simply civil strife,
on the agenda. Congress urged the colonies to form their own governments, and assigned a committee to draft a declaration of independence. The Revolution arrived: the thirteen colonies joined together in a
Declaration of Independence (July, 1776), and war followed (17761784).
In England, the public, including the Anglican and Methodist
churches, generally supported the government and its actions, but a
minority (including other Dissenters, the majority of the colonists having
come from Dissenter ranks) labored for peace on terms favorable to
America. The business interests supported the King as war orders
brought them profits. George III took full charge of the war, even of its
military details, feeling that if the Americans succeeded England would
face revolt in other colonies and would finally be confined to its island.
France, however, recognized the ‘United States of America’ and joined
in war against England (1778). King George persisted, Spain joined
France in war against England, then (1780) Russia, Denmark, and
Sweden united in a ‘Declaration of Armed Neutrality’ which vowed to
resist England’s practice of boarding neutral vessels in search of enemy
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goods. Soon other neutrals signed the declaration. England declared
(1780) war on Holland when a secret agreement between the city of
Amsterdam and an American negotiator was discovered and the Dutch
government refused to punish the Amsterdam officials. Opposition to
the colonial war grew, and finally, the King had to accept a ministry of
liberals, and a treaty of peace (1782, 1783) was arranged with Spain and
France, acknowledging not only the independence of the American
colonies but their right to all the territory between the Alleghenies,
Florida, the Mississippi, and the Great Lakes.
The American revolution instituted a second evolution in the
‘modern’ political realm beyond the centralized and autocratic
monarchy of the early phase of ‘modernity’. Advancing from, but
beyond, the first evolution (the English), and drawing in its Declaration
and its Constitution not only on American experience in the New World
but on ideas from Old World thinkers (both French [Montesquieu] and
English [Locke]), the colonists envisioned a democracy somewhat
different from the English.
The Declaration of Independence expresses the causes which impel
the colonies to their action of separating themselves from the state of
Great Britain and does this in two parts, a preamble and a list of
grievances. The preamble expresses a perspective not unlike that of John
Locke: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that
to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any
form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of
the people to alter or to abolish it and to institute new government, laying
its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”
After affirming the reasonableness of caution for any people as regards
changing its government-- such change should not be for “light and
transient causes”--, and after claiming that “when a long train of abuses
and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to
reduce them to absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to
throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future
security”, the Declaration proceeds: “Such has been the patient
sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the necessity which
constrains them to alter their former systems of government.” Then follows the list of “repeated injuries and usurpations” in the case at hand, at
the end of which comes the unanimous declaration of the thirteen united
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colonies that they “are, and of right ought to be, free and independent
states”, and that they therefore have the full powers with which independent states are empowered. xxviii
The thirteen independent and sovereign states that joined together
unanimously to make this declaration were able to find the statement and
its language acceptable, but the differences between them were considerable in many other regards. Despite the “firm league of friendship” in
which they soon joined in the Articles of Confederation (put into practice
in 1777, but not ratified until 1781) that served to formulate the transitional government of the Continental Congress until the Constitution
could be drafted, the Articles again expressed basically what they could
agree on negatively, resisting oppression; they did not want (even temporarily) a strong central authority such as the British government had been
as what was to guide their action, fearful of it becoming in its own right
a source of oppression. Thus while recognizing the need for having some
government common to all, sufficient to carry out functions that the
individual states could not handle separately but that were needed to
enable them to act in concert in their oppression-resisting action of
revolution and in the assertion of their independence, the thirteen, each
being jealous of its own sovereign power, shied away from setting up
over themselves anything but a minimal central government. In this, they
continued the pattern of the Italian city-states that joined in the Italian
League, and that of the European nations in their preoccupation with a
balance of power. The first step (the Articles of Confederation, and the
Congress it affirmed) was simply an association of independent states; it
proved to be insufficient: Congress had been given no power to enforce
its requests for money or troops, for example, so that by 1786 there was
need to remedy the defects in the Articles that made Congress too weak
to be effective in numbers of its functions. Thus in 1787, a Constitutional
Convention was called for that remedial purpose, but to the fifty-five
delegates that came, the ‘Virginia plan’ that was offered went beyond
revision and proposed a national government in place of the
confederation. This eventually passed, and that passage marked a
commitment to a nation-state that was a unity of states achieved with the
help of a federal government, with the powers of sovereignty being
shared in a specified fashion. This experiment in strengthening an
association of sovereign states by agreeing to a federal government of
the kind in question was marked by features which reflected both wariness and confidence.
The preamble to the Constitution begins: “We the people of the
United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
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insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United
States of America.” The crucial phrase is the first, “to form a more
perfect union”; but because it is “we the people of the United States” and
not the states themselves that is voicing itself directly here, it would seem
that the union meant is not primarily of the states but of the people of
that inclusive nation which is being formed by the union of their formerly
fully sovereign states. And that appearance seems confirmed by the
concluding phrase in the enumeration of the five further aims to be
accomplished by the government which the constitution outlines: “to
ourselves and our posterity”. In Lockean terms, the people are forming
themselves as a single body politic, and as a single community but by
way of a majority (in several forms, the final one being that within each
state in the state-by-state ratification process) are setting up this carefully
crafted form of government with internally apportioned and balanced
and limited powers and a defined relation to the states and state
governments of the uniting people. That government is presumed to be
sufficient in its authority so that, together with the retained but somewhat
limited state governments, it may be effective in regard to all six
enumerated forms of the “in order to”. xxix
If the English advance beyond the autocratic monarchical form which
was the first step in the ‘modern’ evolution of the political brought democracy in the form of a constitutional monarchy and the supremacy of
Parliament (and in particular, of an elected House of Commons), the first
American step, expressing what the colonists seem to themselves to have
learned by their experience under such rule, is to eliminate the monarchy
altogether, and the second step is to place the centralizing governance of
the diverse states and the people of the nation in an institution which is
internally separated in its executive, legislative (bicameral, with diverse
character and roles), and judicial branches. This separation, reflecting the
thought of Montesquieu and to a lesser extent that of Locke, located different facets of the governance power in different branches whose functioning, in each case focused on law (making it, executing it, judging
regarding it), was meant to be independent but complementary. Each
branch was an integral part of the whole but was meant to function in
some tension with the functioning of the others; each was to provide a
check on the operation of the other two while the three together, being
internally balanced, were constituted so as to achieve the six ends (“in
order to”) mentioned in the preamble. This decision not to concentrate
the power within the functioning of the national government in any one
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place internally, was one element in a broader effort to restrain
governmental power generally while at the same time strengthening the
power of the central government beyond what the Articles of
Confederation provided, sufficiently to make it effective as regards those
ends. A second element in this diversifying and balancing, strengthening
and restraining, concerned the relation of this federal government, on the
one hand, to the people, and on the other hand, to the states and state
governments.
As an integrated whole functioning in keeping with the aims set forth,
the federal government was placed by the people above the various previously sovereign state governments, and various specifications were offered as to the intended relation of the two levels of governmental power.
The federal government established by this constitution has only those
powers that are expressly delegated to it by the people, and the states
(unless otherwise restricted in this constitution) or the people hold all the
remaining powers of government (Tenth Amendment, adopted along
with the body of the constitution as part of the Bill of Rights). And yet
part of what is expressly delegated to the federal government is the
authority to make all laws which shall be “necessary and proper for
carrying into execution” the various expressly enumerated powers
(Article I, section 8), so that the federal authority also includes implied
powers of this sort. This constitution, and the laws and treaties
accomplished under it, being the “supreme law of the land” (Article VI),
anything in the State constitutions or State laws which is contrary to the
federal constitution can not stand. But the federal government does not
merely restrain and limit state governments in certain respects (section
10 of Article I, for example); it also makes express commitments as
regards the states, guaranteeing to every state a republican form of
government, providing protection against invasion of a state from
without as well as (when requested) against domestic violence.
The people not only limit the powers of the federal government as
regards the states, but also as regards itself. There are express limits in
the legal or judicial sphere especially, but in the Bill of Rights (the first
ten amendments) there is also the prohibition of the federal
government’s actions regarding the establishing and free exercise of
religion, the freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances. The point is to provide a sufficient, but limited, power to
the federal government, that it can achieve the six ends (“in order to”) of
the preamble, but speaking more specifically in regard to certain matters,
constraining it to do so in keeping with certain rights of utmost
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importance to the people and in keeping with the state-structure of
governance already belonging to the states which are joining in union in
forming the United States. ‘We the people’, then, are establishing for
ourselves a governance structure that has different levels but which is
meant, in the operation at each level and the interaction of the levels, to
serve the people, who are the ultimate sovereign and source of political
power.
Overall, then, the Americans sought to provide for a unifying governmental force proportioned and structured to achieve for the people of the
nation certain ends but constituted in a way to avoid certain problems
which had become evident in their experience of political regimes of the
times. Much, however, was not anticipated, and even what was recognized was not necessarily satisfactorily treated-- thus the amendment
process, as regards the constitution itself, and the ongoing functioning of
a representative government meant to adapt to changing circumstances.
Just as the British first step has since been modified and improved toward
a more effective democratic regime, so the American has as well.
Neither British nor American at first lived up to ‘democracy’ in that the
lower classes in the societies in question had little voice or participation
in governance, let alone sense of taking part in a system of the self-rule
of a people. Pressure built in that direction in both places, and progress
was achieved in making the ‘demos’ fully inclusive, although in a
meaning of inclusive which recognizes (for example) that in virtue of the
maturational meaning of being human it is only adults of a certain age
that properly compose the political demos.
In the American case, there were two significant incoherences in regard to the demos, reflecting the peculiar American situation. One relates
to the Indians who were prior inhabitants of the land. They were never
considered part of the community at the start, xxx and for many years
were treated as to be converted from their religions, to be driven from
land that new settlers wanted and at best to be placed on reservations,
and to be given an ambivalent status as ‘sovereign nations’ of a peculiar
sort within the dominant American system. More problematic was the
situation of black slaves, who constituted a considerable proportion of
the population and functioned as significant figures in the economy,
especially of the more southern states. In the constitution, reference to
their presence is disguised, the word “slave” avoided, but their presence
counted; the divergence in attitude of the populace of different states
prevented any agreement on how this matter was to be treated, despite
the ideals declared in the Declaration (“we hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
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creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness”). Even a civil war in the mid-19th century,
and a civil rights movement in the mid-20th century, have not brought a
full resolution of the incoherence.
France achieved the third step in the evolution of the political beyond
the centralized and autocratic monarchy that had been the mark of the
early forms of the ‘modern’ in the political sphere. In 1643, when Louis
XIV (r. 1643-1715) came to the throne (at the age of 5), France was
politically still in the middle of the strengthening of its monarchy, with
Cardinal Mazarin continuing the work of Richelieu (under Louis XIII).
By the end of the Thirty Years’ War (1648) France was on the verge of
displacing Spain as the foremost European power; and after the civil war
(the Fronde: 1648-53) provoked against the crown by the hatred of
Mazarin and what he was doing, the latter returned from victory to
continuation of the construction and operation of the administrative
structure which made Louis XIV an absolute monarch. Shortly after the
defeat of Spain (1659) and the fulfillment of Richelieu’s project of
making France the foremost power in Europe, Mazarin died (1661) and
Louis took the reins of government in his own hands. What followed
was a long reign which embodied absolute monarchy in its most naked
self-assertion, although the reign also showed a culturally brilliant face.
Louis believed without reservation in the divine right of kings, and as
God’s representative on earth, tolerated no disobedience. Drawing on
men of commercial and financial expertise to see to the actual operation
of government, Louis also saw to the revision of the laws and in that
revision placed himself above the law. In finances his minister, Colbert,
reshaped the French economy, stressing the development of industry,
downgrading agriculture and making trade serve an economy with an
industrial heart. The function of commerce was to export manufactured
articles in exchange for raw materials and/or precious metal. In the mercantilist order in question, the wealth of the business class grew as did
the revenues of the state; but the condition of the workers suffered. At
the same time, France began the outreach of exploration and colonization,
both in Canada (up the St. Lawrence, into the Great Lakes) and down the
Mississippi River (hence “Louisiana” as the name of the Mississippi
delta area), and in India and Ceylon. While the old conflict between
church and state, the Pope and the king, had no important effect, the
subsequent conflict between Catholic and Huguenot did, and eventually
Louis was convinced to revoke (1685) the Edict of Nantes, and in the
persecution that followed France lost many in its business class to emigration. Already before the death of Colbert (1683), the latter’s
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reconstructive work on the economy was beginning to be
counterproductive, with government regulations strangling economic
activity; the revocation of the Edict and the subsequent emigration
moved the economy further toward collapse.
In the period between 1667 and 1714, Louis was engaged in a series
of wars animated by considerations of glory and fame, dynasty and the
strengthening of France against its rivals. In the end, while he expanded
the borders of France somewhat, he left France somewhat the lesser in
many regards, her seapower lost, her economy near collapse. He had
centered too much in himself-as-king. Upon his death (1715), he was
followed by Louis XV, another 5 year old king. Like Louis XIV (his
great-grandfather), Louis XV knew a long reign (1715-1774), but unlike
his predecessor, it was an affair marked by the indolence and
ineffectiveness of the king and hence by the domination of his court by
factions and the lack of clear and decisive direction from the top. Under
a regent, then two successive ministers, and even after Louis himself
became more assertive, there was hardly any progress in the agricultural
side of the economy, and with some population increase and little
emigration (to cities or abroad), there was inflation and a deterioration
of the condition of many peasants-- something lasting, actually,
throughout his rein. Thus when revolution came, the crown was unable
to rouse rural support to crush what was basically an urban movement.
Beginning with his more assertive role, but not apparently because of it,
the industrial side of the economy showed some signs of life, correlating
with a rise in the demand for manufactured goods and luxury items; but
it was only in commerce that, despite the loss of Canada and India in the
Seven Years’ War with England (1756-63), the economy showed significant progress, especially so far as it involved the colonies in the Caribbean and the sugarcane and coffee produced there, which was refined in
France and then often re-exported to other parts of Europe. The improvement in the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy over the
span of Louis’s reign at least brought an accelerating pace to the economic life of the urban areas, and especially the port cities. But it is
rather something else that the French cities in these times knew which,
linked with the economic changes, formed the most significant factor in
the conditions lying behind the revolution. That was the intellectual and
cultural transformation going on in those urban centers.
Louis XV’s reign was the time of the Enlightenment. As we have
previously noted, early in the 17th century ‘modern’ philosophy, in the
persons of Bacon (1561-1626) and Descartes (1596-1650), had begun
focusing in on the new knowledge and its method which ‘modern’
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science was providing, and toward the end of the 17th century, the
evolution of the scientific enterprise had achieved a culmination in the
work of Newton (1642-1727). In addition, in the first half of the century
there was also much stirring in a variety of directions of inquiry and datagathering, the acquaintance-- and reacquaintance-- with the world men
found themselves in was expanding in a variety of areas of life as well
as of thought. Finally, the 17th century was the time of the founding, in
Italy, France, and England, of a variety of societies or academies for
discussing and promoting the new knowledge and science. In its
broadest sense the Enlightenment was a mainly 18th century revival, in
altered form, of the Renaissance and its humanism; in this new form, it
was not inspiration by a particular past (the Greek and Roman) that was
central, although recovery of a broader past was included, but rather an
extending and amplifying of a focus on ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ which was
being embodied in the advancing inquiries of ‘modern’ science that were
an offspring of the Renaissance reawakening, particularly of the Greek.
The movement itself, centered in France with Paris as its heart but
drawing strength also from the English and political, intellectual, and
religious changes occurring in Britain, was animated by an attitude of
intellectuals who, while feeling an affinity with the emerging ‘modern’
science and with a variety of disciplines relating to human history and
historical documents (the Bible, for one), were not-- despite the name
philosophes attached to them-- philosophers as original thinkers
responding re-flectively to the problematic of existence. Nor were they
themselves scientific inquirers. Rather they were progressive and
thoughtful human beings interested in truth as it was being discovered in
a whole variety of places and ways; and they were mostly concerned to
propagate it and, in general, to advocate the permeation of human
practise by knowledge and truth in whatever future forms that “reason”
in some loose sense (not the more precise sense of Descartes, say, or
Spinoza) would still discover.
The philosophes were thus advocates of a life improving itself
through learning and knowledge, and as reformers they spent much effort
in pointing out and resisting what they took to be the many forms of
unreasonableness that were obstructing the advance and improvement of
life: superstition, fanaticism, myth, unself-critical conviction,
intolerance, censorship, restriction of freedom to think for oneself, orthodoxy. In its direction, theirs was an aggressively progressive attitude,
with leading voices like Voltaire (1694-1778) and Diderot (1713-1784),
together with the numerous contributors to the latter’s Encyclopédie
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(1751-1772); but at its start it included as well others such as Montesquieu (1689-1755), less controversial and combative but perhaps more
profound in a quiet and thoughtful way. Finally, it included another
leading voice, that of Rousseau (1712-1778), whose vision of man
sounds in considerable contrast with that of Voltaire, especially in its
stress on ‘nature’ rather than on ‘reason’. Thus while these two
important voices of the Enlightenment shared a sense of the civilized
world of their times as corrupt, Voltaire attacked the unreasonable facets
of that corruption (especially in the Church) in the name of reason and
affirmed the need and possibility for progress, for improvement of the
conditions of human life, guided by reason; in contrast, Rousseau
focused on civilized life as the unavoidable corrupt outgrowth of the
human capacity for self-improvement. For despite the fact that the
human being is natured to grow and mature and is possessed of a freewill, a capacity for self-perfection, and a feeling of compassion with the
living, that under appropriate conditions would enable such maturation,
as man in his primitive condition had become more numerous and
interacted in more complex ways, his development of a ‘civilized’ mode
of existence had inescapably brought life to be dominated by corrupting
features (in particular, by the prevalence of the egoistic). There was no
going back to a simpler, more ‘natural’, life, but there was a possibility
of achieving the appropriate development of the potentialities of human
nature even in this setting. But that would require his establishing a
connection among human beings-- the political or governance
connection-- in which, joined with others in a body politic centered in
the embodiment of a ‘general will’ and a supportive functioning of
reason for discerning the concrete embodiment of such a will, he would
be willing and able to affirm the priority of the community of the shared
nature in human beings and their common good over their particular interests. This represented a difficult-to-realize but possible constructive
ideal to achieve and seek to sustain in the midst of the corruption. The
strength for that, however, would be provided not by ‘reason’ but by the
effective development and maturation of other sides of human nature,
feeling and will and a moral commitment, which maturation is needed in
order to provide the inward matrix within which reason could function
in constructive fashion.
Whatever their different emphases as regards human nature, Voltaire
and Rousseau shared in a deistic religious sensibility that led them to see
the institutional functioning of Christianity as they knew it (whether
Catholic or Protestant) as part of the corruption which degrades the human. Likewise, if on this as on their various points of agreement and
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disagreement Voltaire’s was the more acerbic and elitist tonality, and
Rousseau’s more that of sympathetic affirmer of the ‘common man’,
both embodied a spirit which they shared as well with the other
philosophes, a spirit which affirmed that things can be better, that in the
light of what is possible to human beings French institutions needed
reform and that it was in the power of Frenchmen to achieve such reform.
For the imminent revolution, these reformist intellectual voices formed
a significant preparatory factor articulating some things which were
recognizable to non-intellectuals as well in their experience of the
conditions of the present. While the proportion of the population who
could read the writings of the intellectuals and could engage in such
discussions was not large, it was sufficient, and sufficiently well-placed,
and the subjects being discussed were sufficiently accessible and
recognizable to many others, to impact the dynamic and to make a
noticeable difference in what happened.
The French Revolution came in 1789 after decades of political
decline under Louis XV; the latter’s death brought to the throne a young
Louis XVI (r. 1774-92) and brought him there at a time when the finances
of the kingdom were problematic. For France had surreptitiously come
to the aid of the Americans in their revolt against the English, and joined
overtly in 1788. The cost of supporting the navy needed for such a
venture was considerable, and the crown, unable to manage it without
calling upon the country’s elites to provide help, found an unreceptive
audience. Well before then (1740s), the crown had already been in
financial difficulties, and the reforms of the tax system that were
attempted, continuing the administrative restructuring which Louis XIII
(Richelieu) and Louis XIV (Mazarin) had carried forward but not completed, were blocked by the opposition of the parlements. By the 1770s
the debt had swollen to the point where unpopular measures had to be
enacted, and part of the debt simply repudiated. Proposed financial
reforms were attacked by the Paris Parlement, which provoked Louis XV
to dissolve it and to authorize ministerial work to create a different set of
parlements. But Louis’s death in 1774 ended that effort, and Louis XVI
called the parlements back into existence. In late 1774, Louis appointed
Turgot to be comptroller general, and the latter carried through reform
measures in keeping with his physiocratic principles, freeing productive
activity from controls that had been in effect, thinking that the resultant
expansion of the ability to produce and pay taxes would provide the
income needed to resolve the difficulties. But in 1776 he was dismissed:
a poor harvest, and opposition from many quarters, were too much for
Louis XVI, and what reforms were carried through were
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disproportionate to the problems. In particular, nothing was accomplished that dealt with what the progressive wing of public opinion saw
as the fundamental problems of the state. When the expenses of the
involvement in the American revolution were met not by taxation but by
borrowing, and the national debt rose to unsustainable proportions, Louis
was forced to appeal to the privileged orders to help deal with the matter,
and after several attempts and rebuffs, called together the EstatesGeneral in 1789. It was in that meeting-- or rather, in the preparations
and deliberations for that meeting-- that the revolution began.
The events that followed were complex, with numerous significant
shifts in the locus and the focus of discussion and action as various factions and forces struggled with a rapidly changing situation charged with
the sense of its momentousness for the future of France. If the initial
locus was the Estates-General and initial focus was on how the three
estates were to operate in any decision-making, the king and, soon, the
populace of Paris were significant actors in the unfolding drama that took
its controversial start with the claim of the Third Estate to be a National
Assembly, not simply one estate among the three (the nobility and the
clergy being the other two). The back and forth of the action in the
meeting of the estates was being played out on a background of an
economic crisis brought on by bad weather and reduced harvest and food
supply, and of by the king’s mobilization of royal troops in the Paris
region and its uncertain but foreboding meaning. A riot of Parisians,
more riots, the assault on the Bastille, and municipal revolutions in many
cities beyond Paris, and a background of peasant insurgency which had
its own reasons (food shortages, but more broadly, changing conditions
in the management of land) but linked in support of the urban uprising
in solidarity with the Third Estate, brought violence into the drama and
popular action beyond the discussing parties; and this brought a step
forward (a renunciation of ancient feudal privileges), followed by a
second step, a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen that
pointed in the direction in which the National Assembly wished to move
in constructing a new regime now that it, as representing the nation, was
exercising the sovereignty that belonged to the nation. That Declaration,
in its appeal to the natural and unalienable rights of man (much as in the
American Declaration of Independence), pointed to a reconstruction
which would not be bound by history and tradition but which would be
achieved by a reason discerning and protective of rights that belong
inherently to human beings. It took two years to draft a constitution
which made a Legislative Assembly central, its representatives being
elected, indirectly but basically, by the body of adult males who were
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propertied citizens. The Assembly’s work in these and other respects
(redistricting of the political divisions, decentralization of much government activity but subordination of this to the national legislature and
ministries, restructuring of the judicial system, turning church property
into national lands, etc.) constituted the first constructive step in the
revolution. But the step taken alienated or disappointed various
important segments of French society, and touched off varied reactions,
including that of counter-revolution. From there the conflict of
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intensified and brought a
worsening crisis, with more radical extremes gaining strength on both
sides. When the new and now elected Legislative Assembly convened,
the counter-revolutionary threat was reinforced by the response of other
countries to what was happening in France, and in 1792 France went to
war against Austria, Prussia, and disaffected émigrés, to prevent a
threatened restoration of the king. And that led, after an act to suspend
the king provoked by a crowd storming the royal palace, to the
disintegration of the Legislative Assembly: the constitution of 1791 had
lasted less than a year, and a second revolution was underway, with a
National Convention called that, judging the king, would draft a new
republican constitution and would govern France while the emergency
lasted.
The invaders being repulsed, the National Convention did convene
and condemned the king, and he was executed in early 1793. The
Convention turned then to a program for eliminating the revolution’s
enemies. A second round of the war had broken out (Spain and Britain
and Piedmont had joined the coalition), and a civil war had broken out
within France, with counter-revolutionaries mobilizing to overthrow the
republic and to restore the Bourbons to the throne. The Convention itself
was divided on what to do, and the factionalization between more radical
and more moderate elements grew worse and led to the expulsion of the
more moderate members from the Convention. That in turn led to further
destabilization in the country, more extreme accusations and growing
hostilities, but it allowed the Convention to draft and submit to
referendum a new constitution (of 1793), whose approval was followed
by its being shelved during the emergency, in favor of the ongoing
functioning of the provisional government until peace was reached. The
popular terrorist mentality that had led to the 1789 uprisings was
gradually taking over in the continuing emergency, and what followed
now was a parliamentary dictatorship and a reign of terror whose
leadership (Robespierre, in particular) went too far and provoked action
by the remainder of the Convention to bring the terror to an end, with its
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leaders executed.
There followed a struggle for power, moderation in turn threatened
to disintegrate and anti-terrorism to turn into terror in its own right, and
instead of implementing the constitution of 1793, the Convention
prepared a new and less democratic charter, the constitution of 1795. It
set up a liberal republic with great power given to the central government,
and in particular, to a five-man executive Directory to be chosen by the
legislature. But the Convention, seeking continuity, required that the
new legislature include, as two-thirds of its composition, members of the
current convention, and this, whatever the results of the elections for the
new legislature. The new regime, centered now in the Directory, was not
embraced well and the effort to maintain the political center against the
radical left of the revolution and the radical right of the counterrevolution disenchanted many. Efforts made by the regime to export
revolution beyond the borders employed an army that had been enlarged
considerably in 1793, and it was the commander of one of these
campaigns, General Napoleon Bonaparte, who was enlisted by
disaffected conservatives that longed for more stability and whose
actions eventually end the revolution. Economic problems, and an effort
to revive a calendar that had a 10-day week and seemed designed to
swallow up the Christian Sunday and to form part of the regime’s attack
on the Roman Catholic religion, had also weakened support for the
regime, and so when a coup was undertaken to jettison the constitution
and in the course of it Napoleon asserted himself, transition was made
again to a different regime. Napoleon, the energetic military hero whom
the plotters had enlisted, advocated a drastic concentration of power, and
while the republican form was retained outwardly, it was in fact an
authoritarian system being established in which he, as First Consul in the
executive, wielded all the power. The three preceding regimes set up in
the course of the revolution had organized the political order around
representation and legislative supremacy, the principles proclaimed in
1789 by the National Assembly. That ended now, in reality, and given
the turmoil of the revolutionary period most Frenchmen were ready to
accept the new regime, despite the intolerance for opposition and dissent
it involved: a police state would at least provide stability.
In contrast with the English and the American revolutions, the French
revolution did not bring a lasting evolution politically, one which could
be further refined without regress so as to complete the emergence of
‘democracy’ as the (so far) fulfilled form of ‘modern’ governance. It
took until the Third Republic (1875) was formed before the French
revolution saw an issue which could be regarded as a recognizable
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offspring of its ideals. Yet of the three, it was the French which had the
most immediate impact and lasting reverberations in the European world.
(2) A fourth revolution
In his voluntary exile from 1726 to 1728, Voltaire had found early
18th century England attractive enough that on his return he was full of
praise to his fellow Frenchmen for English ways and institutions-- its
religious ways and religious tolerance, the liberty and natural rights
stressed in its political life and thought (Locke), the freedom of its press,
the preeminence of its science (Newton).
Voltaire’s return to France found him a vigorous voice in the intellectual world of the Enlightenment which we discussed above. At midcentury, France acknowledged defeat at the hands of England in the
Seven Years’ War (a treaty was signed in 1763), and after that, itself knew
the stirrings of an economic recovery. By that time, there were also the
beginnings of discussions of economic theory which challenged the
prevailing mercantilism, that is, the state regulation of the economy
basically for reasons of aggrandizement of the state itself. Men who
came in the 19th century to be called “physiocrats”-- etymologically,
“rule of nature”-- were bringing to culmination a line of thought,
elements of which had been present in England as well as France in the
late 17th century. The book of an Irishman (Richard Cantillon, Essay on
the Nature of Commerce) that had been translated into French (1755)
struck a note that was soon to be amplified: land is the source of wealth,
and such wealth, extracted by productive human labor, amounts to what
provides for the sustenance, convenience, and comfort of life. xxxi
Forming as a school of economists led by François Quesnay (1694-1777),
a court physician, but flourishing only for a brief while in the last decades
of the reign of Louis XV just before the Revolution, the physiocrats
ventured a concept of economic activity as, like all operations of nature,
a lawful affair which society can and should honor in its positive law and
not interfere with by (say) governmental activity. Broadly, the physiocratic proponents of “nature” took the land to be the source of wealth, an
agricultural society to be the one that achieves the most direct production
of wealth, and the natural economic activity of members of that society
to be such that, if productive activity and the handling of what is
produced is not interfered with by regulation or by a misplaced emphasis,
an appropriate price regime will obtain, determined by supply and
demand and the cost of production. From this perspective, not only is
the mercantilist emphasis on bullion-thence-coin as the essence of wealth

Commented [70]: The following passage was originally
entered here:
Having moved beyond the Glorious Revolution (16881689) and achieved a union with Scotland (1707) which
created a large internal free-trade area as a result, Britain
knew also, as it made the transition to the Hanoverian rulers
(George I: r. 1714-27; George II: r. 1727-60), an economy
that was beginning to thrive: trade was increasing,
industry growing, and agriculture was stable and solid
enough to provide a sufficient food-supply. But by midcentury, at a time when the political system gave property
owners (especially of land) a prominent role, when a
powerful navy gave such supremacy of the seas that the
beginnings of a colonial empire (in America, in India)
could take shape, and when an economic prosperity was
building that increasingly included wealth derived from
mercantile and financial sectors, conflicts with France at
home and overseas, while initially augmenting the British
overseas domain (in Canada especially), also relieved
pressure on the American colonies and contributed to the
build-up toward the American revolution.
Commented [71]: [[CM-130]]

377

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

misplaced, but so is the stress upon manufacture and foreign trade, and
the consequent weight given to regulation of the economy by the
government. As for government action, it is best when it amounts to
laissez-faire, letting the natural economic system and its laws operate,
and supporting this operation mainly by not doing anything to interfere.
Governmental use of rules and restraints to shape the economy may bring
a kind of order to it, but it is one which hampers the innovation,
enterprise, and competition, which are essential to the natural order of
the economic.
Such a non-regulatory stress in economic thought, together with the
critical attitude toward the ‘unreasonable’ which Enlightenment philosophes promoted in various other areas of life (religion and politics in
particular), is indicative of a broad liberational thrust manifesting itself
in the France of these times, an intense and even aggressive advocacy of
the freeing of life from something oppressive and to something more ‘natural’ and ‘rational’. The meanings of “nature” and “reason” were by no
means always the same, but a cluster of things that could readily be
conveyed by such terms was being set forth as attesting something
important, even essential, to the human. As it happened, the forces and
tensions of the times, expressed in such ways in these intellectual realms,
were leading toward an upheaval in France that was not simply
intellectual or even economic but political and social in a fundamental
way.
Such a stress was found not simply in France. It happens that a Scotsman, Adam Smith, after publication of his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), had been spending time in France as a tutor and working
on the book which, in 1776, he published as Inquiry into the nature and
causes of the Wealth of Nations. In the latter he would develop a view
of the economic kindred in spirit, if somewhat different in content, to the
view of the physiocrats. xxxii But already in his first work, he had been
concerned to focus on human nature and to articulate a view of it as it
operated as the basis for social institutions and behavior; but as the title
suggests, his concern in that first book was with moral sentiments, and
included the idea that moral judgments were made possible by the
capacity for sympathy and the ability to reason, enabling one to be
impartial spectator to one’s own and others’ actions, even as those
actions are driven by self-interest and the drive for self-preservation. In
The Wealth of Nations, Smith addressed economic affairs from a kindred
perspective of “nature”; presupposing that human nature operated in
certain ways, his account provided an extended analysis of the factors
involved in the functioning of the economy, especially those in a
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basically commercial economy. The analysis presumes a human nature
in which self-preservation, self-improvement, and self-interest, are the
dominating factors in each individual, and in which the three drives enter
individuals into active enterprise of such sort as is meant to achieve such
preservation, betterment, and interest. xxxiii More specifically, he
analyzes the economy of an advanced or civilized society on the
background of a sketch of individuals in primitive times, where each is
dependent on his own initiative and capacity to provide for himself what
meets his wants and needs and sustains him. Although in such times
there is little exchange between individuals, it is in the self-interest of
each to enter into such exchange at times, to secure for himself
something which he judges contributory to his own preservation and/or
betterment. Implicit in such exchanging, the propensity to which
belongs to human nature, is a principle which eventually, as societies
form and human beings settle and increasingly interact with each other,
becomes widespread in reference to productive activity, that of the
division of labor. In such a co-operative interacting, the individuals, each
contributing one part of an encompassing productive activity, can join in
producing more than they would acting separately, making the society
wealthier than previously and that means, possessed through the industry
of its productive activity of a greater quantity of things and possessed of
the wherewithal with which the various members can better secure for
themselves and enjoy the ‘necessaries, conveniences, and amusements
of human life’. And that-- consumption of this sort-- is the sole end and
purpose of all production.
Without entering further into a characterization of the system that is
being delineated here, a system of ‘perfect liberty’, let us simply note
certain important features which the analysis claims would mark it if it
were allowed and enabled to operate “naturally”, that is, in accord with
the natural functioning of human nature in the operative elements of the
system. First, a functional economic differentiation is present among
members of the society, between laborers, organizers of cooperative
labor (owners, overseers, those who provide the opportunity for laborers
to work in an efficient division-of-labor arrangement), and landowners
(land being the basic aspect of the natural setting on which all else is
founded, since it provides the food necessary to sustain all the human
beings of the society, whatever their role in the economy, whether
productive or merely one of consumption). Each functional class has a
different role and its own distinctive class-interest; but operating together,
they enable the members of the social whole to attain that “sole end and
purpose”. Second, the laborer’s work is remunerated by wages, the
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organizer’s organizing and supervising by profit from the distribution
and exchange of the goods produced by the workers, and the landowner’s
ownership of land appropriated as private property brings him rent from
the lease of the land for productive use. From the wages, profits, and
rent, the various participants are able, by doing their part in production
of goods, to secure for themselves the means for meeting their own wants
and needs. The greater the size and complexity of a society and its economic system, the more additional factors emerge with an important role
in the system-- money, say, and labor-and-productivity-enhancing
machinery-- and the more additional roles become central as well-- that
of the banker or financier, say--; and this holds all the more as the system
involves interaction with the systems of other societies, so that intersociety trade becomes a significant element. Third, in all of this, there is
a principle which, if brought to function in a “natural” way, enables the
system to operate in the best interest of the society as a whole, providing
the most goods for society members to enjoy; and that is the principle of
self-interest, or because self-interest can function in a way that distorts
the system, prudent (rational, enlightened, judicious) self-interest.
Fourth, underlying all the economic functioning of the society and enabling it are two things: one is the earth, its lands and waters, its various
living-and-non-living resources, its climate and weather, that is, the
larger system of physical nature; and at the other extreme, the political
organization of society, that is, government with its three natural
functions or duties: providing security against injury arising from outside
the society, administering justice so that society members are secure
from oppression and injustice suffered at the hands of other members,
and erecting and maintaining certain public works (commerce-facilitating roads, say) and public institutions (educational in nature). xxxiv
It was the operation of the actual economy of Britain, which Smith is
bringing to self-consciousness under his understanding of it, that was the
moving force which initially gave to ‘modernity’ in the economic sphere
its next distinctive features, those which marked the Industrial
Revolution. Quite beyond theory, the free-trade area formed by Scotland,
England, and Wales saw actual economic productivity increasing, with
the land still being the basis of a considerable part of the wealth, status,
and power (economic and political) of members of the society in
question but with enterprising mercantile and financial forces and agents
becoming ever more central and even dominant in the economic and then
political life. London was the center, politically and economically,
financially and population-wise, but the advance involved the spread of
intra-national trade, the growth of provincial towns, the increasing

380

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

mobility via turnpike-roads and the increasing communication via a
postal network, and the increasing number and widening distribution of
newspapers that enhanced the timely cognizance of political and economic happenings in London even for those at a distance. As America
broke free politically, and France was venturing on revolution, the
British were beginning a phase of industrial capitalism which came to
spread, internally and from there externally, in the 19th century and in
time to change life on earth in fundamental ways.
Underlying the economic evolution was a considerable population
increase in the last part of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries.
More people meant changes and innovative adaptations of various sorts.
The changes in the economy that made manifest by the 19th century that
a revolution was underway were not sudden and overnight, but
adaptations begun in the 18th century in and to a market-system that
included an entrepreneurial class possessed of considerable capital and
access to overseas as well as home markets. Not all sectors of the
economy participated in the early changes. There was some change in
agriculture, with new food crops and improvements in cultivation
methods (crop rotation) and in seed varieties and in livestock; and as
change took hold in manufacturing, there were eventually the beginnings
of the mechanization of agriculture: factory-made tools, new equipment
such as seed drills, and by the 1830s, even chemical fertilizers. The
earlier agricultural use of land for subsistence and a merely local market
virtually vanished, but industrial agriculture was still a thing of the
future. Where the industrial changes were most noticeable and of
immediate significance were in two places: one, in the machinecomponent of various manufacturing and mining industries (especially
in regard to processing wool and cotton into textiles, but also in the
improvement and use of the steam-engine); but secondly, and more farreachingly, in the organization-component: a factory system with
increased division of labor and specialization of function was emerging
in some industries. With the combined change in these two components,
the laborer working in a factory usually became simply a machine
operator working on a limited task, no longer a craftsman and creator of
a whole article, and thus he had a considerably altered relation to his
work. Finally, change included transportation and communication
developments that facilitated the functioning of the economy generally,
enabling quicker and more efficient distribution of goods and more
distant acquisition of raw materials.
The successful introduction of such novelty in some areas of the
economy led to further improvements in the new elements and expansion
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of the venturing in further directions: for example, harnessing of energyand-power-sources (water, steam, coal) led to multiplying applications
and inventions that facilitated further uses, including steam engines,
thence steamships and eventual oceanic-transport-use, and on land,
railroads and an expansion of their original coal-mine use to provide
commercial transportation by the construction of widening networks and
the use of steam-driven locomotives as the middle of the 19th century
arrived. The scale (the expanding size of units) and reach (the expanding
markets) on which economic activity was being enabled to take place
also brought ownership and management changes, and eventually, in the
first half of the 19th century, the amassing of capital by way of joint-stock
companies become private corporations, with the consequent more
flexible participation of a broader ownership than before and more
concentrated form of economic power and political influence as well.
Change was not uniform nor uniformly paced throughout the
economy, and even the older ways that persisted were often able to
expand to some degree. Relatively small firms formed the large majority,
and only a few large firms were able to accumulate the capital and
organize for efficient functioning in certain sectors of the economy. But
the dynamic of the change taking place had an impact throughout the
economy, and perhaps more importantly, reached throughout most of the
society. By the first half of 19th century, the change in the organization,
character, and pace, of much work required adaptations in the society
affecting all areas of life. Work, and working conditions, were becoming
redefined and regimented: for example, factories involved shop rules
enforced by foremen, and those rules sought to speed work along, to keep
workers focused on it and on the machinery which set the pace, and to
cut down on socializing and other idle time; thus not only was the factory
worker not an autonomous craftsman but his working was at the behest
of a foreman and unwearying machinery, its daily duration long, and its
conditions potentially dangerous given the hazards of unprotected
machinery. At the same time as work was being simplified and regimented for any factory worker in expression of an intensified division of
labor and the interjection of machines, work generally was becoming
promoted, in a new work ethic, as the basic human good, the vehicle for
bettering one’s condition; idleness was being frowned on. With such a
shaping of work in the lives of workers, the rest of life-- leisure time,
family life-- was impacted, especially as work and home became
separated physically, and more and more marriage and family meant
work outside the home for the man and a domestic role for the wife.
Especially in the emerging middle class, women concentrated on tasks
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related to the maintaining of a home and children.
Even more broadly, the evolving economy meant increasing urbanization and an accentuation of the contrast of the urban with the rural, and
with the growth of cities and urban areas, the emergence of a whole range
of required adaptations and burgeoning problems. The more complex
economy meant new social classes with different attitudes and experiences, and new class conflicts, especially in the urban areas. In particular,
a social separation emerged between the middle class, who owned businesses or acquired professional education, and the working class, who
depended on the sale of labor for a wage. But other separations occurred
as well, between the more and less educated, the more and less skilled,
the factory workers and the independent artisans, and so on. And the
differences and tensions became reflected in, say, residential patterns,
with the wealthier moving away from the crowded slums of the poor.
For the population increase, centered in the urban area, brought pressures
on infrastructure: not simply on sufficient housing stock to meet demand,
but on sanitation facilities, on street conditions (lighting, say), and a
variety of problems that made for quarters for the poorer being marked
by sanitary and safety problems, and for more tolerable suburban escapes
for the better-off from the slum conditions which were taking shape at
the heart of the urban area. The class differences which were reflected
in such residential patterns showed themselves also in the occasional
protest movements which arose out of and reflected the tensions in the
economy. Thus the middle-class became involved (say) in political
protest in hopes of winning new rights, while the working-class
organized despite bans on unions and strikes, some protesting the
reliance on machinery (the Luddite protests), others seeking better
working conditions.
As the evolving capitalist economy took shape in the early 19th
century, there were entrepreneurs who, seeing elements of
dehumanization in it that did not seem unavoidable, sought to chart a
course accordingly. Thus Robert Owen, the manager of a cotton mill,
sought to address management as concerned not simply with making a
factory a decent place to work but also with workers as having families,
with the education of their children, with the availability of goods to his
workers at a reasonable price, and so on. Over time, he grew more
radical and came to urge that to make the machine a servant to human
beings rather than the reverse a transformation of the social order would
be required. His efforts led to the establishing of cooperative
communities, and he became a pioneer not only in the Trades Union
movement but also in the founding of British Socialism. The resistance
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to social and economic dislocations being brought by the Industrial
Revolution, and to the injustices and inequalities which seemed built into
the capitalist system, grew stronger during the 19th century, even as the
system itself grew more dominant and its proponents in the political
system of the time grew stronger. In the last third of the 19th century, the
thought of Karl Marx, often developed in collaboration with Friedrich
Engels, gained widespread influence in socialist and communist circles,
but had its greatest impact in the 20th century, especially as it is taken up
in the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Accepting a Hegelian sense of
history as a dialectical process but understanding it and its dynamic quite
differently, he thought of man as a creature of need dependent on nature
and in need of wresting from nature what will satisfy his needs; for that,
he develops means of production, and through his struggle with nature
he not only secures what he needs but comes in his work to realize
himself as human. Thus the relations that enter into his production (the
economic structure) form a foundational factor in-and-for his being, and
the legal and political superstructure of his society is based in these. As
the economic system becomes complex and reaches the stage of its
development which represents capitalism, it harbors contradictions
between the material forces of production and the existing relations of
production (particularly as confirmed in law); in class terms, the major
contradiction lies between the owners of the means of production (the
bourgeoisie) and the actual workers who do the producing and give the
economic value of the product to that product (the proletariat). In time
the dynamic and force of the contradictions in the capitalist economy
will bring the economic and social structure to evolve beyond its current
self and, in this case, bring about a classless society by way of a
dictatorship of the proletariat. It is in that classless society-- a communist
society-- that man achieves a production in which his freedom is realized
fully, without being distorted by contradictions in the economic system.
If the Industrial Revolution began in England and, intensifying there
in the last half of the 19th century, also spread to the continent (Belgium,
and slowly also to France, then others), the rebellious offspring of Britain,
the United States of America, that was eventually to take the revolution
to a new height, had been evolving in its own fashion from its birth, and
at first, developing in a way still entangled in European conflicts, indeed
subjected again to a conflict with Britain (War of 1812).
The first quarter-century of existence as a nation represented the
initial testing out of the new democratic governance arrangement. It was
one in which the ‘union’ was to find its first concrete interpretation, and
the direction taken in deeds implicitly asserted a reading which drew
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back away from the stronger federalism that the Constitution embodied
in contrast with the Articles of Confederation; what emerged instead, for
which the warning by George Washington about ‘parties’ in the political
arena stands as a specific symbol, was an initial strengthening of what
were already significant differences among the states and resistance to a
uniform way into the future except in the sense that each would prosper
in its own way and under its own terms. If one speaks of those
differences as regional, this is not to be taken narrowly: they are partly
something fostered by differences in landscape and in the adaptation of
the settlers to the landscapes, partly something grounded in different
values and perspectives which the diverse settlers in those different landscapes brought and developed in their life there, and partly something
embodied most obviously in the institutions involved in the economic
side of the adaptation. There were two crucial arenas of conflict, both
involving the way in which the Constitution had sought to instate a
balance between federal and state governments. One was the area of prenation debts: Alexander Hamilton proposed that the national government
pay off the debts of the Continental Congress at par and assume state
debts upon itself, then proposed the establishment of a Bank of the
United States. But while some form of the latter was initially approved
as part of a compromise (1791), its charter was not renewed (1811); and
when the Bank was reconstituted (1816), its charter was again allowed
to expire (1836). Hamilton’s idea had been that such fiscal actions would
strengthen the union; the resistance, and the eventual failure of both
efforts, meant that, faced with an opportunity to share at the federal level
responsibility in fiscal affairs that concerned all and to reaffirm in this
way their commitment to the union, states and their Congressional
representatives opted in preponderant numbers for a path whose answer
expressed the weakness in the commitment of many to “union” and the
strength of the fear of central government power. Placing weight on the
separate responsibility of the diverse states within the balance of federal
and state governments struck in the Constitution, the outcome
symbolized the interest in each state and its constituencies, once freedom
had been achieved in concerted action, in moving as much as possible in
its own direction(s) separately and maintaining ‘union’ in an attenuated
form at best. The second and more contentious-- and more fundamental- arena is constituted by slavery. The Constitution implicitly recognized
the presence-- and a widespread one-- of this institution but declined to
address it in any direct and constructive fashion, for fear the effort would
possibly preclude union at all. The presence of slavery was not only
extensive in the southern states but it was tightly interwoven into the
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economy as it had developed there and into the political functioning of
the states, given the social standing and political power of the wealthier
few who benefited from the plantations that flourished with the help of
that institution. The covert recognition and acceptance of its presence
stood in stark contradiction to the principles of liberty and equality which
were affirmed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
But its importance to the economy of various southern states, and just as
importantly, its pervasive reinforcement by a doctrine of racial inferiority,
made it (so it was judged) impossible to deal with at the start of the nation.
Fortunately, as the different regions within the union moved in their different directions on this matter, it was so important, morally and economically and thereby politically, that the constitutional papering over
of the issue could not be maintained; but unfortunately, it took a civil war
and an act of emancipation in the middle of the 19th century to begin the
effort to incorporate into the political structure a just resolution of this
matter, to say nothing of making the ideals of the Declaration a reality in
the lives and hearts of the people.
If one side of the evolution of this new nation economically was the
utilization of slaves, another significant side was the movement
westward of the country and the number of European immigrants who
left their homeland for opportunity in this ‘new world’. Instrumental in
that movement was Jefferson, whose pursuit of a policy of expansion led
to the purchase of the Louisiana territory from France (1803);
subsequently, with the securing of Florida from Spain (1819) and the
settlement of the border with Canada after the War of 1812 (1814, then
further, 1818, and finally, 1846), the area to expand into included much
of the continent to the west of the original coastal location of the nation.
The two acquisitions, while already occupied by various native
American tribes, were already being expanded toward and into, with
considerable hostility occasioning various battles and wars, to say
nothing of raids and retaliations, as step by step the influx of Europeans
and European-Americans advanced and the frontier moved westward.
With the Louisiana purchase, followed by the exploration by Lewis and
Clark, the settlers moving into the area west of the Mississippi became
numerous, attracted by land but also by precious metals (gold,
especially). The establishment of various territories both east and west
of the Mississippi River and the question of admission of new states into
the union carried with it as well conflict over the matter of slavery: would
slavery be legal or not in new territories being established and new states
being admitted into the union. The temporary solution of the Missouri
Compromise (1820) preserved for a brief while the sectional balance
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between the states in which slavery was legal and those in which it was
not. But the issue arose again in the Compromise of 1850, then again in
the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854).
The economic expansion of the nation after the conclusion of the War
of 1812 was rapid, but of quite different character in different regions.
In New England, the industrialization of the textile industry contrasted
with, but was linked with, the boom in cotton production in the South,
and the latter, in whose economy the role of cotton in earning profits was
central and for which slavery was instrumental, developed in a
significant plantation mode. In the Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois),
agricultural production of grains and pigs was central. Such regional
specialization, suited to the lands and ways of different parts of the
country, was aided by the development, with federal government help,
of roads, canals, and railroads, to improve the transportation system and
allow raw materials and industrial and agricultural products convenient
transport over considerable distances. In the 1830s and 1840s,
considerable immigration (mainly German and Irish) added to the
population of urban areas and the Midwest, and linked with the spread
of the factory system into the states of the Ohio valley to diversify the
economy there. All the while, pioneers were venturing across the central
plains into mountain country and on to the west coast (the Oregon Trail,
1843), with interest focused on fur trapping and trading and on discovery
and mining of gold. Annexation of the Republic of Texas, victory in a
war with Mexico (1846-1847), and settlement of the boundary dispute
with Britain in the northwest (Oregon Country) led to significant
expansion of the area in the west that was claimed as part of the United
States. By mid-century, all of the states east of the Mississippi River had
been established and admitted to the union, together with several west of
that, including Texas and California as well as Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, and Arkansas. And prospects of more land and of more wealth
to be gained in the movement westward kept attracting more settlement.
It was the conflict over slavery, the secession of southern states and
the subsequent war (1861-65), that represented a turning point of
fundamental significance for the evolution of the nation. While the
development of the economy had been bringing the regions of the
country east of the Mississippi into closer contact-- canals, toll roads,
railroads, but also the printing press, the telegraph system--, the political
activity had been exacerbating the slavery issue, and the war in many
ways only deepened the division, although formally it did address the
problem and set the country on a path that could lead to resolution. The
post-war period through to the end of the century was marked by three
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things that affected the economy in fundamental ways and that marked
the American participation in the Industrial Revolution.
One: The aftermath of the war, while it involved efforts to make
effective the union it had been fought (by the North) to preserve, was a
complex and difficult affair in the face of the war-damage done to the
South and the considerable adjustment in way of life that was called for
there to make something positive of the emancipation of the slaves and
the re-integration economically within the United States. And efforts
were complicated by divisions in the North on how to proceed and what
to seek to accomplish. The result in fact, though not in intention, was a
fluctuating reconstruction effort which allowed a re-constituted political
system in the South to be operated for the most part by traditional
political leaders, and to maintain many of the old ways and attitudes,
replacing slavery with racial discrimination and embodying such
discrimination, and the white supremacy that was involved in it, in laws
that limited the legal rights and the actions which black persons could
undertake. Effective embodiment of political and civil equality was
lacking, and social equality was dismissed by whites as unacceptable, the
hostility of the mass of whites being expressed in extreme form by a few
in such a terrorist organization as the Ku Klux Klan. And yet there was
sufficient freedom and opportunity that members of the black population
could take responsibility for their own lives and begin the gradual
advance, despite the enormous obstacles of discrimination and
segregation, toward effective participation in a way of life that answered
to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Economically, however, the whole South, and not just the black population,
suffered an agricultural depression (mainly from crop failures) in the late
1860s and 1870s; and even by the 1890s, the South had not recovered
from the profound economic depression that marked the region after the
war; by the end of the century, it was a relatively poor and backward
region, with its white population still unwilling and unable to make the
adjustments that would take up with the new situation constructively and
begin to build a different and better future for itself within the Union.
Two: In contrast with the South, which showed few signs of
successful economic readjustment and advance (with two exceptions, the
textile and lumber industries, together with the building of a rail
network), in the post-war period the North moved ahead economically,
and most significantly, by way of industrialization, a phenomenon of
both the East and the Midwest. This was aided by exploitation of the
riches of the West (mines, forests), which in the last decades of the
century was growing rapidly in population, more so than any other
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section of the country. That exploitation was fostered by improved
transportation: the first chartered railroad in the United States (Baltimore
and Ohio, 1827) was an Eastern affair, but the West was exploited with
the help of a trans-continental railroad (1869), quickly followed (by 1883)
by three other railroads connecting the Mississippi valley with the far
west (Portland and Los Angeles). The demand for rails for these and
other railroads stimulated the iron and steel industry (located mostly in
western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio), the gold and silver mines of the
West provided new sources of capital for investment, and investment
along with technological advances brought industrial advance-- and
more broadly, economic expansion-- on numbers of fronts. The beginnings of the telephone, electric light, and automobile, industries, for
example, belong to the end of this century. But symptomatic of what
was happening was the passage of anti-trust legislation (Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890), in the attempt to curb growth of concentrations of power
whose practices sought to reduce competition and interfere with free
trade. Not only was investment being attracted (often enough from
Europe) and was productivity growing, but in various areas of the economy power was becoming concentrated in large corporations which
sought to operate as cartels or monopolies. This was the time of the
‘robber barons’, with their exploitation of railroad transportation, of
natural resources, and of workers, together with their exertion of political
influence; but the sword of the ‘free-trade’ ideology was double-edged,
for growth and expansion, increasing efficiency, and competitiveness,
but for this within the framework of genuine competition, of a diversity
of players of sufficient size and resources to compete and bring the
benefits of competition to consumers (choice, lower prices). Correlative
with this growth in size of many economic units went increased tension
between employers and workers, and the appearance of labor unions and
labor unrest.
Three: The admission of California as a state (1850) had brought the
westward advance of the national frontier to a close with a west-coast
state, and turned the work of nation-building to the task of consolidating
the ‘inland empire’. For while America did not know what Britain knew,
an overseas empire with political and economic significance, Americans
had certainly acted ‘imperially’ as regards the native American and
Mexican populations in incorporating western lands, and was about to
crown that act economically, with exploitation of the resources of the
region. This meant ploughing the grasslands of the Great Plains, mining
the mineral deposits and cutting the timber of the Rocky Mountains and
west coast, and using the open arid plain as rangeland for cattle
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production. Already back in 1830 the policy of the United States toward
the legal and political rights of native American population had begun to
shift, with the Indian Removal Act that authorized the President to grant
Indian tribes unsettled western prairie in exchange for their territory
within already established states east of the Mississippi River. But the
pressure of white settlement east of the river soon extended westward
across the river, so that whether settled on the land willingly or under
compulsion of force, Indians soon knew renewed pressure even on their
new lands. Particularly with the discovery of gold in California in 1848
and the increasing westward migration that followed, coercive military
actions were undertaken, and the ‘agreement’ to treaties that nullified
Indian claims to lands that the white man now wanted followed; such
wars led to the removal (by 1887) of most tribes to ‘reservations’,
producing a situation fraught with injustice. Even so, the achievement
of the Manifest Destiny, even if by questionable means, brought a
significant contribution to the economic prosperity of the country. But
even as the infill development of the interior west-- Great Plains, Rocky
Mountains, and Southwest-- began to consolidate such achievement, and
the admission of six western states in 1889-1890 brought the formal
incorporation of the West into the union near to completion, Americans
were seeking out a still further direction for expansion, and in particular,
for new outlets for an increasing agricultural and industrial production
that was developing rapidly in all but the South. In the last half of the
century, America had become a great power economically, rivaling
Britain and its empire; and pushed by some to act like such a power, and
in particular, to follow the lead of the British example by assuring their
access to overseas markets as well as their own national security by way
of a dominant naval force, Americans in sufficient numbers were ready
for an imperialistic venture themselves. Beside the prod of economic
reasons, the sense of religious and cultural superiority that from the start
had animated the treatment of the natives encountered in the original
immigration from Europe to this continent and had been re-expressed in
the idea of a Manifest Destiny, could readily be extended to a sense of
having a mission in regard to the whole world, kindred to that which the
European overseas reaching had initially carried: the superior culture and
the blessings of Christianity were matters we could bring to others as we
expanded our economic might, even if this meant a political imperialism
that ran against the grain of many Americans. A rebellion in Cuba
against Spanish rule led, through a series of events culminating in the
sinking of an American warship in the harbor at Havana, to an armed
intervention, the expulsion of the Spanish from Cuba, then on to Puerto
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Rico; and at the same time, a naval victory in a battle with the Spanish
in the harbor of Manila in the Philippines brought the war to its conclusion with a peace treaty in which Spain, recognizing the independence
of Cuba, also granted Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States and
was forced to ‘sell’ the Philippines to the United States. The long-standing American aversion to putting others in the position like the one in
which it had itself been at its beginning, that of being governed by a
distant alien people, brought a brief reaction against this step, but the
treaty was passed in the Senate, although more with the tactical thought
of making imperialism the focus of the next and imminent presidential
campaign. The tactic backfired: imperialism won out in the election. But
it was economic reasons that seemed to fuel the aspiration to imitate
Europe, and to make of an American territorial-acquisition in the western
Pacific a launching point for economic expansion into the Chinese
market.
As we have seen, the imperialistic outreach which the United States
joined, first in its westward conquest of the continent, now in its overseas
economy-impelled outreach, had a number of motivating reasons, but so
far as these were economic the reasons for colonization and establishing
outposts on foreign continents changed, and with them, the character of
the outreach. By the time the Industrial Revolution was well underway
in the leader, Great Britain, a first (or was it a second?) phase of
imperialism was ending: the British had lost their American colonies and
were focused on India, France had lost her footholds in North America
and India, and Portugal and Spain had lost most or all of their colonies
in the Americas and declined in importance as colonial powers. But with
this development in the economy, a new wave of imperial outreach was
fueled, with its dominant character and dynamic reflecting the economic
changes represented by the Industrial Revolution. The time when it was
basically precious metals and spices that provided an economic
motivation for the outreach is gone, and even the time when trade that
took place under mercantilist policies and that provided mutual benefits
to a mother country and colony whose goods-production was of a fairly
simple order, was passing as a laissez-faire economic order and machinecentered industrializing economy were taking shape.
With
industrialization, nations had the capacity for producing an increasing
volume of goods, and owner-producers intent on greater profits drove
forward in search of new markets. In that regard, colonial areas could
also provide the raw materials for industry as well as the foodstuffs for
an increasing population. Given the drive to create wider markets and
obtain new raw material, the imperial outreach now sought to serve the

Commented [74]: [[CM-98]]

391

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

industrializing economy by adapting colonial areas to the priorities of
such an economy, even if this meant (as it usually did) major disruptions
of existing social systems. For to make non-industrialized parts of the
world into useful adjuncts required that the industrializing nations do
such things as overhaul land and property arrangements in colonial areas,
generate a labor supply for the type of work needed there and do so by
force if necessary but at least by indirect enticement measures, and
spread the use of the money system of the imperial nation into the local
economy. All of this led, overall, to imposing the culture and the
language of the dominant power so as to make the colonial area a lasting
functional adjunct.
By the late 19th century when the United States was tentatively beginning its outreach over the seas, new imperial powers (Germany, Belgium,
Italy) were joining the older powers (Britain, France), and Asia and
Africa were becoming the main loci for imperial (political and economic)
outreach by the industrialized/industrializing European powers. xxxv
Colonization no longer was limited (for the most part) to coastal
locations that seapower might readily serve, but reached inland, with
emigrating Europeans spreading into the interior of continents and, if not
killing off the indigenous peoples or forcing them onto specially reserved
areas, then transforming their society to suit the needs of the militarily
more powerful and technologically more advanced nation. At the heart
of this latest phase of the Western outreach was the growing disparity in
technologies between those of the leading European nations and the
United States, and those of the rest of the world. The gap was especially
important when it came to military power, for it was this which
ultimately enabled the imperial powers to impose their will on the much
larger indigenous populations. But consolidation of foreign rule over
extensive territories was also aided by advances in communication and
transportation, notably railroads, and over time the populations were
‘integrated’ into the alien economic system with its complicated
technology of industrial production filtering down very little, only
sufficiently to make the integration work. Carried along with this
technological superiority and this ability to apply overwhelming force
was an arrogance and racism, a sense of cultural superiority (we were
bringing progress, after all), that were demoralizing to the colonial peoples, making them feel inferior. But as before, the impact of this outward
reach by European nations was not limited to the lands and peoples
directly involved; the reaching had an important reference back to
rivalries among themselves in their homeland locations, and to the
balance of power on the continent and the impact of the ownership and
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exploitation of overseas territories on that. This latest phase of imperialism in the late 19th/early 20th centuries thus showed a similar intertwining
of political and economic to that which had marked its beginnings and
likewise a continuing rivalry among mother countries in terms of power;
but now much of the land-area and the population of the globe was being
drawn into this latest phase in the imperial competition for power and
advantage. Thus human costs were mounting, some quite visible, others
more hidden, especially those inward to the aggressors responsible for
the obvious ones.

(3) Germany
The French Revolution and what led up to it had an impact in other
European countries, inspiring support or opposition, but in France the
Revolution was hijacked by Napoleon. His was an aspiration for a
France-dominated empire in Europe, with himself as dictator. But he
overreached, and was brought down finally in 1815 by a coalition of
invading forces. In reality, his rule, while sham as regards parliament
and lacking in press freedom and freedom of assembly, confirmed a
number of the other changes instituted within France by the Revolution:
it affirmed equality before the law, for example, and set a practise of
recruiting the governmental bureaucracy according to ability. At the
same time it also curbed the liberal individualism of the Revolution,
stressing centralization politically and more traditional structures
socially (the patriarchal family) and making some rapprochement with
the Church while maintaining some measure of religious freedom. But
he, together with the Revolution, had an impact on the Germanic peoples
which set in motion the next major step in the political history in Europe
of ‘modernity’.
After 1648 (Peace of Westphalia), the Holy Roman Empire (as we
noted earlier) was an ‘empire’ more in name than reality, since the Emperor exerted little real power; but it was not a ‘modern’ state either, for
that same reason, and instead basically a loose confederation of independent units which at most knew a feeling of shared nationality but nothing
strong enough to generate any effective reaching for a nation-state. Likewise, economically the hundreds of independent units discouraged initiative that might generate connective activity despite the barriers and produce advance and unity in this domain. In the time between 1648 and
the French Revolution, this confederation with its basic conservative
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bent was marked by rulers who ‘owned’ their states and could do what
they wanted, including waging war, for whatever reasons of dynastic
aggrandizement, territorial expansion, prestige and power, they felt
drawn by. And economic development depended importantly on the
whim of the ruler. However, the Empire harbored two larger states
whose rulers, in seeking their own aggrandizement, would eventually
lead to a different future, namely, Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria. The
former, under a series of capable leaders (Frederick William, 1640-88;
Frederick III, 1688-1713; and Frederick William I, 1713-1740), became
an autocratically ruled state with a strong economy, a tightly run administration, an efficient fiscal organization, and above all, a powerful army.
But it was not fundamentally aggressive, the rulers being content with
dynastic aggrandizement within the Empire and resistance to any encroachment by the Emperor that might limit them. Austria, as the normal
seat of the Emperor but a kingdom in its own right, grew somewhat territorially as a kingdom when the French King, Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715),
sought expansion of France and drew much of Europe into a conflict that
eventually frustrated his ambition. But when in 1740 the Austrian ruler,
Charles VI, who was also the Emperor at the time, died without a male
heir and his death raised the question of succession, the new Prussian
King, Frederick II (1740-86: Frederick the Great) launched an attack
seeking expansion of the area he controlled, and the ensuing series of
wars, involving Prussia and Austria but at times drawing in others, ended
up rather indecisively but nonetheless strengthened Prussia while leaving
a relatively strong Austria as well. Both states were becoming somewhat
‘modern’ politically under centralized and autocratic systems with strong
rulers (thus in the manner of the first phase of ‘modernity’), and the
Prussian was headed by a king with some personal commitment to
rational tolerance and free-thinking and responsiveness to the French
Enlightenment. Indeed Frederick II undertook legal reforms and
established religious tolerance as a state policy, and encouraging scientific and scholarly efforts in the Prussian Academy, he also promoted
economic development and lifted some of the tax burden from the
poorest of his subjects. But his interests were dynastic and personal, with
no thought of becoming leader of a German nation. xxxvi By the time of
the French Revolution, after another conflict with each other and
diplomatic maneuvers that thwarted each other at times, both Prussia and
Austria were significant powers in central Europe, but hardly on the leading edge of the development of ‘modernity’, which had already moved
beyond the monarchical stage of political organization.
When Napoleon had brought the revolutionary overthrow of the ‘old
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regime’ to an unanticipated conclusion in his coup, he began ‘reforming’
the French government, but also began an expansion of French power.
In virtue of his initial military successes, he was able to subdue and
reorganize parts of Europe, and by way of the parts of western Germany
and northern Italy who knew French rule for a brief while, he
familiarized the people being ruled with what a ‘modern’ state could be
like. If the Revolution had undermined the ‘old regime’ in France,
Napoleon extended its encouragement of such subversion to others, both
in a positive way-- government worked!-- and in a negative way-- his
lack of regard for the old ways was threatening to old-style rulers in his
sphere of potential aggression. In the course of his conquests, he brought
French rule to the Rhineland (1793) and, securing peace from both
Prussia and Austria (1795, 1797), he eventually established a chain of
satellites east of the Rhine (1803). Having encouraged the formation of
a Confederation of the Rhine (sixteen of the second-level states) (1806),
he finally brought the Holy Roman Empire to its end (1806). In these
and other actions Napoleon was restructuring the Germanic world
politically, and without this being his intention, furthering the
consolidation of the German nation; what was still needed was a
Germanic power that could bring effective political centralization and
overarching governmental unity to peoples feeling their kinship. That
was to prove to be Prussia, not Austria.
After the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815)
sought to re-establish a balance of power in Europe such as had been the
case in 1648 after the Peace of Westphalia; but it was not-- and could not
be-- one constituted as before the Revolution (too much had changed for
that), but rather one that recognized the new reality while maintaining
the conservative bent of the negotiators and the countries they
represented. Just as in 1648 something reminiscent of the mid-15th
century Italian League had been settled for, so again in 1815. Although
the heart of the Renaissance had been an aspirational reaching, the
members of the Italian League had settled for a balance on the primordial
aggressive-defensive level which, while protective thus of the
aspirational, nonetheless confined it; however much any unit (Florence,
say) prospered culturally, that upward-reaching was subordinated to the
maintaining of the dialectically-primordial aggressive-defensive posture
in the units on the political level. If in 1648, the now-separated forms of
religion were recognized not simply as central in the aspirational but as
having aggravated the aggressive-defensive reaching outward politically
to an unsustainable and unbearable degree, the new balance could not
allow either side of a Christianity internally split and at odds with itself

Commented [75]: [[CM-99]]

395

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

to be imposed on others; the interconnecting of the diverse within the
balance must restrain this new and particularly destructive temptation, a
temptation because religion provided the socially-basic framework for
the engagement of the participants of each political unit in affairs on
earth that could be felt to be of ultimate consequence aspirationally, and
destructive because ultimate differences inflecting the aggressivedefensive encounter tempted to ultimate solutions that destroyed one or
more of the parties. The result was a balance in which there was not
simply the tension of aggressive-balance on the primordial level but also
an inflection of this by the tension of restraint on the aspirational level.
But until some different orientation to religion could claim the
participants, acting to impose it on others seemed to be leading to mutual
self-destruction.
In 1815, however, while the balance-of-diverse-powers sought on the
primordial level in the new situation affirmed the self-restrained continuation of the various participants, what was harbored in the aspirational,
while again subordinated to the balance and continuation, this time was
not religion but a ‘reaching beyond religion’ that had begun to show itself,
a reaching to a deeper re-form inwardly than the split within Christianity
had signified, at least as Christianity had been being realized. The liberational reform element involved in aspiration this time-- that which had
been manifest in the three political revolutions and the beginnings of the
economic revolution along with its attendant economic theory-- was one
seeking, due to its very nature, an inwardness relating to the humanity of
human beings, one that required of the political unit (here, nation-state)
some sort of freeing of itself from what, within itself, held back its members from a way of reaching for the higher-and-better that was more fully
human for all and from engaging others out of that. If the recognition of
the full nature of such inwardness was as yet incomplete-- liberty is only
part of what is called for--, and its realization still short of what would
be fully in keeping with the ultimate meaning of human aspiration, it was
nonetheless something that had become part of the current situation and,
to the (conservative) participants establishing the terms of the new balance, something to be restrained. Thus 1815 settled for a relatively conservative balance, acknowledging some elements of the liberal direction
that had entered into the evolution of ‘modernity’ in the political and
economic spheres while seeking to keep those elements restrained.
Seen from this perspective, the path of the evolution of ‘modernity’
politically has so far held recurrent achievements among diverse political
units of a balance-of-diverse-aggressive-powers which, as regards the
aspirational venturing internal to each unit and for whose sake the
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balance is called for in order that the political units could be protective
of and sustain it, failed in each case to function as support for an adequate
realization for all, within that balance, of the full human meaning of the
aspirational, namely, that it is to culminate in the fulness of human
responsibility. The history of ‘modernity’ is (from this perspective) the
story of the repeated attempts to reach toward that fulness from a
starting-point within a balance of aggressive powers that recognize the
need to maintain an equilibrium with each other, but of repeated
substitution of, and settling for as the best possible at the time,
venturings-upward which fall short of widely embodying that fulness. In
each case so far, the limitations and flaws of that substituting and those
substitutes-- including the flaw of substituting the social-meaning
element in responsibility (in particular, the institutional) for its full
concrete realization-- have led to recurrent breakdowns and, once some
‘balance’ has been restored, to recurrent attempts-again. In the case at
hand (in 1815), the attempt-again has been preceded by a loosing of the
liberal genie which cannot now be wholly put back in the bottle without
renouncing the aspirational reaching altogether. For the liberal in some
form is an essential facet within the aspirational. The new balance sought
now harbors as acknowledged side of the aspirational an embryonic
realization of the liberational power of spirit which is gaining strength
and self-awareness but which has not yet flowered fully. It may never
succeed in flowering, and in the meantime may be misread and perverted.
But at least it is now being acknowledged, for better or worse.
In post-Napoleonic times, while conservatism prevailed in European
nations for a brief while, a new round of liberal agitation arose in the
1820s in Britain, France, and Belgium, and the liberal quest for stronger
parliaments, wider protection of individual rights, suffrage for the
propertied classes, and commercial legislation that would favor business
growth, saw some progress, especially in Britain. While the French were
struggling and undergoing another revolution in 1848, socialist ideas had
been spreading and entering into economic and political restiveness. The
German Confederation established by the Congress of Vienna left the
Germanic peoples still only loosely connected, with a stress on
differences and separate sovereign units despite the power which the
Confederation’s Diet had to pass measures that would strengthen
political and economic unity. But eventually, with willing first steps
taken by some to introduce constitutional and representative government,
under the pressure of agitation by liberals with a vision of a closer
national unity, and against the resistance especially by Austria under
Metternich, some liberalization got underway but it was aborted in 1819

Commented [76]: [[CM-100]]

397

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

by repressive measures sparked by an assassination. It was not until
economic development and the beginnings of industrialism took hold, so
that the idea of liberal government could be more than a foreign and
imported idea and could make greater immediate sense because of the
changing social structures and new actualities of ongoing life, that
political progress among the Germanic peoples could be anything more
than by fits and starts which made little continuing headway. As the
features of the Industrial Revolution began to appear-- large-scale industry, the mechanization of various branches of manufacture,
improvements in the transportation network, and urbanization--, a
middle-class that owed its wealth to industrial activity arose, and as their
activity became more important in the overall economy, so their
members sought greater political influence. The political fragmentation
of the Confederation meant problems-- diverse monetary systems,
commercial regulations, taxes-- that businessmen had to negotiate, and
the changes involved in economic development impacted peasants and
artisans in ways that required considerable adjustment but without any
satisfactory and ready way to achieve it smoothly. One step forward was
a Customs Union (1834) and thus some commercial unification, but the
political situation and various impacts of economic change and social
dislocation remained. Finally, in 1848-49, a revolution: a severe
business depression resulting in a halt of industrial expansion and
aggravation of urban unemployment, together with crop failures, brought
riots and disturbances, and in 1848, revolutions against various governments of the Confederation. To forestall republican and socialist experiments like those taking place in France, accommodations were made to
liberals and (most of all) elections were held for a National Assembly
that was to prepare the constitution for a free and united fatherland. But
disputes over the form national unification should take-- whether Austria
should take the lead, or Prussia, say-- and conflicts of an economic and
class nature-- the proletariat wanting protection against mechanized production and rural impoverishment, the bourgeoisie seeking promotion of
industrial capitalism based on freedom of enterprise-- slowed the process
of deciding the future course; and counter-revolution began to take shape,
gaining ground especially in Austria. When the Assembly came up with
its proposal for a federal union headed by a hereditary monarch whose
powers were limited by a popularly elected legislature, Austria resisted
such a system, and the monarchy was offered to the king of Prussia, who
refused as well because it restricted his power too much. And soon the
revolutionary movement petered out.
What followed was an attempt to achieve national unification in a
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conservative form, and Frederick William IV initially accepted the crown
in a national federation in which his royal prerogative was unhindered.
But Austrian mobilization of opposition, and proposal of a revived
German Confederation, left the nascent nation divided into two camps.
When Frederick William IV backed down and the Prussians agreed to
the restoration of the Confederation, the old order was re-established
(1850), and with it, restriction or abrogation of previously granted
political concessions, and in general, a time of conservative re-assertion
of power and control. But the movement forward was salvaged indirectly,
by a period of considerable economic advance, and while a financial
crash in 1857 ended that temporarily, the German Confederation had
taken on an industrial form of economy now with its irreversible
urbanization. By the end of the 1850s a new struggle between liberalism
and conservatism was in the making. Crucial was a shift in leadership in
Prussia: Frederick William IV suffered a mental breakdown, and his
brother became regent, policy and personnel changed, a liberal majority
was elected, and a new course possible. But William, becoming king
(1861: William I), was conservative (if a moderate one), and the tension
between crown and parliament increased with time until army reform
brought an impasse, broken by Bismarck, an unyielding conservative
made minister by William. Four years of internal conflict followed, the
royal government going its own way without parliament, until finally,
after settling the dual leadership of the German Confederation in a short
war with Austria, Bismarck was able to force Austria to yield some
territory to Prussia and to accept the dissolution of the Confederation and
the formation of a federal union (North German Confederation) led by
Prussia. The balance of power as established by the Congress of Vienna
was for the moment upset, and the achievement of German unification,
with the help of a military-victory-inspired nationalism, enabled
Bismarck to accommodate to, but limit, liberalism and to allow, but
restrict, freedom. The ‘compromise’ he embodied in the constitution of
this new federation included a dual legislature and a presidency held with
hereditary right by the rulers of Prussia, and the whole working in such
way that the president could continue authoritarian rule and policies in
fact while appearing to have the support and input of institutions that
represented the states and the voters at large but that actually gave little
power to the legislature. In addition, there was no bill of rights provided
for, and no civilian supervision of military affairs. But by introducing
uniformity in various areas of importance economically-- currency,
weights and measures, commercial practices, industrial laws, financial
regulations--, he created the economic unity that the middle class had
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been seeking and the achievement of which helped reconcile them to the
defeat of hopes for greater political freedom.
The emergence of this unified North German Confederation, together
with the secondary position of Austria now, changed the balance of
power in Europe in a way that led France to feel threatened. An occasion
which both the Confederation and France could use to their advantage
(the question of succession to the Spanish throne) led, by way of a
provocation that induced France to declare war, to a war in the course of
which the southern Germanic states that had not previously been part of
the Confederation, animated by patriotism, joined in on Bismarck’s side
and, the French being defeated, the further consolidation of the German
nation was now possible. This turn of events (1870-1871) completed
the emergence of a powerful German Reich at the geographical center of
Europe, an industrialized militaristic nation with a strong sense of nationalism and a future that would have immense consequences for
Europe and for the world.
(4) A fifth revolution
By the middle of the 17th century, ‘modern science’ was moving toward an initial climax, one achieved by Newton (1642-1727) late in the
century. In his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687),
he brought the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo to a culmination
that seemed, for a while, to have effected an unsurpassable understanding
of nature (celestial and earthly) in its basic features, grasping it as a realm
of things in motion exhibiting a lawful mechanical operation and structure throughout. In fact, of course, that was not so, and the dogma of the
machine-character of a world of matter-- and perhaps, of the world, simply-- was a misreading both of Newton and of reality. In the course of
the next hundred years, scientific inquiry advanced in physics (with the
principle of the conservation of energy as a landmark) and also in chemistry (presupposing Dalton’s turn-of-the-18th-century hypothesis of the
atom); and the understanding of light, of gases, of electricity, advanced
as well. But the next major turn in the development of ‘modern science’
was not in the realm of matter but instead in the realm of life. In the
course of advances in taxonomy that would take the orderly
classification of the diverse phenomena of life beyond Linnaeus, the
thought emerged that perhaps species are linked in some sort of genetic
relationship. But while both Buffon (1707-1788) and Cuvier (1769-1832)
provided material in natural history and paleontology that could be read
in that perspective (although they did not do so), it took Lamarck (1744-
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1829) to offer the first broad theory of evolution, one whose principle
was placed in the cumulative inheritance of modifications induced by,
and acquired in the course of response to, the environment. It was
Charles Darwin (1809-1882), xxxvii however, working at a time when
Hutton (1726-1797) had already proposed and Lyell (1797-1875) was
further advancing views on the history of the earth and the changes
taking place on it over long periods of time, whose ideas, first made
public in 1859 (On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection),
developed the theory of life as an evolutionary phenomenon that began
a revolutionary turn in thinking about life in general and ourselves as
living beings in particular.
In Darwin’s account, the relation of living organism to its environment is one in which adaptation of the former to the latter was called for
(survival was not automatic); and in regard to such adaptation, different
members of the same species might be differently (better or worse) fitted
to make the adaptation needed in the particular circumstances involved.
Thus he saw a competition within a species among individuals better or
worse fitted for adapting to and surviving in the environment in question,
and saw this as leading, by way of those individuals who had
advantageous traits for adaptation and passed those on genetically to
their offspring, to the eventual emergence of a new species. Thus a
principle of natural selection seemed to be the primary vehicle for evolutionary change, with the genetic preservation of favorable variations
within a species eventually issuing in new species. Having developed a
considerable body of evidence to make plausible his claim, Darwin’s
presentation of the theory led to its quick acceptance in most scientific
circles. But because in that work and in follow-up works he sought to
erase the fundamental difference between the human and other animals,
the inability of his proposal to be squared readily with the Christian
account of creation as this was usually understood made the vision he
was presenting controversial, not to say anathema, in many circles.
Indeed, the challenge to the Christian account, interpreted literally, was
even more central than in the case of the Copernican revolution; the latter
only displaced man and earth from the center of things physically, but
the Darwinian challenged the very nature of humanity and its place on
this displaced-from-the-center abode of ours.
As with Newton in the 17th century, so with Darwin in the 19th: from
Newton’s work in physics a model of mechanics and mathematics was
imposed on the world by others (normally with little faithfulness to his
actual thought), and a view of the world as a machine circulated under
his name which at best only roughly approximated something in his
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thought and yet had wide acceptance and use; even more so in the case
of Darwin, since his work concerned the human, and his attention to
change and variety, to individual members of species and concrete
particulars, and to struggle and survival, fit well with a larger sense of
the times, which reinforced among many who had no scientific training
(or even among some who had) the plausibility of his account. Much
work since his time has modified and corrected, refined and advanced,
Darwin’s basic idea, and in a more complex and sophisticated form his
proposal maintains itself today as a scientifically credible rendering of
available evidence. But its original impact spread far beyond the realm
of biological science, and (in the last part of the 19th century) issued e.g.
in a school of ‘social Darwinists’ who, extending the principle of ‘natural
selection’ to social groups, claimed struggle in human society is also
leading to the ‘survival of the fittest’. Such a reading of the social life of
human beings was used to support laissez-faire capitalism, class
inequality (a matter of superior and inferior adaptive capacity or fitness),
resistance to reform attempts (counter to ‘nature’: the poor are ‘unfit’,
the wealthy ‘fit’), and justification of a conservative governance policy;
and on a larger scale, it was used to rationalize imperialist, colonial, and
racist, policies, and in general, the biological-and-cultural superiority of
the European (and American).
For the most part, ‘modern science’, both physical (‘natural philosophy’) and biological, had been developing in relatively self-contained
fashion, and the inventiveness, the practical ingenuity, that had been integral to the economic development giving rise to the Industrial Revolution
had taken shape without much direct connection with the advances being
made in the inquiries of physical science. But during the second half of
the 19th century, things changed. As part of the round of technological
change that was taking place-- in smelting iron, in transmission of power
by way of electrical and internal combustion engines, in a variety of
forms and uses of powered equipment, in the automatization of industrial
production--, science began providing more significant and widespread
help to industry (by way of metallurgy and chemistry, and the studies of
electricity and magnetism). But industry helped science as well,
providing more delicate and refined instruments for scientific experimental use, enabling new methods and paths of inquiry. And in virtue of
this growing reciprocal assistance, scientific inquiry gained public
support and financing in virtue of the promise of its applications to
industry and thereby to the improvement of life generally. Moreover,
while academies and institutes had long been part of the world of
‘modern science’, as institutions for the interaction and communication
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of scientists and their inquiry, now institutions which more directly
sought to further its practical application began to emerge in numbers
(the École Polytechnique in Paris, 1794, had been the first), and governments and universities sponsored research (making financial grants to
scientists, founding research institutes), so that by the end of the 19th
century science had assumed a mainly public role and function and was
no longer the province of individual inquirers following out their own
interests in private. Yet businesses also, as they became larger and
amassed considerable resources, were soon to sponsor their own research
units, oriented to the discoveries and applications that their own business
interests saw as most profitable.
As for philosophy, its ‘modern’ beginning-again as more than
‘natural philosophy’ focused around the latter, as we saw earlier in regard
to Descartes (1596-1650) and Bacon (1561-1626); and the divergence of
continental and British developments continued, with Locke (16321704), Berkeley (1685-1753), and Hume (1711-1776), continuing
Bacon’s focus on knowledge and the approach to understanding in an
empirical vein, and with Spinoza (1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716)
continuing the emphasis on ‘reason’ found in Descartes, with somewhat
different understandings of what that term stood for and what that power
was capable of. The two divergent lines of development came together
in the last half of the 18th century in Kant (1724-1804), still with an
initial focus on knowledge (thus the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: 1781, rev.
1787), but with a more thorough and wider follow-through than other
philosophers up to his time and with a more profound apprehension of
the matters at issue. But his transcendental address (maintained in his
Kritik der practischen Vernunft: 1788, and his Kritik der Urteilskraft:
1790) led again to a divergence; this time one path led into efforts to
grasp reality itself, something which Kant’s account of knowing
precluded to knowledge (this path culminated in Hegel), and one path
led in an epistemological direction to a variety of destinations, none of
which accord to philosophical inquiry anything like its traditional
fundamental role.
Hegel (1770-1831) sought to transcend Kant, whose way of understanding knowledge confined it to appearance as it came into the realm
of objectivizing thought; Hegel took the subject-object distinction as a
limited and limiting one, enabling certain forms of knowledge but indeed
(as Kant claimed) unable to enable comprehension of reality in its fundamental unity. That unitary reality, the totality of Being, is nonetheless an
intelligible unity that can be comprehended; as such, it harbors a
diversity in manifold forms, and does so on the strength of a
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dialectical xxxviii dynamic inherent to Being and constituting it an affair
of self-unfolding in the course of which what is implicit in Being becomes explicit and increasingly concrete until finally Being becomes
fully itself in Absolute Spirit. The structural essence of Being-- Being in
itself-- engenders Nature as the otherness or the spatial-and-temporal
existential externality of the essence of Being, and out of Nature it engenders Spirit as the otherness to Nature whereby Being eventually returns
to itself in a coming to know itself in and via finite spirits (human beings).
It is in relation to this ‘coming to know’ that Hegel addresses history and
develops the ideas which came, if mostly only indirectly, xxxix to have
influential bearing on the further shaping of ‘modernity’.
As Hegel addresses it, history appears in the course of-- but is not the
same as-- the extended temporal existence of human beings on earth, and
more specifically, in the course of that existence as a being-together of
human beings in a people, thus in a variety and succession of distinct
peoples. In his account, history is that temporal existence so far as it
embodies and manifests the intelligibility which Spirit, as the World
Spirit and the Spirit of a people, introduces into the interaction of human
beings, and introduces not simply in a single people but in a temporally
ordered multiplicity. That intelligibility of history, which manifests in
this medium the dialectically self-differentiating structure of Being,
arises when a people, formed in the interaction of individual human beings, achieves the character of a state. The term “state” is ambiguous: it
signifies the people as an articulated and organized spiritual whole, but
sometimes merely in the political aspect of this whole, and sometimes as
the whole itself as an inclusive spiritual affair, thus as including not
simply the political (thus law) but also religion, science, art, and that
communal morality which makes the state a moral whole. The primordial
factor in this articulated whole-- primordial because enabling to the other
factors-- is the political ordering, which involves law and a
differentiation within the people of the ruling and the ruled. Law is the
rational principle whereby the will of individuals is joined to the rationaland-universal in a way that subordinates the particular-and-personal to
the rational-as-shared-humanly and connects the various members by
way of their common-rational-nature-and-will. The other facets of the
state as a spiritual whole-- facets which are the other organs of the state
as an existing internally self-differentiated-and-organized moral-andspiritual whole-- are comprised by religion, art, disciplined-rationalknowledge (forms of scientific knowledge, and philosophy), but also (as
spheres in which Spirit is operative) the usages-and-customs of a people,
the practical relation of its members to nature as regards the satisfaction
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of their particular (non-spiritual) needs, and the defense and protection
of the state against attacks and wild animals. Of these, religion is the
most fundamental, in that in it the spirit of a people represents to itself
(in its idea of the divine) the essence of true being and reveres and enjoys
that in its religion; it is this same essence that is presented as image and
intuition in its art, and is apprehended cognitively and conceived as
ultimate in its philosophy.
The articulated spiritual world which is the state (in the
comprehensive meaning of that term) is engendered, develops, and
endures for a while as the concrete expression of the Spirit of a people,
but as such it is a finite affair that eventually loses its vital energy. As
the culture in such a people becomes habit instead of a spiritually creative
affair, the decline of the living spirituality that was achieved has an
ambivalent outworking, on the one hand in corruption, unreason, vice
and evil, in a being-together that is dominated by personal needs and
interests, in the ruin thus of a people spiritually, and on the other hand,
in the separation of the individual thinker from his own cultural matrix
and, in the course of his criticism of that culture, his discernment of a
higher principle and potential of culture implicit in the dying culture.
The people may well continue to exist in a ‘ghostly’ form, its members
active and able to accomplish various things, but such individual
achievements arise only in virtue of determinate individual needs and
interests and in a merely habitual participation in culture, not in virtue of
an interest in the spiritual community of the people.
Along its course, the movement of history is carried by different peoples whose concrete spirituality, at each stage along the way, represents
the achievement of a deeper level of the realization of the World Spirit,
and thus an advance in the self-becoming of Spirit which brings Spirit’s
concrete realization in this medium of history progressively toward its
fullest realization. Given the nature of Spirit, that realization is, in each
step along the way, the discerning and enacting and concrete embodiment of the freedom that is of the essence of Spirit, so that the
process that constitutes the concrete course of history makes of it the path
of the increasing realization of spiritual freedom. The fullest and
culminating realization in question, holding (among other things) the full
self-knowledge of being which constitutes Absolute-Spirit in its own
fullest realization, is the ultimate purpose aimed at in the existence of the
world. Because there is a beginning and a culmination of such concrete
spiritual realization, history is a finite process. As Hegel sees it, the
beginning, after an extended pre-historical ongoing of human affairs as
an affair of peoples, is to be found in the peoples of the Orient (India and
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China, Persia and Egypt); but while the Orientals were the first to
discover freedom, they did not recognize that Spirit (man as such) is free.
For all the differences in the four peoples in question and in the measure
and manner of the realization of Spirit’s freedom in each case, Spirit
functioned without coming to consciousness of itself in differentiation
from Nature, and in virtue of that, its realization meant only one (the
despot) was free and free with a freedom that was still caprice. The
intermediate development-steps on the evolving pathway are manifest in
the Greeks and the Romans; but while the Greeks (say) gained
consciousness of freedom, they did not comprehend it in all its depth. In
them, Spirit emerged indeed out of submersion in Nature and,
recognizing as its other the Nature in Nature and beginning a Spiritual
apprehension and transforming of Nature, Spirit defined a creative freedom for itself that was nonetheless linked to the natural, not wholly free
and self-defining out of itself. Thus the Greeks only recognized that
some were free, not man as such; as a result and reflection of this, slavery
obtained in the midst of freedom as they could grasp and realize it. It is
only among the Germanic peoples, and through Christianity, that the
culminating realization of freedom is to be found, involving recognition
that man as man is free, that freedom of Spirit is the very nature of man.
The Romans prepared the way for this in two ways: one, with their
realization of Spirit in a subordination of all concrete individuality to a
state (in the political sense) founded on force and oriented to dominion,
and two, in the correlate to such a state in the individual person fully
differentiated from Nature and free in his inner self while giving himself
reality by appropriating (private) property rather than by higher occupations and objects enjoyed by Spirit. The recognition that man is free as
man first arose in the Christian religion, in the innermost region of spirit
as it came to grasp itself as super-sensuous, super-natural, not essentially
tied to Nature but isolated from it back to itself and, amidst the emptiness
of worldly life, longing for union with God. It took time, and a long and
severe effort of civilization, before the secular world could be molded
and penetrated by this sense of spirituality, and that freedom of Spiritfully-itself could be effectively realized in concrete form. The
culminating place in history at which this happened is the one that Hegel
finds himself located at in his own day, since Absolute Being’s selfdisclosure to itself in and via finite spirits in the course of history has
made freedom in its fulness effective in the world of his ‘today’.
Whether or not one accepts Hegel’s notion of philosophy as the spiritual self-understanding, in conceptual and scientific form, of Being, it
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gives to Western philosophy a culminating ‘modern’ form with considerable power and complexity. After Hegel, philosophy as a separate discipline degenerated, losing its sense of itself as ‘modern science’ advanced
and came to seem paradigmatic, if not exhaustive, of the human capacity
to know. There was one further sign of life in the 19th century, again in
Germany; that is to be found in Nietzsche (1844-1900). xl Quite in
contrast to Hegel, Nietzsche came to find his time not the culmination of
history but a time of a fundamental challenge and crisis which was
unrecognized by most but which represented a decisive turning point for
human life on earth. Kant, Hegel, and also Darwin, lie in the background
of Nietzsche’s thinking, and in a sense because he brings to a fruitful
culmination this background and provides an anticipatory formulation of
the ‘crisis’ of our times today, he is perhaps the most significant modern
philosopher as aid to our understanding of our 21st century situation. But
because his immediate influence was based on radical, even perverse,
misunderstanding and had little constructive bearing on the way
‘modernity’ evolved, I shall postpone any discussion of his thought and
return to it later. xli
(5) 20th century: a series of cataclysms
The 20th century began with European and American life caught up
in the increasingly swift and gradually wider-reaching current of ‘modernity’, with the ‘modern men’ who were its bearers confident, even
complacent, concerning what they were bringing to pass despite the obvious signs of tension and distress politically, socially, and economically.
But as it turned out, it became a century of cataclysmic events, disclosing
ever more threateningly the darker side of ‘modernity’. For there has
been a darker side from early on, and one whose impacts have been
growing along with those of the brighter side.
The dynamism for the con-crete movement and momentum of
‘modernity’ out of the 19th century and into the cataclysms of the 20th
century had a three-fold leading edge. For one, in Europe, central for the
first cataclysm to mark the 20th century (World War I) was the 19th
century emergence out of the Germanic peoples of a powerful German
Reich at the center of Europe, an industrialized and militaristic nation
with a strong sense of nationalism. For a second, arising in France and
England the thrust of a counter-movement to industrial capitalism, led
importantly by the ideas of Marx and Engels but taking concrete shape
with the second cataclysm, the Russian revolution (Lenin, then Stalin),
gained power for a while in a communist world. And third, across the
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Atlantic there was the growing strength, economically, scientifically, of
the United States of America, and its reaching out economically and
militarily to join in the first cataclysm before itself bringing on the third,
the Great Depression. Out of the fourth cataclysm, the Second World
War, in which the two sides of the ‘modern’ world of nation-states joined
together in defeating the Germanic attempt to assert itself under Hitler,
came the prolonged threat of a fifth cataclysm in the ‘cold war’ of the
communist and capitalist worlds, the MAD period of ‘mutual assured
destruction’. The peaceful conclusion of that ‘war’ arrived toward the
end of the 20th century, with the collapse of Soviet communism and its
empire.
From what we have seen of ‘modernity’ as it was taking shape in the
time up to the 20th century, the turbulence of that century should be no
surprise, even if the con-crete forms that it took, in virtue mainly of the
con-crete decision-making of the participants, were unforseen, indeed
unpredictable, at the time. Let us briefly recall what happened.
1. The first cataclysm arose out of the confluence of two energies.
One was evidenced in the growing strength of an industrialized Germany
with an authoritarian political leadership (under the Kaiser and his
minister, Bismarck) whose conservative management of affairs favored
the landed elite and the large industrialists as well as the military, so that
any movement toward liberal democracy was stifled; under their
successors, Germany came into the 20th century with overseas imperial
ambitions that reflected more its ambition to become a major power on
the international scene than any realistic possibility, and then a
refocusing of concern upon eastern Europe and the Balkans. The other
was evidenced in the complex ethnic tensions in the Balkans, involving
Serbia and Austria in particular, but Russia and Turkey as well. The
spark that initiated the cataclysm was the assassination of the Austrian
Archduke by a Serbian pan-Slav nationalist; the fire that was ignited
soon turned into a conflagration which drew in Germany and Turkey,
Russia and Great Britain and France, Italy and Japan, and finally (from
1917) the United States. The balance-of-power setting in Europe,
involving shifting alliances and a mixture of nationalism, increasing
militarism, and renewed imperialism, and the world-wide interplay of
nations which ‘modernity’ was generating, was interactive medium for a
conflict which not only drew in East Asia and the United States but also
brought extensive death and destruction. For with the industrial development, warfare had become much more mechanized than before, with
tanks, airplanes, and improved gunnery, and with submarine action that
destroyed much neutral-nation shipping; then too, “total war” broke
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down the distinction of military and civilian, and brought enormous
casualties, both military and civilian, on a scale never seen before.
The conclusion of World War I in the victory of the Allies left a destabilized Europe, with four imperial lines coming to an end (Hohenzollern,
Hapsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman), with new nations and boundaries
being formed in eastern and southern Europe, with enormous loss of life
and destruction of landscape, and on top of all this, with a peace
settlement that was unsatisfying to almost all concerned. Political
recognition of a larger problem implicit in the war had brought from the
United States (Woodrow Wilson) the proposal for a League of Nations,
expressing hope that the war had been one to end all wars and that this
international institution with its collective security aim could assure that.
Although the United States would not join this institution which its own
President had proposed, its wide-reaching membership made of it
initially a global organization, not encompassing all but a start on
including all; but when Japan, Italy, and Germany, by their actions
repudiated the peace-treaties, the unwillingness of the major powers to
act to enforce them showed it to be a rather powerless organization by
the end of the 1930s. Despite having been formed to express lessons
learned in and by the war and to prevent future such wars, it clearly had
not been formed out of sufficient depth of insight into what was amiss
and problematic in the contemporary world and into what might effectively rectify that.
2. Already, before the end of the war, Russia had suffered a revolution, indeed a double revolution (both in 1917), the first leading to the
abdication of the tsar, the second to the rule of the Bolsheviks. This second cataclysm had roots back in the 19th century, both outside the country
(the emergence of socialist thought, and particularly, of the German, Karl
Marx) and inside, in growing unrest with authoritarian tsarist rule. Already that rule had brought a war with Japan, and defeat in that war had
brought forth discontents that had been simmering for a while; in virtue
of a revolution (1905), the Tsar consented to the formation of an elected
assembly (the Duma), thus acknowledged some limits to the monarchy.
But neither the Social Democrats (with their internal division into Bolshevik and Menshevik, with contrasting aims and programs of action)
nor the Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia accepted the Duma as a
satisfactory end to the revolution. When Russia was drawn into the First
World War, the tsarist conduct of the war lost him support, and another
revolution-- this time, the double revolution of 1917-- changed the
political order significantly. The dominant figure in that change, Lenin
(1870-1924), was a Marxist before he was 20. Jailed for helping unify
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Marxist groups in a Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of the
Working Class and exiled to Siberia for three years, he then left the
country for Germany and work in uniting the various Marxist groups in
Russia and Western Europe into a Social Democratic party. As his
thought evolved, he had come to think of the party as the “vanguard of
the proletariat”, that is, as an activist organization, highly disciplined and
centralized, which would function as leader and guide to the proletariat,
showing it where its true class interests lay. Taking this direction, the
revolution he envisioned would represent (in effect) an autocracy-- of the
party, in the form of a dictatorship of the proletariat-- replacing an autocracy-- of the tsar. In virtue of resistance by numbers of Marxists, his
work to shape the Social Democratic Workers’ Party in these terms led
(in 1912) to a split and made the Bolshevik Party a separate entity. When
the war broke out, he interpreted it as an imperialist and capitalist affair
on both sides, which was to be turned into a civil and class war instead,
with workers on both sides turning their guns on the rulers in their
countries and not on each other. Taking imperialism as a function of a
capitalism dominated by major banks, whose amassing of capital
allowed immense profits to be made in colonies and colony-like
territories, he understood the war to be a result of a race for empire on
the part of the advanced nations, in which rival coalitions of imperialists
were seeking a redivision of the world at the expense of each other. Imperialism being marked by an expansionist dynamic inevitably leads to
war, and will continue to do so until capitalism is overthrown. Returning
to Russia in 1917, he was dissatisfied with what the first phase of the
revolution had led to (the Tsar replaced by a provisional government)
and urged the establishment of a soviet government that would negotiate
Russia out of the war and would immediately nationalize all land and
divide it among the peasants and establish tight control over all privately
owned industry for the benefit of the worker. The Bolshevik line-- of
peace, land, and bread, immediately-- eventually won sufficient support
among workers, peasants, and soldiers, that Lenin contemplated, then led,
the second phase of the revolution, bringing the Bolshevik-dominated
soviets into power and establishing a “dictatorship of the proletariat”
which, when this direct rule by armed workers and peasants had achieved
control of the situation, was supposed to “wither away” and be replaced
by a non-coercive, classless and stateless Communist society. The coup
succeeded, a civil war ensued, but the Soviet coup was sustained, the
Reds overcoming the Whites and exercising control over much of the
area of the old Russian empire. Thus with victory secured and Russia
established as the dominant power of a Union of Soviet Socialist
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Republics (1922), one of the major goals of his revolutionary work was
accomplished and the venture on a centralized planned economy under
the control of the Party was launched in earnest. But “Party” was not
quite what dominated: Lenin’s insistence both on the merciless
destruction of opposition to the Bolshevik dictatorship and on tight
control over dissent within the Party, prepared the way for the one-man
rule of his successor, Stalin. The other major goal of his revolutionary
work, the formation of an international movement and a world of soviet
republics, had hardly been started on before his death. Nonetheless, the
aim remained, embodied in the Third International he had founded in
1919, in which the Russian Communist Party was held up as the ideal of
all Communist parties, and others were to be formed in other nations that
were accountable to the Russian Party, not to their local constituencies;
but championing the rights of the peoples of colonies and semi-colonies
to self-determination and independence, the International won considerable sympathy for Communism among such peoples. This, the exchange
of autocracies by revolution and the impetus for global revolution to
enforce centralized autocracy worldwide, was the second cataclysm,
which established the Bolshevik regime in a hostile relation to a world
that was hostile in return and by this regressive expression of ‘modernity’
set the stage for another cataclysm later on.
3. The third cataclysm arose when after the First World war the
United States, refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, drew back from
involvement with the European nations except as insisting on debtrepayments from her recent allies against Germany. Those allies had
little or no gold with which to make the repayments, and needed dollarcredits that they could gain by exporting goods to the United States; but
a clutter of new tariff walls was built up (1922) as the government
responded to demands from industry to protect it in its American market.
The result was that repayment dragged out, the Americans turned
isolationist all the more and, putting their energies into making money,
they cut taxes and Federal spending and generated a considerable but
uneven economic expansion. Productivity gains meant working less
hours and higher pay, an expanded consumer credit system enabled more
to enjoy more (and more diverse) goods, and elevation in the standard of
living was fairly widespread (except ‘down on the farm’). The country
seemed on the upswing as a function of unrestrained enterprise and greed,
but late in 1929, the period of prosperity came to a sudden end, with a
crash in the stock market, a strain on overextended banks and the
financial system, declining production and rising unemployment. In the
midst of this more tariff walls were erected (Smoot-Hawley Tariff
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[1930]), and within a year or so, a couple dozen countries took protective
countermeasures (tariffs and quotas). When Germany defaulted on its
reparations payment, financial panic set in, and most European governments went off the gold standard and devalued their currencies,
destroying the exchange system and devastating international trade.
European withdrawal of gold from American banks led to leading banks
calling in their loans to American businesses, and then those businesses
and the banks collapsed. As economic decline cascaded, it reached more
widely. Because of the degree to which the world economy had become
integrated, the Great Depression in the United States (at its worst in
1929-1932) brought a worldwide economic slump, with Germany and
Great Britain in particular suffering. In the United States, this brought a
Democratic administration into power, and a fairly significant shift in the
relation between government and the economy: increased government
regulation, support for workers via large-scale public-works projects and
extensive relief for the unemployed, and in general, what came to be
called the “New Deal”. Poor regulatory policies and corruption, speculation and unself-critical optimism, narrow-minded focus on profit and
goods, had enabled underlying weaknesses and imbalances in the
economy to grow without effort to correct them and had finally undermined the prosperity that occupied the forefront of attention. The downturn, when it came, was so extensive and significant that not only had
government action been required, but that as, with the help of such action,
recovery was slowly effected during the 1930s, a multi-sided government role in ensuring economic stability and social welfare evolved
as a persisting feature of the relation of government and economy in the
United States to this day. But even granted that it was short-sighted and
narrow-minded policies (public and private) that brought on the Great
Depression, was this correction itself profound enough in its
understanding of what had been-- and was then-- happening to get to the
roots of the problem? Granted also that in a time of crisis the foreground
element in a responsible address must concern the obvious and pressing
and then the not-so-obvious and not so pressing, but if what is taking
place grows out of something deeper even than that, does not someone- and someone in a leadership role-- need to reach to the depth on which
what is problematic is intelligible in its roots and at least see that any
address to the obvious and not-so-obvious is formed within an understanding of these which enables one not to abet the working of the rootfactors and to worsen the situation in the name of problem-solving
addressed to the obvious and urgent? And if those deeper factors point
to a need for a responsible address which entails outgrowing the
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incentives in the political and economic systems for such actions as
brought on such a cataclysm-- incentives such as greed and selfishness
and longing for power, presumed by many to be essential and
unchangeable factors in ‘human nature’--, what then?
4. The unsatisfying peace agreement that followed on World War I- indeed, five peace treaties-- was resented in Germany, especially by
nationalists who felt that the terms of the Versailles Treaty signified a
betrayal of the nation and its military might. And in general, the postwar period was more difficult for the European nations than for the
United States, on whose soil none of the battle was fought, whose institutions-- until the Great Depression-- were still intact, whose ongoing
life involved none of the reconstruction tasks with exhausted resources
which the battlefield nations knew, and whose military strength and
political power were considerable, if maintained now in disuse and
semi-isolation from the rest of the world. In Europe the new situation
was fraught with divergent and conflicting interests (internal to nations
and between each other), considerable mistrust, with no widely agreedon future for the European community (let alone shared understanding
of what had taken place) to guide decision-making. Because confidence
in this-or-that agreement between this-nation and that-nation often depended on American support of the follow through implied in the agreement, when the Great Depression hit and economic malaise spread to
Europe, all that was being built up in the 1920s collapsed, and while
democratic countries became uncertain of democracy itself and faith in
free-market economics declined, authoritarian regimes grew stronger
and bolder.
But more broadly and deeply, the difficulty of the post-war period in
Europe was compounded by the war’s having engendered a strong
current that contrasted with the still-persisting upward-reaching current
of the leading edge of ‘modernity’: a current of disillusion and
disenchantment, of emptiness filled by the irrational (by negation and
hatred, envy and greed, fear and anxiety: a Freudian view of human
nature fit with this mood); a current of cynicism, of anti-intellectualism,
of dismissal of rational argument and evidence in favor of emotion: in
short, a current subversive to established values and norms but without
constructive issue. Despite the different conditions, such a current also
found expression in the United States: enhancing a dark side of America
already present (racial prejudice), a terrorist group such as the Ku Klux
Klan presented hatred and fear in a visible and outrageous form that in
fact provoked little moral outrage, as if we could no longer allow
ourselves to feel the moral deeply; but for the most part it took more
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innocuous forms, the disjunction from the pre-war ways offering
opportunity for reaction against traditional conventions and norms which
was potentially constructive but whose constructive potential was for the
most part unrealized (in contrast to what happened after World War II),
expressed in the self-indulgent display of unconventional attitudes and
behavior. Counter to this mainly urban phenomenon there emerged in
rural areas a religious (Christian) fundamentalism which sought
orthodoxy and the preservation of conventional morality (confusing
genuine morality with adherence to certain particular beliefs and norms).
Opposed to this current in its various forms, there was a genuinely moral
response to the Great Depression, and a slow but gradual recovery from
a Great Depression which had evoked constructive moral and social
effort not simply to aid economic recovery in the narrow sense but to
begin to rein in some of the economic excesses, injustices, and inequities,
that had brought such widespread and deeply-felt distress to most
Americans.
Back in Europe, however, the Fascism of the 1930s, though carrying
the different coloring of the different nations and cultural traditions involved, proved to be a greater regression from the leading edge of ‘modernity’ than Communist Russia; promoting itself as anti-Marxist, it was
anti-democratic and anti-liberal as well, and more irrational and extreme
in its authoritarian roots than even the Communist regime. On the European continent, it was the German that proved to be the most potent form
of Fascism. After World War I, Hitler had helped build up the German
National Socialist Workers’ Party and in the early 1920s he became its
leader. The vision he would promote was to inspire a mass movement;
it focused on natural differences between individuals and ‘races’, with
the Aryan races as the superior, and it regarded a Volk (people) as the
natural unit of mankind, with the German as the greatest. His was a racial
nationalism which saw in Marxism its greatest enemy, and behind the
Marxist face he saw the greatest enemy of all, the Jew. When the
economic troubles of 1929 arrived, it brought a congenial setting in
which Hitler could find funding and companions for promoting his
vision of a Germany awakening out of its current suffering to regain its
greatness, and for the task of providing a strong right-wing and antiworking-class movement that could take over the government. With the
help of unremitting propaganda and mass agitation combined with the
ineffectiveness of government in both internal and external affairs, the
Nazi party gained electoral support, and in 1933 he was invited to be
chancellor of Germany. Once in power, he used his position as stepping-
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stone toward the achievement of an absolute dictatorship, and succeeding in this, he maintained power by systematic terror and
intimidation. A desire to reunite the Germanic peoples, hostility toward
the Marxist Russia that had emerged at the end of the war, and hostility
toward France, led him to actions, skillfully masked by propaganda that
worked all the more effectively because of the insensitivity, weakness
and irresoluteness, of those nations he addressed it to, that amounted to
a repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles and its constraints on Germany.
By 1936 he had established a connection with Fascist Italy under
Mussolini, and an anti-Comintern pact with Japan; the three aggressive
authoritarian nations were bringing the world toward the next cataclysm,
World War II. By 1939, Hitler’s aggressive moves finally provoked
Britain and France to declare war to stop him in his invasion of Poland.
German expansionism, curtailed in its pre-World War I form, had revived
now in a new and more dangerous form.
Long before this war started in Europe, Japan had become opened to
the West (mid-19th century) and, following the lead of the West, had
become an industrial nation (during the last third of the 19th century),
developed a modern army and navy, and begun an imperial expansion of
its own. The expansionist reach brought war with China over Korea
(1894-95) and Japanese victory. A Russian-Japanese war followed
(1904-05), and a peace agreement mediated by the United States was
quite favorable to Japan, shifting the balance of power in the Far East.
After annexing Korea (1910), Japan fought on the Allied side in World
War I, limiting itself to seizing German possessions in China and the
Pacific; when China sought return to her control of the German holdings
in Shandong province, the negotiations were difficult, Japanese demands
excessive, and the conclusion left a legacy of distrust and ill-feeling
toward the Japanese on the part of the Chinese. When the Treaty of Versailles did not enable China to recover its losses, friendship with Japan
became impossible for her. It was not until the mid-1920s, with a
network of treaties that sought to provide for Japan’s security but to
restrain its expansionism, that something in the way of a pause arose in
her aggressive activity. But that did not last long. The Great Depression
in its worldwide impact proved a time when, given the rapid growth of
Japan’s population and its requiring large imports of food to support its
population and given the limitation on its exports by tariffs and racist
legislation in other countries, it became plausible and popular among
Japanese (especially among the younger military officers) to think of
solving their economic problems by expansion achieved by military
conquest. Manchuria provided an opportunity for military activists who
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felt curtailed by civilian government, and in 1931 an incident (some
Chinese soldiers tried to bomb a South Manchurian Railway train)
provided an occasion for aggressive action, and all Manchuria was soon
occupied. The inability of the civilian government to control the
extremist military officers led to a reconstitution of Manchuria as an
‘independent’ state which, in reality, was controlled by the army; and
when the League of Nations recommended (1932) that Japanese troops
be withdrawn and autonomy be granted to Manchuria, Japan formally
withdrew from the League (1933). In 1936, Japan had signed the antiComintern pact with Germany, and by 1937, Japan was engaged with an
internally divided China in full-scale war. In 1940 Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, which recognized Japan as leader
of a new order in Asia; it committed each to assist the others if they were
attacked by a power not yet involved in their wars, and that meant, the
United States. With the German attack on Russia in 1941, the Japanese
saw the opportunity for shifting focus of its aggression away from China
and for expansion into Southeast Asia, and did so, via Indochina; with an
“East Asia for the Asiatics” policy, Japan sought to displace the previous
colonial masters and secure an economic bloc of Manchuria, Korea,
North China, Southeast Asia, and itself-- this is the new order it would
establish. Then in December 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor,
and Hitler declaring war on the United States the day after the attack, the
Americans were drawn into a two-pronged war against totalitarian
regimes.
The war ended in 1945, with Allied victory, the surrender of the
Japanese being provoked by the American use of a new weapon of mass
destruction, the atomic bomb. But as with the aftermath of World War I,
a devastated Europe was left; the war not only involved vaster armies
than ever before and produced even more massive destruction than
World War I did as well as unprecedented deaths (40-50 million), but it
also completed the undermining of the balance-of-power system that had
prevailed before World War I and that for a variety of reasons had not
regained effective force in the interim between the two World Wars.
With the emergence of the Americans and the Soviets as major military
forces in the course of the war, the one in technology and the other in
manpower, not only did this represent a decisive shift of power in the
world away from the states of western Europe, but it offered the opportunity for a somewhat different European community to emerge, for its
peoples and leaders, its states, to reshape themselves politically and economically, having learned from what Europe had been through over the
last several centuries. Two further major differences marked the
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aftermath this time. One was that America did not withdraw from
Europe but remained an involved partner, and one that sought to aid in
the recovery (Marshall Plan, 1947), including that of Germany. And the
other was that the Soviet Union also remained, this time as having
extended its empire throughout eastern Europe and having forced a division of Germany between East and West. Amidst these two powers and
their tension with each other as well as the threat of the Soviet Union to
western Europe, the latter took steps of its own toward a new and
integrated political and economic order; after some jockeying back and
forth over a divided Germany and other matters of conflict, the move
toward union began with an economic community of some western
European nations (1957-58); that beginning developed slowly and haltingly toward a fuller union, adding members and evolving in nature and
function over time. A different sort of European community than ever
before existed was able to take shape. At the same time, as the aftermath
of World War I had brought political unrest to the colonies of the imperial
powers of Europe and a movement toward independence on the part of
the subjugated, so the aftermath of World War II saw a rapid decolonization (the first wave in 1946-1950), achieved for the most part
peacefully. Aided in Asia by Japan’s aggression leading into and during
the war, and supported in various other places (Africa, for one) by the
Soviet Union seeking to expand its empire, the work of gaining independence from colonial or semi-colonial control came to fruition everywhere, with somewhat different legacies and consequences. It was in the
Middle East, with the presence of the oil reserves that were so important
to the economic vitality of ‘modern’ nations, that the most explosive
consequence was to be found.
As the split of Europe and the Western world between the United
States and the Soviet Union was taking place, in the larger world another
current was flowing in the Far East. Toward the beginning of the century,
the Chinese had revolted and freed themselves from the Qing or Manchu
(Manchurian) dynasty, replacing imperial rule with the Republic (19111912). But the first years of the Republic were fraught with internal conflict, and several unsuccessful attempts to restore imperial rule, as well
as a split between North and South China over the way into the future;
indeed, ‘war-lords’ in various areas competed for exerting control over
territory, and no faction was able to dominate in the government of China
whole. At the same time, changes in the educational and economic systems were bringing greater Western and ‘modernizing’ influences into
China, and critical scrutiny of Chinese culture and traditional ethics.
Ideas of individual liberty and equality, of a scientific spirit of inquiry,
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and of a ‘modern’ pragmatic approach to the problems of the time, were
being promoted, affecting not the rural masses but the urban centers. In
1919 a student protest against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, as it
related to Germany’s rights and possessions in Shandong (Japan was to
retain these), led to the government’s refusal to sign the Treaty, but also
helped spread other revolutionary ideas that led to the reorganization of
the Nationalist Party and to the birth of the Chinese Communist Party,
and eventually to the Communist revolution (1949). With the People’s
Republic of China that emerged with the latter, Western Marxism, revolutionary and totalitarian in nature, gained a Chinese embodiment, and
linking with the Soviet Union government to government (with
significant tension internal to the linkage), reinforced one side of the split
between the free and Communist powers in the world.
As America had promoted a League of Nations after the first war, so
it promoted a new and improved version after this second war, the complex of institutions known as the United Nations (1945). Indeed, just
before the end of the war and soon afterward, other international
structures and agreements were also formed, frameworks for discussing
and negotiating and rule-making, mainly related to economic affairs but
with clear political reference as well: for example, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (1944), the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (1947), and fifty years later (1995) the World Trade
Organization. Without going as far as the intra-European effort at union,
the aggressive-defensive address was likewise maintained in all these
inter-national efforts but subordinated to an intent to reach beyond the
self-centered orientation it invited and to facilitate nations engaging with
each other-- in some cases, with all other nations-- in a way that
embodied fairness and justice for all. But as with the League of Nations,
so with such institutions: it remains a question of how well thought
through and how consonant with the nature of reality such institutions
are.
5. This post-World War II period was the locus of the fifth cataclysm
in this 20th century series. Coming out of the war there were two ‘superpowers’, the USSR and the USA, who were, politically and economically,
antagonists, each seeking the expansion of its own kind throughout the
world and at least containment of the other. Each had succeeded in harnessing scientific research and technological development to augment its
military power, although in the United States such research and development had also a much wider and broader scope, free of that reference and
addressed to diverse aims, intellectual, economic, medical, among others.
There was an arms race, particularly in regard to that most destructive of

418

Thoughts on Today and Tomorrow

all weapons, the atomic bomb (and soon, nuclear weapons); and technology needed to be developed for delivery of such weaponry, and for
defense against attack by it. The ‘free world’ and the ‘communist world’:
could there be lasting co-existence when the major powers were working
so intensively at cross-purposes with each other? For a while, given the
accumulation of weaponry on both sides and the scale of the destruction
which each side could in principle impose on the other, each party recognized that any ‘first strike’, however much destruction was sought, could
be defended against sufficiently by the other as to leave a retaliation capacity on such a grand scale that use of such weapons was madness. The
stalemate that resulted on that level-- that of MAD (mutual assured destruction)-- did not prevent seeking other means of winning the ‘cold
war’, economic included; the competition for supremacy in a world of
nations of its own kind continued apace. Thus for a while the world and
each side lived under that threat of cataclysmic destruction, by a mistake
or miscalculation if not by intentional action. In time it turned out that
the centralized communist state and state economy was not equal to the
task and basically collapsed from within. The Soviet attempt to place
the science-based technological advances at the disposal of a centrally
planned economic system and an authoritarian political system, and to
combine elements of the advancing side of ‘modernity’ with elements of
regressive ‘modernity’, failed in the face of the competition from free
world systems. But with only one superpower left, what kind of world
had ‘modernity’ brought about as its latest issue? A free world?
f. Later ‘modernity’, its progressive dynamic
We saw above (340-351) how the terms sketched out earlier (250256) brought the initial formation of ‘modernity’ into an intelligible
perspective, and our recall of the development which continued,
augmented, and modified, that start from the mid-17th century onward
to today shows an evolution which is likewise intelligible in those basic
terms. Seen overall in their light, the continuation of ‘modernity’ has
advanced and expanded it, with the participants in this history-making,
in their responsiveness to the creational-and-human-nature meant-tobe’s and their standards, having been guided by particular interpretations
(and reinterpretations) of their directional pointing such that, over time
and in ways reflecting different circumstances, the diverse venturings
directed by them have effected an increasingly wider, complex, and
evolving, movement in the con-crete. That movement, seen in reference
to the fundamental directional pointers, has gradually brought the
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meanings involved in that pointing to deeper and fuller con-crete realizations with the help of such guiding interpretations and over time have
achieved realizations that are more apt con-cretely to what the meanings
with their implicit standards intend. There has been progress in this
sense, measured in this reference. But at the same time, the con-crete
movement, the issue of a venturing whose fathoming of the directional
signs has also often involved misreadings and bias and distortion, to say
nothing of immature decision-making and commitment, has also gained
momentum and character from inadequate realizations which have
marred it and have eventually brought it to harbor ventures which,
especially in the 20th century, have had cataclysmic consequences and
which even now (indeed, especially now, in the 21st century) are threatening to undermine the whole endeavor. ‘Modernity’, while a
progressive movement, has nonetheless been an ambivalent affair. Let
us sketch out the dynamic of the continuation of early ‘modernity’ in this
second phase, starting from two points concerning that earlier time.
First, the key to the whole movement lies in its Renaissance beginning, in a disparity between aspiration as it was found in some persons
and what ongoing-tradition offered as reading of it, together with the discovery of determinate matters from ancient Greece and Rome that functioned in inspirational manner to help make aspiration in those persons
more definite by way of some possibilities of life-and-activity in the circumstances of the time alternative to those which ongoing-tradition authorized. At the heart of this confirming and particularizing inspiration
was a sense of an earthly human fulness as what aspiration was pointing
to; whatever the different particular alternatives were that were being
enacted, it was as expressing this-- an affirmation of earthly life and
human fulness-- that they were being acted on. But if humanity and what
sort of fulness is possible and appropriate to a human being were the
focus, these do not exhaust the pointing of aspiration. xlii Nonetheless,
attention was immersed in the human component, and in particular, was
referred back (as aspiration naturally refers one) to the individual human
being and to a self-responsibility that is presupposed so that whatever
was to be reached by human effort animated by aspiration, that effort
itself was indispensable to the attainment of the fulness in question and
that attainment was worth striving for. Such a sense of encompassing
directionality and solicitation to effort persisted as ‘modernity’ took
shape, while the concrete course was marked by different interpretations
of both what it was to be human and what constituted that fulness as
different aspects of the human became emphasized in different situations
and different ventures tried out.
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Second, this initial Renaissance releasing of aspiration from the
Christian perspective was not anti-Christian or irreligious, but it was not
long in the early becoming of ‘modernity’ before two challenges arose
which more directly addressed the Church as the dominant institution.
For one, a second stream, that of the Protestant Reformation, represented a conflict within Christian religion. The focus of this conflict was
the nature and operation of the institution itself, not the claim to
revelatory truth; indeed, the parties involved were able to take for
granted the Christian rendering of human aspiration, although their
acceptance of it as truth was questionable for the way both parties took
up with the myth or sacred story as if it were to be read literally and as if
its religious function was to provide a literal anchor point for belief and
commitment. The institutional challenge to the way the Church was
enacting the meaning of religion led to an institutional split within
Christian religion, and as part of the way that split affected political life
in those developing nation-states in which ‘modernity’ was moving
ahead, the long-standing question of the relation of church and state
became settled within ‘modernity’ by the gradual but effective shift in
the way the church (in Catholic or in Protestant form) was allowed to
function in the political side of the ‘modernity’ that was taking shape.
The institutional split opened the way for the strengthening monarchical
form of political power to subordinate the divided institution to its own
functioning, making the church secondary to the temporal or secular
power within the ‘modern’ political realm. With this came also the start
of something like religious tolerance or freedom.
For the second, a third spring and stream had early arisen in the shadow of the Renaissance, the one that formed the beginnings of ‘modern
science’. As this took shape, Christian religion (Catholic and Protestant
both) was challenged in another way, this time (although indirectly at
first) as regards the ‘truth’ claimed in the myth or sacred story. For when
read literally, the characterization of the physical world on significant
points seemed questionable to inquirers who, on the path of inquiry
which they took as expression of the self-responsibility of the human,
had compiled evidence and developed (seemingly) confirmable accounts
of facets of that world. This was the beginning of an enduring and
increasing tension between the Christian religion (Catholic and
Protestant both) and ‘modern science’ on the matter of truth. Thus the
latter, as it developed and widened what was taken as its proper field of
inquiry, became a subversive intellectual agent within ‘modernity’ to a
religion which refused to dig deeply enough into its own
questionableness and to understand more appropriately its revelatory
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claims to truth.
As the political and intellectual streams evolved in the second phase
of ‘modernity’, the eventual consequence of these two challenges was a
‘modernity’ which, because the institutional Christian religion (in both
Catholic and Protestant forms) resisted the self-critique and self-reform
that could have ‘modernized’ it and made clear its being as a spiritual
affair alone, eventually left the Christian church a non-‘modern’
institution impinging from the outside on the emerging political and
scientific (or intellectual) streams within the ‘modern’ movement.
As for the evolution of ‘modernity’ itself after the mid-17th century,
this was carried mainly by the three streams, the political, the economic,
and the intellectual (scientific and philosophic). The evolution shows a
progressive phase, then a time of troubles in which the darker side of
‘modernity’ emerges in a series of cataclysms.
(1) Progressive phase
Within the political, the centralization that had been involved in the
first phase development of the monarchical nation-state had not only required the development of skill at administering law and achieving order
but had involved, in most cases, concern for economic development,
with available wealth being an important part of the ‘power’ needed by
monarchs. At the same time, literacy and education, encouraged during
and by Protestants in particular and the humanism spreading from Italy,
were facilitated by the printing press. In the 18th century, this intellectual
interest gave rise to the Enlightenment (in England and France), with its
affirmation of ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ and its practical reformist bent. Thus
in this second phase of ‘modernity’ the emergence of intra-state classes
(an economic and intellectual middle-class, say), led (in England,
America, and France) to the revolutionary emergence of a more apt
(because wider) realization of self-responsibility in governance than the
monarchy, that is, led to liberal ‘democracy’ of some sort. This
revolutionary evolution toward democracy meant a recognition of the
human as, in the case of all adult human beings (though at first, only the
male and propertied), marked by the self-responsibility of each for
his/her own individual life and, as these lives involve those individuals
in the limited communities which the political-systems mark out, as
needing-- and capable of exercising-- a role in the decision-making of
community governance affairs as part of that self-responsibility.
Democracy is in this way an appropriate formal recognition of our shared
humanity in this social-community aspect of it, and a progressive step
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despite the defects which also mark its realization in these times.
Included in these defects: even with democracy, the subtending aggressiveness to inter-national political functioning, manifest in the first
phase in the assertiveness of the king as he became monarch in a nationstate, endured, and ‘power’ (thus dominance, but at least, balance) remained the characteristic feature of the interacting of the various
European political units.
The two-sided development of the political thus maintained its dual
roots in human nature: first, in the self-responsibility involved in aspiration, and second, in the trusting-but-wary outreach. But because the
latter usually continued to express the aggressive/self-protective mode
of address (of one state to another) in an immature form, it maintained
a tension at odds with responsibility in its fullest sense, out of which a
connecting with others that encourages and supports their responsible
participation is the atmosphere within which wariness is properly
operative and aggressiveness muted. It also formed the underlying
enabling-- but also hedging in-- foundation for the development of all
else (what the aspirational also was being realized in), so that the latter
became captive to this address in the political sphere and what it led to
in inter-national political relations. Even in the political itself, the
expansion of self-responsibility in this democratic direction tended to
stress an individualism and individual rights (as in the American
Declaration of Independence) without acknowledging duties, and
attested a responsibility the capacities for which were also arrested at the
development stage of an immature ‘ego’-self, making for a domestic
political functioning that embodied an ‘adolescent’ (self-interested, selfcentered) self-responsibility which took “liberty” to mean “freedom of
the individual to do what he/she wants”, restricting it only negatively (by
what does harm to others) and detaching it thus from responsibility in its
vocational fulness. The French revolution, in its affirmation of
“fraternity”, pointed crudely in a more apt direction, but fraternity was
slighted in favor of equality and liberty and the outcome of the revolution
itself suggests that fraternity was more slogan than real.
Because the revolutionary advance was not universal, the revolutions
meant a split in the European (including America) matrix for ‘modernity’,
into a vanguard in which ‘modernity’ was advancing (politically, into
democracy) and a hinterland in which the political communities were
digressing and even regressing, not advancing beyond the monarchical.
In this regard, the Germanic principalities at first occupied a mid-ground,
but after the third (the French) revolution, the internal reaching of
‘modern’ states for a liberal ‘democracy’, attested among the French but
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diverted by Napoleon, evoked a response among the Germanic peoples:
a desire to move toward unity (a nationalism), and at first, a reaching for
a more liberal political condition and then, this provoking a conservative
effort to restrain or even suppress the liberal, eventually a Germany
united under a conservative regime with the specious appearance of a
liberal state. Politically, then, the initial outworking of the development
in this second phase of ‘modernity’ (mid-17th into late-19th centuries) was
a Europe divided into three, the ‘modern’ vanguard (including America),
the reactionary, and the German amalgam. The internal impetus in each
division was different, and out of that difference, together with the shared
subtending aggressiveness, soon grew (in the 20th century) some
fundamental cataclysms.
Behind the three political revolutions the economic stream, complemented by developments in the intellectual (the Enlightenment, but also
modern science coming into its own), proved to be the most effective
moving forces (both in their own right, and in their political impact) for
progress in the evolution of ‘modernity’. As in the political, both
stressed the aspirational element of self-responsibility, although the currents involved were different in character and in the way selfresponsibility worked.
The economic presupposes, in human nature, a maturationally called
for self-responsibility which, in a needy being such as a human being is,
implicates the self-responsible agent in effort to meet those needs that
have their roots in the life being assumed. As a social arrangement, the
capitalist form of economy represents a larger and complementary
method of shared responsibility for individual needs-providing within a
limited social community; this responsibility, effected in a system of
coordinated and cooperative production and exchange of goods and
services in which group members participate, would be for providing for
the needs of all the social group’s members. Any such arrangement involves a variety of different roles for executing that shared responsibility,
and the character of that variety helps determine the nature of the economic system. We saw earlier that, in response to the profound change
in life-circumstance which the Black Death plague and various
pestilences introduced, the previously-established (i.e. medieval) system
of self-responsible provision for need had to be adapted to the new
circumstance. As this happened and enterprise gradually developed
successful ways of providing which could work on larger scales and in
regard to distant markets, a new system-- capitalism in its initial form-began to take shape, one internally differentiating between the enterprising, as self-appointed leaders, and the rest, as contributing followers,
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thereby giving the prominent place in itself to the enterprising among
individuals as, in virtue of their particular strengths, exercising a leadership role in the system, whereas others contributed their part in providing
for the needs of all by following the leaders and taking advantage of the
opportunities opened up by them.
Now in such a system, the leaders also had the opportunity to gain
greater benefit (in this case, accumulation of wealth) than the followers,
for profit, the vehicle for maintaining the system and improving, expanding, transforming, its productive work, was reaped by those leaders and
could be made also (by those whose self-responsibility was arrested in
an ‘ego’-enhancing mode) an instrumental vehicle for ‘ego’-aggrandizement. With this the rationale for economic activity led by the
enterprising could shift its emphasis, from need (meeting the needs of
self-and-others) to wealth (creating wealth for all, and greater wealth for
the enterprising leaders, securing for them an exchangable resource with
innumerable ‘ego’-enhancing uses, including social status and political
influence); and with this altered form, it was taken for granted that the
need-meeting would be a by-product of the seeking for wealth. Thus in
contrast with the individualism in a democracy, where it was the
individual as human being self-responsible for his/her own life who was
equal participant in the collective decision-making concerning the collective good that would condition the living-together of all and thus his
own life, in the individualism of the capitalistic system it was the individual as differentiated by particular capacities (enterprise,
organizational leadership, management competence) whose greater importance in the production-and-distribution system justified a greater
reward within it. Thereby the self-responsibility of all, simply as human
beings, became merely presupposed by the system and was
acknowledged within it only indirectly, in the degree to which it
manifests itself in certain ways, in terms of the differentiating
particularity whereby some are enabled to be the more competent, industrious, venturesome, skillful, in the competitive endeavor which is economic activity in a capitalistic system. The emphasis within the
economic in this form, then, is not on the common humanity but on this
differentiating particularity, and more specifically, as the system evolved,
the emphasis was on this individual self as ‘ego’-self whose coveting of
wealth was the centerpiece which made the system bring the ‘new and
better’ in the way of goods and services. Here there could be progress in
terms of “standard of living”, meaning goods and convenience rather
than quality of life: something quite different from progress in the
realization of humanity. The reshaping of the original system along such
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lines did not represent progress in the realization of humanity and a
fulness of human life, but the rather an expression of an arrested
(‘adolescent’) maturity, a corruption of the original system.
By the mid-17th century the new (capitalist) ways of providing for
need(s), together with religious shifts and the mercantile energies of London, had not only brought the political pressures which eventuated in
Britain in the Glorious Revolution but were on the way to increasing
resistance to the mercantilist restraints that had replaced the medieval
restraints on economic activity that had sought to shape it to serve human
need and reward human effort in an appropriate limited fashion. In
seeking freedom from mercantilist restraints, the entrepreneurial class
was venturing toward a form of capitalism which, by the mid-to-late 18th
century, began to be rationalized, first in France (the physiocrats), then
in Britain (Adam Smith), as a “free-market free-enterprise” form. In this
form, so it was claimed, capitalism would provide the ‘goods’ which
would meet all ‘needs’, indeed, all desires, provided of course that
human nature were allowed to operate freely (presumably, according to
[prudent] self-interest) throughout the production-and-exchange
network. For such a system would be self-correcting, working by the
law of supply and demand to answer to demand and provide what would
meet it. The view of human nature on which this view of the economic
rested was a foreground one that placed freedom (meaning absence of
external constraint on the ‘ego’) and self-interest (for the most part
meaning ‘ego’-interest) at the heart of the human; its proponents were
oblivious to the ‘adolescent’ nature of such a view, and more broadly, to
the significance of the maturational character of human nature. For ‘ego’
is not ‘self’ but the human self in a development phase which by nature
is to be outgrown; but if growth is arrested at this stage and ‘ego’ is not
outgrown, indeed is even confirmed in adult life by the nature of the
economic system, then that system accords a place to a power that is
subversive to its basic meaning. For ‘ego’ is insatiable and knows no
internal restraint; an economic system rationalized by reference to wealth
and authorizing its own operation by such a self thereby ‘justifies’ (say)
greed and with it a motivational power which eventually overwhelms
‘prudence’, especially given the competitive pressures of economic
activity in such a system. The result of the overreaching of ‘ego’ is the
subversion of the basic reason for an economic system, that its
arrangement enable all the members of the society to meet their needs in
orderly and cooperative fashion by self-responsible participation in it.
With the 19th century development of capitalism in the Industrial
Revolution, at least some of the inhumanity implicated in the free-market
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free-enterprise view became visible, sufficiently to generate a protesting
labor movement, then some assertion through government of an
externally-imposed substitute for the fulness of responsibility missing
from the economic system itself (regulation, labor laws, a social safetynet, and the like), and soon a socialist-then-communist alternative
economic system that promised to vanquish the dehumanizing elements.
In particular the latter focused not on the reduction (within the system)
of individual human beings to role-players playing roles of different sorts
with different qualifications required, but on the different rewards able
to be secured for different role-players when the productivity that
provided the reward-basis was the work of all and especially of the
‘worker’. It was the altered operation and rationale for the capitalist
system, in which wealth became the aim of economic activity and the
system was formed and rationalized in a catering to the ‘ego’-self, that
seemed particularly offensive to communist thought, being exploitative
of the genuine wealth-creators (the workers). Clearly the sort of
unrestrained capitalistic system that had emerged, both in its domestic
working and as integral to the revival of imperialism, was defective in
important ways, both in its effectiveness in enabling the needs of all to
be met (part of the basic function of an economic system) and in its
impact on human beings in their very humanity. But the socialist/communist alternative was as yet untried and its presumed remedy
unproven. The momentum of the development of economic effort since
the mid-17th century thus entered ‘modernity’ into the 20th century in a
two-pronged fashion (capitalism and socialism-and-communism), with
a question of which economic path-- or perhaps some third economic
path-- the ‘modern’ would take in that century.
Within the intellectual stream (scientific and philosophic), the search
for knowledge in the vein of ‘modern science’ developed rapidly. As with
the political and the economic, the intellectual presupposed the maturationally called for self-responsibility, but here, with a focus on the responsible employment of shared human cognitive capacities, reason and
the powers of sense, and in science, a concern to use these in inquiry
addressed to the public face of things in a truth-seeking vein. Because
of the shared nature of the capacities and the openness of all to the overall
field to be inquired into, explored, and known, ‘modern science’ came
into its own as a (potentially) universal power, its collaborative potential
making for a community of inquirers whose individual work could complement and supplement as well as stimulate that of others. In the 19th
century, the evolution of this enterprise of knowledge showed three
further significant but different sides.

427

Chapter 5. What ‘today’ are we now in the midst of?

One side was its augmentation to fulfill the role which Descartes
envisioned for it, as power enabling humanity to become “master and
possessor of nature”. Given its nature and field, advances in such
knowledge could be drawn on in economic activity, especially as
enabling technological innovation; indeed, not simply the application of
scientific knowledge, but the development of inquiry with practical
application in mind first and foremost, enabled ‘modern science’ to begin
contributing importantly to the productivity of the economy. With this,
“nature” was being exploited to serve man.
A second side of the 19th century phase of its evolution is visible in
its turn to explore life as part of its field, and with Darwin in particular,
to explore the human species as arising in an evolution of life forms on
earth. The evolutionary view of humanity, claiming the lack of any fundamental distinction of man from animal, provided an alternative vision
of the human to the Enlightenment focus on reason, but one which also
enabled the non-rational to be stressed in the human makeup. While such
a vision of the human as a ‘species of animal’ gave another twist to the
emerging ‘modern’ view of the human and of a fulness to human life,
there is an irony in it. For although the undertaking which gave rise to it
was another expression of self-responsibility, this time in a different
particular and ‘modern’ direction, that of disciplined truth-seeking in
science, the account arrived at basically deepened our ignorance of
ourselves; for in focusing on the organic side of our being, it distracted
attention from the undertaking itself and (to the extent that it was taken
seriously) undermined self-responsibility: we are all merely animals
driven by our ‘natural’-urges-and-drives, not thereby ‘responsible’ at all.
In this measure, it also unwittingly undercut democracy and offered a
way of reinterpreting the leadership role of a few in the capitalist wealthcreating economic system, one which saw the ‘competitive’ nature of the
system as an expression of the evolutionary struggle for survival, with
the more capable within the species having an advantage in the
competitive struggle. The irony, however, reached an extreme in this
way, that such a view of the human undercut scientific inquiry itself as
human undertaking, since such a view is-- and can only be-- the work of
self-responsible inquiry and thought; it unwittingly denied, in its content,
the distinctive human thing that it was doing in generating such content,
namely, inquiring and thinking; for these have an inherent reference to
truth and norms, to obligation, and their accounts have a claim to truth
only as generated under such a reference. But this has to place in the
animal world, not even in the super-animal which is evolutionary man.
Not only that, but this view of the human, so seemingly at odds with the
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Christian view, brought an intensification of the conflict of the two
powers on the matter of truth. The opportunity for both sides to develop
a self-critical perspective on themselves was squandered in the passion
of the conflict, centered now on the human and not (as in the Renaissance)
on the heavens.
Finally, a third side of the 19th century phase of its evolution lay in
its separation of itself from philosophy and, taking itself as a discipline
which could advance knowledge while philosophy, lacking the appropriate method, could not, promoted its (unself-critical) selfconception as a progressive part of ‘modernity’. Philosophy, in contrast,
seemed to the scientist-- and increasingly to many who were pursuing
what they thought of as philosophy-- unable to issue in any verifiable or
useful knowledge and make any progress. From the scientific
perspective, it became dismissed as mere armchair speculation, a historical relic. Yet this was from the outside; seen from the inside, philosophy continued and sought, in ways that incorporated the advance of
knowledge, to place what was becoming known in the inclusive perspective of being. It sought, in virtue of its own nature, the self-critique
that science lacked, and sought the unity of the-all as it included
humanity and human agency. Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel,
developed their understanding of being, doing so from the standpoint of
self-aware re-flective agents participant in an interactive existence; and
yet Hegel seemed to bring this to a close, not only making history a significant movement that culminated in his own day but bringing the-all into
intelligibility in a way that claimed to reach beyond ‘modern science’
and (turning the table on science and the claims made on its behalf) in
doing so to be more “scientific” than even science for its being a comprehensive self-critical knowledge. In that way, Hegel seemed both to
culminate and terminate philosophizing in any form that was
recognizable as kindred with the tradition of philosophizing from the
Greeks on. And yet, in the last half of the 19th century, something new
and provocative--and extensively misunderstood-- appeared, in
Nietzsche, and with him, the first philosophically significant insight into
‘modernity’ as entered into a time of crisis, one that no one but he had as
yet seen and sought to understand. xliii
In the advance of ‘modernity’ up to the end of the 19th century in
these three streams, there is progress of the sort that I mentioned above
(417), but at the same time misreading and immature decision-making.
Specifically, there is human progress in the political realm, but an
incompleteness that will bear disastrous fruit in the 20th century. The
economic and ‘scientific’ are much more ambivalent. In each there is
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indeed ‘progress’, but of another sort (wealth-production and knowledge)
which, when put together with the incomplete side of the political (the
persistent subtending aggressiveness), will bring out the darker side of
‘modernity’ in the century to come. At the turn into the 20th century, the
human is very much a mixture in the ‘modern’ mind, and similarly for
the fulness of human life on earth.
(2) Time of troubles, and gathering clouds
If the 19th century ended with Nietzsche’s philosophically
provocative claim, together with the controversial scientific exploration
of life (including human life) in an evolutionary vein, with the tensions
of a threefold political division of European and American powers and
the revival and expansion of their imperialistic outreach to the rest of the
world, and with the twofold economic division of capitalistic and
socialist/communist systems with competing paths for economic
development, the 20th century that followed fulfilled the ‘promise’ of
conflict immanent in that ending and proved to be a time in the
development of ‘modernity’ that openly disclosed its darker side and
provoked again the questions that marked the very beginning of
‘modernity’ in the Renaissance: What is it to be a human being? What
is the fulness of life appropriate to a human being?
On the political level, the amalgam which Germany was had incorporated the industrialism of ‘modern’ capitalism but not the democracy,
and its aggressiveness led to two World Wars in the 20th century,
shattering the European ‘balance of power’ arrangement and generating
a mode of warfare which, enhanced in its destructiveness both by
industry-enabled advances in armaments and by a policy of ‘total war’,
called into fundamental question the course of the European nation-state
development of ‘modernity’. How could there be any assurance of peace
if nation-states, continuing to know politically both an absolute
sovereignty and a subtending aggressive address to each other, could
develop new and increasingly destructive forms of weaponry and
warfare? Stalemate there might be for a while, but not peace, and not for
long even stalemate. Finally the aftermath of the second War brought an
effort to form a different sort of political order-- a European Union--, an
effort still underway. And on the larger global political stage, the
aftermath of each War brought some effort to establish a securitypromoting political order including ‘modern’ Europe (and America) and
the multitude of non-‘modern’ nations with which the ‘modern’ ones are
confronted. Both the European and the globe-inclusive international
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efforts clearly reflect recognition that something is amiss, perhaps within
‘modernity’ but at least in a world which politically is a mixture of
‘modernity’ and non-‘modernity’. But whether either the United Nations
or a European Union is shaped out of sufficient thinking through of political institutions to reach the roots of the matter and to discern, let alone
foster, a sufficiently basic change in the political order to amend what is
amiss and avert further and even worse cataclysms, is still an open
question.
On the economic level, the 20th century has seen the revolutionary
takeover and the subsequent communist experiment in Russia, which experiment was attempted within an authoritarian political framework,
only to collapse eventually at the end of a ‘cold war’; and if the Chinese
experiment eventually avoided that by deliberately replacing their
version of communism with a form of capitalism while retaining their
authoritarian political system, this together with the Russian experience
suggests the inadequacy, indeed unsuitability to human nature, of this
supposedly superior version of a ‘modern’ economic system. But the
American experiment, not a pure free-market free-enterprise system but
as close to one as is to be found, has collapsed twice now in my lifetime
and brought reluctant steps to rein in the ‘free’ in the name of the human.
These failures suggest that neither alternative economic path has brought
‘modernity’ to an adequate realization of an economic system that could
be consonant with the fulness of human life on earth. Again, attempts
have been made to establish international economic institutions to
oversee facets of economic activity in an increasingly global (and
basically free-market) economic network. But even if there are problems
that may be addressed in this way, it is questionable whether any understanding of the economic has grasped the fundamental flaws of these alternative systems, let alone the flaw that they share, namely, that they
embody and promote ways of providing for human need which disrespect the earth and non-human living beings.
On the intellectual level, the 20th century has seen extraordinary advances in ‘modern science’ in a variety of directions. But this considerable and expanding strength of ‘modernity’ has been pursued with
scarcely any thought-- by scientists, or by the society in which science is
pursued and its knowledge utilized-- about the inherent ambivalence of
“knowledge”. For if knowledge is, in and of itself, a good in the
achieving, that goodness does not carry over into its use, its application.
Thus, for one thing, in the 20th century it became enlisted in economic
and military ventures that have had as their issue enormous destruction
made possible by knowledge. Thus the two World Wars, and especially
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the second, with the atomic bomb; and despite the interlude of MAD and
the lessons to be learned from it, the pursuit of new nuclear weapons and
proliferation of the old continues, as well as the production of other sorts
of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological), all under the
pretext of self-protection and at the expense of genuine security but all
enabled by our increasing knowledge. Then again, the application of
knowledge in the economic sphere has brought a proliferation of ‘things’
and helped reinforce an outward focus of life on possessions
(“materialism”); but more importantly, it has led to innumerable and
mounting health and environmental problems, many only being
discovered long after they had begun making their injurious impacts:
pollution in innumerable forms, for example. Usually such problems
have arisen because of hasty application of ‘knowledge’, before we have
really understood the potential consequences of the application: indeed,
before we have really understood what we think we understand. But no
remedy for that has yet been found, and we continue our knowledgeventure and continue unwisely pressing ‘knowledge’ into immediate
practical use before we really know what we are doing.
Speaking of “wisdom”: In regard to all of these matters-- political,
economic, intellectual--, where have our 20th century “lovers of wisdom”
(philosophers) been? If we needed the fullest understanding of what was
happening, would it not be them to whom we should look for the needed
wise insights and perspective? Only one name emerges of someone even
seeking perspective with sufficient depth and self-awareness, namely,
Heidegger; the title of his major work, Being and Time, is right to the
point, but his working out of the issue, in it and in his other writings,
leaves much to be desired, and in any case has had little impact on common affairs. Or is the “wisdom” of the philosopher not the right sort of
wisdom, not a sufficiently “practical wisdom”, to be relevant? Who
could provide such wisdom, that we might do better at understanding
ourselves and averting the increasingly massive cataclysms we seem to
be bringing on ourselves?
But it is not simply that the 20th century development of ‘modernity’
has subjected the world to a series of troubling cataclysms; it is also that
case that it has set in motion the making of further cataclysms whose
most destructive phase looms ahead of us. (I leave aside the current
financial crisis, begun in the United States but spread now throughout
the world.) Three of these gathering clouds are of special concern.
In the one (that being induced by radical Islamic groups originating
in the Middle East), we find the latest form of long-standing clashes
between Muslims and Christians (recall the Crusades), going back
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centuries before the beginning of ‘modernity’. September 11, 2001,
would have been my father’s hundredth birthday, had he been alive, but
the day lives on in public memory because of a sneak attack by radical
Islamic terrorists on targets in the United States. It was a bit less than a
century ago, with the demise of the Ottoman empire after World War I,
that there emerged the setting within which-- and the first phase in the
activity with which-- a revival of a pre-modern series of clashes took
place and began the cataclysm-in-the-making symbolized by 9/11. This
latest form is marked by a non-state source of aggression (a radical
Islamic group, al Quaeda) being given sanctuary in various national
settings for its terrorist activity, and by its utilization of the most recent
Western scientific-and-technological developments (such as computers
and the internet) to help make good on the threat of an attack using (say)
a nuclear weapon. If the original clashes centuries ago were religious in
nature, this is more a religious-extremist clash with a ‘modernity’ that
since the 18th century has asserted itself primarily in imperialistic vein in
the larger Middle East area, and especially so from the first World War
on. The historical roots are manifold, but two are especially significant:
one goes back to the 19th century Zionist idea of a return of Jews to their
‘homeland’ (thus the Israeli-Palestinian side of the background); the
other concerns petroleum in the Persian Gulf area (thus the Iran, Iraq,
Saudi Arabian, side of the background, itself several sided). Complex as
this set of situations and events has been and continues to be, the arc of
dominantly Muslim lands from Egypt to Pakistan has been the matrix for
the rise and development of a radical or extremist Islamic movement and
its aggressive reaction to ‘Western imperialism’, one stressing the
militaristic side of early Islam and pursuing an unrelentingly hostile
striving for world domination on its part, taking as added motivation the
various more recent grievances, humiliations, and conflicts, which arose
under the presence and pressure of the ‘modernity’ which European nations and the United States embody and whose imperial outreach
throughout the globe reflects its own working to bring humanity into an
inclusive integration which would be dominated by ‘modern’ ideas and
institutions. What makes this terrorist attempt a cataclysm in the making
is the combination of fanaticism, threat to Western access to much of the
world’s oil supply, and the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.
The second cataclysm in the making has two roots. ‘Modern science’
took shape as an inquiry into nature that regarded it basically as mathematically-determinate mechanically-structured matter. This early ‘modern’ perspective received philosophical affirmation and development in
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Descartes’s vision of man as ‘master and possessor of nature’, with ‘nature’ here being the abstract and reductionist version of the world and
ourselves which, except in reference to the odd case of humanity, could
be credited with no inwardness but was mere material machine that
humanity could treat simply as resource which it could put to human
ends without compunction or any respect for it in its own right and being.
As the ‘modern’ economy developed and came to feature a free-market
exploitation of nature, and especially as in the Industrial Revolution it
became an organized and large-scale exploitation of ‘natural resources’
in an anthropocentric vein, the distortions involved in this effort as they
regarded the human beings involved-- workers, say, and communities-were subject of some attention and attempted correction. And there even
arose the notion of a socialist economic system that promised
comprehensive relief from such distortions. But what was left unsaid
and unnoted was the matter on which both capitalist and socialist agreed,
that ‘nature’ had no standing in its own right but was worthy of regard
only as able to be made use of to the benefit of human life. A way of life,
and within it, an economic system, was evolving which focused on
developing systems which made energy-- and in particular, the
petroleum source of energy-- a central feature, and which involved an
applied scientific effort that especially made use of the work of chemistry
to develop and produce synthetic materials an integral part of the
manufacturing process. With the extension of this practical aim in
various forms through much of the productive system, not only did
chemical compounds and synthetic stuffs become common but the
productive processes involved generated much in the way of hazardous
waste which was disposed of in the air and water and in-and-on the land,
with very little understanding of-- or concern for-- the potential consequences, except where discernible health impacts on certain human
populations became so noticeable as to rally efforts to find safer
production and disposal methods and require their use. Unfortunately, a
focus on the short-term and a disregard for the long-term, a haste to act
on ‘knowledge’ before we fully understand what we claim to know, and
a penchant for denial and shrugging off responsibility as long as possible
(especially if accepting responsibility would cut down on profits! better
to shift the burden to others if possible!) and for dismissing discernible
negative consequences until they had reached major proportions, have
magnified the cataclysm in the making. In the name of “progress”, the
desire for ‘improved’ life-conditions has brought a rising standard of
living (in contrast with quality of life: the two are quite different!), but
along with that and some measure of change for the ‘better’ has also
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come pollution and poisoning of the air, water, and land, to say nothing
of foodstuffs and homes, not intentionally but as the ‘price of progress’;
and this has occurred on a scale that increasingly threatens human life
and indeed life itself on this earth that we share as habitat with other life
forms. The multiplication of unforeseen injurious consequences and of
accumulating long-run impacts has become so noticeable as now-- from
the middle of the 20th century on-- increasingly both to call into question
our haste, heedlessness, and short-sightedness, and to summon with
some urgency our efforts to remedy the damage and modify our activities
to avoid further damage. The greatest such unknowingly produced
change, acknowledged now as an affair to which human activity has been
a significant contributor, is global climate change (warming), a
consequence mostly of the character of our fossil-fuel energy economy.
Given the scale and power of the change we have helped set in motion,
the potential in this case is for major disruption of climate, and that
means, of life-conditions not simply for human beings (sufficient water
for food supplies, say) but for an interconnected biosphere that supports
many species. But can we mobilize at least to mitigate the looming
disaster?
A third cataclysm in the making stems from another side to the development of ‘modern science’, spoken of also by Descartes in the limited
form of the improvements in health we might expect from scientific
knowledge. As in the 19th century we began scientifically to address “life”
as an organic and evolutionary phenomenon and to approach the functioning of our bodies in their organic side with the idea of understanding
not simply their current functioning but that functioning when seen in an
evolutionary reference, we have proceeded, both in our effort to know
and especially in our applications of our ‘knowledge’, in a relatively
narrow-minded and incautious manner. Not only have we ignored, or
thought through quite insufficiently, the fundamental differentiation of
inward from outward (we are a differentiated unity of the two), and have
tended to identify life with the organic (the outward); we have also
ignored the ambivalence of all scientific knowledge: that it can be put to
good and bad uses both, and that we need to guard against the latter as
part of the integration of science and its applications into our way of life,
all the more so as our knowledge reaches farther into its subject-field.
The latter part of the 20th century has brought striking advances in our
‘knowledge’ of the matter we are studying (the organic), reaching into
the structures and functions which mark the outward side of the living
body and the inheritance with which such bodies are endowed because
they have beginnings as well as ends and because as element in their
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beginning there are features which reflect inheritance from the previous
living beings from which present living beings derive. Simply as
bringing an enhanced cognizance (but under interpretative coloring) of
this existence in which we find ourselves, such advance is exciting,
expanding our capacity to participate wittingly in the affairs of existence.
But the more we come to think we know life in this knowledge and the
more we are tempted to take our knowing as absolute (ironically,
exhibiting the noetic counterpart of religious belief, the unself-critical
holding-for-true from which science has sought to free itself), the more
we have become tempted to venture in the direction of engineering the
forms and materials of organic life. Initially that has taken place under
the dual cover of modifying natural forms of food-stuff to better serve
the food-needs of the human race, and of providing cures or treatments
in medicine. Neither is inherently objectionable or threatening. But in
cloning endeavors and in genetic engineering, we are verging on
practical efforts of applying our ‘knowledge’ to modify the organic side
of human and non-human life, to design (indeed, re-design) these to take
‘desirable’ shapes, and to loose the artificially-produced into the natural
world, thereby interfering with and modifying the natural character of
the genetic connections of living beings and the functioning of the
biosphere as a natural system, with perhaps lasting-- and who knows
what type of eventual-- consequences. But in this, we are tampering
with nature on a large scale and without the possibility of undoing should
our experiment turn threatening, even disastrous.
One final note about where we are, here in the midst of cataclysms
past and in-the-making: Entering into both the second and third
cataclysms in the making is another facet of our ‘today’ which has been
enabled by-- and is in turn provoking the efforts involved in-‘modernity’. One of the important starting-points for ‘modernity’ was
the population-decimation in Europe by the Black Death. The capitalist
form of economy was born out of enterprising responses to the changed
conditions, and since that time, the evolution of ‘modernity’ has provided
sufficiently supportive life-conditions that, despite the wars and famines
and a variety of counter-forces, the population in Europe and beyond has
shown a dramatic rise. On the backdrop of an estimate of five to ten
million at the time when the sedentary agricultural revolution began
(10,000 years ago), and of three hundred million at the beginning of the
Christian era (2,000 years ago), the current estimated population of six
billion plus is astonishing; perhaps even more astonishing is the increase
during my lifetime, from the estimated two billion in 1930 to the current
figure. But numbers are mere abstractions; life is lived in the con-crete,
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amidst particular environmental and life-conditions and in the con-crete
life-ways of the persons being counted at different times in human
history. What is central is the fit of the human beings in each case with
the earth as habitat and the way in which they are able, under their
determinate conditions, to organize themselves and, at the subsistence
level of a human being, to provide for themselves by availing themselves
of what their particular earthly niche offers for their support. Even so,
more than sheer subsistence is involved in any human way of life, and
when it comes to what is of fundamental importance humanly-- namely,
quality of life, and with it, responsible engagement with circumstance
under aspiration for the higher-and-better--, numbers have a subordinate
place. And yet a place, because that engagement is with the multiplicity
of beings that compose circumstance, and the increase in numbers of
human beings that form part of the immediate circumstance of any
person’s life redefines the character and range of possibilities that are
open to that person. In our almost wholly unrestrained reproductive
capacity we are multiplying in ways that, aided by various forms of
knowledge (medical and other) and our capacity to keep ourselves living
longer, are bringing upon us a population which is going (say) to outstrip
our capacities to produce food. Even supposing our knowledge and
economic system enable us to expand our ability to exploit nature, not
only is an endless expansion and exploitation of this finite earth
impossible, but under the anticipatable changes which global warming is
likely to bring on, widespread starvation is a real possibility.

B. The ‘crisis’ of our ‘today’
Our ‘today’ holds an increasing interconnecting of human beings
throughout the globe, a con-crete integration and consequent interdependence which, on the fundamental level, has its leading impetus in the
development and expansion from its original European base of the
historical movement we have been calling ‘modernity’. Not only has
that movement brought an increasing clash of ‘modern’ with non‘modern’, but the ‘modern’ has harbored a becoming of itself which in
its recent form has been bringing to widening circles of humans on earth
troubles generated out of its own ventures over the last century and is
bringing such gathering clouds at the beginning of the present century as
we have just brought to mind. While there are many different forms of
trouble arising from the different sides and facets of this becoming and
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this confluence of ‘modern’ and non-‘modern’, there is connection and
kinship of them such that, if we let them sink in and become felt by us,
we find them working together and, in their coherence and intelligibility,
raising in us a fundamental question harbored for us in the problematic
of existence, namely, the question of what it means to be a human being.
I say “for us” and mean in particular us “modern men”, because this is
the aspect of the problematic that the present situation most readily
brings to our attention. For back in the Renaissance time of the
beginning of ‘modernity’, it was the human component of the uncaptured
aspirational reaching that was emphasized, and it was the various
ventures under the inspiration of the ancient Greeks and Romans that
provided the initial tentative con-crete answers to the question which set
this novel movement of ‘modernity’ underway. Ever since, that movement has continued to develop its new vision of the human with the help
of an extending, modifying, amplifying, and improving, its answers to
that question. Now, in the process of uniting mankind on a global scale
and finding ourselves in a time of troubles, some of which seem to
threaten the continued existence of humanity on earth, we have reached
a decisive crossroads at which we are being forced by the gravity and
variety of threats to expressly rediscover the question in its universal
reference; and faced with it, we need to achieve a more profound answering and to find a self-aware, perceptive, and effective, practical way to
move forward in our current situation as human beings joining with other
human beings out of this deeper answering that adequately-- or at least
more adequately-- realizes in con-crete fashion the meant-to-be’s of our
human nature, with such realizing taking place in efforts to help secure
the meant-to-be of creation.
The crisis of our ‘today’, then, is a “crisis” in a dual sense: the term
(in Greek, krisis) carries its etymologically grounded meaning of “decision”, xliv but also the sense of a decision-making made in face of “a
pressing threat to a meaningful existence of the human race on earth”,
the threat in this case arising from the current way in which we are concretely coming together to achieve a globally-integrated humanity. The
crisis of our ‘today’ is then a crisis for a decision-making in which we
are dealing with (among other things) the troubles our of times, but a
crisis of “identity” in the sense that what is fundamentally being brought
into question in our decision-making at this crucial time of humanity on
earth is ourselves, who and what we are as human beings and what this
implicates us in in the way of something at-stake in our activity and, with
that, in our way of dealing with the affairs of existence, including
especially our troubles, as we act under the claiming of that at-stake and
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in the course of that relate to each other as human beings. Given the
reach of the con-crete context of our existence in our present historical
situation, this question of what it is to be a human being, while a
perennial question which personally we are each answering somehow in
our involvement in existence, currently bears expressly on each of us in
a way that has never before been the case. For always before, through
our organization in societies, our institutions and the way we operate
them, it has concerned our decision-making as we have been (in our
diverse societies) making efforts to secure a meaningful life and to do so
with-and-for members of our society; but in the present context these
ways (especially those of ‘modern’ human beings) reach far beyond our
own society and are threatening any viable existence at all for the human
race in future, even more broadly for most species of life. And we-especially we members of ‘modern’ societies-- can not responsibly carry
out our decision-making as individual human beings and participate in
the institutions of our society any longer without expressly bringing to
mind how, in the decision-making involved in our individual participation in existence, we are responding to the implication of the humanity
we are enacting in ourselves for our relating to the other human beings
with whom we are interacting, whether individually or through our social
institutions. And those others are now not simply our immediate neighbors, but all of our contemporaries, within and beyond our own society.
Recalled back into ourselves in our common humanity beyond the
social (including the social reading of that commonality: we are all
‘rational beings’ or ‘intelligent animals’ or ‘images of our creator’ or ...),
what do we find ourselves called to undertake, simply humanly, as we
take part in existence individually or personally and as member of a
society? We will address that in Chapter 6 when we take up with
‘tomorrow’. As preparation for that, let us complete our consideration
of ‘modernity’ by re-flecting on two things: first, the directional pointing
of the meant-to-be’s and their standards and measures, ever present
fundaments that have been interpreted in determinate ways in
‘modernity’, and second, the questionable sides of such interpretative
guides and of our use of them in the present form of ‘modernity’, as this
makes intelligible both where we are in this time of troubles and what
we need to undo if are to continue ‘modernity’ in a way that would better
measure up to what is called for creationally by those meant-to-be’s.
On the first matter, we can be quite brief, since we have covered the
basics of what needs to be attended to already and need only briefly recall
them here. The fundamental directional factor is the at-stake in being,
namely, the ongoing con-crete consummation of being which is at stake
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in the interactivity of the beings of an interactive existence and for whose
securing the interacting agents are the vehicle. So far as those agents are
human, the realization of such consummation in its fullest form includes
agents acting out of the vocational responsibility that is the grown-into
culmination of their decision-making capacity. That is, it is human
beings who have realized the maturational and communal meant-to-be’s
of human nature and who, knowing such culminated decision-making
capacity in their own person, are participant agents in that fullest consummation of being that is at-stake in being as a creational affair. Now
included in the communal meant-to-be is its proximal realization in the
social meanings which facilitate the interacting of human beings with
each other. In that socially-inflected human-interacting, a considerable
variety of possible institutions is possible as mediating powers, but when
the social group formed by shared social meanings reaches a certain level
of complexity two such institutional structures become developed and
function in-and-for the adult members of the group, namely, that of
governance or the institution for the group’s decision-making as it is
concerned with the common good of that group, and that of needsmeeting or the economic arrangement (the coordinated and cooperative
production and exchange of goods and services) whose basic functional
significance is to enable the members of a group to participate in orderly
fashion in providing for and meeting their needs-thence-desires (the
needs in question being facets of the inward and outward neediness of
the human being in living active beings). xlv Both institutional structures
are meant to give to all the adults of the group a place in the social institution that extends into the social realm the (in the one case)
maturationally-formed decision-making capacity in which each assumes
responsibility for his/her own life (including that life in this society) and
extends (in the other case) the functioning in which each seeks to provide
(directly and indirectly) for the natural needs that have their place in that
life. Such institutional structures are not themselves human beings, of
course, but facilitating factors for human beings in society and such as
carry particular interpretative renderings of the human. But because
social meanings set off one group of human beings from others who do
not share those meanings as their life-and-interaction-conditions,
governance and economic institutions, marked by (differing) readings of
the human from group to group, have an internal-to-the-group function
but operate as well in the relations of a group with other human beings
and groups whose social readings of the human are more or less different.
The standards and measures for the structures in question relate to the
aptness of their facilitative capacity for vocationally-responsible human
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beings who are members of the group, where the distinctive facilitating
in the governance institution is shared decision-making concerning the
common good and in the economic institution is shared providing for the
life-needs of the group members. Now not only is the structure itself
different from its working as the group members participate in it and
make it actual, but since those members are maturing (and quite rarely,
fully mature) human beings whose assimilation of the social meanings
involves their own interpretation of their meaning, the members who
make actual the structures are also almost always persons who do not yet
have the adequate fulness of responsibility which the structure is fitted
to be operated with. Thus since such institutions will be operated by
adults but not necessarily those who embody the fulness of human responsibility, as secondary standard for the structure itself is the presence
of such elements in it as also work to restrain and assist the outgrowing
of the basic natural factor which marks immaturity, namely, ‘ego’, as this
factor operates in the participants who do not know in their own person
the fulness of responsibility as a vocational affair. Because individual
human beings know not only the native-to-human-nature meant-to-be’s
which mean (over time) a maturing into vocational responsibility and a
mutual connecting of human beings in the fulness of a responsibility that
is more than social but also the social-meanings inflecting their being
and marking the institutions in which they participate, there is then a dual
set of measures and standards in regard to institutions: one relating to the
structure itself and its aptness for facilitating something as it operates in
actual human beings, and the other relating to the actual human beings,
to their actual enacting of human being in their participation in such institutions, and thus to their making the institutions work as they actually do
in the con-crete. One may have the best institutions possible, but they
may be operated by the immature and for that reason fail of the
facilitation that they are fitted for; and one may also have less than the
best institutions, which in the operation of some persons can become
transformed and function as vehicles (despite their relative deficiency in
structure) of a participation which embodies the highest responsibility.
In the light of the measures harbored in the creational and human
nature meant-to-be’s, ‘modernity’ represents a novel reaching to find and
establish-- both institutionally and in the con-crete living of the
individuals involved-- a way of life whose con-crete form is adequately
commensurate with those measures. Of course, every way of life is
centered in aspiration and a reading of the at-stake in life-and-activity;
the differences lie in the way those meant-to-be’s (including thus
aspiration and the at-stake) are interpreted and the way, guided by such
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interpretation, they are con-cretely realized in particular circumstances
by particular persons.
The Renaissance-initiated movement of
‘modernity’ opened with a way which emphasized the human (thus
human initiative and self-responsibility) and the fulness of earthly life,
and in the particular circumstances, took shape under the inspiration of
the ancient Greeks and Romans. xlvi As this venture unfolded with the
confluence of the various streams and evolved in virtue of the contributions of the varied peoples, circumstances, and events, that carried
forward the increasingly complex affair, this venture maintained that
initial focus on humanity and the fulness of earthly life. It is still alive
in the current form of ‘modernity’. But along the way that focus became
turned into something ambivalent and in important regards defective by
virtue of the interpretations developed and the interpretation-guided
actions taken. The human became truncated in ‘modernity’, not envisioned and realized in its fulness, and an anthropocentric humanism inadequately realizing the meant-to-be’s came to mark the ‘modern’ way
of life, and marks still in its present form.
The truncation and inadequate realization show themselves
especially in three ways.
The first arises out of the inability, the refusal, of the Christian religion, Catholic and Protestant alike, to make the self-critical selfappraisal which is called for if the religious is to measure up to its
ultimate meaning. For the universe exhibits a creational structure, and
the disclosure of this, the opening into awareness of the mysterious,
provides the immediacy which revelation-- and that includes the sacred
story or myth which brings that revelation into speech-- discloses. But
that speech, basically fitted for ceremonial realization and for
communication in virtue of the participation in ceremony, is symbolic in
character. And the religiosity that takes adequate shape out of ceremony
holds fast not to dogma but to the presence discovered with the help of
the symbol in the ceremonial occasion. And yet, often-- and particularly
in the religions of ‘the book’-- the language of myth has become recorded
apart from ceremony, and read and interpreted in that ‘apartness’, usually
in such way as treats it literally. The Christian church, the self-professed
institutional keeper of the Christian ‘story’, has in both Catholic and Protestant forms proceeded in this vein for the most part. And as the institution whose responsibility is to maintain ‘the truth’-- and there is only
one truth, in this tradition-- as something to inform the living of the ‘believer’, the church has remained an active force in the world in which
‘modernity’ was taking shape, but as a non-‘modern’ (even anti‘modern’) force. Even so, it has contributed indirectly to the evolution
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of ‘modernity’ by (say) serving as focus for criticism (in the Enlightenment, for example) and by aiding thereby the exercise and
strengthening of that critical thinking in which ‘modernity’ was evolving
in its search for the reasonable. At the same time, the Christian religion
in its non-‘modern’ form for a long while functioned as an element in the
social fabric which helped, by the social norms which it upheld (in word,
and occasionally in practice), the state maintain public order, only gradually losing force in this regard as society became more thoroughly ‘modernized’ and the old norms questioned and altered in a changing society.
Finally, even as the institution (church) became subordinated, with the
Reformation’s unwitting assistance, to the governing powers (state) in a
way that eventually enabled the dominance of the governance power in
temporal affairs, and as something in the way of religious tolerance and
religious freedom was made possible, it missed the opportunity with
these developments for acknowledging religious differences in a way
that might foster the deeper self-criticism that would open the way to its
own ‘modernization’ and a coming into its own as a genuinely spiritual
institution. In its resistance to ‘modernization’ in general and to its own
‘modernization’ in particular, the church thus despite itself helped the
progressive evolution of ‘modernity’ in a variety of ways, while at the
same time, by maintaining the religion in a non-‘modern’ form and
allowing that form (for most persons) to seem the only proper one, it
obstructed the evolution of the ‘modern’ in the religious dimension, its
filling out in the direction of depth and the register of the deeps of being.
“Modernity” thus still knows only an a-religious humanity as part of
itself, and what is more, acknowledges no genuine truth in, or meaning
to, religion or the religious.
The second arises out of the inability of ‘modern science’, once
underway and being successfully pursued, to become self-aware to its
own limitation and to be self-critical concerning the status of the truths
it was discerning. The initial field in which such inquiry developed-- the
physical face of (inanimate) nature-- and the initial attempt to
differentiate the ‘objective and real’ from the ‘subjective’ reflected a way
of taking up with certain facets of the face of things as if those facets
represented reality in its inherent nature and not simply aspects of an
interactive actuality. In virtue of this mistaking, nature or natured beings
became reduced to ‘nature’ as ‘matter in motion’ and the pretension of
humanity to become ‘master and possessor of nature’ became abetted by
this reduction, not simply by reason of the knowledge gained by science
of the face of things but also because other beings became treated as if
they were without inwardness. Thus they could in good conscience be
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treated as merely ‘resource’ to be used for human purposes, as the
capitalist (and socialist/communist) economies have done. When the
evolution of science brought the living into the forefront of attention in
the 19th century, the predisposition was to take a part (the organic, a
feature of the outward face of the living) as if it were the whole, and
dismiss what is apparent in the self-awareness of any human being,
namely, the two-sidedness (inward and outward) of a living being. The
added irony, of this living active human inquirer proceeding as if an
account of the outward in terms which do not allow a functioning in
which obligation has an essential role-- in thinking and knowing, for
example-- was sufficient for understanding the human, has been noted
before. Nature as natured beings, thus as companions-within-nature to
ourselves as kindred active beings, has become replaced by an outwardly
accessible surrogate, human nature has also become treated reductively,
and the sense of humanity as simply another animal species in the
evolution of life on earth-- a half-truth at best, even after one has excised
the “simply”-- has so far been the upshot, in science, of the movement
of ‘modernity ’ that began in Renaissance times with a quite different
feeling for the human. “Modernity” thereby knows a truncated humanity,
deprived not only of essential factors inward to itself (a responsiveness
to obligation, say, and what was just noted above, a responsiveness to the
depths of being), and even anthropic psychology has not redressed this
failure to allow the fulness of human nature to emerge -- and along with
it, the essential connection of the human agent with others (including
non-human beings) in his/her interacting.
The third is due to a persistent feature of the human as a maturational
affair, that we begin in impotence and at best eventually reach fulness.
But there is no automatic success, and the difficulties to surmount are
considerable, so that most of us manage at best a self-responsibility
which is that of an arrested-development self. In virtue of that, the
widespread empirical presence of the human self in a form in which ‘ego’
is being mistaken for self-- that is, in which the self in an arrested
maturational stage is mistaken as the self in a fulness to itself-- has
meshed from the start of ‘modernity’ with the failure, in the Renaissance
focus on the human side of aspiration, to heed the ancients in this matter.
For both Plato and Aristotle stress a humanity essential to which is not
simply learning and education but (as the underpinning of these in human
nature) above all maturation and the learning integral to that; but despite
the later ‘modern’ concern for learning and education, this underpinning
was not carried along except in the limited form of “reason”, recognized
as part of the human which for whatever reason is not there from birth as
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an actual power. And indeed, within the Christian horizon, the heart of
the human lay in free-will, in the receptivity to grace, and in faith as
committed belief in revealed truth; in this framework, growth and
maturation have no fundamental significance, although they appear and
play some part. But maturation is not the basis for faith, for grace, for
the decisive facets of life. The maturational essence of the human being
becomes readily downplayed in this context, both that which ‘modernity’
provides and that which the non-‘modern’ (here, Christian) provides. As
a consequence, when the primordial trusting-thence-wary outreach and
the aggressive/self-protective development of our nature consistently
becomes taken up into the arrested-self (the ‘ego’-self) as the epitome of
the self, we are ready to acknowledge it indeed (as natural in a nonmaturational sense, an inherent part of our nature), and turn a blind eye
to the dehumanizing it wreaks, internally to ourselves and externally to
others and to nature, as significant factor at work in the political
imperialism and the economic exploitation of nature that ‘modernity’ has
become involved in.
In sum: in its development over the centuries ‘modernity’ filled in the
uncaptured aspiration of the Renaissance in such an interpretative
fashion as to arrive, in our day, at an anthropocentric view in which the
“anthropos” in question is regarded as present in a universe which is not
creational in character but simply exists. Without a responsive register
to the depths of being as something essential to its being, and as well
without essential reference to the being of other beings with which it
interacts and connects in its existence, the race of human beings is taken
to have been generated from other living beings on earth and to inhabit
this earth as an unusual planet, a globe circling the sun within a solar
system somewhere in an infinite universe of beings. The vision reaches
for no account of being itself, only one of beings generated from other
and prior beings and, in the case of humans, of evolution-shaped beings
knowing in the time of individual existence a struggle to survive and
enjoy the time of that existence on earth. This vision and self-understanding is the interpretative fruit of various experimental ventures,
nothing present at the start of ‘modernity’ and not something arising
inevitably given that start. It represents something learned in the
experiences of such ventures, but in a learning that does not reach very
deeply into things, however broad and increasingly complex the grasp of
the face of things is which ‘modern science’ has been achieving. Judging
from the guiding interpretations, ‘modernity’ has not yet gained sufficient depth and form con-cretely to be a civilizing and civilized affair
commensurate with the measures inherent in being and representing the
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fulness of human earthly existence reached for in its Renaissance
beginning.
Nonetheless, there is another side to ‘modernity’, including a variety
of strengths-- for one, the courage to venture and in particular to venture
on a finding and facing truth, and for a second, a resolve to assume responsibility and commit ourselves to carrying it out con-cretely--; and in
the way of life we have brought to exist, there are facets that have been
developed (despite a variety of flaws) to a place closer to adequacy to
the measures than ever before, including a commitment to selfresponsible participation in governance (thus political democracy) and a
similar commitment in the economic area in which enterprise and risktaking are central. In both the political and the economic areas, however,
the flaws are still considerable, and even the positive features of the
achievement in these areas are to a significant degree undermined by the
incompletness of our personal self-development, too often arrested
significantly at the ‘ego’-form of self. Similarly with the intellectual area,
in which the courage to seek truth has made striking advances, and yet
operates still within a lack of self-awareness and self-critique which
reflects the oblivious manner in which we ‘adolescents’ are proceeding
and applying that knowledge, still a considerable distance from the
spiritual fulness we are meant to reach. Even so, there is life left in the
movement, and directions able to be discerned, and hopefully enough
courage, strength, and intelligence, able to be drawn on to enable the
venture to redeem itself as we face the troubles of our times and
participate in the completion of a global unification of all-- ‘modern’ and
non-‘modern’, transformed-- of a sort that, as it in turn evolves and
changes in future, continues to realize the creationally at-stake and
measure up to being the civilized existence in which human beings live
and act contributing effectively to the consummation of creation.
*****
****
*****
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NOTES

i

This freeing can never be complete, though the element of dis-regard
which is involved can itself be ignored, simply taken for granted, and
the scheme can operate (for human beings, note, and thus for them as in
their ‘today’ giving it anchorage) as if it were ‘objective’; but the very
meaning of ‘objective’ involves reference to subjects, and the binding
back of the scheme to individual human beings operating in and out of
their own here-and-now and the ‘today’ of that existence is apparent
thereby, if still in muted and abstract form.
ii
There is something kindred in the Italian Renaissance to the re-birth
after a ‘Dark Ages’ which ushered in archaic and then classical Greek
times. For my understanding of that ancient Greek happening, and for
more indications of why I might speak of kinship here, cf. my The
Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece (Chapters 1-4 and “A Retrospective Postscript”, 1-136), also my Homer and Hesiod, Myth and
Philosophy (Chapter 7, 73-88).
iii
Although there were already some twenty or so translations of the
Bible into German having recently been made, Luther himself made a
translation of both Testaments into a vernacular German (1522, 1534),
and his translation had profound and lasting influence on the language
and religion of Germanic peoples.
iv
218-224. See also the summary discussion on 250-256 above,
especially 254-256.
v
Gallic Protestantism adopted Calvin’s Institutes, so that after 1550
Luther was almost forgotten in France. Calvinism (the Huguenots) was
widespread in France by 1559. The very name Huguenot came from
Zurich through Geneva to Provence. In May 1559 the Protestants sent
deputies to their first general synod, held secretly in Paris, and by 1561
there were 2,000 ‘Reformed’ or Calvinistic churches in France.
vi
The‘religious wars’ of 1562 to 1594 were to France what the Thirty
Years’ War (1618-48) was to Germany, and the Civil Wars (1642-48)
were to England. In the French case, other factors than religion were
important; in particular: When Francis II succeeded to the throne,
France was near bankruptcy, while the Catholic Church had acquired a
third-- some say, two-thirds-- of the riches of France. Behind the
religious wars lay the desire to retain or obtain this ecclesiastical
wealth. Moreover, ministers to Francis II were convinced that if France
(like Germany and England) adopted Protestantism the Church would
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be near its end and France would lose the religious ardor that had supported its social order and its national unity; they were intolerant
therefore of heresy and proposed to exterminate it by force. But the
Huguenots were no longer a small and helpless minority of French
Protestants led and inspired by Calvin from Geneva, but a spreading
doctrinal and social revolt against the Church. Professing loyalty to the
French monarchy, they nonetheless organized on republican lines the
regions where they prevailed; formulating a temporary ideology of
liberty, they agreed with the Catholics that the state should enforce the
‘true religion’ throughout France. Finally, social and economic factors
underlay the religious strife: the peasantry remained Catholic, but the
proletariat, small numerically, denounced its employers, and the Gospel
became a textbook of revolution. The middle classes too gave ear to
the preachers Geneva trained and sent to France; the businessmen noted
the successful alliance of German, English, and Swiss merchants with
Protestant rulers and ideas, and resenting ecclesiastical wealth and
tithes as well as feudal tolls on trade, they had long suffered under
bishops and barons disdainful of commerce and tied to feudal ways;
and many nobles took up the rebel cause, unreconciled to the
centralization of power in a unified state. The death of Francis II
(1560: at 16) brought his brother, Charles IX, to power (at 10), with his
mother (Catherine de Médici) as regent, and she, joining Elizabeth of
England and Philip II of Spain, guided the chaos of Europe to their
rival ends. Her concerns were dynastic and political rather than
religious or economic; but ... first Religious War (April 1562-March
1563); after Charles IX was declared of age and Catherine surrendered
her regency, a second War (September 1567-March 1568), then a third
(March 1569-August 1570), the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and
within two months, the Huguenots opened the fourth Religious War. In
July 1573 Charles signed the peace of La Rochelle, guaranteeing the
Huguenots religious liberty-- politically, the massacre had
accomplished nothing. Charles IX died soon afterward (1574), to be
followed by Henry III (reigned 1574-89), then Henry IV (1589-1610).
Henry III ended the fifth Religious War (1576), giving the Huguenots
full freedom of worship everywhere in France, making them eligible to
all offices, and allowing them eight cities in which they were to have
complete political and military dominance. Most French Catholics
were shocked by these concessions to a party supposedly destroyed.
There followed a sixth, seventh, and eighth Religious Wars . In the
course of these, Henry III was assassinated (1589), Henry IV took over
(1589-1610), surviving five years of civil war (with the English
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supporting him, the Spanish opposing) and embracing Catholicism.
Uncontested King from 1594-1610, Henry IV was faced with a France
devastated by 32 years of ‘religious’ wars, and almost as chaotic as
after the Hundred Years’ War the century before. The people of France,
tired of anarchy, allowed him-- the business classes begged him-- to
make the new Bourbon monarchy absolute, and he did. The Duke of
Sully was given the task of economic and monetary recovery, and
succeeded, and Henry proceeded to recreate France with the help of
such ministers. In 1598, the Edict of Nantes was issued, authorizing
the full exercise of the Protestant faith, and freedom of the Protestant
press, in all of the eight hundred towns of France except 17, in which
Catholicism was overwhelmingly predominant. The eligibility of
Huguenots to public offices was confirmed; the government was to pay
the salaries of Protestant ministers and of the rectors of Protestant
schools. Protestant children were to be admitted, on an equality with
Catholics, to all schools, colleges, universities, and hospitals. The religious liberty so granted was still imperfect; it included only Catholics
and Protestants, but it constituted the most advanced religious
toleration in Europe. In the end, Henry IV was assassinated. The
sudden death of Henry IV (leaving his heir, Louis XIII, a boy of 8) left
France in a renewed disorder, resolved by Richelieu, the most ruthless
statesman in French history. French Catholicism knew a rebirth of
vigor and devotion, reforming itself in numerous ways, but the conflict
of creeds (Catholic, Huguenot) continued, and neither was disposed to
tolerance. Richelieu accepted the doctrines of the Church but preserved
the ‘Gallican liberties’ of the French Church as against Rome; and in
things temporal he subordinated the Church to the state as resolutely as
any Englishman. He overcame the Huguenots of La Rochelle, but
confirmed Henry IV’s Edict of Nantes, recognizing the immense
economic value of the Huguenots to France; they abandoned revolt,
gave themselves peacefully to commerce and industry, and prospered
as never before.
vii
The great nobles still had their fortified castles, their armed forces,
their private wars, their private courts, their officers of law; they still
had the peasantry at their mercy, and charged obstructive tolls on
commerce traversing their domains. France, dismembered by
feudalism as well as by religion, was not yet a nation; it was an
unstable and agitated assemblage of proud and semi-independent
barons capable at any moment of disrupting the peace and the economy
of the state.
viii
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As early as 1521 young rebels in Oxford eagerly imported news of the
religious revolution in Germany, and Henry, composing a treatise
against Luther, was conferred the title ‘Defender of the Faith’ by the
Pope. Luther responded (1525), and the King never forgave Luther and
even when he was himself in full rebellion against the papacy he
repudiated the German Protestants. Keep in mind also: Tyndale’s
translation into English of the New Testament (1525-26), with a
separate volume of notes and prefaces based on those of Erasmus and
Luther, was smuggled into England (printed in Worms); but the Bishop
of London tried to suppress it, and More criticized it, and the King
forbade the reading or circulation of the Bible in English until an
authoritative translation could be made. Wolsey sent orders to arrest
Tyndale but the German prince protected him, and he proceeded with
his translation of the Pentateuch (1530) and despite being captured by
Imperial officials and eventually burned at the stake (1536), when the
historic Authorized Version appeared (1611), 90% was unaltered
Tyndale.
ix
The nation (with national spirit even stronger than that in Germany)
generally sided with the King on his dispute of the right of the popes to
govern the English Church; even the clergy were not averse to independence from a papacy so obviously subject to a foreign power. One
thing led to another, and the Church of England was born (1532) and
became an arm and subject of the state. Henry’s most aggressive agent
in these affairs was Thomas Cromwell, who had served Wolsey
faithfully for five years; made chancellor of the exchequer, master of
the rolls, and secretary to the King, from 1531 to 1540 he was the chief
administrator of the government as an obedient executor of the royal
will. His aim was to make the King supreme over every phase of
English life, and to finance an absolute monarchy with the confiscated
wealth of the Church. With the Act of Succession, then the Statute of
Supremacy (1534), Henry became the sole judge of what, in religion
and politics, the English people were to believe.
x
By 1535 Cromwell had become powerful in many spheres; the King
had become bankrupt, Cromwell eyed the monasteries as a solution,
shutting many of them down and confiscating their property to the
state. Resistance was strong in the north and east counties, Henry’s
reaction was not accommodating and overcame the resistance; some of
the properties were given or sold at bargain prices to
supporters/administrators of the King’s policies, some spoils went to
build ships and forts and ports, some helped to finance war, some went
into royal palaces. A new aristocracy created by Henry’s gifts and sales
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became a powerful support to the Tudor throne, and a bulwark of
economic interest against any Catholic restoration. The old feudal
aristocracy had decimated itself; the new one, rooted in commerce and
industry, changed the nature of the English nobility from static
conservatism to dynamic enterprise, and poured fresh blood and energy
into the upper classes of England. The effects of the dissolution were
complex and long-lasting: more unemployed needing work, depressing
the earnings of the lower classes for a generation; strengthening of the
monarchy; the growth of crime, pauperism, and beggary, diminished
provision of charity; loss of monastic hospitals, closing of many
schools (for girls, at convents, and for boys). This, however, probably
only hastened something that was already happening: an inevitable
lessening in the number and influence of English monasteries, with the
decline in religious fervor and other-worldliness, with fewer novices
entering conventual establishments.
xi
The 37 years of his reign transformed England; he had sought to replace the pope but not the old faith, but his successful defiance of the
papacy, his swift dispersal of monks and relics, his repeated humiliation
of the clergy, his appropriation of Church property, his secularization of
the government, so weakened ecclesiastical prestige and authority as to
invite the theological changes that followed in the reigns of Edward and
Elizabeth.
xii

The Puritan attack on Elizabeth took shape in 1569; the Puritan
conception of the Church involved Christ’s having arranged that all
ecclesiastical authority should be vested in ministers and lay elders
elected by each parish, province, and state. The consistories so formed
should determine creed, ritual, and moral code in conformity with
Scripture. They should have access to every home, power to enforce at
least outward observance of ‘godly living’, and the right to
excommunicate recalcitrants and condemn heretics to death. The civil
magistrates were to carry out these disciplinary decrees, but the state
was to have no spiritual jurisdiction whatever. By 1572 the majority of
the London Protestants, and of the House of Commons, were Puritans;
the businessmen of the capital looked upon Puritanism as the bulwark
of Protestantism against a Catholicism traditionally unsympathetic to
‘usury’ and the middle classes. But Elizabeth felt that the Puritan
movement threatened the whole settlement by which she had planned
to ease the religious strife. She despised the Puritan dogmatism even
more heartily than the Catholic. Attempts at troubling the
troublemakers intensified the Puritan rebellion. Attempts to challenge
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the current Anglican set-up in Parliament were rebuffed, and further
efforts led to Parliament’s decreeing that anyone who questioned the
Queen’s religious supremacy should be imprisoned and (unless he gave
a pledge of future conformity) should leave England and ever return, on
pain of death. At this juncture Richard Hooker (a parson) raised the
controversy to the level of philosophy, piety, and stately prose (Of the
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: 1594, 1597)-- a noble attempt to
harmonize religion and reason (‘the assurance of what we believe by
the Word of God is not to us so certain as that which we perceive by
sense’, ‘man’s reasoning faculty is also a divine gift and revelation’).
Based on medieval law as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas, he
anticipated the ‘social contract’ of Hobbes and Locke (the community
is the ultimate source of the laws, king and parliament may issue laws
only as the delegate or representatives of the community; religion is
integral to the state, for social order and thus even material prosperity
depend on moral discipline, which collapses without religious
inculcation and support; consequently every state should provide
religious training for its people; the Anglican Church might be
imperfect, but so would be all institutions made and manned by the
children of Adam). The Puritans acknowledged Hooker’s eloquence,
but went on their way, many emigrating (Holland welcomed them), the
exiles preparing for their fulfillment in America.
xiii
King Charles I (1516-56) of Spain became Emperor Charles V
(1519-58) of the Holy Roman Empire, and had spent most of his effort
as Emperor, not King. Pro-Catholic but anti-papal, he sought like
Ferdinand to make the Spanish Church independent of the popes, and
to a great extent succeeded; the Church became subordinated to the
state. But in the end the fervor of the Spanish orthodoxy infected him
and nothing seemed more important than to suppress heresy-- hence his
attitude toward the Netherlands, but also within Spain and what of the
Protestant appeared there-- thus the expansion of the Spanish
Inquisition, and the severest treatment for the Protestants-- the first
known Spanish Lutheran was burned at the stake in 1542. Charles V
gave Flanders and Holland reasonably good government except in
religious liberty. Accepting the current theory that national peace and
strength required unity of religious belief, and fearing that Protestantism in the Netherlands would endanger his flank in his strife with
France and Lutheran Germany, Charles fully supported the Church in
prosecuting heresy in Flanders and Holland. The reform movement
was mild there before Luther; after 1517 it entered as Lutheranism and
Anabaptism from Germany, as Zwinglianism and Calvinism from
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Switzerland, Alsace, and France. Despite censorship, Luther’s
translation of the New Testament was widely circulated; a longing for
the restoration of Christianity to its pristine simplicity generated a
millenarian hope for the early return of Christ and the establishment of
a New Jerusalem in which there would be no government, no marriage,
and no property; and with these notions were mingled communistic
theories of equality, mutual aid, and even ‘free love’. Anabaptist
groups formed, and eventually some insurrections arose (1535);
Charles imported the Inquisition into the Netherlands and gave its
officials power to stamp out the movement, and all other heresies, at
whatever cost to local liberties. The Netherlands became a major
battleground between the old and the new forms of Christianity. The
Imperial pogrom focused on the Anabaptists, and succeeded, and the
communistic movement in the Netherlands collapsed; but as the
Anabaptist wave subsided, a stream of Huguenots poured into the
Lowlands from France, bringing the gospel of Calvin. The stern and
theocratic fervor of the new heresy appealed to those who inherited the
traditions of the mystics and the Brethern of the Common life; and the
Calvinist acceptance of work as a dignity instead of a curse, of wealth
as a blessing instead of a crime, of republican institutions as more
responsive than monarchy to the political ambitions of the business
class, contained ingredients diversely welcome to many elements in the
population. By 1555 the Calvinist movement was spreading beyond
Flanders into Holland, and this, when Charles resigned (1556) and his
son (Philip II) took over, would be his opponent in conflict that would
break the Netherlands in two, liberate Holland from the Spanish domination, and make her one of the major homes and havens of the modern
mind. Alarmed by the growth of heresy, Philip renewed the
proclamations and their penalties, and fear spread that he intended to
introduce the Spanish form of the Inquisition in all its severity.
Calvinism was congenial to the mercantile element in the economy,
which was considerable; the businessmen who controlled the main
towns respected Catholicism as a tradition-rooted pillar of political,
social, and moral stability; but they had no relish for its pompous
hierarchy, and they liked the role given to the educated laity in the
management of Calvinist congregations and policy. They also resented
the taxes laid upon the Netherlands economy by the Spanish
government. But the peasants suffered most and benefitted least from
revolt. The richest and ablest of the great landowners was William of
Nassau, Prince of Orange. Philip fumbled ruinously in handling the
Netherlands nobles; brought up in Spain, he could speak neither French
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nor Dutch, and found it difficult to bend to the magnates graciously, to
respect their customs and their debts, while they disliked his somber
pride, his penchant for the Inquisition, his appointment of Spaniards to
lucrative posts in the Netherlands. It was in asking for funds from the
nobles and businessmen who constituted the States-General that the
impetus toward conflict arose; provision of only a minimum was
followed three years later by requests for more, which they yielded
only on condition that all Spanish troops be withdrawn from the
Netherlands. He made this concession, but canceled its conciliatory
effect by getting papal permission to establish eleven new bishoprics in
the Low Countries and nominating to these sees men willing to enforce
his father’s decrees against heresy. When he sailed for Spain in 1559,
never to see the Netherlands again, the economic and religious outlines
of the great struggle to come were taking form. That struggle took till
1648, with many twists and turns.
xiv
The Duke of Alva (1567-73); William of Orange; England and
France drawn in; Act of Abjuration, July 1581; assassination of William
of Orange; the truce of 1609; in 1619 the Mennonites founded at
Rijnsburg their Quakerlike sect of Collegianten, with whom Spinoza
would find safe refuge; in 1629 Descartes was to praise the intellectual
freedom that he enjoyed in Amsterdam, and by the end of the century
Holland was to be the haven of heretics from many lands; Battle of the
Downs, a naval victory in 1639, ranking in Dutch history as the defeat
of the Armada does in English, it ended all claim of Spain to control the
seas and cut the lifeline between Spain and her colonies; involved in
the Thirty Years’ War, Spain decided to yield everything to the Dutch in
order to be free to fight the French, thus Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
xv

It did not end wars, however. The Thirty Years’ War, beginning in
1618, was rooted in a pathological fear of a Catholic conspiracy among
the Protestants and the equally entrenched suspicion of a Protestant
conspiracy among the Catholics. Even after the complicated war was
settled in 1648, struggle continued between France and Spain until
1659, and within a decade, Sweden was at war with Poland (1655-60),
Russia (1656-58) and Denmark (1657-58). In the east, a war broke out
in 1654 between Poland and Russia (lasting until 1667), while tension
between the Hapsburgs and the Turks increased until war came in 1663.
Even within the empire there were disputes (1651, 1661). And yet ... it
was almost a century before German rulers went to war with one
another again.
xvi
On this level, only a couple of suggestions of something more: the
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Duke of Sully and Henry IV (France) with their ‘Great Design’ for
Europe, and Hugo de Groot (Grotius) (United Provinces) and his
pointer to law. In his De jure belli et pacis (On the Law of War and
Peace) (1625), he sees the necessity for evolving for Europe some
principle of common authority to replace the Papacy (which the
Protestant North would not recognize) and the Holy Roman Empire
(which had been ineffectual and was being undermined completely in
the Thirty Years’ War). And that authority is law in three forms (law of
nature, implied by the fact that man is a social and rational being; law
of God, leading nations to follow Christ’s teachings as far as possible;
law of nations, which the Roman Empire had developed in its practical
dealings with the customary rights of subject peoples). The work
furnished the basis for the ‘modern’ state system which emerged from
the Peace of Westphalia. According to it, governments may be exempt
from positive man-made law but not jus naturale (=the dictate of right
reason showing the moral turpitude, or the moral necessity, of any act
from its agreement or disagreement with a rational nature, and
consequently showing that such an act is either forbidden or
commanded by God, the author of nature). Natural law is that system
of rights and duties which follows from the essential nature of man as a
rational being living in a society; whatever is necessary for his
existence and his participation in society is his natural right, it is something due to his nature. In their behavior, states should observe natural
law; they also should be subject to jus gentium, meaning, in this case,
the vague accumulation of rules and restraints customarily accepted by
the most developed nations in their mutual contacts. On these two jusbases, he builds his theoretical structure, the first modern formulation
of desirable international law. He does not outlaw war in general: a
war in the face of threat to possessions or life of citizens is acceptable,
but war is unjust if it is waged for conquest, for plunder or land, or
from the real or pretended desire to impose a beneficent government
upon a people unwilling to receive it. Preventive wars are unjust. In a
just war, every nation has certain rights (use deceit, make reprisals,
capture spoils, take and use prisoners) but also certain duties (declare
war before waging it, honor any treaty responsibly made for it; spare
noncombatants, prisoners should not be killed although they may be
enslaved). [But ... (1) the ‘law of God’ is no more than a Christian ideal
to be aimed at by a civilization which was already laying less and less
emphasis on religious ideals; who would define this law of God?
Without a universal Church to serve as a sort of supreme court to define
and interpret the law of God, there would be only national churches
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under the authority of national monarchs; thus international relations
would (at best) be governed more and more by the customary law of
nations, and by the law of nature. But (2) {and the following is my
interpretation, and may not relate well to Grotius} who shall determine
what ‘dictate of right reason’ is indeed ‘right’? That is, if the appeal is
to something ‘natural’ and ‘a work of reason’, these require
interpretation and justification to be accepted as such. As with positive
laws, that a legislature has enacted something does not make it right,
only lawful (supposing that there is no higher authority for the
legislation, as e.g. the American Constitution). Only law as interpreted
is enforceable, and that enforcement does not make it right. Where is
the international legislature and international force-- and the
international ‘Constitution’ (and even this is an interpretation)-- that is
needed for enforcement? And how can the operation of these factors be
guaranteed to be ‘just and right’? and by what standards? The modest
restraints and violable agreements accepted as convenient for the time
being by the powers concerned are not the same thing as ‘just laws’.
And who is to determine “the most developed peoples”? All of this is a
recognition of the human condition as one in which something is atstake and this, in such way as bears on us in the mode of obligation.
We can not act responsively without some interpretation of this
presence and its meaning, but that can be inadequate; at best, we can
come to agree on a shared interpretation, recognizing that this in turn
requires of each of us a personal interpretation, and that in turn requires
that we agree to accept a certain independent interpretativedetermination. But ... the spirit can never be reduced to the law, and no
law or set of laws could be fully adequate to spirit. ] It seems that, in
the face of the conflict of powers intrinsically implicated in the
encounter of sovereign states/individual-rulers-of-such-states, Grotius
sought to point to ‘law’ as a normative element marking the human
condition on all sides, and to elicit how it implicates human
interactivity (here, state interaction) in its venturing where statesovereignty (parallel to individual self-responsibility) is recognized as
in some sense ultimate-as-ought/must (but in a sense that acknowledges
that we can fail in both cases in the way we are exercising our
sovereignty/responsibility). If a Christian-or-religious framework is
questionable, the sense of a community of human nature is less so-keeping in mind that anyone’s interpretation of that is an interpretation, not the matter being interpreted. This community is more
readily something all parties can agree to (again, the matter being interpreted, not necessarily the interpretation); and to that extent, there
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could be a a secular rationale for a law among nations, although the one
that Grotius apparently used (the classical view of natural law and the
rule of reason) represents an interpretation. Similarly with the
concepts of state sovereignty and the equality of sovereign states: these
point interpretatively to something we can acknowledge, perhaps, but
they are interpretations. If Grotius investigated the sources and validity
of the concept of ‘natural law’-- the notion that inherent in human
reason and immutable even against the willfulness of sovereign states
are imperative considerations of natural justice and moral responsibility
which must serve as a check against the arbitrary exercise of vast
political power--, this still remains foreground-and-interpretative.
Indeed, any notion of a “code of duties and prohibitions” (rules, laws,
that are nomative) refers really to the-social, not to the-natural (let
alone the-creational). States are “bound” indirectly-- obligation bears
directly only in individuals and in virtue of their common human
responsive nature-- as institutional-arrangements of human beings
associating in a society. [Grotius is described as having “stressed the
self-defeating character of law, accepted sovereign states as the basic
unit of international law, and skillfully blended natural law, Roman law,
and state practice in a manner that left in vital matters sufficient
discretion for governments to do, without legal hindrance, what they
thought opportune”; but this does not get to the roots of the matter well
enough. Even a Christian basis would not be enough, since Christianity
is itself centered in interpretative-symbols, and what is so pointed to is
what is important, not the interpretation by itself and as if it were
perfectly coincident with the reality in question.] This whole matter of
“international laws as normative rules for conduct relating to sovereign
states or such entities as have been granted international personalitystatus”, and of such rules “as, in contrast with moral laws or rules,
being designed for authoritative interpretation by an independent
judicial authority and capable of enforcement by the application of
external sanctions”, needs thinking through more profoundly. But it
seems there is no ultimacy to the-legal nor the-moral-as-codified, only
the immediate responsive receptivity and commitment to the at-stake as
imperative; and that can not be ‘compelled’ as by an ‘external
sanction’!
xvii

Columbus held an exalted view of his mission, and even after his first
voyage he saw what he was in process of discovering through Biblical
eyes. He seems never to have seen, or acknowledged, that (for
example) he had not been close to Paradise and the location of King
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Solomon’s gold. Yet after his first voyage, whatever the puzzlement
and disappointment and however its meaning might otherwise be
interpreted, he brought back material and human cargo-- gold, parrots,
human captives-- as if to prove that it had been a worthwhile effort (in
those terms as well? or, at least in those terms?). Indeed, the whole set
of ventures seems to have been seen, by others if not by him, as fitting
in with the vision of the Book of Revelation, with the Christian capture
of Jerusalem and the installation of a Christian emperor in the Holy
Land (something which this westward voyage would help finance)
being precondition for the coming and defeat of the Antichrist, the
conversion of the whole human race, and the Last Judgment.
xviii
As might be expected, there is a many-sided connection between
the internal and intra-Europe side of the political evolution that we
considered earlier, and the outward-reaching venturing we have just
been considering. One commonality, and a difference, are worth noting
here. During the period in question we see the dissolving of any sense
of a unitary Christendom centered in Rome and the Pope. The obvious
catalyst for that, the Protestant Reformation, was still Christian, so that
in that sense there was an overall horizon which, in name at least, was
the same. But the Protestant tended to stress a stricter ‘morality’, if for
no other reason than that the corruption and abuses of the Catholic
Church were one of the reasons for the ‘protest’ ‘purification’
movement; even so, there was varying strictness also in the Catholic
Church’s enforcement of ‘morality’, as there came to be in the
Protestant sects. Now in the homelands of the venturers, there was the
teaching of Christianity in contrast with the actual living of life,
something recognized as likely in that teaching but meant, according to
the latter, to be overcome. And for help in this, there were the
institutions of religion. But this time period which we are concerned
with is one of political and economic development and thus of lifeconditions which were not simply changing but bringing into
prominence in both spheres much that, viewed with Christian eyes, was
scarcely in keeping with the ‘morality’ its religious institutions taught,
to say nothing of the obligations and constraints that marked the
medieval world that was being moved beyond. In the measure in which
the times in the European homelands were ones in which (for example)
money, and entrepreneurial endeavor, and changing working-andlivelihood conditions, brought loosening of the moral constraints on
economic activity, and in which political evolution and conditions were
recurrently marked by wars and persecutions and assassinations and a
Machiavellian approach to governing, the age was one of significant
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cruelty, of unpitying treatment of those whom the economy left behind
or who were exploited, and of political intercourse in which power
dominated and political units in which the Catholic institutional support
of education and outreach to the poor and homeless and orphaned was
disappearing without much offered in its stead. Robbery and other
forms of crime were common, bribery and partiality too often marked
the administration of justice, religious persecution was even official
government policy, and business and commercial activity knew shady
and dishonest practice. In short, the life professed in religion was often
not the reality of life in these times in the homelands, the morality
urged in church was not heeded in active participation in con-crete
existence. With the overseas venturing, there was another world into
which Europeans were entering, and while it was a Christian perspective out of which they approached it, there was not present in those
distant lands, as there was at home, the reinforcement for acting accordingly. It is not surprising then that, in the Christian encounter with nonChristians in distant lands, the failure of Christians to live up to
Christian ideals was not only part of the venturing involved but was
even characteristic, especially because Christians who were frail in
their own world and its ‘moral’ terms were invited in these ventures to
be ‘imperial’ in their approach to others in this other world and to do so
with considerable impunity.
xix
In fact, the grasp of the early Greek thinkers found among the
Scholastics (among others) did not enter in any historically or
philosophically apt way into what it was that varied Greek thinkers
thought under the terms logos, nous, noēsis, dianoia, and the like.
Rather, taking what they understood to be that power and proceeding to
speak of its operation within a rather different horizon from the original
one and to mean the same thing in this later horizon as it meant earlier,
the Scholastics (perhaps unwittingly) were in fact forging their own
notion of this power, all the while using what were presumed to be the
relevant terms for translating the Greek (Latin, ratio, among others) but
in truth in that translation meaning something slightly different from
what Plato or Aristotle or Parmenides or Heraclitus, say, had in mind-which, in the case of these four, was not the same thing in any case.
This process of re-forging (wittingly or unwittingly) does not stop with
the Scholastics but goes on in modern thought-- and modern interpretation of pre-modern thought-- over and over again. Descartes’
notions of reason, Spinoza’s, Kant’s, Hegel’s, and so on, are all
different from each other, as well as different from those of the
Scholastics and the early Greeks-- even if the same term may be used in
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English to ‘translate’ the relevant French, Latin, German, and Greek.
xx
Thus in his Novum Organum, Bacon can say “the real and legitimate
goal of the sciences is the endowment of human life with new
inventions and riches” (p. 58), the ultimate point of inquiry/naturalphilosophical-inquiry is to gain “some new earnest of effects, and a
new light in axioms” (p. 59).
xxi
Descartes, in a letter to Father Mersenne in 1638, regards the
philosophizing of Galileo as “much better than the average”, in that he
proceeds in the only way possible for the discovering of truth, namely,
by abandoning as completely as he can the errors of the Schools, and
by attempting to examine physical matters by the methods of mathematics. But he is critical of the way Galileo presents matters (too many
digressions, not enough explanation of what is relevant to his points),
and takes this as reflecting his having failed to consider things in the
proper order, and that means, having neglected the effort to build what
he would say on a solid foundation in the grasp of the first causes of
nature.
xxii
I leave to one side Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533-1592) who,
in his Essais, realizes a very interesting thoughtfulness characteristic of
‘modernity’, but not of major significance for our story.
xxiii
An economy, as a social arrangement, has as its foundation a
variety of facets of our human being and condition, but most
fundamentally, as a distinctive institution it has its roots in two sides of
our being, one of which makes us dependent upon our environment and
the other of which concerns our acting upon the first. The second root
is the maturationally intended responsibility of each for his/her own
life-and-activity (existence), together with the referral (by way of the
communal meant-to-be) of ourselves as human agents to other human
beings as intrinsic to our development and the fulfillment of our human
initiative-capacity; and the first root is the neediness of ourselves, not
simply as living beings with a human organic side (thereby with desires
prompting us to action to meet needs rooted in that side of ourselves)
but with a human inwardness and a neediness rooted in the
maturational and communal meant-to-be’s inherent in the inwardness
of our nature and related to our initiative capacity, with desires
springing from this neediness and prompting us to action answering to
it. Given such roots, the economic itself is fundamentally the social
arrangement-- in particular, the coordinated and cooperative production
and exchange of goods and services-- in which the members of a group
participate so as to meet their needs-thence-desires; the needs in
question are fundamentally facets of the complex neediness (inward
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and outward both) of our human being as active beings whose being is
centered in a caring formed at the very heart of our being and animating
our activity as responsive to the creationally-at-stake as this claims us
in our being-active as human beings. Much more is included in an
economic system, of course, and considerable complexity is introduced
by the maturational character of our initiative capacity and the way in
which needs-thence-desires become gathered up into our initiative
differently at different times of life and desires-or-wants introduced in
reflection (say) of the operation of that initiative, desires-or-wants that
have an ‘ego’-enhancing function but become operative in an economic
system as well as the genuine need-based desires.
xxiv
It is important to recognize that Locke thinks this matter of reason,
and more broadly, reason and freedom, in a context of a sense of the
human which sees the maturational development of the human being as
important. (Cf. Chapter VI, sections 55-58, 61, 67). Thus children are
not born to the full human estate and to the basic equality of humans;
the infirmity of childhood involves the need for parental direction, and
in particular, for parental support in the growth toward the first-hand
participation in reason and the capacity therefore for freedom-and-awill-of-his-own and for governing their freedom by way of reason’s
recognition of the law of nature and its dictates. If parents fail in their
duty, children grow up but not into the actuality of the fulness of the
human estate which enables them to discern and follow the law of
nature. In that case, they remain stunted, arrested in their maturation,
and in their use of their freedom liable to act irrationally. Chapter VI,
section 61: “we are born free as we are born rational; not that we have
actually the exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the
other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to
parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same
principle. A child is free by his father’s title, by his father’s
understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The
freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to
his parents whilst yet short of it” are distinguishable yet consistent with
each other. A child is in subject to parents and nurses, tutors and
governors, till age and education bring him reason and ability to govern
himself and others. “The necessities of his life, the health of his body,
and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by
the will of others and not his own; and yet will anyone think that this
restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of, that
liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to
those who had the government of his nonage? This government over
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him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If anybody should
ask me when my son is of age to be free, I shall answer, just when his
monarch is of the age to govern.” Section 23 starts: “the freedom then
of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on
his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to
govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty,
before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege
of his nature to be free, but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and
abandon him to a state as wretched and as much beneath that of a man
as theirs.”
xxv
This, of course, would raise numerous problems but in particular
would highlight the problem of the relation between reason in the form
of the law of nature, and reason in the form of positive laws of some
particular community. Is this “law of nature” not a single law but the
multiplicity of laws which reason discerns when addressing the
diversity of aspects of the world? If the enforcement of the law of
nature (of reason) in a civil society requires positive law, is that because
in society there are complexities that are not part of the state of nature
and it is the application of the (one) law of nature/reason to these added
complexities that is (at least part of) the work of positive law? If the
law of nature (of reason) extends to all human beings because of its
roots in a common humanity and has force everywhere at all times
(“keeping faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of
society”), and the positive laws of a community do not extend beyond
the community and its members, how are the two expressions of law related? Note that when Locke contrasts the legislative, executive, and
federative powers of a commonwealth, this external relation of the
commonwealth to others outside it is governed by the federative power
(as he calls it, expressing indifference as to the name). This is the
power of the united body politic, which is in a state of nature with the
rest of mankind, whereby that body manages controversies between
any man of the society with those that are out of it. This power of so
managing includes “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances,
and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the
commonwealth”. But can this power enable the community itself to
unite with other communities, to form one inclusive body which
establishes its own government? How, for example, would Locke
understand the United States of America and its federal system of
government, which retains state governments under a federal
government? Would a world government be possible under Locke’s
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view of the political?
xxvi
When Locke speaks of “law” and particularly “positive law”, he
has in mind an expression of reason. Law, in its true notion, (cf.
Chapter VI, section 57) is not so much the limitation as the direction of
a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no
farther than is for the general good of those under that law. The end of
law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge, freedom.
Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which
cannot be where there is no law. Freedom is not liberty for every man
to do what he lists, but liberty to dispose and order as he lists his
person, actions, possessions, and whole property, within the allowance
of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the
arbitrary will of another but freely to follow his own. The freedom
then of man and the liberty acting according to his own will is
grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him on that
law by which he is to govern himself and make him know how far he is
left to the freedom of his own will.
xxvii
Such a focus is all the more called if Locke’s theory of value
obtains. For according to it, it is labor, and its improvements, that
makes for the value of the labor-modified product; labor (as contrasted
with nature) makes for by far the greatest part of the value of things we
enjoy. Thus man has in himself, in virtue of his labor, the great foundation of property and of the value of properties. When men settled in
communities and drew territorial boundaries and by compact and
agreement established a civil society, the laws that regulated the
properties of the private men of the society in question had to include
reference to their value.
xxviii
It is worthy of notice that in this declaration, there is no use of the
language of Locke to specify what is central to the functioning of
government, namely, the preservation and enjoyment of “property”,
whether that be understood in the peculiar and inclusive sense in which
Locke occasionally uses it or in the narrower and commoner sense
(when “property” is phrased by Locke as “estate”: cf. Chapter VII,
section 87, where he speaks of the power “to preserve his property, that
is, his life, liberty, and estate”). In its enumeration of the rights which
government is to secure, the Declaration speaks of “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness” as among the “unalienable rights” government is
to secure, thereby amplifying the personal sense of ‘what is proper to a
person’ (the linguistic root of Locke’s inclusive meaning) which
enables Locke to include life and liberty under his inclusive sense of
“property” and not extending it to what is beyond the person but
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appropriated by him via his labor (the possessive sense of “property” as
“private property”).
xxix
Again it is worth noting that there is no direct mention of what
Locke places as the whole of what is to be conserved by governance,
namely, property; indeed, in the original document as a whole there is
no mention of “property” (other than the “property belonging to the
United States”: Article IV) except in Amendment V (“nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation”) and
Amendment XIV (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”). Instead of property,
the language makes central “a more perfect union”, “justice”, “domestic tranquility”, “the common defence”, “the general welfare”, and
“the blessings of liberty”. There is also no use of the phrase in the
Declaration of Independence, of the “rights”of “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness” (as enumerated rights among a larger class that is
not fully enumerated but implied). [Indeed, not until the Bill or Rights
or the first ten amendments is the language of “rights” used in the
constitution; its main body lacks such express language.] The stress is
thus somewhat different: the governance being envisioned is to insure
tranquility within the nation and provide for a common defense to
protect the nation’s people from injury by others, and internally, to
insure a tranquility that is marked by an operation of the governing
powers which establishes justice, provides for the general welfare, and
secures the blessings of liberty; and in all this, the operation of the
governing structure is giving shape to a more perfect union among the
people and in the interplay of the states joining together in this nationstate. The overall sense is of a people who see in the activities of its
individual members, which (if Locke’s thought is relevant here) are
initiatives undertaken within the law (moral and governmentallyenacted) and thus respectful of the rights and welfare of all, the heart of
a living whose issue is a strengthening of a unity of all that is just and
tranquil and is provided with the means for protecting itself against
injurious intrusion from beyond the community. The main blessing of
liberty would seem to be that being achieved-- and being achievable
only-- in the living and acting out of oneself in a way that is guided by
intelligent judgment heedful of the claims of all and that connects one
with others likewise living and acting. It is the enjoyment of living and
acting in such free assocation which government is to foster, but the
actual living and acting is of course that of the individuals who
compose the people and the achievement of such blessing depends on
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how those individuals, supported by government in those ways,
actually enact their freedom.
xxx
Article I, section 2, of the original constitution, speaking of the
apportioning of representatives and direct taxes among the states
according to their numbers, determines that number “by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a
term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
persons”.
xxxi
If the discipline of “economics” is the study of the economy, and
the economy itself is the way human beings operate to provide for the
needs and wants of a life that would participate effectively in answering
to the at-stake of existence, then the physiocratic way of placing life as
integral to what is to be served in economic activity takes us in the right
direction. But it is to foreshorten economic analysis considerably to
treat the economy as focused on wealth, even if wealth is taken to be
constituted by what sustains and provides convenience and comfort to
life. Cf. the later discussion in this chapter for an alternative view.
xxxii
Apparently Smith was considering dedicating this second work to
Quesnay, whom apparently he had met during his time on the continent,
had not the Frenchman died before its publication.
xxxiii
It is not clear whether, in Smith’s use of the terms or in reality he
would seem to be referring us to, the “self” involved in these three
phrases is the same self, or three different (more or less connected)
selves, or three sides of the same self, or ... . It is of considerable
consequence what is the case, but it is not something which he
explores.
xxxiv
Smith’s discussion of education sees it as having come to address
almost all members of the society and as providing what seems an
advantageous way of spending the long interval between infancy and
that period of life at which men begin to apply themselves in good
earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to
employ them during the remainder of their days. Commenting that the
greater part of what is taught in schools and universities does not seem
the most proper preparation for that business, he observes that because
the understandings of most men are formed by their ordinary
employments, and that because for them their employment is confined
to performing a few simple operations, they have no occasion to exert
their understanding or to exercise their invention in finding out
expedients for removing difficulties which they never encounter. They
‘naturally’ lose, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally
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become as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to
become. Indeed, the mental torpor induced by their work not only
makes them incapable of participating in any rational conversation but
also of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, thus of
forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties
of life, let alone concerning the interests of his country. More broadly,
the dexterity he acquires at his trade is gained at the expense of his
intellectual, social, and martial virtues, that is, of the nobler parts of the
human character; and this is the state-- of gross ignorance and
stupidity-- into which the great body of people must necessarily fall in
such an economically-advanced society, unless government takes some
pains to prevent it. But a man without the proper use of the intellectual
faculties of a man is, if possible, more contemptible than even a
coward, and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more
essential part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to
derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people,
it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether
uninstructed. The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage
from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they
are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among
ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An
instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and
orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each
individually, more respectable and more likely to obtain the respect of
their lawful superiors, and they are therefore more disposed to respect
those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable
of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition, and
they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or
unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free
countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the
favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must
surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to
judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.
(V/1.178, 189)
xxxv

That the imperial drive was not simply economic, and not even
primarily so, is indicated by the fact that Russia and Japan joined this
expansionist movement, the former spreading south and east under the
tsar and the later south onto the continent and islands.
xxxvi
The 18th century Germanic states, with all their political
fragmentation and their dynastic rulers conservative in orientation but
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bent on dynastic glory and aggrandizement, provided a matrix-- and
Prussia in particular a setting-- for considerable intellectual and cultural
(both literary and musical) creativity. Philosophically, the most
significant of modern thinkers, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), was at
work in the last half of the century, to say nothing of the ‘philosophical
idealists’ such as Herder (1744-1803) and the literary figures such as
Lessing (1729-1781). And the poet Goethe (1749-1832) and the
playwright and poet Schiller (1759-1805) are to be found in this matrix
as well. If there is anything which such thinkers and authors have in
common, it is a varied expression of a spirituality that expressed a
common humanity and that aspired in various ways to transcend the
differences and divisions of nation, class, and religion. But this focus
on a liberating inwardness was not developed in any significant way in
its implications for the political; only such a figure as Christian Wolff
(1679-1754), a student of Leibniz, spoke to the political in a significant
way, but then, while bespeaking the Enlightenment, his thought
affirmed basically a benevolent absolutism, basically affirming the
present in an enlightened and benevolent guise. Most of the creative
figures, however, were concerned almost wholly with the ethical and
the cultural. Musically, we find J.S. Bach (1685-1750) in the first half
of the century, and Beethoven (1770-1827), with the Austrians Haydn
(1732-1809) and Mozart (1756-1791) in between.
xxxvii
His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) had already
developed his own speculative ideas on evolution, somewhat like those
of Lamarck, seeing species as self-modifying by the way they adapted
to their environment. But his grandson rejected such ideas of his
grandfather and of Lamarck.
xxxviii
The meaning of this term in Hegel’s use of it is somewhat
different from the way in which I use the term. In his meaning, the
dialectical is structured to begin in the laying down of a determinate
thesis that implicitly harbors much that is being excluded; in virtue of
this, there follows a negation of that thesis in an antithesis, which
makes explicit what has not been part of the express thesis, but does so
in a correlative determinate thesis. Due to that, the dialectical leads to a
gathering up of the two theses via the negation of the negation and their
inclusion in a synthesis which maintains but transforms the thesis and
antithesis. This synthesis functions as itself another thesis and
beginning for the continuation of the dialectical movement. Because
this movement is ultimately in a circle that eventually brings the
movement back to its original starting-point, the inclusive movement is
basically a matter of making explicit all that was implicit in the original
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beginning point. This dialectical movement of spirit, Hegel often
speaks of as the work of reason, but “reason” understood in Hegel’s
own distinctive sense: it is not the reason of Descartes or Spinoza or
Kant or Plato or Aristotle or ... .
xxxix
By way of Marx (1818-1883) and his ‘dialectical materialism’, his
attempt to turn Hegel on his head and re-conceive the nature and
dynamic of history.
xl

For an extended treatment of the thought in his works up to and
inclusive of its initial major culmination in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cf.
my study entitled The Well of Eternity.
xli
I would refer the reader to my study of Nietzsche’s thought, entitled
The Well of Eternity. However, it treats only (or almost only: Ecce
Homo is considered) of that phase of his thought up to and including
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, whereas there is much of interest in his later
works, especially in Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of
Morals.
xlii
Aspiration is the element in our human nature which, belonging to
us as developing in our decision-making and initiative capacity and
arising in that transition time in our developing (youth) in which we are
to assume responsibility for ourselves and our own life as our own,
moves us by its register of the creationally-at-stake as it relates to the
human life being assumed, a register with a directional impetus that
opens the way for us into an adult participation in the affairs of
existence. Aspiration thus points our self-responsible effort into (a) an
eventual fulness of our own responsibility (our vocational
responsibility), (b) an eventuality requiring effort and commitment on
our part responsive to the ‘higher and better’, and (c) our participation
out of that eventual fulness in a con-crete connecting with other beings,
human and non-human alike, which measures up to the standards-andmeasures implicit in the at-stake. As regards that connecting, aspiration
points us to participation in connecting (d) with other human beings
taking part in the interactivity out of the comparable fulness of
responsibility in themselves, thereby forming a community of higherand-better human selves, and in connecting (e) with non-human beings
which, in the otherness of their being, are existent in their own right
and active out of their own natures (whatever this may involve) and are
to be welcomed by us in responsiveness to-- and respect for-- that
independent being and otherness. Finally, the creationally at-stake is
(f) a con-cretely (interactively) realized fulness of being-as-uni-versal
in a temporally ongoing connecting of beings, which fulness, according
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to the measures harbored in the at-stake as meant-to-be in the act of
creation, includes (so far as human participants are concerned) this
vocational fulness and this welcoming of others (human and nonhuman) in their otherness as integral to the culmination of the act of
creation; thus aspiration points into a fulness which involves, on the
human side, a responsiveness that registers the nisus and power of
creation, making human participation in the connecting and realization
a religious affair in which self-and-others (all the beings that are
involved) are responded to as creatures in the connecting, all of us other
in our being to each other but united in this connecting. In short:
aspiration points us into the resolution of the problematic of existence
as, for a human being, an affair of an ongoing life and living, to the end
ever con-crete and interactive.
xliii
Cf. discussion in my The Well of Eternity, especially Chapters 13-14
on Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
xliv
Individually, we are always deciding what it is to be a human being
in bearing responsibility for our own lives in the way we do; likewise,
in our collective action we comport ourselves under social meanings
which interpret for us the human thing and, as we act, we are deciding
what it is to be a human being in the way we enact such meanings.
xlv
See 348-349, and Note 23 above, for a slightly more ample
statement.
xlvi

Thus when toward the nearing-the-climax time of the late 19th and 20th
centuries, first Nietzsche then Heidegger sought an encompassing sense
of the movement which each felt arriving at-- or arrived at-- a climax
which exhausted what had gone before and called for some sort of new
beginning, both thinkers spent much thought on recollecting the Greek
beginnings, returning to what in Renaissance times had been
importantly inspirational and seeking a new vision of that beginning.
Unfortunately, while both thinkers made a nod toward non-Western
thought (Indian especially), neither had a feel for the ancient
alternatives to the Greek beginnings, and thus failed to take advantage
of the perspective which a thoughtful experiential apprehension of early
Chinese and Indian times (not just the beginnings of philosophy then,
but myth and indeed culture generally) could help provide. My own
effort along such lines is contained in three works on the beginnings of
philosophy and a fourth on myth and poetry, with particular reference
to the background and matrix for the birth of Greek philosophy. See
my The beginnings of Philosophy in Greece, The Beginnings of
Philosophy in China, The Beginnings of Philosophy in India, and
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Homer and Hesiod, Myth and Poetry. This present work was originally
thought out as an attempt to understand the contemporary world and
think it through with the help of the thinking found in those three
beginnings.

Chapter 6: ‘Tomorrow’

Chapter 6
‘Tomorrow’
--------------------A Transition
---------------------

In 2005 at age 73, author Richard Gotshalk developed early symptoms
of the fatal Lou Gehrig’s disease (ALS). ALS sapped his physical and
intellectual strength over the next four years. As stated in his Preface
and Dedication, he became unable to complete this, his final book.
In Chapter 6, Dick intended to lay out his own philosophy of life. In
doing so, he would pull together key observations from his personal
experiences, his understanding of the ancient philosophies in India,
China, and Greece and the more recent philosophy of Nietzsche in
Germany, and his perspectives on the modern Western world. His
lifelong path of duel learning, he hoped, would equip him to offer a
world view – or, at least, some useful thoughts – on how we human
beings might meet the challenges of Tomorrow.
I had the good fortune to spend Dick’s last 17 years with him as his
mate. Shortly after receiving his ALS diagnosis, Dick commented,
“This will be interesting. I’ve never died before.” His spoken words
revealed the practical philosopher at his core.
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With a heightened sense of urgency, Dick worked feverishly on this
manuscript. He saw it as the culmination of his life’s work: the study,
teachings, writings, reflections, and experiences of a philosopher
acutely aware of his existence as an ever-growing human being living in
community with others.
During 2008, Dick began to suffer increased physical pain and
profound muscle weakness. He steadily lost the strength and dexterity
to fly fish, play piano, type, write with a pen, sit at his study desk, drive,
walk, even feed and toilet himself. He remained able to speak, however
labored and softly. No matter how grueling the night before, he awoke
each morning with a positive outlook, brightly inquiring, “Well, what’s
on the agenda for today?” As 2008 gave way to 2009, he cheered
President Barack Obama’s inauguration and our first bluebird sighting
in early spring.
In his final weeks of life, Dick pondered aloud the status of his
unfinished manuscript. He lamented his inability to “keep all these big
thoughts in my mind”. He asked that this book at least be shared in raw
form with family members, friends, and colleagues. If there were a way
to finish it, publish it, and have it show up on some university library
shelves, he thought that would be great.
Dick wished to say goodbye to several people whose love, friendship,
and mutual respect he treasured. He was able to speak by phone with
about ten individuals the week before he died. Each conversation was
heartfelt, and the tender exchange of affection went both ways.
Dick was able, with technical assistance, to submit a Letter to the Editor
of The Missoulian newspaper. His letter provoked much discussion
within the newsroom, as well as the Missoula, Montana community
where Dick had lived, taught, engaged actively in community affairs,
and enjoyed the outdoors for many years. Missoulian news reporter
Michael Moore called twice to speak to Dick in follow-up to his letter.
The philosophy professor who remained forever a teacher, eager to talk
about life-and-death matters, was pleased to do so.
One evening when it was just the two of us, Dick verbalized a tribute
and “charge” to the people of Missoula. I wrote down his words.
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Though they were directed to a single community in a single state, I
believe he would understand them as pertinent to many people and their
home places across the globe. On two afternoons, he recounted stories
from his childhood and young adulthood. He reflected on individuals
and experiences that had profoundly influenced him as he matured both
personally and as part of humanity around the world. I tape-recorded
these conversations, both of which reiterated some of the memories
shared in his Introduction to this book.
Dick reached the point where daily living no longer held meaning in the
way he understood Life. He begged me to let him go. He no longer
wanted food or fluid. He was prepared to die. Over the next three
days, his thirst at times became unbearable. Whenever he asked for
water, I offered it to him. Most often he would take a sip, slosh the
water around in his mouth, and spit it out into the cup I held. The
practical philosopher knew what he was doing.
Dick died on April 16, 2009. Michael Moore’s account of his
conversations with Dick and associated reflections by a few of Dick’s
colleagues appeared in the April 20 edition of The Missoulian. It was
Easter Sunday.
What follows is my effort to fulfill Dick’s Chapter 6 intentions to
present his philosophy of life. Dick rarely asked or wanted anyone
(including the editor of his publishing house) to rework his writings.
Respectfully, what follows are his own words. Regular script reflects
Chapter 6 portions that he drafted before ALS stymied his progress;
italicized script reflects words he wrote or spoke during his final weeks
in 2009.1 They seem to flow effortlessly from the core of his being,
wracked though it was by disease and debilitation. I hope readers can
appreciate the timeless relevance of his final words and thoughts. They
seem to me to strip away all the grandiosity of language, elevate our
short-term view of personal and global stress and distress, and compel
our mind, heart, and soul to focus on the crux of what it means to
live...and to die.
May we too experience the “magic and wonder of Life” that Richard
1 His Letter to the Editor, his dictated tribute to Missoulians, and his
thoughts shared with Michael Moore by telephone.
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Gotshalk recognized from an early age. May we each find our way
towards meeting the challenges of Tomorrow that he clearly articulates
for us here, as Death knocks on his door.
Doris Fischer
Sheridan, Montana
January, 2022
--------------------I am dying, wasting away rapidly, and will not know any ‘tomorrow’
first-hand, or even the ways in which we, in our ‘today’, will try to
bring about this ‘tomorrow’ rather than that one. But I do know that in
our current ‘today’, we exist and have the nature and resources as active
human beings which are granted us out of the very creational nature of
being as we have sketched it out in Part I of this book and here and
there in Chapter 5…
Genuine progress in the realization of the humanity in ourselves and the
world we create, is possible...We need as enabling powers two things in
particular. One is an unconditioned acknowledgement of all of us as
human and interconnected essentially in that humanity-- essentially, but
not yet concretely. The other is such involvement in the work (discussions and deeds) in question as acknowledges our imperfections but
strengthens the maturing of ourselves humanly as individual active
beings and brings us closer to the meant-to-be capacity for adequate responsibility whereby we are enacting our own living and acting in the
manner of a vocational affair. Ideally, the task at hand calls for fully
grown up human beings, who are few and far between; the most fundamental thing which each of us can contribute to the making of the future
that needs to emerge, then, is ourselves living and acting in such way as
is advancing our own maturation, our own growing up and growing
fuller in our humanity, thus our living and acting in a way that is
augmenting our capacity to contribute to the advancement of the human
not only in this situation but also in others. For in such a way of living
and acting, we are employing our capacities as responsibly as we can, in
a way that enhances our sensitivity, strengthens our judgment, fortifies
our courage, sharpens our insight, and confirms our commitment to the
‘higher and better’. As we grow in these ways, we mature humanly, and
advance toward wisdom such as a human being can share in it.
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Obviously much specialized knowledge and skill will be called for as
well, but it is above all a strengthening and enactment of the naturebased morality of responsibility and its accompanying practical wisdom
that is needed to maintain touch with the underlying fundamentals, to
maintain the standpoint for exploring and understanding our situation
and for self-critically discerning the best possibilities for furthering,
expanding, and purifying the human progress which has so far been
achieved in the ‘modern’ movement, and to persevere in the
commitment to an integration which includes all as living together with
each other in a way that affirms the humanity of all.
--------------------•

Human life summons us to take responsibility for our own
individual life and to make something worthwhile of it. I tried that
by teaching philosophy at the University of Montana and
becoming a citizen activist in neighborhood affairs, air pollution,
land-use planning, open space conservation, and historic
preservation.
Human life is mortal, with many ways it can end. If it is the right
thing to live by taking responsibility for one’s life, the same holds
for dying. Responsible dying does not mean clinging to life
beyond the point when your capacities to give to others have
virtually disappeared – indeed, in my case, at 77 and burdened
with this disease, they have faded to nothing.
ALS is incurable, progressively debilitating, robbing one of energy
and strength, mobility and breath. A vegetative condition is not a
life, certainly not a dignified human life. The most dignified thing
for me now is to act responsibly and, retaining life in my own
hands, to bring what has been a marvelous adventure to a fitting
and dignified end. That is now my intent.

•

I have been talking with the people I love. These are
conversations that couldn’t be written down in an essay. They are,
in a way, spoken love poems between people. These are thoughts
that are meaningful between two people, not something that would
be passed off as a poem, but still, they are lyrical in their own way.
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They are difficult things to say, because you are saying them at
the end, but they are part of the conviction you live with and thus
they are part of the conviction you die with…
My sense is that we are all what we are, in a personal sense, but
we become less than that if we are not interacting with others. It’s
essentially worthless to be a philosopher or a mechanic or
anything else if you are not that thing in concert with others.
Philosophy has no useful purpose if it is not put to work.
There are things that happen that seem to be of minuscule value,
and yet they touch you in ways that nothing else does. And there
are things that happen and happen and happen and happen and
they appear to be important, but in the end they don’t mean that
much. My sense now is of sorting through these things and, as
they regard those in my life, make sure I speak to them. It’s
important for these things to be said.
I had always known for a long time that I wanted to die on my own
terms. Not because my terms are so important, but because dying
is a very personal act and I wanted to act as my own person,
absent all the theatrics that we’ve come to associate with death.
Death is very difficult, with so many aspects that have nothing to
do with really living and dying, and by that I mean laws and
courts. It’s too easy to translate life into statistics. On any day,
we can say what dying is, in numbers and headlines. But this is
not what it is.
In ways, we look for meaning in certain things in life, and not in
others. We want to make something out of life and not something
else, and for that thing to be at the heart of being alive. We want
that meaningfulness to be part of life and when it leaves, well, life
comes and goes. It’s the going now.
We tend to intellectualize too much of what it means to live. We
don’t think simply and we use stilted terminology and we don’t say
what needs to be said. I am grateful that you are listening to me
tonight. It’s not easy to be human, in life or in death. It’s very,
very hard, and yet we can find in ourselves a sense of grace by
trying to live honestly with each other. Life does as it does, and
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you will respond to it the best that you can and part of that is not
falsifying and saying that a thing like death is not what it is.
--------------------[And to the People of Missoula, Montana…]
•

You are now part of a marvelous community, with an
opportunity to make of this place a living testimony to what it is to
take part in a Western community that unites diverse people,
diverse creatures, and diverse ways of thinking, living, and acting.
We have the makings here in Missoula of an unique community –
knowledgeable, compassionate, sustainable, and able to affirm
what is best about the complex way of life and set of
responsibilities which belong to us Westerners.
What we need most is to learn and re-learn profoundly the value of
community, the teachings of the history of our community, the
diversity of life both human and non-human on earth, and the
fragility it has, such that we can destroy it mindlessly with little
effort.
There are many who share or have shared a sense of such things,
many from different walks of life. May all of you live long here
and make the most of the wonders of this place.

•

I urge all Missoulians to give at least some of their time to
maintaining and improving their community.

•

Farewell, friends. Make the most of your life while you have
it, and let your dying honor your living.
******************
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